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This PhD examines the role of the transnational media in articulating and 
mobilizing different political and identity positions for migrants. It explores the 
complex linkages between Kurdish and Turkish transnational ethnic media and 
migrant communities. It is based on 74 in-depth interviews and 6 focus groups 
with Kurdish and Turkish migrants of diverse age, gender, political affiliation, 
occupation and length of migration in London, Berlin and Stockholm. Drawing 
upon the concepts of “imagined community” (Anderson 1991) and “banal 
nationalism” (Billig  1995), it seeks to understand how migrants make sense of 
the media representations of the ethno-national conflict between the Turkish 
state and the Kurds and how they position themselves in relation to these media 
texts. The thesis explores how the media impact differentially on migrants’ views 
and ethnic identities in the three countries. 
 
This study argues that transnational media speak on behalf of the nation to the 
nation, even if the members of these imagined national communities live in 
different places, connecting people across different geographical spaces and 
thus building transnational imagined communities. They create a sense of 
belonging to a meaningful imagined community defined as “our” nation. The 
mediated Turkish-Kurdish ethno-national conflict has contributed to this 
transnational imagined community. The analysis of interviews found that the 
mediated conflict has hardened ethnic-based divisions and differentiation 
between Kurdish and Turkish migrants in Europe. Transnational media have 
contributed to deterritorialization, differentiation and division among migrants. 
Kurds and Turks have developed distinct identities in Europe and cannot be 
viewed any longer as a homogeneous group. The thesis concludes by 
suggesting a three-way framework for the analysis of ethno-national identities of 
migrants, taking into account firstly the country of settlement, secondly Turkish 
and thirdly Kurdish media as significant in constructing imagined national 
communities. 
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Introduction: Transnational Media and Migrants in Europe: The Case 
of the Turkish-Kurdish Ethno-National Conflict 
1. Introduction 
In the 1980s and more rapidly in the 1990s communications technology 
has interconnected different individuals, networks, communities in several 
countries (Vertovec 2001). This has lead to the transnationalization of 
different identities and political positions. Owing to the patterns of migration 
and the rapid development of communications and transport technologies 
in the age of globalization, ethnic, political, cultural, religious identities have 
become more diverse in Europe. In this process transnational communities 
have emerged in many European countries at an unprecedented scale 
(Becker and Behnisch 2001, Hafez 2000, King et al. 2008a, Vertovec 
2007). One of the contradictory consequences of this new development 
has been a revival of national and religious identities of migrants in 
European countries of settlement. Transnational media have played a key 
part in this by enabling a re-connection of diasporic populations with a 
mediated homeland (Aksoy and Robins 2000, Faist 2000c, Georgiou 2005, 
Hesmondhalgh 2001, Karim 1998, Pries 2002, Robins and Aksoy 2001, 
Tsagarousianou 2004, van Bruinessen 2000a). 
 
One example where this has occurred is in relation to Turkish and Kurdish 
communities in Europe. Turkish print media have been distributed in 
Europe since the end of the 1960s. However, the Turkish and Kurdish 
transnationalized media including print, audiovisual and internet have only 
entered strongly and visibly in the political, cultural and social life of 
Europe’s Turkish and Kurdish audiences since the 1990s. They have 
become the key provider of “information” and maker of opinion for 2.5 
million Turkish and 1.5 million Kurdish migrants in Europe. The media have 




The media have also carried news to Europe about the ethno-national 
armed conflict between the Turkish state and the Kurdish Workers Party 
(PKK) that has lasted for 30 years. The role of transnational media 
reporting on the conflict has become more important since Turkey began 
television broadcasts to its “gurbetci” (expatriate) population in the 1990s. 
From 1994, Kurdish television channels have been broadcast from Europe 
and “Southern Kurdistan” (McDowall 2004 135) that is Northern Iraq, 
addressing audiences both in Kurdistan and “Penabera Kurdan” (Kurdish 
refugees and diasporas) in Europe. The audiences of these transnational 
ethnic media follow political developments in the homeland closely, 
especially the tragic ethno-national conflict. The Turkish and Kurdish 
transnational media disseminate the sense of belonging to an imagined 
Turkish or Kurdish community in the diaspora. Kurds are an important, 
ethnically distinct part of Turkey’s population, making up 25% of the 
country’s population. What I will argue in this thesis is that transnational 
Turkish and Kurdish political communication plays an important role in 
linking and mobilizing migrant populations in Europe either in the Turkish 
state’s interests or on behalf of the Kurdish national movement. This has 
led to a strengthening of transnational political, ethnic and religious 
identities in the settlement countries. A media war between nationalist 
Turkish and Kurdish media is taking place in Europe, creating imagined 
transnational ethnic communities. 
 
Transnationalization of the Kurdish and Turkish media is seen as a 
development that poses a challenge to the nation states in Europe. The 
European nation-states aim of cultural and linguistic, as well political, 
“integration” of migrants into the ethnically dominant society. When 
migrants consume media from their home countries, this is often seen in 
contradiction to state policies of integration, so that “The rows of satellite 
dishes in multiethnic neighborhoods have become the ultimate symbol of 
ethnic segregation in the eyes of some local authorities” (Georgiou 2005 
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481). The settlement countries - especially Germany - see the ethnicisation 
of migrant communities through disseminated symbols, language and 
sense of ethnic identity by the Turkish and Kurdish media as a creation of 
a parallel society within their cities. The Social Democrat Party (SPD)’s 
politician, Hans-Ulrich Klose summarizes the debate in Germany as 
follows: 
“In the meantime, we have in Germany, at least in 
the ‘large cities’, so hardened parallel societies that I 
do not believe that there can be still a real integration 
success. This is a very bitter statement because it 
applies according to my appraisal to about 85 
percent of the Turks living here… the linguistic 
proficiency of the youngsters of the third and fourth 
generation is worse more clearly than in the second 
ones; they read predominantly Turkish newspapers, 
watch Turkish television… we must turn this trend 
absolutely, even if there are considerable conflicts" 
(SPD politician, Hans-Ulrich Klose, quoted in Becker 
2000: 10). 
 
It appears that “An ideological consciousness of nationhood can be seen to 
be at work”, (Billig 1995:4) which” embraces a complex set of themes 
about ‘us’, ‘our homeland’, ‘nations’ (‘ours’ and ‘theirs’),’ [our cities, our 
language], the ‘world’, [the conflict] as well as the morality of national duty 
and honour” (Billig 1995:5). While migration is often seen as part of 
globalization, Klose’s invocation of the clear boundaries between “us” and 
the migrants emphasizes that society is still most often imagined as a 
nation, an idea which “is already very much taken for granted” (Gellner 
1983:4). Some social scientists share the concern of the SPD politician 
and problematize the ethnicisation, pluralism and diversity in “their” large 
cities through the ethnic-based media. These media are seen as creating 
“parallel and mutually exclusive media communities” (Robins 1998:11). 
This is seen as cultural, economic and linguistic hindrance of “integration” 
of Kurdish and Turkish migrants in the countries of settlement (Piorr et al. 
1996).  Indeed, the mobilization of Kurdish and Turkish national identities 
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in the European countries of residence challenges these countries’ own 
national imagined communities. The conflicting Turkish and Kurdish 
national identities are seen as a potential challenge to the sovereignty of 
the European countries of residence. In particular the Turkish and Kurdish 
media’s reporting on the Turkish-Kurdish ethno-national struggle has been 
criticized for heightening the conflict between Turkish and Kurdish migrants 
(Heitmeyer 1996, Özdemir 1997).  The debate around the migrant media 
cultures perceives the transnational media as “potential threats …for 
European democracy and values, in popular media and mainstream 
political discourses” (Georgiou, 2005:482). 
2. The Research 
We are witnessing a new process of ethnic identification amongst Turkish 
and Kurdish migrants in Europe. There is a shift from being seen as 
“Turkish migrants” to becoming “Kurdish and Turkish migrants’ and 
establishing diasporic Turkish and Kurdish imagined communities in the 
settlement countries. I call this “the dissolution of the ‘homogeneous’ 
Turkish nation” in the diaspora. The mediation of the Turkish and Kurdish 
ethno-national conflict has played a crucial role in the division, 
differentiation and de-territorialization of political, ethnic and social 
identities amongst migrants from Turkey/Kurdistan region in Turkey that is 
variously called “Northern Kurdistan”, (McDowall, 2004:135,van 
Bruinessen 1998) “Turkish Kurdistan” or “East and Southeast of Turkey’. 
However, this diversity has only become strongly visible in recent years 
because of the spread of information about ethno-national conflict through 
the media. The research will present how the media impact differentially on 
migrants’ views and ethnic identities in the different countries. This thesis 
will show that processes of ethnic identification are strongly related to 
media consumption. 
 
The research is based on 6 focus groups and in-depth interviews with 74 
Kurdish and Turkish migrants of diverse age, gender, occupation, length of 
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migration in the three cities of London, Berlin and Stockholm. The research 
tries to understand how migrants make sense of the media representations 
of the ethno-national conflict in their homeland and how they position 
themselves vis-à-vis the media print and visual texts.  To this end, the 
project applies Anderson's concept of “imagined community”, Billig's of 
“banal nationalism” and Gramsci's of “hegemony” as well as that of 
“transnationalism” to the case of Turkish and Kurdish migrants in Europe. It 
is important to understand the role of transnational media in the lives of 
Turkish and Kurdish migrants in Europe as this forms part of their 
“everyday ethnicity”. In some cases, this “everyday ethnicity”(Brubaker 
2004) leads to conflicts between Turkish and Kurdish migrants in particular 
transnational spaces e.g. Berlin boroughs of Kreuzberg and Wedding and 
London boroughs of Hackney and Haringey, as well as Stockholm borough 
of  Rinkeby-Kista.. There is a need to understand how nation-ness and 
nationalism as “cultural artifacts of a particular kind have come into 
historical being, in what ways their meanings have changed over time, and 
why, today, they command such emotional legitimacy”  (Anderson 1991:3-
4). This should be understood as being within a certain sovereign territory 
and also beyond it, as is the case of Turkish and Kurdish migrants' 
relationship and emotional attachment to their “nation”.  
 
This research highlights the relationship of media texts to migrants’ identity 
formation. In this process, the Turkish media contributes to a polarization 
between Turkish and Kurdish migrants in their views of Turkish policy 
towards the Kurds. The media also unintentionally contributed to creating a 
sense of opposition among Kurds who feel that Turkish media portray them 
mainly negatively or reduce their ethnic identity to “separatism”. This 
alienation from the Turkish media has led many Kurds to embrace 
Kurdishness and Kurdish media. The Kurdish media has politically and 
culturally empowered Kurdish migrants to create a sense of belonging. Yet 
it has also alienated some Kurds with its highly politicized programmes. 
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However the politics of identity takes place in the everyday life of migrants 
on different levels. The complex and dynamic picture that has emerged 
from my interviews shows that both migrant groups make different sense of 
the texts and images of media. There are differences of ethnic 
identification, political and social values both between Kurds and Turks but 
also within these groups. 
3. Research questions 
This research aims to explore the intersection of local, national and 
transnational local relationships and identities through media production 
and consumption and the role of the media in the tension between 
Diasporic and transnational discourses (Cohen 1997, Faist 2000a), 
national (and nationalist) institutions and social movements. It examines 
processes of media reception in three European countries of the Kurdish 
and Turkish diaspora - Sweden, the UK and Germany. 
 
The key research questions are: 
1. What is the impact of transnational Turkish and Kurdish media on 
migrants from Turkey?  
2. What part do the media play in the construction of transnational 
community identities among Kurdish and Turkish migrants in Europe? 
3. What role has the ethno-national conflict played in division, 
differentiation and re-construction of Turkish and Kurdish migrant 
communities?   
4. How do Turkish/Kurdish media produce/reproduce banal nationalism?  
4. the Study of Kurdish and Turkish migrants in Germany, the UK and 
Sweden 
Three different European countries – Germany, the UK and Sweden - have 
been chosen because: 
1. They represent a range of European realities of immigration, as they 
have diverse demographic and institutional factors and politics of 
migration and migrant incorporation. 
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2. The nature of migration from Turkey differs in the three countries. 
Kurdish and Turkish migrants are mainly political refugees in the UK 
and Sweden (mainly Kurdish); however the migration to Germany has 
been characterized more by labour migration and the guest worker 
recruitment (mainly Turkish). 
3. “Turkish and Kurdish homeland politically-oriented organizations” 
(Østergaard-Nielsen 2003:261) including ethnic, religious, economic 
and cultural networks and organizations in the three countries are “in 
co-operation (…) with their counterparts elsewhere in Western Europe 
and in Turkey” (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003:261). 
4. The transnational Turkish and Kurdish media are consumed and partly 
produced in these countries especially in Germany. Daily Turkish and 
Kurdish newspapers are printed in Germany and distributed to other 
European countries. 
 
Therefore, the rationale for choosing these three countries is that they 
show a different relationship of migrants to the media: the UK Kurdish and 
Turkish community consists mainly of refugees. Kurds are in the majority in 
the UK and tend to support the Kurdish national movement. As Kurds are 
in the majority in the UK, there is little direct confrontation between 
nationalist Turks and Kurds.  
 
In Germany, Turks are in the majority and there are some intense, and at 
times violent, confrontations between some Turks and Kurds about the 
Kurdish-Turkish ethno-national conflict. Migrants from Turkey are the 
largest ethnic minority group in Germany, and Germany represents the 
largest European settlement country for migrants from Turkey. Therefore, 
Germany represents a key context for both Kurdish and Turkish 
transnational communities’ media production and consumption.  
 
The power relations between Turks and Kurds differ in the three countries 
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and the degree of political integration into the host countries also differs. In 
the UK, Kurds are well connected with British political parties, whereas in 
Germany Kurds are, by and large, marginalized from lobbying the big 
political parties, while Turkish community groups play an important role in 
lobbying German political parties on behalf of pro-Turkish nationalism.  In 
Sweden, Kurds are politically well connected, but Turks are less visible as 
a lobby group in Swedish politics. The majority of migrants from Turkey are 
Kurdish refugees except for a small group of Turkish refugees and labour 
migrants. Sweden has played a key role in the creation of Kurdish culture 
by supporting the development of Kurdish language and cultural 
production. Therefore, the Kurdish community in Sweden differs from that 
in the UK, as they are well educated, speak and write Kurdish very well 
and for these reasons, until recently Kurds in Sweden were 
overrepresented as professionals in Kurdish media production. However, 
Kurds in Sweden tend to be politically more critical of the hegemonic PKK 
position within the Kurdish national movement. Therefore, the rationale for 
including Sweden in the study was to show a differentiated and critical 
position of Kurdish migrants towards the Kurdish media. These issues are 
discussed in more depth in chapters IV and VII.  
5. The Originality of the Research 
There is some important critical research on different Turkish and Kurdish 
migrants (King et al. 2008a). These studies focus on their transnational 
political and cultural mobilization in Europe (Faist 2000c, Østergaard-
Nielsen 2000, Wahlbeck 1998a, Wahlbeck 1998b), transforming citizenship 
(Erel 2009), Kurdish refugees (Bloch et al. 2009b, Griffiths 2001, Wahlbeck 
1998e), the Kurdish community and employment (Holgate et al. 2009a) 
However these works have not explored the role of media in migrants’ 
identity formation. Some research has examined the media contexts of 
banal nationalism in Turkey (Yumul and Özkirimli 2000). Other research 
has explored the construction of Kurdish identity in the Turkish media  
(Bulut 1992, Sezgin and Wall 2005). Hirschler has examined the 
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construction of Kurdish history in the Kurdish media in Turkey (Hirschler 
2001). However, this research has not looked at the media in a 
transnational migration context. Furthermore, this previous research has 
focused on discourse or content analysis of media texts without engaging 
with how audiences, in particular audiences in Europe, make sense of 
these texts. While there is a body of work that explores the role of the 
Turkish and Kurdish media in the formation of migrants’ identities in 
Europe, this does not look at how migrants make sense of the Turkish-
Kurdish conflict.  
 
Instead, these studies have looked at the role of Turkish media in creating 
“parallel societies” and causing intolerance or violence  among Turkish 
migrants in Germany (Heitmeyer 1998, Oberndörfer 2001). Other work has 
looked at the ethnicisation of Turkish media culture and its relationship to 
globalization (Hafez 2002). There are some studies on the Turkish media 
in Germany, the media consumption habits of Turkish migrants and the 
portrayal of Turkey and Turks in the German mass media (Zentrum für 
Türkeistudien 1995, Zentrum für Türkeistudien 1997).  All of this research 
is from Germany, where the impact of Turkish media on migrants’ 
integration is widely discussed as an issue of public concern. Aksoy and 
Robins (2003) emphasize the theoretical aspect of transnationalism rather 
than the role of media on the integration of migrants into national cultures 
of the countries of residence.  
 
However, the Kurdish-Turkish ethno-national conflict is mostly hidden 
behind Turkish Studies (in Europe). This misses the complex realities of 
Kurdish and Turkish migrants from Turkey. However, I argue here that 
research that includes Kurds in research on “Turks”, the “Turkish 
diaspora”, and the “Turkish-speaking community” etc. is problematic as it 
intentionally, or unintentionally, ignores the political differentiation between 
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Turkish and Kurdish migrants.  Holgate highlights the importance of 
examining the Kurdish migrants and their political, cultural aspects:  
 
We argue that it is therefore necessary for 
contemporary research to understand and explain 
the specific economic, cultural and political nature of 
the Kurdish migrant population in Europe and their 
relationship to the host country’s state and non-state 
institutions. It is also important in order to understand 
the new emergent political and social realities in 
Kurdish societies in Europe that have created new 
collective Kurdish identities and collective action in 
places of recent settlement in European countries. In 
particular, there is a paradigm shift from having an 
imposed identity from Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria, to 
a dreamed, imagined and constructed Kurdish 
identity formed in Kurdistan, which is strongly felt in 
displaced migrant communities  (Holgate et al. 
2008:19). 
 
There is a need for a direct and explicit account of the Kurdish migrant 
population in Europe and their relationship to Turkish migrant communities 
and Europeans. Even the Turkish ultra-nationalists complain of the lack of 
academic research on “separatist broadcasting” as there is currently of 
journalistic writing on Kurdish publishing and broadcasting (Laçiner 2000). I 
address this gap in the research literature with particular focus on Kurdish 
and Turkish transnational media and migrants.  
 
In this context, the thesis is original as it differentiates Kurdish and Turkish 
migrant identities in the three European countries. It contributes to debates 
in three distinct bodies of literature:1) debates on migration and 
transnational media in Europe 2) debates on the Kurdish-Turkish ethno-
national conflict and its media representation 3) audience research among 
Turkish and Kurdish migrants on their identities. Therefore, this thesis 
helps us develop a more complex understanding of the relationship 
between migration, transnational media and ethno-national conflicts. 
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The thesis employs the notions of imagined communities, banal 
nationalism, transnational community and hegemony in its theoretical 
framework. It explores the relationship between imagined communities, 
banal nationalism and the competing and conflicting notions of Kurdish and 
Turkish transnational community. The thesis argues that it is important to 
differentiate between Kurdish and Turkish migrants in Europe. It argues 
that the countries of residence matter in positioning Turkish and Kurdish 
migrants differently and in how they make sense of the transnational media 
reporting of the Turkish-Kurdish conflict. The most important original 
contribution of the thesis is its empirical investigation of the role of the 
media in migrants’ ethno-national identities. We cannot read these 
identities off from media texts as migrants navigate the complex tension 
between an ethnically differentiated migrant identity (Kurdish or Turkish), 
the homeland (which is also ethnically differentiated) and the country of 
residence.  
5. Outline of Chapters 
Chapter I focuses on the theoretical debate around the emergence of 
nationalism (Anderson 1991), banal nationalism (Billig 1995), and the 
concept of hegemony (Gramsci 1971) and the discourse of 
transnationalism. I have chosen these theoretical concepts to understand 
how Kurdish and Turkish transmigrants make sense of the mediated 
ethno-national conflict for hegemonic power.  Anderson’s imagined 
community and Billig’s concept of banal nationalism explain the role of 
media in disseminating the idea of nationhood, its language, and meaning 
and also creating national consciousness within and beyond the nation-
state territory. I am using Gramsci’s concept of hegemony to conceptualize 
the struggle for hegemony between the Turkish state and its ideological 
allies including transnationalized Turkish media and subordinated Kurds 
and their transnationalized media within and beyond the current territory of 
Turkey. These theoretical debates inform the analysis throughout the 
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thesis, though Gramsci’s notion of hegemony is given less weight than 
debates on nationalism and national discourse-oriented media.  
 
Chapter II describes the methods used in this thesis and outlines the 
reasons for choosing them in order to explore the role of the Turkish and 
Kurdish media in national and ethnic identity construction among migrant 
audiences. It illustrates the direction in which I took my research, the 
problems I encountered and the original insights I gained from this work. 
Chapter III focuses on the origin of the Turkish and Kurdish ethno-national 
conflict and the role of the media in the conflict. Chapter IV presents an 
overview of the transnational conflict within Turkish and Kurdish 
communities in Germany, Sweden and the UK and their media 
consumption habits. Chapters V to VII focus on my empirical findings. 
Chapter V looks at the politicization, differentiation, deterritorialization and 
ethnicisation of Turkish and Kurdish migrants through mediatized political 
communication. Chapter VI focuses on an important media event that 
contributed to the polarization of Turkish and Kurdish migrants’ views of 
the conflict. This discusses representations of the capture of the PKK 
leader, Öcalan, in the Kurdish and Turkish media and the impact of these 
representations on Turkish and Kurdish migrants’ relationships in Europe. 
Chapter VII examines the mediated banal nationalism in the Turkish and 
Kurdish media. It looks at Turkish and Kurdish migrants’ interpretation of 
the political and social meanings of banal nationalist news. Chapter VIII is 
the conclusion, summarizing the thesis. It highlights the contribution of my 







Chapter I: “Nationalism has gone mobile” 
Theoretical framework 
1. Introduction 
How can we make sense of the mobilization of Turkish and Kurdish 
migrants around homeland politics? What is the role of Turkish and 
Kurdish media in politically, culturally and ethnically re-constructing the 
migrants’ identities in different nation states? The thesis will explore the 
politicization, differentiation, deterritorialization and ethnicisation of Turkish 
and Kurdish migrant identities in Europe. I begin by discussing theories of 
nationalism, following modernist approaches, in particular I critically use 
Benedict Anderson’s work on “imagined community” (Anderson  1991) and 
Michael Billig’s work on “banal nationalism” (1995). Both theories are 
helpful as they focus on the role of media dissemination for constructing 
and maintaining nationalism. The primary focus of the study is on the way 
these two ideas both complement and counteract each other in the 
construction of the Turkish and Kurdish identities of migrants in Europe.  
   
The reason for applying Anderson’s concept of an imagined community to 
my thesis is that, as many scholars (Georgiou 2005, Karim 1998, Kosnick 
2007, Tsagarousianou 2004)  in the field of transnationalized media and 
migration have highlighted, many nation states try to project imagined 
communities through print language as well as via satellite television. The 
aims of Turkish state TRT also makes clear that they intend to build a 
Turkish imagined community of the homeland in different settlement 
countries (TRT 2006) (see chapter IV).  Secondly, the media play an 
important role in creating a specific culture amongst migrants who 
consume different media from the “native” residents in the settlement 
countries. One of the striking elements of Turkish and Kurdish media 
products is their repeated deployment of national symbols and nationalist 
language which can be usefully theorized by Billig’s notion of “banal 
nationalism”. Through this media culture, migrants create their social, 
 25 
cultural and political attachments. The media play an important role in 
shaping migrants’ ways of thinking. The media deployment of banal 
nationalism also shapes their feelings of belonging to their “homeland”, in 
particular where they are politically, economically and culturally excluded 
by settlement countries.  
 
The third section explains the reasons for drawing on some useful insights 
from Gramsci about the nature of power and hegemony, and how this 
manifests itself through the media and in the relations between these 
communities. The fourth section discusses the relationship between 
nationalism and transnational communication, identities and politics. I 
argue that membership of an imagined community cannot be limited to a 
sovereign nation-state territory. Instead I suggest that communication 
technologies help to disseminate print in national languages and symbols, 
contributing to a new form of deterritorialized nationalism in the age of 
globalization. This is supported by Anderson’s recent acknowledgement 
that “Nationalism has gone mobile” (Anderson 2005). 
2. Theoretical Debates about Nations and Nationalism 
2.1. Primordialist and Modernist Approaches to the Study of 
Nationalism 
The concepts of “nation” and “nationalism” have initiated a series of 
theoretical debates amongst scholars which are summarized in two distinct 
types of nationalism. The first type of nationalism is based on culture and 
tradition. In this view, the nation is an inclusive, taken-for-granted and 
natural community as well as “something sacred, eternal, organic, carrying 
a deeper justification than the works of men” (Kohn 1951:249). This view of 
nationalism was conceptualized by German romantic writers such as 
Herder, Fichte, Schlegel and Schleiermacher and influenced most of the 
primordialists including key writers like Smith (2001) and Hutchinson 
(2006). The second approach to nationalism foregrounds the role of the 
bureaucracy, the intelligentsia and communication technology in 
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constructing the political entity of a nation-state. This approach is taken by 
modernists and is “by and large rational rather than emotional” (Horace 
1978:29). 
2.1.1. Primordialists 
The primordialists’ approach (Hutchinson 2000, Smith 2001) sees nation 
as “a named human population occupying an historic territory and sharing 
common myths and memories, a public culture, and common laws and 
customs for all members” (Smith 2003:37).  Primordialists argue that 
nations emerged from pre-modern ethnic communities which shared a 
collective history, culture, language, religion, territory, myths and 
memories. The nation is primarily characterized as an anthropological 
phenomenon based on shared kinship and tradition (Geertz 1963). 
According to this perspective, nations occur naturally, and nationalism is 
not an ideology, but a “universal, natural” condition (Smith 1994:707) and 
instinctive social disposition of humankind. Thus nations are timeless.  
 
The primordialist approach takes for granted the naturalness of feelings of 
national allegiance and therefore does not explore the role of states, media 
and other institutional actors in actively constructing such feelings of the 
nation (Anderson 1991).  Moreover, the primordialist approach cannot 
explain that two or three different ethnic groups may use the same 
standardized language and share some of the same memories or myths. 
For example Scots, English and Irish use the same language, yet many 
members of these groups view themselves as forming distinct nations. 
Likewise Arab countries share a majority religion and use the same 
language. Nonetheless, they have created 22 states which see themselves 
as individual nation-states. Therefore it is useful to look for factors other 
than shared culture or language to understand nationalism.  
 
The primordialists accept that culture and ethnic identities are changeable. 
But they suggest that these changeable cultural identities are distinctive of 
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the same ethnic group over time. This does not adequately explain why the 
boundaries of ethnic or cultural groups change (Puri 2004) and even 
sometimes overlap (Cohen 1978, Horowitz 1985). For example, after the 
collapse of the Ottoman Empire, many Muslim Balkan populations 
migrated to Turkey without knowledge of the Turkish language or culture 
(Hirschon 2003). They were Muslims from the newly independent Balkan 
countries where they were not tolerated because of their religion. Yet, the 
newly created Turkish Republic treated them as ethnic Turks and 
integrated them. The Turkish state has resettled many of these immigrants 
in Kurdistan, as it was resettling parts of the Kurdish population in other 
parts of the Turkish Republic. By settling “Turkish” immigrants from the 
Balkans in Kurdish regions, the state intended to strengthen the Turkish 
identity of the populations in this region to achieve hegemony over other 
ethnic groups. But in some cases, the contrary happened and some of 
these immigrants were assimilated into the larger Kurdish population, 
eventually identifying as Kurds. Some of them even play an important role 
in developing Kurdish nationalism. These examples show the flexibility of 
boundaries of ethnic groups and the multiplicity of ethnic identity. 
Primordialist approaches which emphasize the stability of an ethnic group 
over long periods of time as the basis for nationalism do not adequately 
address this aspect of Kurdish and Turkish nationalism.  
2.1.2. The Modernists 
Modernist approaches to the study of nationalism are more useful for 
exploring the changing politicization of migrants’ ethnic identities through 
their engagement with media. The modernists consider the nation a 
political and ideological phenomenon, rather than a natural expression of 
human feelings of belonging (Anderson 1991, Billig 1995, Gellner 1983, 
Hobsbawm 1996, Hopkins and Reicher 1996, McCrone 1998). They 
emphasize that feelings of national identity or allegiance are not a given. 
They argue that the organization of political entities according to national 
boundaries cannot be taken for granted. Instead, they show how particular 
 28 
actors, such as bureaucracies (Gellner 1983)   or intellectuals (Hobsbawm 
1992)  made an effort to create a homogenized culture and anchor it in the 
idea of a shared national identity. They argue that industrial society, 
enlightenment and rationalization were important factors that contributed to 
the construction of the nation state. 
 
Within the modernist approach to nationalism different theorists have 
emphasized different aspects as central to how the nation is socially 
constructed. Modernist approaches encompass functionalist views, such 
as Gellner’s (1983)  who consider the emergence of the nation and nation-
state as a fulfillment of the economic and political demands of 
industrialization. Hobsbawm’s (1992) more Marxist approach sees nations 
as “dual phenomena”, constructed from above and from below. Within the 
modernist approach, I have found Anderson’s and Billig’s work, which 
emphasize the role of media in nationalism particularly useful for my thesis.  
 
2.2. Anderson’s framework of “imagined communities” 
Many scholars (Georgiou 2005, Karim 1998, Kosnick 2007, 
Tsagarousianou 2004) in the field of transnationalized media and migration 
have highlighted the role of sending states in attempting to build imagined 
communities through print media and satellite televisions. Migrants’ media 
culture is an important aspect contributing to the politicization of their 
ethnic identities.  
 
Anderson agrees with other modernist theorists like Gellner, that 
nationalism is not a given but socially constructed: “[N]ationalism is not the 
awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations where they 
do not exist but it does need some pre-existing differentiating marks to 
work on” (Gellner 1983:169). However he refines this argument by pointing 
out that this does not mean that the nation is a “fabrication”. Instead he 
suggests that nationalism is a way of “imagining” the nation: “In fact, all 
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communities larger than primordial villages of face-to-face contact (and 
perhaps even these) are imagined” (Anderson 1991:6). Anderson argues 
that the key invention that facilitated large groups of people to imagine 
themselves as a nation was the newspaper.  
 
Anderson was influenced by a Benjaminian perspective which is based on 
the notion of the role of mechanical reproduction and dissemination of 
commodified print language which he terms “print-capitalism”. Print-
capitalism has an impact in creating and shaping the attitudes and 
worldview of people as it made it possible to spread literacy beyond the 
religious elites, and widely accessible in the languages spoken by the 
people, rather than in Latin. Anderson sees this as “revolutionary 
vernacularizing” (Anderson 1991:39) because print languages “created 
unified fields of exchanges and communication”, and “standardized 
national languages” above the spoken vernaculars.  
 
As a result of linguistic standardization, people “became capable of 
comprehending one another via print and paper” and “gradually...hundreds 
of thousands, millions…” started to imagine themselves as part of a 
community (Anderson 1991:44). Secondly, print-capitalism “gave a new 
fixity to language, which, in the long run, helped to build that image of 
antiquity so central to the subjective idea of the nation” (Anderson 
1991:44). Thirdly, “print-capitalism created languages of power of a kind 
different from older administrative vernaculars. Certain dialects [language] 
inevitably were 'closer' to each print language and dominated their final 
forms” (Anderson 1991:44). Such dialect was “correspondingly elevated to 
a new politico-cultural eminence” (Anderson 1991:45) and turned language 
into a tool to dominate and subsume the others which “were unsuccessful 
(or only relatively successful) in insisting on their own print-form” 
(Anderson 1991:45). The nations which were successful in creating their 
own print-languages actively discouraged attempts of failed nations to 
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develop publications in their own languages (Anderson 1991:45). In the 
meantime, other languages spoken in the territories claimed as belonging 
to the nation were targeted and banned from public use. This was intended 
to create unified fields of communication which were crucial to the 
imagining and establishing of nation-states (Anderson 1991:44). When 
discussing the historically later development of radio and television, he 
considers these to be even more influential than print media, owing to their 
easy access and large reach. This makes clear, how central media and 
language are in Anderson’s framework for understanding the nation and 
nationalism.  
 
Beyond this, he outlines four key elements of his view of the nation: 
1. Firstly, nations are imagined: “because members…will never know most 
of their fellow members…yet in the minds of each lives the image of their 
communion” (Anderson 1991:6). 
2. Secondly, the nation is limited “because even the largest of them . . . 
has finite, if elastic, boundaries, beyond which lie other nations”. Therefore, 
in the minds of nationalists, there must be others who do not belong to 
their nation and are, therefore, outsiders. 
3. Thirdly, the nation is sovereign “because the concept was born in an age 
in which Enlightenment and Revolution were destroying the legitimacy of 
the divinely ordained, hierarchical dynastic realm…nations dream of being 
free…The gauge and emblem of this freedom is the sovereign state”. 
4. Finally nation is a community “because…the nation is always conceived 
as a deep, horizontal comradeship…Ultimately it is this fraternity that 
makes it possible, over the past two centuries, for so many millions of 
people, not so much to kill, as willingly to die for such limited imaginings” 
(Anderson 1991: 7). 
 
I have adopted Anderson’s framework for the central role he gives to the 
media in forming nationalism. This guides my analysis of the ways in which 
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Kurdish and Turkish migrants’ ethnic identities have been politicized in the 
diaspora.  
2.2.1. Refining Anderson’s framework 
While Anderson’s framework has been highly influential, it was originally 
published in 1983 and other authors have built on this framework by 
criticizing some of its elements. In the following I review some main points 
of these critiques, as qualifying or further developing the concept of 
imagined communities rather than as invalidating it.  
2.2.1.1 Ethnic Cores  
The primordialist Smith (1983) criticizes Anderson for ignoring that nations 
have a history of “ethnic cores' consisting of a pre-existing kinship. He 
argues that nationalism is a product of a specific history, culture, traditions, 
ethnicity and every nationalist movement has its own specific historical 
circumstances. Therefore a general framework of nationalism can only be 
a “simplistic ascription” (Smith 1983:15).  He argues that the “expressions 
of fervent attachment to the concept of the nation as a territorial-cultural 
and political community” go back as far as the fourteenth and fifteenth 
centuries 'in France, England ... as well as in Poland and Russia” (Smith 
1998:137, also see Pittock 1999). While specific ethnic cores do not 
preclude developing a general framework for understanding nationalism, I 
think it is important to attend to the specific development of nationalism in 
each historical and geographic context. While feelings of allegiance cannot 
fully explain the rise of nationalism, in my analysis I pay attention to the 
emotions and feelings of belonging (See below, chapters III and VIII). 
These emotions are treated as important elements in producing and 
reproducing the nationalism of migrants through their engagement with the 
media, which in turn, produce or stoke such emotions. 
2.2.1.2 Third World Nationalism: Model or Original 
Anderson argues that one important way in which the model of nationalism 
spread was through colonialism. The colonial powers when exporting their 
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languages, education and capitalist system into the colonized world also 
brought nationalist ideas, literacy and modernity. This gave the colonies 
access to “the models of nationalism, nation-ness, and nation-state 
produced elsewhere in the course of the nineteenth century” (Anderson 
1991:107).  Chatterjee criticizes Anderson’s concept as oversimplifying the 
export of Western nationalism to post-colonial societies(1993, Chatterjee 
1999). He argues that Anderson’s framework universalizes the 
development of European experiences and reduces the anti-colonial and 
post-colonial nationalist movements to a copy of the model of European 
nationalism. This ignores the role of nationalism as a tool against the 
colonial powers (cf. also Harootunian 1999, Itzigsohn and vom Hau 2006, 
Sommer 1999) He criticizes Anderson's framework as Eurocentric, 
encompassing all experiences as a “product of the political history of 
Europe”, (Chatterjee 1993:215) while the societies of the colonized world 
are cast as “perpetual consumers of modernity” (Chatterjee 1986: 38) .  
 
While arguing the nation is historical constructed and imagined by the 
intelligentsia and by popular mass nationalist movements as a 
homogenized society and culture in a single political entity, he emphasizes 
the different historical circumstances between colonial powers and the 
colonized world (Chatterjee 1999). Anderson acknowledged these 
criticisms in the 1991 edition of his book, revising as “hasty and superficial” 
his earlier view that “that the immediate genealogy should be traced to the 
imaginings of the colonial state” (Anderson 1991:163). Responding to 
postcolonial critics, he highlights the practice of cosmopolitanism in 
contemporary nationalism, however also states that he does not believe 
“that there is a distinctively Asian form of nationalism… One should also 
add that what people have considered to be East and West has varied 
substantially over time” (Anderson 2001: 31-32). 
 
The postcolonial critique of Anderson’s framework is useful for my context, 
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as Chaterjee’s finding makes me mindful to consider the different 
circumstances of Turkish nationalism, which has been considered by some 
authors (McDowall 2004, Fernandes 2010) as a colonial enterprise, and 
Kurdish nationalism, which has been developed in resistance to national 
oppression.  
 
2.2.1.3. Nationalism and Multilingualism 
Anderson views the creation of a standardized language through print 
media as a key element for development of national consciousness. 
However, in much nationalism, in particular in the postcolonial world, a 
majority of people are multilingual. Segal and Handler (1992) challenge 
Anderson’s assumption that “a common language is a functional 
prerequisite for ‘communities’, whether imagined as sacred or national. 
This is, in effect, to treat (linguistic) homogeneity as a human norm and not 
as a contingent principle of the nationalist world view” Segal (Segal and 
Handler 1992:7, for a similar criticism cf. Hollinger 1999). This criticism 
applies to many national contexts, thus Switzerland has four official 
national languages while India recognizes forty-eight (Chatterjee 1986).  
 
This criticism of Anderson’s framework is particularly apt in the context of 
Kurdish nationalism: Kurds have four different dialects Sorani, Kurmanji, 
Zazaki, Gorani. In addition, these dialects are not fully standardized and 
use different scripts: Latin, Cyrillic and Arabic. Despite this difficulty of 
developing a standardized print language, Kurds who speak different 
dialects and live in different nation states have developed a unified national 
consciousness. This was largely in response to the repression and racism 
that they experienced. In this sense, Chatterjee’s argument that collective 
resistance to dominant powers can fuel nationalism is an important 
qualifier to the central role Anderson’s framework assigns to a common 
standardized print language (1993). 
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However, I do not reject Anderson's concept that the media connected 
people from different geographical spaces through feeling part of a nation 
because of their shared experiences (see chapter VI). However I qualify 
his argument by suggesting these do not need to be told in a single 
standardized print-language. Kurdish newspapers and satellite TV 
channels report similar news on the Kurds in their dialect. This shared 
news content created imagined shared experiences and awareness of 
Kurds in other parts of Kurdistan. The recent rapid development of satellite 
and internet media creating a Kurdish imagined community underlines the 
topical relevance of Anderson's emphasis on the role of media in creating 
nationalism. However, the case of the Kurds puts a question mark over the 
centrality of a single common language, and indeed Anderson 
acknowledges that “In a world in which the national state is the 
overwhelming norm, all of this means that nations can now be imagined 
without linguistic communality”  (Anderson 1991:135). Indeed, in Turkey, 
the state’s policy of prohibiting the use of Kurdish in public (see Chapter III) 
has meant that Kurds are forced to use the Turkish language. Yet, even 
though they may share some mediated experiences with Turks, the Kurds 
have re-interpreted the meaning of belonging to the nation in an 
oppositional Kurdish nationalist way.  
2.2.1.4. Contestations of the imagined community  
One of the key elements of Anderson’s view of the nation is that it 
constitutes a community “conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship” 
(Anderson 1991:7). This perceived fraternity, according to Anderson is why 
people are prepared to die for the sake of the nation. But this comradeship 
is always conceived as problematic by excluded and subordinated social 
groups. Therefore, the nation is in “permanent crisis” (Chernilo 2006:15).  
In order to address this crisis, some nation states impose values, politics 
and cultural references to maintain or create a coherent internally 
homogeneous community. This is then legitimized through media and 
rituals of everyday life (Billig 1995). In particular in “ethno-centric nation-
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building projects, which tend to marginalize or exclude the minorities,” 
(Yiftachel 1999:287) the nation-state uses coercive and consensual ways 
to maintain their imagined community. This process could be seen as a 
hegemonic struggle between dominant and subordinated groups.  
 
These “horizontal ties” (McNeill 2001:342) are actively cultivated by states, 
for example through sports activities (King-White 2008). While this might 
be successful in some cases, Itzigsohn and vom Hau (2006:193) criticize 
Anderson for remaining “rather silent on explaining how national 
discourses are contested and how national inclusion - the question of who 
is a member and who can claim rights - evolves over time”.  Their study on 
Mexico, Peru and Argentina's subordinate people, indigenous ethnic 
groups, and excluded elites shows that official national ideologies “cause 
conflicts between states and movements of subordinate actors and 
alternative elites (…). Internal cleavages differentiate between strong and 
weak citizens; the latter being those groups that are marked as not fully 
belonging to the national community” (Itzigsohn  and vom Hau 2006:194- 
195, also see Lomnitz 2001).  
 
The weak citizens’ linguistic and ethnic differences are seen as potential 
danger to the imagined community. This leads to hegemonic struggles 
over the internal and external boundaries of ethno-national political 
projects, so that subaltern and dominant political projects are in 
“contestation and negotiation” (Itzigsohn and vom Hau 2006:194 – 195, cf. 
Lomnitz 2001). The subordinated or “ [e]xcluded groups, such as ethnic or 
racial minorities or immigrants, often put forward alternative visions of the 
nation that aim to reshape established national imageries and to expand its 
internal boundaries” (Itzigsohn – and  vom Hau 2006:196). Indeed, 
subordinated ethnic groups can mobilize to resist the dominant group’s 
hegemonic construction of the imagined community. While Anderson 
acknowledges “old nations”, once thought of as fully fledged, find 
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themselves challenged by sub-nationalisms within their borders, (Anderson 
1991:6) he merely uses this to emphasise the ubiquity of the nation as a 
form of social organization, rather than seeing it as systemically liable to 
contestation from its internally subordinated “other(s)” . In this thesis I draw 
on critiques of Anderson which explore nationalism in a “dynamic, multi-
ethnic setting” (Elmhirst 1999:814).  
2.2.1.5. Postmodern critics 
Modernists have approached the nation as linear, internally homogeneous, 
stable, bounded and inclusive. However economic and cultural 
globalization has challenged   “the era of the pure national” (Rantanen 
2002:139). The mobility of millions of people, the rapid development of 
communication and transport technologies have impacted on nations and 
nationalism. Some researchers, taking a postmodern approach, question 
the very concept of the nation-state: “the nation-state has always been 
historically opaque, sociologically uncertain and normatively ambivalent” 
(Chernilo 2006:15). They argue that with the process of globalization, and 
the deterritorializing impulse of socio-cultural, economic and human 
mobility, the concept of nation-state has been challenged by an increasing 
cosmopolitanism (Papastergiadis 2000, Rantanen 2002, Woodward 1997).  
Instead of focusing on the construction of nations, post-modernist 
approaches highlight the hybridity of identities and cultures’ interaction, 
(Chambers 2009, Papastergiadis 2000), mobilities of people (Chambers 
2009, Papastergiadis 2000), practices of cross-cultural engagement 
(Lamont 2000), recognizing multiple identities (Held 2002), rhizomes 
(Appadurai 2003). Others, suggest that globalization and nationalism 
should be seen as “co-original and in co-evolution rather than two 
opposing forces” (Chernilo 2006:16).  
Yet, while globalization, and especially migration and transnational 
communication are important phenomena, this has not made nations less 
important. Instead, this thesis is concerned with how nationalism is being 
reconstructed through transnational media in the lives of migrants. Even in 
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today’s globalizing world, nations remain the main democratically 
legitimated source of political authority in everyday life domestically and in 
international relations.  
2.3. Billig’s Framework of Banal Nationalism 
Billig's influential work examines the everyday forms through which 
nationhood is re-produced, disseminated and negotiated in routine written 
and visual texts. He looks in particular at media, national symbols, signs 
and speeches of politicians. The media play a crucial role in designing the 
style in which the nation is imagined. The media are an authorized national 
reminder creating national consciousness and belonging in everyday life. 
They “operate directly, through their messages, stereotypes and deictics” 
(Billig 1995:124). In contrast most studies of nationalism focus on the origin 
and rise of the nation-state and nationalist ideology, (Smith, 2004, Gellner, 
1983, Anderson 1991) but not on how these are reproduced and 
disseminated in everyday life.  
               
While extending Anderson's concept of the imagined community, Billig 
explains how the imagined community and people’s attachment to the 
nation are sustained. Contrary to the view that nationalism takes place 
during periods of “extraordinary emotional mood, striking at extraordinary 
times” or is a phenomenon of “blood and soil”, “dangerously irrational, 
surplus and alien,” (1995:55) he shows how banal and unworthy of 
comment it is:  
“The ideological habits, by which our nations are 
reproduced as nations, are unnamed and therefore 
unnoticed. The national flag hanging outside a public 
building in the United States attracts no special 
attention. It belongs to no special, sociological genus. 
Having no name, it cannot be identified as a problem. 
Nor, by implication, is the daily reproduction of the 
United States a problem” (Billig 1995:6). 
 
 Standard definitions tend to locate nationalism as “something beyond the 
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established nation-state” (Billig 995:43), while the label of “patriotism” is 
attached to the nationalisms of established Western nation-states. In so far 
as nationalism is acknowledged in Western democratic nation-states, it is 
often seen as the province only of the far right. In contrast Billig argues that 
nationalism is an “endemic condition” (Billig 1995:6), “the surface of 
contemporary life”, (Billig 1995:93) and an ideology which has become 
common sense (in Gramsci’s sense see Billig 1991:7). Nationalism, Billig 
argues, is reproduced in different “hot” or “banal” form in different political 
geographies. It is a taken-for-granted part of a collective group and 
personal identity. National identity is a “form of life which is daily lived in a 
world of nation states” (1995:68) that has to be reproduced as well as 
“emotionally driven” (Billig 1995:44). While Billig acknowledges the 
existence of “hot” nationalism that is explicit and erupts in times of crisis, 
he is most concerned with exploring the workings of the “banal” form.  
 
“Banal nationalism”, refers to the repetition and routine diffusion of symbols 
of nationalism through the media, consumer culture and other areas of 
social life. Members of the imagined community are faced with “often 
unnoticed” nationalist symbols and expressions in everyday life, 
disseminated by the media and politicians in established, democratic 
nations (Billig 1995:93). The media and politicians adopt a distancing 
rhetoric in using personal collective pronouns such as “we” vs. “them”, 
“our” vs. “their”. By drawing these boundaries of “us” and “them”, banal 
nationalism discursively produces belonging to the nation and exclusion 
from it. Billig shows that the idea of nationhood is reproduced in everyday 
media discourse through 'unmemorable clichés' that are taken seriously 
'because of, not despite, their rhetorical dullness” (Billig 1995:93). Media 
routinely reproduce and disseminate a distancing rhetoric in the design of 
reporting on “home” and “foreign” news. News items are flagged up in 
terms of their relevance to “us”. In addition, a wide range of media texts 
address a national audience by using this deictic language of “we”, “our”, 
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“us” and “here” to signify the nation (Billig1995:105). It is the very 
unobtrusive and taken-for-granted repetition of these nationalist symbols 
that makes them so effective in producing and reproducing a national 
consciousness “that embraces a complex set of themes about ‘us’, ‘our 
homeland’, ‘nation’ (‘ours and ‘theirs’), the ‘world’, as well as the morality of 
national duty and honour” (1995:4).  
 
The ubiquity of nationalist symbols and language suggests that the nation 
is already established and simply reproduces itself through the repetition of 
national symbols. Instead, banal nationalism should be seen as a way of 
constructing and establishing the nation in an ongoing struggle. The 
process of creating a nation “is a struggle for the monopoly of the means of 
violence.  What is being created – a nation-state - is itself a means of 
violence. The triumph of a particular nationalism is seldom achieved 
without the defeat of an alternative nationalism and other ways of 
imagining peoplehood” (Billig 1995:28). 
2.3.1. Refining Billig’s framework of Banal Nationalism 
While critically applying the concept of banal nationalism to examine the 
media’s role in reproducing Turkish and Kurdish nationalism critically, I 
address some criticisms of Billig’s theory as they have emerged in the 
literature and my own work.  
2.3.1.1. Internal diversity 
Billig does not pay enough attention to the differences within the national 
community. People identify with the nation and its symbols to different 
degrees, reflecting differences in their social position according to class, 
gender, age, education, sexual orientation, ethnicity and faith. Moreover, 
the political views of newspapers and the ways in which they reproduce the 
nation differ from one another. For example, For example, the empirical 
application of his theory to the British media ignores its complexity and 
internal diversity: (Conboy 2006, Gripsrud 2002, Harries and Wahl-
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Jorgensen 2007, Higgins 2004, Law 2001, Rosie et al. 2006, Tunstall 
1996) the distinctive features of Englishness, Scottishness (Schlesinger 
1998) and Welshness (Jones and Desforges 2003), fragmented Northern 
Irishness, working class and middle class cultures (Conboy 2006, Tunstall 
1996, Gripsrud 2002, Harries and  Wahl-Jorgensen 2007) and the way 
different media target particular audiences through specific use of deixis 
and symbols. The issue of internal diversity is not specific to the British 
media, but also applies to Spain (Crameri 2000), Switzerland  (van den 
Bulck and van Poecke 1996), Belgium (Van den Bulck 2001, Dhoest 2004)  
and Canada (Raboy 1986).   
2.3.1.2. Oppositional Readings  
All written and visual texts have many possible meanings (Prosser 1998). 
Symbols and meanings of the nation are not interpreted and experienced 
in the same way by all members of a nation. While, to some people, the 
nation is commonsense, others are critical of it and its symbols on a daily 
basis (Whitehead 2005). Condor’s research on Englishness shows that her 
interview partners use banal nationalist terms such as “this country” in their 
everyday conversation (1996). While this confirms Billig’s theory that “in 
both lay and social scientific discourse – the construct of nation is often 
accepted and reproduced mindlessly and uncritically” (Condor 2000:177) 
the interviewees were reluctant to use patriotic pride explicitly. They were 
critical of some nationalistic terms. This shows that audiences engage in 
complex ways with banal nationalism in media texts. My empirical data 
also shows that there is not one standard response, that Kurdish and 
Turkish audiences have complex and multiple understandings of banal 
nationalist signifiers.   
 
National media do not reproduce banal nationalism evenly among their 
audiences. The media’s distancing rhetoric can create oppositional 
identifications amongst audiences which have been ethnicized or 
racialized.  Ethnic minorities and migrants can have an “oppositional 
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reading” (Hall 1973) of the written and audio-visual texts that is different 
from those of the ethnic majority, in particular if the mainstream media 
targets them (Fenton 2007).  My empirical data from three countries shows 
that many Kurds complain about the discriminatory language used by the 
Turkish media which depicts them in various negative, stereotypical ways. 
This racist portrayal aims to make them feel ashamed of their identity and 
accept the dominant ethnic identity. However my research also shows that 
these negative depictions of Kurds in the Turkish media create an 
oppositional reading amongst Kurdish audiences and contribute to them 
embracing a Kurdish national consciousness.  
2.3.1.3. Transnational media and globalization 
Billig’s theory does not engage with the construction of the nation in the 
diaspora via satellite TV and the internet which has led to the emergence 
of “[d]eterritorialised, virtual nationalism” (Eriksen 2007:15) among 
diasporas (See chapter VII).  
As Erikson argues:  
“It can no longer be taken for granted that the people 
who identify with a given nation inhabit the same 
space, nor can it be assumed that cultural 
homogenization takes place at the level of the nation 
through mass media” (Erikson 2007:1).  
 
As Saunders’ (2008) work on Russian minorities in the newly independent 
countries shows, rather than engaging with Russian media, they engage 
with Western countries’ English language media because they think that 
they can build their future in Europe through their English skills. 
 
Billig pays little attention to the transnational media, simply perceiving 
globalization as “the global transmission of American culture” (1995:149). 
He views transnational flows of information and culture as extending “what 
is essentially an American conception of the world” (Billig 1995). However 
research by Hafiz (2002), Kosnick (2007)  and Madianou (2005) shows 
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that many migrants in Europe turn their satellite dishes towards cultural 
programming outside of America or the West. These media consumption 
practices, albeit highly contested, serve “as markers of difference, 
reminders of the other within the “mythically homogeneous nation-state” 
(Madianou 2005:534).  
 
Drawing on research about media use of Palestinians in Israel, Edensor 
suggests that   
“Globalization and national identity should not be 
conceived of in binary terms but as two inextricably 
linked processes. . . . As global cultural flows become 
more extensive, they facilitate the expansion of 
national identities and also provide cultural resources 
which can be domesticated, enfolded within popular 
and everyday national cultures . . . global processes 
may diminish a sense of national identity or reinforce 
it” (2002:29). 
 
 This means that transnational media add a new dimension to the 
construction of national identities.  
2.3.1.4. The blurred boundary between “hot” and “banal” nationalism 
The development of communication and transport technologies made 
possible the mobility of people and culture and has deterritorialized 
identities, cultures and media consumption. This has led scholars to 
debate the role of modernity in the constitution of nationalism. Some show 
that the nation does not develop in a linear way (Papastergiadis 2000). 
Instead, they propose that the nation-state is in “permanent crisis” 
(Chernilo 2006:15). In response to these crises, states propagate a 
national identity in order to stabilize and naturalize the nation. Different 
agencies and institutions try to create an “essentialist conception of both 
society and social agency” (Laclau 1990:89) by reminding citizens of their 
belonging and responsibilities towards the nation. Billig sees “established, 
democratic nations” (1995:93) as characterized by banal nationalism and a 
relative absence of hot nationalism. However he ignores the nationalist and 
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racist tendencies within “established, democratic nations” which indeed 
can be seen as “hot” nationalism.  
 
Contrary to this net distinction, banal forms of nationalism are an important 
aspect of maintaining national identity in non-Western nation-states such 
as Turkey. Billig rightly states that  
“as a nation-state becomes established in its 
sovereignty, and if it faces little internal challenge, 
then the symbols of nationhood, which might once 
have been consciously displayed, do not disappear 
from sight, but instead become absorbed into the 
environment of the established homeland. There is, 
then, a movement from symbolic mindfulness to 
mindlessness” (1995:41). 
 
This same development holds true for non-established and undemocratic 
states like Turkey or for stateless nations such as Quebec or Catalan 
(Gade 2003), Basque lands (Raento 1997), and Kurdish nationalism (Keles 
et al. 2010). My research shows that Kurds make use of both banal and 
hot forms of nationalism to construct national unity and solidarity. They 
mobilize tens of thousands of protesters for marches and activities through 
nationalist symbols, songs, flags, maps and speeches. 
3. Gramsci’s concept of hegemony 
The Gramscian concept of hegemony has been widely regarded as a 
critical evolution from the “economic determinism” associated with Marxist 
theory. Marxist historical materialism posits a social structure of base and 
superstructure. The notion of base covers forces of production (means of 
production and relations of production). These material relations are seen 
as determining all aspects of life in a society including ways of thinking and 
acting, political and ideological relations. These latter form the 
superstructure. Marx and Engels made clear this: … relations of production 
constitutes the economic structure of society, the real base, on which rise 
legal and political superstructures and to which correspond definite forms 
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of social consciousness” (Marx 1993).  
 
This approach has been criticized as simplistic, as it “tends to see all other 
dimensions of the social formation as simply mirroring ‘the economic’” (Hall 
1986:8). Gramsci’s analysis was prompted by the experience of fascism in 
the 1930s and “the failure of the Western European working-class 
movements” (Gitlin 1979:516)  to resist it. Gramsci focused on the role of 
superstructure and developed a social and cultural approach, in contrast to 
the Marxist understanding of the primary role of economic crises in 
subverting capitalism. As opposed to this, Gramsci explored the role of the 
superstructural institutions (norms, ideas and ideologies) in the fight 
against existing structures alongside the economic relations. While other 
Marxists had considered culture as 'ancillary' to the political struggle, 
Gramsci considered culture as politically significant as economic 
domination in the ruling class’s quest for intellectual and moral leadership. 
 
He drew on Marxist ideas but paid attention to the much neglected role of 
the superstructure as the arena where  
“dominant groups in society, including fundamentally 
but not exclusively the ruling class, maintain their 
dominance by securing the 'spontaneous consent' of 
subordinate groups, including the working class, 
through the negotiated construction of a political and 
ideological consensus which incorporates both 
dominant and dominated groups” (Strinati 1995:165). 
 
While Lenin had previously used the term hegemony to refer to the political 
and ideological leadership of the proletariat in socialist revolution (Joseph 
2000). Gramsci’s concept of hegemony differed from this. He considered 
hegemony the struggle of the dominant group for a position of ideological 
domination which would enable it to succeed in enacting its power over 
subaltern social groups. Gramsci was concerned with power relations 
between social groups, rather than just social classes, in capitalist society 
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(Hall 1986:16). He suggested that a social group “becomes dominant when 
it exercises power, but even if it holds it firmly in its grasp, it must continue 
to “lead” as well” (Gramsci 1971:57–58). 
 
According to Gramsci, dominating a social group requires two types of 
control. The first, coercion manifests itself through direct, physical force 
and a “set of social institutions and practices” (Litowitz 2000:530) that 
authorize and legitimate the dominant social group through the army, 
police and courts. Secondly, consent which embraces a complex set of 
civil society institutions. It relates to the dissemination of the dominant 
group’s belief system and values through education, the media and 
popular culture which produces a structure “in which a certain way of life 
and thought is dominant” (Williams 1960:587). In particular, it “involves 
subduing and co-opting dissenting voices through the subtle dissemination 
of the dominant group’s perspective as universal and natural, to the point 
where the dominant beliefs and practices become an intractable 
component of common sense”  (Litowitz  2000:515).  
 
Gramsci (1971:419) characterized common sense as a  
“conception which, even in the brain of one 
individual, is fragmentary, incoherent and 
inconsequential, in conformity with the social and 
cultural position of those masses whose philosophy it 
is…….not something rigid and immobile, but is 
continually transforming itself, enriching itself with 
scientific ideas and with philosophical opinions which 
have entered ordinary life” (Gramsci 1971:326).  
 
Common sense is a key means to form consent and achieve hegemony. 
Therefore, “Common sense is negotiated by unequal forces in a complex 
process through which the subordination and resistance of the workers are 
created and recreated” (Exoo 1987:6). Hall (1983) suggests that this 
argument can be applied to other social groups of unequal power, not only 
to classes. Thus, the Gramscian notion of common sense is useful in 
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conceptualizing Turkish nationalism: how it is constructed as common 
sense, disseminated by the state, widely reproduced in Turkish civil 
society, and accepted and taken for granted, even by subordinated ethnic 
groups like the Kurds. The media play a key role as the “key terrain where 
‘consent’ is won or lost”, (Hall et al. 1978:220) in rendering Turkish 
nationalism as common sense.  
The common sense of the ruling class is accepted by subordinated groups, 
too, who believe that the values, ideology and the economic and political 
system of the ruling group is also to their benefit. This means that 
hegemony relies on a shared common sense. This leads to a politically 
and culturally unified society which gives consent to be governed.  
The moment of “hegemony” transcends “the corporate limits of purely 
economic class and can and must become the interest of other 
subordinate groups too”. In this moment, hegemony begins to “propagate 
itself throughout society ….. bringing about not only a unison of economic 
and political aims but also intellectual and moral unity” (Gramsci 1971:181-
182).  It is this process of the co-ordination of the interests of a dominant 
group with the general interests of the subordinate groups, that constitutes 
hegemony of a particular historical bloc (Gramsci 1971:181-182). It is only 
in such moments of “national popular” unity that the formation of what 
Gramsci calls a” collective will” becomes possible(Ives 2004).  
3.1. Civil society and state 
Gramsci reinterpreted the Hegelian conception of the “ethical state” from a 
Marxist perspective. He developed the notion of “political society”, which is 
a realm of coercion and the notion of “civil society”, which he saw as the 
sphere where the struggle for hegemony takes place. These two spheres 
are understood as interrelated as the state protects “hegemony (…) by the 
armour of coercion” (Gramsci 1971:263). 
“The apparatus of state coercive power legally 
enforces discipline on those groups who do not 
consent either actively or passively. This apparatus 
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is, however, constituted for the whole of society in 
anticipation of moments of crisis of command and 
direction when spontaneous consent has failed” 
(Gramsci 1988:307). 
 
He formulated the interlocked relationship between state and civil society 
as follows “one might say that State = political society + civil society”  
Gramsci associated  physical force with the public sphere denoted as 
“political society” (Gramsci 1971:160) and hegemony with the “civil 
society”, but he cautions that the separation of public (state) and private 
(civil society) is “purely methodological” rather than “organic” (Gramsci 
1971:159-160) since both spheres “form part of a totality” (Litowitz 
2000:526) and most states combine elements of both (Gramsci 
1977:1590). So the state plays an important role in establishing a historical 
bloc through institutions and alliances of social groups through consent, or 
force to maintain its domination. He made clear that the state cannot 
achieve hegemony only through controlling the economic system but also 
needs to control political and cultural belief systems and reproduce this 
order within all elements of society “through so–called private 
organizations, such as the Church, trade unions, schools” (Gramsci 
1971:137).  
3.2. Gramscian ideas beyond Gramsci 
A few key issues in the reception of Gramsci’s ideas provide a context for 
my thesis. The New Left movement of the 1960s and increasingly the 
1970s employed Gramsci’s work to examine the increase of ideological, 
political and cultural domination of ruling class over all elements of society 
and the role of the state and its institutions in creating consent through civil 
society. British intellectuals of the Left developed Gramsci’s thoughts in 
applying his concepts to analyzing the social formation in British history 
(1980, Anderson 1976, Nairn 2003 [1977]) social movements (Thompson 
1991)  and the role of culture  as a determining force in its own right 
(Williams 1977). In particular, during the Thatcher era, scholars such as 
 48 
Hall applied the concept of hegemony to analyze the success of a new 
radical conservatism. More generally Williams (1977) Hobsbawm (1982), 
Hall (1983), and Thompson (1991) used Gramscian ideas for a productive 
debate about the relations between economic base and cultural 
superstructure and the dichotomy between agency and structure. Hall’s 
work employed Gramsci’s concept of hegemony to analyze the ways in 
which the British media established a common sense about ethnicity and 
race (Hall 1983:1).  He pointed out the significance of articulation, 
negotiation and cultural struggles over meaning for understanding the 
ideological role of the news. This made an important contribution to 
expanding the use of Gramsci’s thought from an engagement with class 
relations to wider relations of domination. 
 
An important point of debate among scholars of Gramsci has been whether 
he overemphasized the superstructure. Indeed he has been considered by 
some as a theoretician of the “superstructure” (Bobbio 1987). However Hall 
(1986) makes a critique of the reduction of Gramsci’s notion of hegemony 
to its ideological dimensions, recalling his insistence that: “though 
hegemony is ethical-political, it must also be economic, must necessarily 
be based on the decisive function exercised by the leading group in the 
decisive nucleus of economic activity” (Gramsci1971:161). 
 
It has often been noted that Gramsci’s work is not always coherent and 
can be read in multiple interpretations. Thus, Hall states that “not only are 
the writings scattered; they are often fragmentary in form rather than 
sustained pieces of writing” (Hall 1986:6). One reason for this is likely to be 
the conditions of censorship under which he wrote in prison. This can 
account for the way the term hegemony in the Prison Notebooks has 
various, and sometimes conflicting meanings. It refers to the relationship 
between state and civil society where exactly hegemony operates 
(Anderson 1976:12–13), it is used as the opposite of domination (Gramsci 
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1971:12), sometimes to explain the creation, reproduction and 
maintenance of moral and intellectual leadership (Hoare and Smith 
1971:xiv), or to refer to the practices of the ruling class with the purpose of 
constructing and establishing a “collective will” and consent (Ives 2004).  
Another issue raised by scholars of the Foucault school is aspects of the 
relationship of the state and civil society which are highly relevant today 
that Gramsci did not address. By privileging civil society as the site where 
hegemony is produced, he does not offer concepts for theorizing either 
“the process of penetration of civil society by agencies of government’ or 
non-governmental form of control” (Alonso 1994:381). 
 
Gramsci’s concept of hegemony allows us to develop a “critical 
engagement” (Zompetti 1997:74) with power relations between differently 
positioned social, cultural and economic groups. This can go beyond an 
analysis of class relations and explore the domination in the context of 
“race”, ethnicity and gender as scholars such as Hall (1986), Laclau and 
Mouffe have shown. Laclau and Mouffe (1985) use the concept of 
hegemony “to explore forms of social and political domination arising from 
culture, gender and other sources that are allegedly non-, or only 
tangentially, economic or class based in origin, if not in effect”(Bellamy 
2001:209). They suggest that the notion of hegemony is useful to explore 
and actively advance struggles for democratic participation and recognition 
of subordinated ethnicized and gendered groups. Their revised concept of 
hegemony is meant as a “useful instrument in the struggle for a radical, 
libertarian and plural democracy” (Laclau and Mouffe 1985:4). Ferguson 
(2006:109) suggests that Gramsci’s concept of hegemony is relevant to 
“forms of resistance—along lines not only of race and class . . . but also of 
gender, sexuality, and so on. Gramsci’s brilliant topographic imagination 
may be a guide to this new political world, but only if we are willing to 
update our maps”. 
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In the field of International Relations there have been controversial debates 
about the extent to which the concept of hegemony can help to understand 
the tensions between structure and agency. Some argue that the concept 
of hegemony draws attention to agency while neglecting structure (Joseph 
2009). Yet, Joseph stresses that hegemony is a more complex concept 
than these debates imply (2009). Hegemony “is more than just material 
capabilities or intersubjective agreement, although these ideas capture a 
part of what hegemony is about“ (Joseph 2008:110). He elaborates the 
concept of hegemony in the context of realist approaches “to stress that 
hegemony (whether in IR theory or more generally) has to be considered in 
relation to underlying social structure” (Joseph 2008:109). In his take, 
hegemony is there “to represent the political (or we might also say 
agential) moment in the reproduction of social structures. It is crucial to the 
political mediation between structure and agency” (Joseph 2008:110). 
 
The neo-Gramscian Robert Cox (1983) takes the concept beyond 
hegemonic struggle within a nation state to a global stage. He  uses the 
concept of hegemony to conceptualize the role of transnational 
organizations in constructing hegemony over less powerful states e.g. IMF 
or WTO in the “world order”.  In International Relations a neo-Gramscian 
approach has employed the notion of hegemony to examine the 
dominance of super powers over other states, using political, economic 
and military power to create consent for this domination (Cox 1981, also 
see Gill 1993, Gilpin 1981, Kindleberger 1981, Modelski 1990, Murphy 
1994, van der Pijl 1984). While my thesis does not focus on these 
international power relations, it is important to note that other research has 
used the concept of hegemony for research in a transnational frame.  
 
3.3. The relevance of Gramscian concepts to the thesis 
Hall (1986:8) argues that Gramsci’s theorizing is relevant for the study of 
race and ethnicity, even though Gramsci did not specifically write about 
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“race, ethnicity or racism in their contemporary meanings or 
manifestations”. However Gramsci’s work offers a non-reductive approach 
to region, religion, culture, class and ethnicity (Hall 1983). According to 
Hall, the notion of hegemony is particularly useful for understanding issues 
of ethnicity, “race” and racism, because of its “multi-dimensional, multi-
arena character” The notion of hegemony encompasses not only the 
“economic and administrative fields alone, but encompasses the critical 
domains of cultural, moral, ethical and intellectual leadership”. The notion 
of hegemony pays attention to the positioning of subordinated social 
groups beyond “limits of purely economic solidarity”. In this sense, Hall 
argues that Gramsci’s concept can be fruitfully employed to examine the 
hegemonic struggle between ethno-national groups.  
 
As Joseph argues imagining a national community has been a way the 
nation-state has achieved hegemony:  
“Since early modernity, hegemony has been 
connected to the national project. And while the 
nation is connected to the state …, it is also 
connected to a wider forging of identity around social, 
political, historical, cultural and economic factors. 
Nationalist ideologies must therefore be seen as 
attempts to mobilize support around a national 
project... By constructing a social project around the 
nation-state, nationalism can act in passing off the 
interests of a certain group as the national interest, in 
constructing belief in a shared community that cuts 
across notions of class and other forms of social 
stratification. The ideology of nationalism therefore 
acts to legitimate the political practice of a leading 
group, and its struggle either to maintain power or to 
achieve it. It may, however, take on contradictory 
forms according to its social base and the dynamics 
of struggle. We have seen recently in former-
Yugoslavia how in some cases nationalist 
movements would seem to create their own basis or 
even their own nation” (2002:136). 
 
However, he also shows that challenges to this nationalist common sense 
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from other groups who create their own nationalist imagination can be 
seen as struggles for hegemony. It is in this sense that I employ the term to 
explore how Kurdish and Turkish transnational media create a nationalist 
common sense and try to mobilize support among migrants in Europe.  
 
A Gramscian conception of the interrelationship between state and civil 
society is very relevant to understanding the situation in Turkey, where 
there is a strong interplay of the media and state coercive bodies – the 
military and judicial system around nationalism (see chapter III).  In Turkey 
large parts of the media and civil society concur with the state’s official 
ideology to legitimize and disseminate a nationalist common sense that 
only accepts Turkishness as a legitimate national identity within the state. 
Alonso argues that “the equation of the dominant ethnic identity with the 
core of the nation, and the location of subordinated ethnic identities at its 
peripheries, is secured partly through differential power over private and 
public spaces” (1994:382) 
 
So according to Gramsci, the dominant group creates an alliance and 
forms compromises with different social groups to establish hegemony. 
The alliance of these social forces can be defined as a “historical bloc” 
(Gramsci 1971:366). A historical bloc reproduces and disseminates a 
national social order. It makes it possible to create and reproduce a 
nationalist common sense and establish moral and intellectual dominance 
over subordinated people by force or consent. Joseph (2002:32) would 
argue that “the state provides the institutional framework for the 
implementation of hegemonic projects” and secures “the unity of the ruling 
bloc”. This conceptualization helps in understanding the Turkish nationalist 
common sense, and the ways in which Kurdish nationalist projects 




However Gramsci also theorized how subordinated groups (workers) can 
develop their resistance or counter hegemony2 in a “war of position” within 
civil society against the existing hegemony (Pratt 2004). This approach is 
relevant to analyzing the challenges of Kurdish nationalism. Counter 
hegemony can be understood as resistance through the juxtaposition of a 
subordinated group’s common sense to that of the dominant historical bloc. 
Gramsci differentiates two types of struggles: war of manoeuvre” (“frontal 
attack” (Gramsci1971:238) or “sudden incursion” (Gramsci1971:234) 
“where everything is condensed into one front and one moment of struggle 
and there is a single, strategic breach in the “enemy’s defences” which, 
once made, enables the new forces “to rush in and obtain a definitive 
(strategic) victory” (Gramsci1971:233, Hall 1983:5). This is related to “more 
of a tactical than a strategic function” (Gramsci1971:235). The second type 
of struggle is “war of position” “which has to be conducted in a protracted 
way, across many different and varying fronts of struggle; where there is 
rarely a single break-through (Hall 1983:5) and “this strategy requires 
steady penetration and subversion of the complex and multiple 
mechanisms of ideological diffusion” (Femia 1981:52). The war of position 
consists of “a concrete programme which engenders widespread consent 
and a system of alliances under its hegemony” (Showstack Sassoon 
1987:214). However this process requires a long time to “to occupy or 
create new spaces for alternative identities, moralities, and ways of life 
within the limits of existing social, economic, and state structures” (Carroll 
and Ratner 1999:4). In the case of Kurdish nationalism, the research 
focuses on the “war of position” rather than the “war of manoeuvre”.    
 
Anderson and Billig's work focuses on the establishment and maintenance 
of nationalism but fails to consider how subordinated nationalist projects 
might challenge the dominant nationalist project. Anderson excludes the 
potential threats of “others” juxtaposing their imagined community or how 
the dominant group oppresses, subjects or excludes social groups to 
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create a unified national print language and reproduce the dominant 
language and culture.  These assimilative and eliminationist policies cause 
an “inevitable site of ideological struggle” (Fiske 1992:291). between 
“ethno-centric nation-building projects” and subordinated or excluded 
minorities (Yiftachel 1999:287 ).  
 
Different  studies on Indonesia (Elmhirst 1999, Fachry 1997, Hefner 1989), 
Latin America (Escolar 2001, Gutierrez 1999, Itzigsohn and vom Hau 
2006, Lomnitz 2001, Mattiace 1997), Kurds (McDowall 2004, Vali 1998, 
Yegen 2007) show that “sub-nationalisms” (Anderson 1991:6) also 
challenge the hegemonic discourse in several ways which lead to 
permanent crises (Chernilo 2006:15) for  the “fully consolidated” imagined 
communities (Anderson 1991:6).   One response that states can take to 
achieve national cohesion is to create a civil nationalism or a federative 
system.  However another possible response to subnationalism by the 
state is the use of coercive control and consent for the hegemonic project 
of an internally homogeneous national community. However such coercive 
policies can contribute to a collective rejection of the dominant national 
project by subordinated groups. This can take place within the state 
territory but also, and perhaps more easily, in the diaspora where 
contested and alternative media discourses can flourish outside the control 
of the dominant nation state. In particular satellite TV has created a civil 
society in the sky, simultaneously contributing to the permanent crises of 
fully consolidated nation states. 
 
In summary, in my research I apply Gramsci’s theory to conceptualize 
(a) the exercise of ideological power through coercion and consent in the 
context of the Turkish state and Turkish media. While the Turkish media is 
diverse, Kurdish issues are represented uniformly so a strong common 
sense prevails across otherwise differentiated media. 
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(b) the relationship between state and civil society including Turkish and 
Kurdish political parties, NGOs, media in Turkey and in Europe. 
(c) the Kurdish challenge to the “supremacy of a social group”, which 
“manifests itself in two ways, as ‘domination’ ” and as “intellectual and 
moral leadership” (Gramsci 1971:57). 
(d) the political and ideological impact of the negotiated power struggle in 
changing both nationalist groups: their concepts, tactics, values, symbols 
and dreams. 
(e) the role of  “intellectual and moral leadership” in the cultural and 
political reproduction of the hegemonic form of “Turkishness” and counter 
hegemonic “Kurdishness” through the politicized process of producing 
meanings by the media in Turkey and Europe. 
4. Diaspora, Transnational Discourse and the role of the Media 
In recent times, many academics (Basch et al. 1994, Baumann 2000, Erel 
2009, Pries 2002, Safran 1991, Soysal 2000, Wahlbeck 1998c) have 
discussed new theories of the formation of migrant political, economic and 
cultural movements, the decline of citizenship and challenges to the nation-
state posed by diasporas and “transnational communities”. The thesis 
explores this theoretical debate and the relationship of transnationalism 
theory to the phenomenon of the media promoting and reproducing a 
particular concept of the “nation” and “nationhood” outside of their national 
borders in the states of settlement among the migrant communities in the 
diaspora.  
4.1. Concepts of the diaspora and transnationalism 
4.1.1.Diaspora 
Diaspora is a Greek word meaning to scatter abroad. It commonly referred 
to the scattering of people away from an established or ancestral 
homeland (Jews, Armenians, Greeks, and Africans) (Cohen 1997, 
Chaliand and Rageau 1995, Green 1998 ). However the concept has been 
revised since the 1980s to define the dynamics of dispersal of a range of 
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ethnic minorities living in countries of settlement and thus has also been 
applied to Kurds (Clifford 1994, Esman 2009, Esman 1986, McDowall 
2004, Safran 1991). The contemporary meaning is applied to research on 
immigrants’ everyday life and their social, ethno-political and cultural 
position in the “host” countries as well as their relationship with their 
homeland (Sheffer 1986b, Bruneau 1995). This has represented a shift 
away from earlier studies on immigrants mainly concerned with integration 
into the host country, echoing the general expectation that immigrant 
groups would “shed their ethnic identity and assimilate to local norms” 
(Shuval 2002:44). 
 
However, there has been much debate about the concept of diaspora. Key 
arguments that scholars have put forward to explain diasporic 
identifications have been the role of collective memory, shared loyalties 
and attachments to particularity (ies) (Safran 1991, Bruneau 1995, Cohen 
1997). Therefore, a key aspect of diasporas has been identified as a strong 
ethnic group consciousness. Yet, scholars differentiate different types of 
diasporas according to the key reasons for forming them. Research has 
distinguished between political, entrepreneurial and religious diasporas 
(Bruneau 1995). Labour migration, the formation of empires (e.g. British), 
trade, and victim diasporas (Chaliand and Rageau 1995, Cohen 1997, 
Cohen 1997, Safran 1991, Van Hear 1998) also characterize the formation 
of diasporic groups.   
 
The classic definition of the diaspora connoted “forced expulsion and 
dispersal, persecution, a sense of loss, and a vision of return,” (Vertovec 
2005:1) in particular the Jews, Armenians, Greeks and also Kurds and 
Palestinians. Certainly these issues might describe to some extent the 
situation of these groups, in particular with respect to displacement, pain 
and trauma. The term diaspora often evokes a sense of loss and related 
struggles for justice and recognition. Therefore the notion of diaspora has 
 57 
“acquired a more sinister and brutal meaning. Diaspora meant a collective 
trauma, banishment into exile, and a heart-aching longing to return home” 
(Cohen 1997: ix). 
 
Yet, in recent debates, diaspora has been used to describe migrants’ 
maintenance of strong links with a real or imagined home country more 
generally. For example Safran (1991) describes the diaspora as “a 
metaphoric designation’. It could be applied to expatriate minority 
communities and “wider categories which reflect processes of politically 
motivated uprooting and moving of populations, voluntary migration, global 
communications and transport… The term… encompasses a motley array 
of groups such as political refugees, alien residents, guest workers, 
immigrants, expellees, ethnic and racial minorities, overseas communities”  
(Shuval 2000). Esman restricts the definition of diaspora to: 
  “a minority ethnic group of migrant origin which 
maintains sentimental or material links [with their 
homeland], either because of social exclusion, 
internal cohesion or other geo-political factors. It is 
never assimilated into the whole society but in time, 
develops a diasporic consciousness which carries 
out a collective sharing of space with others” (Esman 
1986:316).   
 
While the notion of diasporas had previously been applied mainly to 
particular ethnic and national groups, recent scholarship refers to a wider 
range of “self-defined diasporas” (Vertovec 2005:2, Butler 2001:2)  or 
“modern diasporas”, (Sheffer 1986a) “communities that scholars had once 
labeled as immigrants, “(Butler 2001:3) who recreate new ethnic and 
religious spaces in settlement countries while simultaneously  reconnecting 
emotionally, politically and culturally through travel and media to “their” 
real, or imagined, home country. In comparison to previous generations, 
the “proliferation of global communications has also reduced the ‘emotional 
distance’ for potential migrants by enabling them to keep in touch with this 
home country while away” (Stalker 1994:32), making it possible to 
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exchange ideas, political thought, cultural dynamics as well economic links 
(Appadurai 1996). 
 
Some scholars criticize what they perceive as a primordialist or “ethnicist” 
approach in research (Vali 2003)for seeing diaspora migrants as 
oppressed ethnic minorities, passive victims of trauma who have a 
historically fixed ethnic identity. Instead they emphasize the ways in which 
diasporic groups contribute to processes of cultural hybridization (Brah 
1996, Clifford 1994, Gilroy 1993, Hall 1999, Vertovec 2005).  They 
consider the diaspora as an ongoing, dynamic, changeable condition (Hall 
1990) arising “from the experience of being from one place and of another” 
(Anthias 1998:565). For them the key characteristic of diasporas is “the 
idea of particular sentiments towards the homeland, whilst being formed by 
those of the place of settlement. This place is one where one is 
constructed in and through difference, and yet is one that produces 
differential forms of cultural accommodation: in some versions, hybridity” 
(Clifford 1994:16 quoted in Alcid 2007:36). 
 
Furthermore, increasing globalisation encourages stronger links between 
political parties and movements in the states of origin and of settlement, 
where immigrant groups are likely to build a lobby for the economic, 
political interests of their homeland (Rigoni 2002, also see Chapter VIII). 
These diasporas sustain ‘a sense of community, across and beyond 
localities, through various forms of communication and contact” which does 
not ‘necessarily depend on returning to a distant homeland” (Peters 1999).  
 
Some scholars have proposed the notion of “global-deterritorialized 
diasporas” (Cohen 1997)to theorize the contemporary form of diaspora. 
Other scholars have described this new condition as “transnational 
communities” and transnational networks which span borders and have 
multiple relationships with more than two countries, because “The 
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membership in a diaspora now implies potential empowerment based on 
the ability to mobilize international support and influence in both the 
homeland and hostland”  (Butler 2001:3, also see Clifford 1994). Yet, it is 
not easy to neatly distinguish between notions of transnational 
communities and diaspora as some scholars argue that “[d]iasporas are 
the exemplary communities of the transnational moment” (Tölölyan  
1991:5). They view the concept of diaspora as reflecting “a sense of being 
part of an ongoing transnational network that includes dispersed people 
who retain a sense of their uniqueness and an interest in their homeland” 
(Shuval 2000:43, also see Hall 1990 ).   Globalization and transnationalism 
have become important aspects of the concept of diaspora, enriching the 
diaspora discourse (Castles and Miller 1998, Kennedy and Roudometof 
2001, Laguerre 1998, Mahler 2000, Papastergiadis 1998).. According to 
van Hear, the transnational community becomes “a more inclusive notion, 
which embraces diasporas, but also populations that are contiguous rather 
than scattered and may straddle just one border (Van Hear 1998:6). The 
terms diaspora and transnationalism make it possible to examine issues 
related to belonging, identity and communication between mover and 
stayer.  Thus, the notions of transnational communities and diasporas are 
often used interchangeably.  This has both advantages in the sense of 
enabling dialogues between scholars, but can also sometimes lead to a 
loose application of concepts. In this thesis I will generally refer to 
transnational communities and only where the aspect of migrants’ 
relationship with the homeland is in the foreground will I refer to the 
diaspora.  
4.1.2. Transationalism 
The debate on “transnationalism” is interdisciplinary (Clavin 2002, Cohen 
1997, Flandreau 2003, Georgiou 2005, Iriye 2004, Keohane and Nye 1981, 
Milward 2000, Patel 2004, Robins and Aksoy 2001, Smith 2003, Smith 
1997, Vertovec 2001) referring “to various kinds of global or cross-border 
connections” (Vertovec 2001:X). It can be defined as 
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“the processes by which immigrants forge and 
sustain multi-stranded social relations that link 
together their societies of origin and settlement. We 
call these processes transnationalism to emphasize 
that many immigrants today build social fields that 
cross geographic, cultural, and political borders…. An 
essential element is the multiplicity of involvements 
that transmigrants sustain in both home and host 
societies. We are still groping for a language to 
describe these social locations” (Basch et al. 1994:6). 
 
The debate on transnationalism has raised many contradictory claims. In 
some writings, the phenomenon is portrayed as novel and emergent, 
whereas in others, as old as labour immigration itself... For purposes of this 
investigation, it is preferable to delimit the concept of transnationalism to 
activities  that  require  regular  and  sustained  social  contacts across 
national  borders  for  their  implementation (Portes et al. 1999:218). 
 
While some scholars of transnationalism focus on the economic 
(Flandreau 2003, Glover et al. 2000), others have focused on transnational 
political activism (Al-Ali et al. 2001b:616, Al-Ali and Koser 2002b, Richman 
1992)  emphasizing the distinction between refugees and labour migrants. 
They have found different typologies of transnationalism among refugees 
studied (Bosnian refugees in the UK and the Netherlands and Eritrean 
refugees in the UK and Germany), where some refugees repatriated to 
their country of origin play a crucial role in post-conflict reconstruction and 
“consolidate the process to which they have contributed from abroad” (Al-
Ali et al. 2001b:617, also see Koser and Black 1999a). The refugees 
unable to return move “from a situation of temporary exile,…to permanent 
exile, where transnationalism has been extended to active involvement in 
contributing to reconstruction in their home country” (Al-Ali et al 2001:633). 
This does not mean that they focus on their integration in host countries 
and their transition into ethnic minorities (Portes and Rumbaut 1990). 
Rather they maintain their links with the homeland through cultural, social, 
political, economic ties (Al-Ali et al 2001:617) and promote their particular 
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social, cultural and political activities in the settlement countries. Portes 
describes these as networks  
“across political borders, created by immigrants in 
their quest for economic advancement and social 
recognition. Through these networks, an increasing 
number of people are able to live dual lives. 
Participants are often bilingual, move easily between 
different cultures, frequently maintain homes in two 
countries, and pursue economic, political and cultural 
interests that require their presence in both” 
(1997:812). 
 
One of my Kurdish participants’, a second-generation Kurdish refugee in 
the UK, illustrates how far he lives transnationally in Europe: 
“Yes, I use internet to take contact to relatives…They 
live all over. They live in Aegean ?Sea region, 
Mediterranean Sea region of Turkey, Istanbul, in 
Cyprus and in Europe including Hungary, Finland, 
Germany, Sweden, France, Denmark, Belgium, 
Switzerland here, [England] Scotland. I sometimes 
visit them. I feel very lucky because it’s economically 
quite useful [Laughs], so that I have seen many 
European cities….For the Kurdish youth events, 
festivals, concert, demonstrations visiting my 
relatives, travels…. you feel like …one whole 
countries you go and you have relatives living in all 
parts of Europe and they have very good connection 
with native people in these countries. Through my 
young relatives, I became friendship with two 
German, one Swedish who have visited me in 
London. What I told you is not an exceptional case. I 
know many Kurds who visit their relatives in 
European countries and became friendship with 
native Europeans and visited many European 
countries due to attend political events or visit their 
relatives. I think the diaspora Kurds are more 
European than the Europeans themselves because 
there is already a set up bases in getting touch with 
native Europeans through their relatives in European 
countries” (Interview with Rojhan, London, 5 April 
2008). 
 
This sense of belonging and solidarity across borders is not related to the 
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small-scale of propinquity relations, but in a broader sense it is as Faist 
argues: 
“a link through reciprocity and solidarity to achieve a 
high degree of social cohesion, and a common 
repertoire of symbolic and collective 
representations... Transnational communities can 
also consist of larger aggregates, primarily held 
together by symbolic ties of common ethnicity or 
even nationhood. For example, refugees such as 
Kurds from Turkey who have pursued nation building 
or political opposition projects in their home countries 
typically try to develop and entertain dense 
transnational ties” (Faist 2000b:196). 
 
From these transnational communities, a transnational social space and 
networks have emerged, “grounded upon the perception that they share 
some form of common identity, often based upon a place of origin and the 
cultural and linguistic traits associated with it” (Vertovec 2001:574). 
 
In these spaces and networks, a transnational dialogue has developed 
between differently located people who reproduce “social practices, 
symbolic systems and artifacts” (Westwood and Phizacklea 2000, Pries 
2002:3 ). The emerging transnational social space which has resulted from 
these processes has partly overcome the nation-state and extended to 
several other nation-states, societies and continents. The relation of this 
new reality of “transnational social spaces” in different countries 
has expanded blurred the boundaries of nation-states. It has created 
deterritorialized identities that are not contained within the nationally-
orientated majority culture of either the country of settlement or country of 
origin (the Kurdish case is a good example). The effects of the new social 
interaction through transnational networks can be seen in both the country 
of origin and the countries of settlement, as well as between them (Al-Ali 
2001, Erel 2009) However it is debatable whether transnationalism has 
replaced interest in immigration and integration as some theorists argue, 
(Lie 1995  quoted in  Wahlbeck 1998a:2) because the social fields 
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constructed through transnationalism exist on the territory of liberal nation-
states. This late modernity or liquid modernity (Bauman 2000) is influenced 
by national social spaces with their own regulations. Therefore, Al-Ali and 
Koser suggest that debates on transnational communities refer rather to 
the fact that “new labels are being applied to old processes” (Al-Ali and 
Koser 2002:1). 
As Westwood and Phizacklea (2000:2) state, there are “the two processes 
simultaneously at work. On the one hand the continuing importance of the 
nation and the emotional attachments invested in it, and on the other hand, 
those processes such as cross-border migration which are transnational in 
form” (also see Al-Ali 2001).  
 
On the other hand “the rulers of the country of emigration” sometimes see 
the transnational communities and their transnational social spaces as “an 
external homeland” (Faist 2000:192).  In the case of the Turkish and 
Kurdish migrants, the Turkish state sees the Kurdish transnational 
communities as separatist and terrorist groups promoted by Western 
countries.  Some theorists in the field of nationalism have highlighted that 
these transnational communities and their everyday cultural and political 
practices are “an extension of origin of their society” (Pries 2002:2-3)  
Indeed, many Turkish and Kurdish actors in the homeland support the 
transnational communities, trying to strengthen these networks in their 
national interests, for example by helping to set up community centres in 
different countries, inviting MPs of Turkish and Kurdish ethnic background 
in European countries’ parliaments to lobby for their country or protest 
pro/contra Turkey or the Kurdish national struggle.  
 
The Turkish and Kurdish migrants’ political and cultural activities and ties in 
Europe show that the notions of “homeland”, “nation” and solidarity play a 
central role in their everyday practices, political engagement and media 
consumption. These everyday practices of migrants have reproduced a 
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sense of belonging to a particular entity, namely to Turkishness and 
Kurdishness. Van Bruinessen states that for Kurdish migrants and 
refugees “Due to a combination of political factors and technological 
developments, these diasporas have increasingly become (re-)oriented 
towards the part of Kurdistan and the state of origin…..It was exile that 
transformed Kurdistan from a vaguely defined geographical entity into a 
political ideal” (van Bruinessen 2000a:1-2). 
 
Critically engaging with the notion of transnationalism, Van Bruinessen 
points out that it is too general a concept to apply to Kurds as they are 
internally divided by the boundaries of nation-states. So if they connected 
with Kurds in other nation-states (e.g. a Kurd from Turkey with a Kurd from 
Iraq), this would constitute a transborder but not a transnational encounter. 
He argues, however, that Kurds cross-border political and social 
relationships are not confined to contact within Kurdish communities but 
also relate to other ethnic groups in the settlement countries, and different 
agencies, institutions and parties. For example, Kurds in London recently 
established K4 L (Kurds for Labour) or a Kurdish support group for Tamils 
during the heavy war between Tamil Tigers and the Singhalese 
government in 2009. Al-Ali et al (2001) observe a similar tendency 
amongst Bosnian refugees in the UK and the Netherlands and Eritrean 
refugees in the UK and Germany. These “multi-connected, multi-
referential” relationships amongst and between trans-ethnic groups and 
settlement societies should not be oversimplified when using the term 
transnationalism (Soysal 2000  :13) Transnationalism is not only related to 
the social relations that link together transmigrant societies of origin and 
settlement but should be expanded to encompass relationships and 
interactions with networks and organizations as well as interventions 
“across the borders of multiple nation-states”  (Faist 2000:189). 
 
Transnational media play an important role in connecting people from the 
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same ethnic, religious and political background in different geo-political 
spaces. These transnational media disseminate and contest cultural, 
political and nationalistic ideas and images (Aksoy 2001 Georgiou 2005, 
Karim 1998a, Robins 2001, Tsagarousianou 2004). The audiences of 
these transnational media are immigrant populations who “are often 
deliberately targeted by cross-border media as members of de-territorized 
national or religious imagined communities” (Kosnick 2007:2). However 
these transnational media practices of migrants are seen as obstacles to 
the integration policies of the settlement countries. The role of 
transnational media in creating multicultural or integrated societies is 
widely discussed amongst scholars (Becker and Behnisch 2001, Georgiou 
2005b, Hafez 2000, Heitmeyer 1998, Kosnick 2007, Robins 2001, 
Tsagarousianou 2004) and in some countries, such as Germany, the 
impact of Kurdish and Turkish language media on migrants is seen by 
some politicians and sociologists negatively, as impeding integration. 
However, some researchers - like Kosnick (2007) argue that transnational 
media are not a hindrance to integration but important in supporting 
migrants' multiple identities and linking migrants to their homeland. In this 
linking process, transnational media disseminate and reproduce “our” 
nationhood and its symbols, meaning and language to geo-political spaces 
(see Chapters V and VII). 
5. Conclusion 
I have highlighted the theoretical debate between primordialist and 
modernist perspectives. The primordialist approach sees nationalism and 
nationhood as rooted in pre-modern ethnic communities while I apply a 
modernist approach which takes the nation and nationalism as a product of 
modernity: print capitalism, industrial society and democracy. Therefore, 
the modernists consider nationalism not as natural and instinctive but as 
constructed with particular political and ideological means.  I have focused 
on Anderson’s concept of the “imagined community and Billig’s of “banal 
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nationalism” to explain the role of the media as one of the key modern 
means for disseminating a national consciousness. The creation of 
nationalism went hand in hand with the creation of a uniform language, 
symbols and meanings to create a common sense of belonging to an 
imagined national community. 
 
I have applied Gramsci’s concept of hegemony to explain the long-lasting 
ideological struggle for hegemony between the two ethnic groups, namely 
the Turkish and Kurdish, which are unequally endowed with power. This 
hegemonic struggle is not limited to a territorial space because nationalism 
“has gone mobile” (Khazaleh 2005, Culcom conference) Anderson 
considers this deterritorialized nationalism as “long-distance nationalism, 
email/internet nationalism”(Khazaleh 2005, Culcom conference) but I 
prefer refine the term as “imagined and transnationalized communities” 
because the Turkish and Kurdish migrant politics have strong real and 
imaginary connections with the ethno-nationalist conflict in the homeland. 
Kurdish and Turkish so-called “long-distance” nationalists are not isolated 
from the homeland but a part of the conflict in the homeland and play an 
important role in its construction and maintenance. 
 
The transnationalized media play a central role in disseminating 
information about the nation and the ethno-national conflict. At the same 
time, they produce and reproduce the national and nationalist symbols of 
“us” versus “them”. This creates a transnationalized conversation amongst 
people, networks and organizations in different countries, who are not only 
linked with their countries of origin and of settlement but also have 





Chapter II: Research Design and Methodology  
1. Introduction 
In this chapter I describe the methods used for this thesis and outline the 
reasons for choosing them to explore the role of the Turkish and Kurdish 
media in national and ethnic identity construction among migrant 
audiences in particular. In the following, I evaluate the chosen methods 
and report on the experience of fieldwork. 
 
In deciding on the most appropriate research approach for this thesis, it 
was important to consider both qualitative and quantitative research 
methodology. Quantitative research deals with “the what of audience-
media relationships - but is much less suited for telling us about the why or 
how of such relationships” (Rayner et al. 2002:273).  As Rayner et al 
(2002:273) states, “quantitative research is used to measure how many 
people feel, think or act in a particular way”. This is usually based on 
numbers, statistics or tables and attempts to “measure” some kind of 
phenomenon and produce “hard data” (Rayner et al. 2002:273). 
 
In contrast, qualitative research has been described by Benoliel as “modes 
of systematic inquiry concerned with understanding human beings and the 
nature of their transactions with themselves and with their surroundings” 
(Benoliel 1984:3). Hansen argues that it is necessary to turn to more 
qualitative methods:  
“For examining the dynamics of what experiential 
knowledge and frames of interpretation audiences 
bring to bear in their use of media content, what role 
media use has in the everyday life of audiences, or 
how audiences use the media as a resource in their 
everyday lives” (Hansen et al. 1998:257). 
 
As this thesis is concerned with how migrants make sense of Kurdish and 
Turkish language media, two qualitative research methods have been 
used: focus groups with Kurdish and Turkish migrants (ethnically, 
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educationally and politically diverse audiences) who regularly consume 
transnational Turkish and Kurdish TV and newspapers. Complementary in-
depth interviews with some focus group participants and other respondents 
in order to compare the responses of interviewees in and outside the 
group. 
2. Doing qualitative research with migrants  
There are 8 main reasons for choosing this qualitative research approach: 
2.1. The lack of data in doing quantitative research with Kurdish and 
Turkish audiences in Europe 
The first reason for choosing this qualitative research approach is the lack 
of adequate quantitative data. It is recognized that data on migrants in the 
EU do not adequately cover all aspects, “even the most general statistical 
tables used to analyze patterns and trends of migration in Europe present 
an unclear picture of the reality of human mobility across borders” 
(Singleton 1999:151). There is a lack of data in some countries and no 
agreed understanding of certain key terms from country to country. While 
Singleton (1999:157) overcomes this limitation by using existing data “as 
indicators of emerging trends, rather than as accurate quantitative 
measurements of the actual size of flows”, Zulauf (1999) finds qualitative 
research useful for addressing the paucity of quantitative statistical data.  
 
There is also a paucity of statistical data on Kurdish and Turkish migrants 
in the EU. I decided against conducting a quantitative study as it would 
have been difficult to collect quantitative data for research about the 
Kurdish and Turkish migrants in three countries over three years. Problems 
of representative sampling arise when collecting quantitative data on Kurds 
and Turks in the UK and Germany as there is no reliable data on the 
number of Kurds and Turks resident, nor the age, sex, class, education or 
household composition that could be used for my analysis.  Although all 
the major surveys carried out in the UK ask about the ethnicity of 
respondents, they do not have a separate category for Kurds and Turks. 
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Kurds and Turks appear mainly in the “Other” category. 
 
Germany, on the other hand, collects data on the nationality of its 
residents, and it is possible to analyze that data by country of origin, as the 
Turkish nationals constitute the largest number of immigrants in Germany. 
However, questions on nationality ignore the ethnicity of the respondents 
and Kurds are therefore not separately listed. Hence, the number and 
demography of Kurds living in Germany (Ammann 2000) and in the UK can 
only be estimated (Holgate et al. 2009b, King et al. 2008). Sweden collects 
also data on the nationality of its residents, however, Sweden is different 
from both Germany and the UK, because a lot of research about the Kurds 
has been undertaken, and Kurds are represented in Swedish society both 
politically and culturally (Bozarslan 2006).  
 
For these reasons, it became apparent that a qualitative methodology was 
the most appropriate for this research. In order to collect rich, in-depth data 
and understand meaning-making processes in relation to migrants’ use of 
media, qualitative research methods are crucial for a comprehensive 
understanding of the debates in different settlement countries. 
 1.2. Understanding meaning-making processes 
This research also examines how migrants use and consume media in 
their everyday lives. What are the reasons that they consume particular 
media?  How do these media contribute to the migrants’ social and political 
world? What role do the media play in these two migrant groups’ social 
relationships with each other and with the settlement countries’ institutions 
as well as with cultural, social and political issues in the places where they 
live? 
 
This research also examines how transnationalised ethnic media have 
contributed to the processes of identity formation amongst Turkish and 
Kurdish migrants. Do these media products contribute to the construction 
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of “Turkishness” and “Kurdishness” as two opposed nationalisms and 
created Turkish and Kurdish extended imagined communities? 
1.3. Interrelation of personal and political narratives 
In a qualitative interview where both interviewer and interviewee have 
knowledge about the past and present of the research topic, these themes 
can unfold in the interviewees’ personal narratives.  The in-depth interview 
can provide space for many voices and subjectivities and can build trust 
between interviewer and interviewee. It enables interviewers and 
interviewees to interact in order to understand the complex meanings and 
political, social and cultural implications of different personal narratives 
(Waterston 2005a) and how their meanings change in different contexts.  
 
Here it is important to problematize both the personal and wider political 
aspects of narratives, since. “[e]ven the most individualised and 
emotionally charged narratives belong to specific communities with specific 
scripts” (Bamberg and Andrews 2004:2). The research explores how 
personal political narratives of people are transmitted and transformed in 
both Kurdish and Turkish communities and how they illuminate “individual 
and collective action and meanings, as well as the social processes by 
which social life and human relationships are made and changed” (Laslett 
1999:392).  
 
Personal narratives are key to understanding how migrants identify with 
the larger political narratives about the homeland, the diaspora, and the 
Kurdish-Turkish conflict. Personal stories “gather people around them” 
(Plummer 1995:174), connecting people and social movements. The 
personal narrative “promotes empathy across different social locations” 
(Gamson 1999 quoted in  Riessman 2001:4), as well as across 
communities. Different political and ethnic groups articulate distinct 
personal narratives. These distinct narratives also create communities:  
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“For narratives to flourish there must be a community 
to hear…for communities to hear, there must be 
stories which weave together their history, their 
identity, their politics” (Plummer 1995:87).  
 
Turkish and Kurdish migrants have different experiences of ethnic 
discrimination in the homelands and societies of residence. They also 
relate in complex ways to national identities. These personal narratives 
have multiple meanings (Eastmond 2007), which are focused on in 
different chapters. The way in which personal narratives are taken up in 
public representations and collective memory highlights legitimizing 
strategies within the Turkish/Kurdish conflict. 
 
People’s media consumption and their political activities in the settlement 
countries are also shaped by personal narratives.  One strand is 
characterized by the Turkish and Kurdish migrants who came to Europe as 
so-called “guest workers” experiencing racial and economic discrimination. 
They were seen only as “labour” rather than as people with their own 
desires, histories and hopes. We can also look to the political exiles who 
fled from the two military coups (1971 and 1981) and the ethnic conflict, 
because they brought their personal-political narratives with them and this 
contributed to creating different identities and communities in the diaspora.  
 
Some political activists use their personal narratives explicitly for political 
projects, thereby influencing the structure of the ethnic minority community 
(Hantrais 1999). Thus, some speak for a collective identity and community, 
which is why some interviewees begin every sentence not with “I” but with 
“we”. These politicized migrants are what Said terms “exiles”:  
“Most people are principally aware of one culture, one setting, one home; 
exiles are aware of at least two, and this plurality of vision gives rise to an 
awareness of simultaneous dimensions, an awareness that -- to borrow a 
phrase from music -- is contrapuntal” (Said 2001:186). 
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Some migrant audiences live in two different places, firstly where they work 
and settle in Europe and secondly in their homeland...  In this sense they 
live “in-between” (Said, 2001:186) two different places and cultures but do 
not feel part of one. The personal narratives of the interviews help us to 
understand this in-betweenness, both of those who write their personal 
narratives and publish them on the websites, in the newspapers and in 
audio-visual media and of those who watch these media and relate them 
back to their own personal narratives. 
 
Lastly, the personal political narratives contribute to creating ethnic, 
ideological, religious and political identities that are interrelated and 
present in migrants’ everyday life. Through the personal narratives, people 
not only remember political and historical narratives but they also bring the 
past to bear on present agendas (Rylko-Bauer 2005). In other words, the 
past comes alive and is turned into a political agenda in the diaspora, 
where different identities find opportunities to express themselves. The 
migrants’ personal stories and memories about their political, cultural and 
social attachments or about losing loved ones in the conflict play an 
important role in how they use and consume the Turkish and Kurdish 
media.  
 
Personal narratives can offer different perspectives in terms of orality, 
temporality, sociality and mediation for this research. Amongst Kurdish and 
Turkish communities, where oral culture is very strong, personal narratives 
play an important role in transmitting and transforming the political and 
social conflicts and changes over time (Waterston 2005a). Personal 
political narratives create chains of meaning between people who left the 
country in the 70s, 80s and 90s. There are also breaks in the chains, 
where meaning cannot be transmitted: e.g. a Turkish socialist participant 
states that through her exile she lost her friends, her parents and her 
 73 
dreams.  The political narratives produce solidarity among ethnic 
communities. They also produce status for those seen to be activists or 
leaders who influence community. Therefore it is important to look at how 
they structure social realities (Lamnek 1993, Silverman 1993), Silverman, 
and how they organize the community “internally” (Hantrais 1999:96). To 
sum up individuals’ narratives become an important aspect in qualitative 
research to explain the relationship between personal experience and 
cultural, historical and social structures of the society in which they live 
(Waterston 2005b, Eastmond 2007). 
1.4. Addressing Politically Taboo Subjects 
Conducting research on the Turkish and Kurdish ethno-nationalist struggle 
means talking about a highly politicized, polarized and taboo subject. 
Dündar (2008, 2009) suggests that Turkey is a “republic of fear” that 
punishes people who talk about “the integrity of Turkey” or the “Kurdish 
Question”. People who dare to talk about taboo subjects are called 
“separatist” or “traitor of country”. One prominent example is the sociologist 
Ismail Besikci, who carried out research on the Kurds, for which he 
consequently spent 17 years in Turkish prisons (Beşikçi 1974:1). Many 
people from both communities avoid talking directly about the 
Kurdish/Turkish conflict. Even when people do talk about the conflict, they 
may not speak openly.  
 
In Turkey, people often use abstract terms to signal their political views, for 
example Kurdish supporters of the PKK would refer to themselves as 
“yurtsever” while Turkish nationalists call themselves “vatansever”. Both 
words can be translated as “patriot”; however all those who know about the 
Kurdish-Turkish conflict recognize that one term denotes Kurdish and the 
other Turkish political affiliation. This indirect way of expressing allegiances 
is one way to avoid laying oneself open to legal prosecution which is being 
reproduced in the diaspora, too.  
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As Necirwan, a Kurdish participant in Berlin said: “The Kurdish issue is a 
hot potato. Who touches it will be burned. S/he is branded or stigmatized 
as a terrorist”. Similarly, Hale, a Turkish exile in Stockholm explained that, 
in their struggle for a socialist revolution in 1970s Turkey, they did not talk 
about ethnic issues. “We were all Turks and fought for a classless world. 
The ethnic differentiation among the Turkish migrants was created here” 
(Interview with Hale, Sweden, 19.06.2007)3. This change refers to the 
changing “metaphoric designation” (Safran 1991) of migrants’ self-
identifications.  
 
Vertovec (2005) argues that tensions or serious conflicts within the 
diaspora can arise when new waves of migrants meet people of previous 
waves who might have differing political views depending on the time and 
circumstances in which they left the home country. At the same time, 
newer waves may be highly critical of a tendency within the well-
established diaspora communities in the destination country to promote 
“long-distance nationalism” or support the most right-wing and reactionary 
forms of nationalism.  
 
This type of complex and nuanced data on political ideas and 
identifications can only be collected via face-to-face communication if the 
interviewer can build a rapport and reassure participants of confidentiality. 
These sensitive issues cannot be explored in quantitative research, only in 
qualitative research, where trust and anonymity allow taboo subjects to be 
raised.  
1.5. Issue of language 
Language plays an important role in cross-national research with ethnically 
and linguistically diverse populations (Bloch 2007). The reason for this is 
that the “linguistic dimension interacts with cultural, as well as associated 
intellectual and professional specificities to form the problematic of 
comparative analysis” (Mangen 1999:111). It is not only an issue of making 
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the research question understandable in the language used by the specific 
community being researched, but also language is used “to mark 
ethnic/nationalist boundaries” and “to mark gender and other identity 
issues” (Temple 2002:846). For example if we look at the term “region”, we 
might assume that the term has only one meaning.  However, in the course 
of my research, I discovered that the term was used to convey several 
meanings, depending on who was using it. For example, since 1985 the 
term “region” is used to reference the Kurdish area by Turkish newspapers, 
radio and television. Many politicians, even human rights activists and pro-
Kurdish parties, use the term “region” in this way. Indeed, the Turkish 
Prime Minister told journalists in March 2008 during a visit to Sirnak (a city 
in the Kurdish region) that the “people from the region” support his policy 
and his party.  
 
In probing the use of the term with the participants in this research, I found 
that when I asked Turkish participants what they mean by “region” they 
answered that this refers to “East or South-East Anatolia”. But Kurdish 
participants explained that they mean “Northern Kurdistan”. That is, the two 
groups give a different symbolic reference to the term “region”: while for 
the Turkish participants, it is a “region” of Turkey, for the Kurdish 
participants it is a “region” of Kurdistan. In this way the Kurdish participants 
subvert the prohibition of using the term “Kurdistan” which is banned in 
Turkey. 
 
Moreover, paying close attention to differences is crucial when the topic 
guides for focus groups and in-depth interviews are designed and 
translated into other languages, for example, the different levels of literacy 
amongst Kurdish and Turkish communities in the three countries. 
Differentiated research on Turkish and Kurdish communities highlights that 
many women have not had the opportunity to participate in formal 
education in their homeland  (Uguris 2004, Erel 2009) and have insufficient 
 76 
knowledge of the settlement county’s language (Bloch 2007, Uguris 2000, 
Erel 2009). Bloch highlights that it is necessary to translate the topic guides 
into the relevant languages to ensure that all research participants of 
different linguistic ability or people with low levels of literacy can be 
included in research (Bloch 2007).  In this project, some first generation 
male and female participants could not understand the language of their 
country of settlement and some so-called second generation migrants 
could not fully understand formal Kurdish or Turkish. Therefore the topic 
guides were translated from English into Kurdish, Turkish, and German 
and Swedish. Many migrants use a mixture of languages with different 
idioms, expressions, abstractions and proverbs in everyday life, which are 
a part of their culture in their homeland and create linguistic hybridity in 
their communities (Uguris 2000)4.  This means that it is essential to do 
face-to-face qualitative research with migrant groups, so that the 
interviewer can explain some terms if necessary in two or even three 
languages during the in-depth interview as some second generation 
participants might otherwise not understand the questions fully. Qualitative 
research is flexible enough to take account of this (Uguris 2000), whereas 
quantitative instruments such as questionnaires are unable to 
accommodate this linguistic hybridity. 
 
Edward (1998), Temple (2002), Bloch (2007) focus on doing cross-
language research and how to “carry out research with people who either 
do not speak English or do not use it as their preferred language” (Temple 
2002:844). They address how to use interpreters or researchers with 
relevant language skills. They develop innovative, alternative methods to 
deal with this problem. Bloch used “the dual processes of the translation 
decentralizing procedure and back translation “ because “translation 
decentralizing procedure requires a critical examination of the original 
question to check the appropriateness of different concepts across 
languages and cultures because this is more important than the literal 
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wording of questions” (Bloch 2007:239). 
 
As I am fluent in Kurdish, Turkish, German and English I translated my 
topic guides, paying attention not only to literal meanings but the different 
nuances of the languages. As I have basic Swedish language skills, I 
needed help to translate my research questions into Swedish. My topic 
guides were translated by a student of political science in Sweden who 
speaks Swedish, Kurdish, Turkish and English. This translation was 
checked by two people, one who speaks Swedish and Kurdish and one 
who speaks Swedish and Turkish. This “translation decentralizing 
procedure” (Bloch 2007:239) ensures the accuracy of translation. It makes 
sure the questions are meaningful for research participants with different 
backgrounds and that the Swedish language is used in a way to fit the 
idioms, expressions, abstractions and proverbs used by second and third 
generation migrants in Sweden. However the research participants 
preferred to talk to me either in Turkish or in Kurdish and only three 
research participants in Sweden preferred to speak in English. But I printed 
my topic guides in Swedish and provided them to research participants in 
case they had a difficulty to understand my questions in Kurdish or Turkish 
and English.  
 
During the interview I had the opportunity to clarify my questions in 
accordance with the research participants’ education, ethnicity, religion, 
gender etc. However sometimes participants, particularly migrants who left 
Turkey in the 1960s or 1970s, used some metaphors or idioms which are 
not current any more in Turkish or Kurdish, so I asked them for further 
explanation.  
 
The translation of interview material is another challenge in social 
sciences. The “culturally-loaded meanings of interview material” (Manges 
1999:112) could be difficult to translate. Manges (1999:112) states that 
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“There can be no doubt that the use of one language in multilingual 
environments imposes serious limits”. I translated the interview material 
and tried to match appropriate proverbs, abstracts, and idioms.  
1.6. Comparative, cross-national social research 
This thesis compares media consumption of two different migrant groups in 
three different localities (Berlin, London and Stockholm) with different 
political, labour market and migration policies. In the three countries, the 
public perception of migrants also varies. Therefore it is useful to look at 
diversity, the differences, similarities and “variance” (Mills et al. 2006:621)  
between the three countries’ policies in the context of migrant “integration” 
and how they see the migrant media culture. It is also important to consider 
the “diversity of the characteristics” (Bloch 2007:238) of both communities 
within each country and differences between the three different countries 
to “ensure a more representative sample” (Bloch 2007:238). This helps to 
explain why and how migrants follow the transnational media and how they 
make meaning of transnational media in different political, cultural, 
geographical spaces, (Hantrais 1999) as well as the fieldwork experiences 
in my chosen localities.    
 
Cross-national research applies different methods, ranging from case 
studies, surveys, combined qualitative and quantitative methods, 
longitudinal studies, biographies, secondary analysis to interviews with 
focus group. Recently scholars have critically assessed recent 
developments, current debates and key issues in cross national research 
(Mills 2006 et al:620). This is relevant for “drawing lessons about best 
practice or, more straightforwardly, gaining a better understanding of how 
social processes operate” (Hantrais 1999:93). 
 
There is a long-standing debate on cross-national social quantitative 
research’s “competing objectives” and about what constitutes “a 
legitimated set of methods” (Hantrais and Mangen 1999:91).  Some 
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scholars claim that cross- national research is best done by quantitative – 
rather than qualitative - methods (for further discussion see (Mangen 1999, 
Silverman 1993).  Moreover there is no clear consensus among academics 
“as to whether cross-national research has features different from research 
in general” (Zulauf 1999:159). But Zulauf suggests “that cross-national 
projects may require compromises beyond those of single-country studies” 
(Zulauf 1999:159 also see, Hantrais and Mangen 1996). 
  
Cross-national quantitative research has been done in social sciences, in 
particular political sciences and sociology to analyze “the differences 
and/or similarities between nation states” (Quilgars et al. 2009:19). 
Qualitative methods have been more widely used in recent years in cross-
national research. The status of qualitative methods has changed from 
“last resort techniques” to methods used to “formulate new hypotheses, 
drive conceptual development, evaluate hypotheses, test the validity of 
theories” (Mahoney 2007:221). Qualitative research in comparative politics 
“facilitates the study of over-time data and a concern with temporal 
processes” (Mahoney 2007:125-127).  
 
However a number of methodological challenges and questions may arise 
during cross-national research. Drawing on a UK national survey and “a 
multi-sited comparative survey in the UK and South Africa”, Bloch (2007) 
discusses methodological challenges in carrying out research with forced 
migrants in sub-national units (within one country (UK)) from different 
communities and in cross-national contexts. These challenges include 
“sampling, access and representativeness, the appropriateness of different 
modes of data collection between and within countries and communities 
including the use of interviewers, the impact of politics and exile on data 
collection and research instruments, language and literacy, gender and 
immigration status” (Bloch 2007:231-231). 
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As Bloch mentions the issue of sampling has created a wider discussion 
among researchers. It is argued that the issues of the “scale of the 
analysis” (countries) could create “the risk of having too many variables 
and too few cases to effectively test causal models” (Mills at el 2006:622). 
The issue of how to “construct equivalence” (Mills at el 2006:622) across 
groups, nations and cultures has been widely debated. All of these have 
different references and their understanding and interpretation of certain 
definition such as migrants (Singleton 1999) “race”, class, and gender also 
plays a central role in assessing the validity of the research.  
 
Apart from Bloch’s research on migrants, there is some other cross-
national research on  asylum seekers, labour migrants and migrants in 
professional occupations  (Zulauf 1999, Singleton 1999) and the impact of 
migration on the citizenship status and experiences of children (Ackers 
1999).  These highlight the lack of reliable data and of common definitions 
and relevance of policies on international migration in the EU (Singleton 
1999, Zulauf 1999). Another factor to be taken into account is the “culture-
boundedness” (Ackers 1999:172) - different understandings of values and 
different experiences of migration, discrimination and citizenship. In term of 
media and migration, existing research on transnational media and 
migration is mostly within a single national context (Robins and Aksoy 
2001, Georgiou 2005, Hafez 2000, Tsagarousianou 2004, Kosnick 2007). 
There is little cross-national research on the relationship of transnational 
media and migrants. 
 
In order to address the difficulties of varying concepts across countries, I 
particularly chose the focus group and in-depth interview methods to talk in 
detail to research participants. This allowed me to find out similarities and 
differences within the sub-national units and cross-national units because 
the in-depth interviews make it possible to collect rich data (Zulauf 1999) 
and allow for clarification of meanings. However it is time consuming 
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(Zulauf 1999, Mangen 1999). In particular, in-depth interviews sometimes 
need to be conducted in the format of everyday conversation to gain their 
trust of the interviewee.  This is particularly important to create an 
appropriate atmosphere for talking about sensitive issues. 
 
Cross-national qualitative research is “typically small scale” 
(Mangen1999:113). A small sample was chosen from two contested 
migrant groups in conflict. Overall, I conducted interviews with 117 
individuals: 37 in Stockholm, 46 in Berlin and 34 in London. The samples in 
each country needed to “exhibit sufficient similarity to be meaningfully 
compared to one other” (Mahoney 2007:129) within the sub-national units 
and cross-national units to allow “scope for generalizable inference” 
(Mangen1999:113). These individuals participated in focus groups and/or 
individual in-depth interviews (see below). The participants are from 
Kurdish and Turkish background with diverse age, gender, income, political 
affiliation, citizenship, occupation, religious background and length of 
residency. They included first, second, even third generation migrants who 
regularly follow Turkish and Kurdish media to be informed about their 
country of origin but also to be entertained through football, soap operas, 
films and talk show. So the social, cultural, economic and political variables 
were selected so suitable similarities and differences between both groups 
could be drawn. This helped me to apply my theories. 
 
The countries were selected because they represent a range of 
immigration and integration policies in Europe and different positions in 
migrant consumption of transnational media. Furthermore, there is 
variation in the nature of migration from Turkey/Kurdistan, the size and 
length of immigration of both ethnic groups and their social and political 
status in these countries. Another variation is in their political and cultural 
engagement with their homelands and their homeland-oriented 
organizations (Ostergaard-Nielsen 2002, Faist 2000c). 
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The locations have been chosen as large cities where most of both migrant 
groups are located. The migrants practise their transnational media 
consumption in certain spaces where they have access to Turkish and 
Kurdish transnational audiovisual and print media and reproduce their 
ethnic, religious, cultural and political identities. The cities also are spaces 
where migrants may be involved in homeland politics in different ways 
including in demonstrations and lobbying.  
 
The research focuses on how both migrant groups in the three localities 
consume the media and make sense of its messages regarding the ethno-
national conflict in their homeland. Therefore my research has “an 
acceptable level of equivalence of meaning in concept, context and 
function” (Mangen1999:116).  It is suitable for cross-national comparative 
research and provides empirical data to bring to bear on theoretical 
debates on nationalism and transnationalism.  
 
Gaining access to participants 
Access to participants has been widely discussed in social sciences, in 
particular when doing sensitive research which poses potential 
methodological challenges over ethical issues (Benoliel 1984, Bloch 2007, 
Bloch et al. 2009a, Dickson-Swift et al. 2007, Düvell et al. 2010, Higgins et 
al. 2001, Renzetti and Lee 1993) (see doing sensitive research, Chapter 
II). Researchers have highlighted the difficulty of physical access to spaces 
used by the group under study (Gummesson 2000), the difficulty of being 
an outsider/insider (Okumus et al. 2007). Many researchers attempt to gain 
access through gatekeepers, signposting and phone calls (Zulauf 1999).  
 
Through working as social pedagogue in Berlin and project manager and 
adviser for a Kurdish community centre in London, I made contact with 
Turkish and Kurdish migrants as well as their socio-cultural organizations. 
 83 
Therefore I had ready access to research participants within the commonly 
used spaces such as community centres, mosques, the Elewî cultural 
centre and women’s organisations.  But I also had contact with people 
beyond the reach of these collective organisations and spaces, who avoid 
them for reasons of sexism, or their political or religious nature. My 
knowledge of locality and contacts with groups and individuals in London 
and Berlin helped give me access to a range of different individuals without 
having to go through gatekeepers. I went to legal advice, cultural, social, 
political and religious community centres, women’s organizations, student 
societies at universities, youth centres, parent and  pensioner 
organizations, communal spaces used by people from the same city, town 
or village, cafes, restaurants, minicab offices, or off-licences to find 
participants for the research. Access through gatekeepers can be helpful to 
reach invisible groups, undocumented migrants in particular (Bloch at al 
2009) and to get an overview of the situation of the people under study 
(Gummesson 2000). However access through gatekeepers can also be 
problematic because they represent certain political, ideological or religious 
groups who have power to build a community around their agenda, and so 
serve their interests but not those of the research project (Feldman et al. 
2003, Lee 1993).  
 
In contrast, in Sweden I had only briefly stayed in Stockholm in 2000. 
Before beginning the fieldwork, I renewed my contacts there and 
conducted desktop research to identify the neighbourhoods where both 
communities were mostly settled. I also sent out information about my 
research to community centres, the Elewî Cemhouse, student networks, 
mosques and also contacted people through Facebook.  I also obtained 
access through some Turkish and Kurdish gatekeepers including the 
Kurdish Federation and the Turkish Federation. Then I went to Turkish and 
Kurdish areas and distributed my research information sheet in cafes and 
restaurants. However, only two participants contacted me in response. 
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However, on my return visit, when I talked to people directly and invited 
them to participate in my research, the response was better (See Appendix 
F). 
3.  Design of field research  
The fieldwork consists of two sections: Focus group and in-depth interview.  
During my focus group sessions I showed short clips from the Turkish 
commercial television (Star TV) and newspaper (Hürriyet and Milliyet) 
photographs of the Turkish flag, as well as of Abdullah Öcalan, the PKK 
leader when the Turkish army captured him in 1999. I also gave the 
participants two short news items (one is from the Turkish newspaper 
Hürriyet, another from the pro Kurdish Ozgurpolitika), one regarding the 
teaching of Turkish in a German town, the other regarding the use of ethnic 
minority languages in a local authority in Turkish Kurdistan. The focus 
groups were complemented with in-depth interviews with some individual 
focus group participants.  
3.1. Doing sensitive research 
Undertaking sensitive community-based research poses several 
methodological, ethical, and political challenges. It can lead to unpleasant 
experiences or even potential threats. It may be difficult for researchers 
and participants to cope with sensitive research topics in conducting 
fieldwork. Therefore, it is essential to be aware and prepared, as the 
problems for many contingencies (Lee 1993). Any research topic poses 
implicit or direct difficulties of political, cultural, social and economic 
complexity. But the level of sensitivity differs from topic to topic. Lee 
provides a useful working definition of sensitive research as that “which 
potentially poses a substantial threat to those who are or have been 
involved in it” (1993:4). For instance one Kurdish participant in Berlin made 
a statement about just such a threat:   
“There’s a ‘good Kurd - bad Kurd’ issue depending 
on where the Kurd’s from. If you were politically 
active within a Kurdish organization in Europe, which 
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is actually banned because of closer relationship 
between Turkey and some European countries, could 
you get sanctuary and safety in Europe?  The 
Kurdish individual has to be extremely careful what 
s/he says because s/he has been automatically 
criminalized and is associated with, or linguistically 
the attempt to associate Kurds with negative points, 
strengthened by the legal position of their political 
organizations especially in Germany  very heavy-
handed, very authoritarian response to Kurdish 
individuals or community organizations have had a 
serious effect on expressing their opinion” (Interview 
with Dilsad, Berlin, 18 July 2007). 
 
It is possible to do fieldwork in such sensitive situations, as Jenkins et al 
(1984) did in their anthropological study of a Belfast housing estate during 
the conflict. Yet, Knox highlights “the importance of the identity of the 
researcher in the eyes of his/her research subjects and its impact, 
positively or negatively, on access”(2001 :206). Since suspicion of 
outsiders is intense in this type of research, the perceived religion, ethnicity 
or political views of the researcher is likely to be a key factor for 
interviewees. They will look for “clues” to such relevant aspects of the 
researcher’s affiliation. “Coming from the ‘other’ community may condition 
the response of interviewees or put the researcher at some risk given the 
sensitive topic under review and the nature of the questions posed” (Burton 
1978:218). During my research, almost all participants were curious about 
what I was doing and why I was interviewing them. They asked me about 
my views on the Turkish state and the PKK. They want to be sure of my 
views before giving an interview.  
 
Significantly, many of them asked me which city I was from, rather than my 
ethnic background. I told them I was born and raised in Istanbul but my 
family came from Gumushane 40 years ago, a Turkish city in the Black 
Sea region. This explanation was enough for Turkish participants. But I 
had to field some additional questions for Kurdish participants. For 
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instance: “If your family came from Gumushane, how come you speak 
Kurdish? And why do you speak Kurdish so well? Where did you learn to 
write Kurdish?” But during the interviews, when I asked the questions 
about the language issue (e.g. what are the differences between both 
situations? Or “do you think Kurds in Turkey should have the right to use 
their language? And why?”). Many Turkish participants suddenly asked me 
whether I was Laz or Kurdish.  
 
Turkish and Kurdish migrants are suspicious of “outsiders” for political and 
cultural reasons. In particular, Kurds are more sensitive about these issues 
because asking questions and collecting data reminds them of their home 
countries where they were questioned by the authorities. Moreover the 
Turkish State, “still sits over society like an incubus” (Belge quoted in 
Robins and Aksoy 2003:23) in Europe too.  Rigoni (2002:2) argues that the 
state creates “a space of control in the settlement countries of the 
immigrants”. Migrants are intimidated or forced to spy by threats of arrest 
or not to extend their passports in Turkey. Even those who are no longer 
Turkish citizens can be intimidated because they have families in Turkey 
who can be threatened. If they go to Turkey to visit their friends or relatives 
they may be confronted with state violence. There are several 
institutionalized social and political groups which exercise (legal, illegal, 
symbolic) control over the migrants. They can silence an individual’s 
criticism of the Turkish state, the PKK, Islamic or left groups and settlement 
countries.   
 
An example of how far-reaching the fear of openly admitting one’s political 
views can be happened as I began looking for interview partners among 
the Turkish migrants in Stockholm. I interviewed a man whose body 
language and demeanor indicated that he felt very uncomfortable. He 
answered my questions regarding the Turkish and Kurdish conflict with 
very far-right Turkish views. When all of a sudden he asked me where I 
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was from, I told him that my family was from Gumushane, a city in the 
Black Sea region. He asked me “Are you Laz?” (a small ethnic group in the 
Black Sea region). I told him “No I am Kurdish”. Then he started to talk to 
me in Kurdish.  I was a bit upset because I thought I had finished my 
fieldwork with the Kurds and I had wanted to do interviews with Turkish 
migrants. I asked him why he presented himself as Turkish.  He told me 
“you don’t know who is who here. I have to be careful in answering such a 
question”. Then he started telling me that the answers which he had given 
me earlier were not true. He showed me the photograph of the Turkish flag 
on the table saying “this is not my flag. When I see it I remember Turkish 
soldiers and Turkey’s injustice against the Kurds” (Interview with PhD 
student, Karzan, Stockholm, 10th  June 2007). 
 
 
The PKK is not an official power but it has control over Kurdish migrants 
through an active group which physically attacks or politically isolates 
Kurds who criticize the PKK, though this has lessened since 2000, when 
the PKK entered a period of internal crisis. Significantly, during the focus 
group sessions some people were silent about the PKK, but in the in-depth 
interviews criticized it for “occupying Kurdish public sphere with different 
means” (Interview with Alan, Berlin, 28 August 2007).  On the other hand a 
Turkish participant, a shopkeeper, stated that “Milli Gorus uses religion and 
moral pressure to collect “donations”. Although I don’t go to the mosque 
and sell alcohol, they come here every Friday to collect donations from us 
for this and that. If you refuse to give them a donation, they will force 
people not to buy from me” (Interview with Serdar, Berlin, 17 July 2007).   
 
Furthermore interviewing people who are affected by the conflict at home 
or stigmatized in settlement countries has other implications.  Many of 
these people are both politicized and vulnerable.  One participant confided: 
“If I had not gotten involved, I would not be in exile or in this situation” 
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(referring to his health problem – a recent heart transplant). As this 
participant began to feel unwell during the interview I stopped the interview 
and discussed other topics with him which helped him calm down. 
Considering his strong emotional response and his heart condition, I did 
not want to take the risk of continuing the interview.   So interviews may 
arouse difficult feelings in the research participants, yet how these are 
handled also determines whether the relationship between researcher and 
participant is based on the trust necessary for sensitive research. Yet, this 
also raises some ethical problems. Johnson and Clarke Macleod 
(2003:422) state that “the concern here is that however “sensitive” 
researchers might be during the negotiation period, participants might still 
feel obliged to consent to being interviewed” because “there is the 
argument that by ‘being friendly’ in order to obtain data, researchers risk 
being exploitative in the field” (Johnson and Clarke Macleod 2003:422). 
 
However, I would argue that researchers should be friendly in interviews 
with vulnerable people. Otherwise they risk reminding vulnerable Turkish 
and Kurdish people of their terrible past experiences with the police or 
other state authorities (particularly for Kurds or Turkish leftists). In addition 
“being friendly” makes it possible to create a non-hierarchical structure 
between researchers and participants. It was very important for me to 
counter this because the Kemalist elite undermine the “sokaktaki adam- 
common people” by establishing symbolic power over them. Kurdish 
politicians and activists display similarly patronizing behaviour towards the 
Kemalist elites. I gave interviewees space to ask me questions about the 
Turkish and Kurdish communities in different countries and I used this 
reciprocity to collect more in-depth information about their life.  
 
Studying life experiences or “entering the lives” (Dickson-Swift et al. 
2007:336) of marginalized people in settlement countries and people 
displaced from their homeland can emotionally affect the researchers.  As 
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Ely et al.  (1991:49) suggests “if we undertake to study human lives, we 
have to be ready to face human feelings”.  My previous job as a 
documentary film maker and social pedagogue, as well as interpreter 
made it possible to manage “emotional labour” (Hochschild 1983:7), in 
other words ”dealing with other people’s emotions” (James 1989:16 ). 
Some participants had intensely difficult life experiences, especially people 
who had been tortured in their homeland and my previous experiences of 
working with vulnerable people helped to protect me from their sadness 
without “becoming desensitized”  (Dickson-Swift et al. 2007:340).  
 
Sometimes I let the strong emotional responses of participants flow and 
stopped focusing on my interview. I removed the tape recorder and just 
listened to participants, so they were not left alone with their intensely 
emotional life experiences. Sometimes it was not possible to go on. But 
sometimes, these situations turned out to be “opening Pandora’s box”, 
(Ramos 1989:59) or the “tin-opener effect” (Etherington 1996:341) the 
participants calmed down and were able to continue the interviews. 
 
Not only participants confront risk in research on sensitive topics. The 
researchers also face physical and psychological risk. Dickson-Swift et al. 
contribute an excellent body of work to this neglected research area: 
“Traditionally, risk assessments in research have been limited to examining 
the risks to the research participants. Although doing so is appropriate and 
important, there is growing recognition that undertaking research can pose 
risks to researchers as well”(2008:133). It is clear that nowadays risk is 
part of our everyday life (Giddens 1991, Beck 1992, Tulloch and Lupton 
2003). The crucial issue is how we can cope with and minimize it “with 
knowledge”.  The researchers have to know the historical and current 
background to the research topic and which terms or words are used and 
accepted as indicators of the political or ideological viewpoint of each of 
the different groups. Each wrongly used term or word can lead to a 
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judgment being made by the participant against the researchers.  
 
While “outsider” researchers need to familiarize themselves with these 
issues, those researchers deemed to be “insiders” have other problems to 
tackle. Posing critical questions can have negative implications for 
researchers.  It can be interpreted as “undermining our struggle against 
terrorists”. It is very easy to be labeled as either a “separatist” or as 
“undermining Kurdish struggle”. Being aware of the complexity and 
difficulties of my research topic helped me to design my questions carefully 
and I was largely able to avoid causing an unpleasant atmosphere during 
the interviews.  
  
Focus groups and in-depth interviews as the basis for this research 
At first I intended to include participant observation as part of my research 
methodology. But it is difficult to do participant observation in politicized 
communities (where the Kurdish communities are pro PKK and Turkish 
communities are pro Islamic, far right or far left) because of the potential 
suspicion of the researchers as “outsiders” (Knox 2001:218). Feldmann, 
who conducted research on violence in Northern Ireland, states that “in a 
culture of political surveillance, participant observation is at best an 
absurdity and at the least, a form of complicity with those outsiders who 
surveil” (1991:12).  
3.2. Focus Groups 
Focus groups are a standard methodology in the social sciences in order 
to find out how people react to and feel about different issues in an 
interactive group setting.  They are used in media research to find out how 
and why audiences make sense of media content and messages and “how 
audiences use the media as a resource in their everyday lives” (Hansen et 
al. 1998:257). Using focus groups, I aimed to find out how participants’ 
opinions varied across ethnicity, age and gender in the three different 
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settlement countries. 
3.2.1. Focus group questions 
The research aim was to find out how people used and interpreted media 
messages, created new meanings from them and shared them with their 
family and friends. I was interested in “how interpretations were collectively 
constructed through talk and the interchange between respondents in the 
group situation” (Morley 1980:31). The questions included: Do you reject or 
accept the messages regarding the Kurdish- Turkish conflict? How do you 
interact with the influences of these messages? Do you identify with the 
coverage of these media?  The use of focus groups also meant that I could 
get information from some Turkish and Kurdish participants who had a 
stronger oral and visual culture rather than textual one. 
 
The decision to set up different focus groups for Turks and Kurds (3 
Kurdish, 3 Turkish) in the three target countries (two in the UK, two in 
Germany and two in Sweden) was taken as my pilot interviews in London 
had shown a strong polarization and politicization and decrease of 
commonalities between Kurds and Turks in Europe. This is due to 
increased politicization of Kurds and militarist and Islamicist influences on 
Turks, growing resistance to Turkish-style “democracy” and “secularism” 
among both migrant groups and the retention of the Kurdish language as a 
source of comfort and marker of identity against its criminalization in 
Turkey.  
 
The focus groups were mixed in terms of age, gender, education, political 
viewpoints, citizenship, occupation, length of residency and immigration 
status, religious background, and generation of settlement. This diversity 
was aimed at facilitating discussion from the different perspectives within 
the focus group. 
In total, 28 Kurdish and 15 Turkish participants attended focus groups. The 
focus groups took place with 11 Kurds (3 women and 8 men) in Berlin, 6 
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Kurds (2 women and 3 men) in Stockholm and 11 Kurds (6 women and 4 
men) in London. The distribution of Turkish participants was: 7 participants 
(3 women and 4 men) in Berlin, 5 participants (2 women and 3 men) in 
London and 3 participants (2 women and 1 man) in Stockholm. 
3.1.2. Using visual material in focus groups 
Visual material was used in the focus groups to find out the similarities and 
differences in making sense of media-produced images (cf. Mangen 
1999:121). Researchers collect their visual material according to their 
research topic and approach. Prosser defines this as follows: “Images can 
be ‘researcher found’ (generated by others) or ‘researcher generated’ 
(created by the researcher)”(1996:2). 
 
Different “researcher found” visual materials were used as prompts for 
each group (See Chapter III as well as two short news items).  In 
contemporary societies, everyday visual culture has an important influence 
on our behaviour, identity formation, as well as political and social position. 
Visual materials are used to explore social and cultural life as 
methodologically photography, film and video: “have all come to be 
regarded as ‘text’ and worth analyzing as a cultural artefact that can be 
‘read’ ” ( Ali 2005 :266, also see  Banks 2001, Emmison 2000, Knowles 
and Sweetman 2004, Pink 2006, Prosser 1998a, Rose 2006, Stanczak 
2007, Van Leewen and Jewitt 2001). 
3.3. Justifications for selected visual and print material 
3.3.1. The Turkish Flag 
The flag has acquired cult status in Turkey as a symbol of political and 
cultural hegemony. The military hangs “the biggest and the most beautiful 
holy flag” in public places in Kurdish cities. The Hürriyet newspaper 
organized and advertised a contest for “the most beautiful flag” in the 
country, and gave flags as a present to readers in their European edition. 
In 2005, when two Kurdish teenagers threw a Turkish flag on the street, 
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the military published a condemnation of this act, and tens of thousands 
attended demonstrations. The BBC reported that “Turkey is in the grip of 
something close to flag frenzy - with demonstrations across the country to 
show support for the Turkish flag” (Dymond 2005). In Europe, the Turkish 
flag can be seen in Turkish community centres, homes, as an emblem on 
clothes, chains and earrings. In recent years several thousand 
demonstrators have formed a Turkish flag chain across Europe. The 
research was designed to find out how Turkish and Kurdish migrants 
perceive media images of the Turkish flag, because of its ubiquity and role 
in banal nationalism.  
3.3.2. The Picture of Öcalan  
Since the seizure of Abdullah Öcalan, leader of the Kurdistan Workers' 
Party (PKK) in Italy in November 1998 and his ensuing capture by the 
Turkish state in February 1999, the relationship between Kurds and Turks 
have deteriorated dramatically. Demonstrations in protest by Kurds at his 
capture or in support by Turks at times turned violent and wreaked havoc 
throughout Europe and Turkey as well as all over Kurdistan. At this point, it 
became apparent that the ethnic conflict between Kurds and Turks had 
become a transnational issue (see chapter VI). Hence his picture was used 
to elicit the opinion of people marginalized by the pro PKK media, and to 
assess the strength of his symbolic presence and its influence on the 
Turkish -Kurdish relationship. 
3.3.3. The Language Question 
Two news items were shown: one on the restrictions on teaching Turkish in 
a German town by denying the use of a school building as premises; the 
second on the prosecution of a local authority in the Kurdish area of Turkey 
for using minority languages in its official publications. The research aim 
was to find out what they thought about the intervention in minority 
languages in Turkey and in Germany and whether there were differences 
or similarities in the reactions to the two situations. 
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3.3.4. The Speech of the Chief of the Turkish General Staff 
A television recording (Star TV, 15.02.2007) was shown of the chief of the 
Turkish General Staff‘s speech on internal and external “enemies”, calling 
on Turkish migrants to lobby for Turkey during a visit to Washington. The 
coverage depicted him as the sole saviour of the country, implying a threat 
to the sovereignty of the republic akin to the invasion of Iraq. This item was 
deployed to find out how Turks and Kurds identified with the military, and 
reacted to references to “dynamic forces (dinamik gucler)” who will “fight 
against enemy”.  
See Appendix A for documentation, pictures and link to audio-visual 
material. 
4.3. Combining focus groups and in-depth interviews 
In Turkish or Kurdish community organizations there is usually a room 
where people sit and drink tea, watch television or read a newspaper. 
Some people (male and female) spend many hours there, sometimes 
several days a week. They discuss the news and develop a culture (of that 
particular community group, which is often linked to a political movement) 
interpreting the news. I designed and set up my focus groups as a natural 
social activity (Liebes and Katz 1990) and focus group discussions 
followed a similar format to discussions people have at home, in a cafe or 
community organization of media representations in their everyday life. 
 
I began with some simple questions like “Which programme do you 
watch?” or “Which columnist do you follow and why?” in order to create 
social interaction between all participants from the start, and to get an 
overview of the participants. It was very interesting to observe that all the 
participants complained about the media’s ideological or political positions. 
Then I showed or gave the selected media items to the focus groups and 
followed on with discussion. 
 
At first, the discussions with Turkish participants in Berlin were “like a 
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social activity” but when I showed the selected media items they started to 
take up political, social and cultural positions. For example, some 
participants were for teaching Kurdish in Turkey, and some were strongly 
against teaching it in school and one argued: “If they want to learn Kurdish 
they can move to North Iraq”. Yet, there was also unexpectedly vehement 
discussion between first- and second-generation Turkish migrants about 
the legitimacy of teaching Kurdish in Turkey. While participants who 
defined themselves as Kemalist agreed with the speech of the former Chief 
of the General Staff, Turkish migrants supporting Islamic-oriented political 
movements and Kurds criticized his speech as “separatist” and “anti-
democratic”. Kurds also expressed fierce differences in political views, for 
example over the flag. One female participant stated that “if we expect 
Turks to respect our flag we should respect their flag too”. The other 
participants stated that they “never respect the Turkish flag because if they 
see it they remember the injustice in Turkey towards Kurds” (Focus group 
with Kurdish participants in London, 13 April 2008). 
 
In the Kurdish focus groups, there was a consensus about the “double 
standard” of the Hürriyet coverage or the Chief of the General Staff’s 
speech where he called Kurds the “internal enemy” (Focus group with 
Kurdish participants in Stockholm, 09th June 2008), but there was a 
controversial discussion about the PKK-dominated media and the lack of 
freedom of opinion in the media run by the Kurdish parties. Two 
participants in Berlin criticized “the party-dominated media” but added that 
they did not read or watch them. But when I went to their home for in-depth 
interviews, I noticed that they did nonetheless follow these media (Focus 
group with Kurdish participants in Berlin, 22 August 2007).  
 
However, there is a high probability that fear of the Turkish state’s or the 
PKK’s repression hindered Kurdish participants from talking freely in the 
group. Hansen et al state that “Some individuals inevitably exert more 
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influence than others in a group situation, to the extent that they may begin 
to dominate the discussion” (1998:263).  This problem emerged during my 
focus group interviews with Kurds in London and focus groups with Turks 
in Berlin. Some participants were left marginalized in the discussion.  
 
For example, in the focus group with Turks in Berlin, when given the two 
texts to read and asked their opinion as to whether Kurds in Turkey should 
have the right to use their language, one female participant replied “If we 
want to have the right to be taught Turkish here in Germany, the Kurds 
should have the same right in Turkey to learn Kurdish at school”.  On the 
other hand, some participants insisted that Kurds can have the same rights 
as Turks to learn their language in Germany, but not in Turkey because 
“allowing Kurds to learn their language at school will destroy the unity of 
the Turkish nation”  (Focus group with Turkish participants in Berlin, 26 
August 2007). After this statement, the person who was pro-Kurdish 
teaching in school in Turkey was reduced to silence. 
 
It was interesting to observe the use of language. The Turkish participants 
did not use the term “Kurdish question”. Mainly they referred to “South-east 
Anatolia’s problem” or “separatist terror problem” in the focus groups 
(Focus group with Turkish participants in Berlin, 26 August 2007). 
However, in the in-depth interviews, some Turkish participants used the 
term “Kurdish question”. In addition, some participants used the term 
“Turkiyeli” - people from Turkey - which was not accepted by other 
participants because they argued that everybody who lives in or comes 
from Turkey is a “Turk”. This showed the resistance to recognizing ethnic 
diversity among the population of and from Turkey, (Focus group with 
Turkish participants in Stockholm, 27 June 2008) and a discrepancy in 
language indicating political ambivalence or anxiety that only came out 
through probing further in the in-depth interviews.  
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Wimmer and Dominick state, the focus group shall take place “in a 
relatively free discussion about the topic under consideration” (1983:100). 
However, as my topic is a highly political tensions arose. This shows that 
there are also some disadvantages to using focus groups for this particular 
research, as it makes it difficult “to find out what each member of the group 
thinks about the topic under discussion”(Berger 2002:89). Therefore, 
combining focus groups and in-depth interviews (with respondents from the 
focus groups) made it possible to consider the voices of those participants, 
reduced to silence in the focus group session. The in-depth interviews 
allowed me to explore individual opinions and attitudes on a whole range of 
topics that were not expressed in the focus groups. 
4.3.1. Problems with the focus groups 
Doing cross-national research “may require compromises beyond those of 
single-country studies” (Zulauf 1999:159 and also see Hantrais and 
Mangen 1996). While setting up focus groups in different cities, this 
became apparent as various obstacles arose. It was difficult to find a 
suitable time and place to bring together all the participants, especially in 
Stockholm. I had to make some compromise. Despite all my efforts, I was 
unable to bring 7 people together for the focus group as I had initially 
planned. Only 3 people came to the meeting and I accepted this and 
carried on with this smaller number of participants. 
 
Not only ethnic, but also class and cultural references play an important 
role (Singleton 1999) in providing material for participants to interpret. For 
example, with regard to the second text on the prosecution of the local 
council of Sur (Diyarbakir) governed by the DTP (Democratic Society 
Party) in the Kurdish area of Turkey for using minority languages in official 
publications, most of the participants said they had read this article or seen 
it on Kurdish or Turkish television. The difficulty arose with regard to the 
lack of knowledge about the pro- Kurdish DTP (Democratic Society Party 
which was banned in 2009 by the Turkish Constitutional Court) and the 
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small Assyrian minority. Many Turkish participants knew of a pro-Kurdish 
party in Turkey but they did not know its name. When I told them that the 
DTP is a party which predominantly won the local election in Southeast 
Turkey, they responded, “Oh I know, the legal arm of the terrorist 
organization in Parliament” (Focus group with Turkish participants in 
London, 13 March 2008 and also with Turkish participants in Berlin, 26 
August 2007). However Turkish participants with higher levels of education 
did not need any explanation regarding the DTP, they knew the party and 
its political positions. 
 
It is argued that cross-national research should consider cultural 
differences (Coffey and Atkinson 1996) in different locations under study, 
because they may make it difficult to ascertain that participants are indeed 
talking about the same thing in different locations in cross-national 
research. Therefore, it is important to acknowledge culture-boundedness 
and where possible to minimize cultural differences in cross-national 
research (Ackers 1999). This is one of the strengths of qualitative methods 
(Zulauf 1999, Mangen 1999). Indeed, “Qualitative research is not simply 
non-numerical. Its central defence lies in its ability to penetrate the 
experiential social worlds of intentional, self-directing actors, whether 
through the spoken or written word” (Mangen 1999:110). I encountered 
such cultural differences in the different research locations, regarding 
research participants’ knowledge of the Syrianic minority. While the 
participants in Sweden did not ask any questions about the Syrianic 
minority in Turkey, many Turkish participants in Berlin and London asked 
me, “What is Syrianic?” (Focus group with Turkish participants in London, 
13 March 2008 and in Berlin, 26 August 2007). The Syrianic minority lives 
in the Kurdistan region of Turkey and today there is  a significant number 
of Syrianic migrants in Sweden but not in Berlin or London. This shows 
clearly the importance of taking local specificities into account (Hantrais, 
1999).  
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4.3.2. In-depth interviews 
Focus group interviews were followed by 74 in-depth interviews including 
with 10 respondents from the focus groups because I also wanted to know 
what individuals thought outside of a group context, “to elicit from each 
person his or her opinions” (Hansen et al 1998:263). The reason for 
choosing the in-depth interview technique with some focus group 
participants was the sensitive and controversial nature of the research 
topic. Some participants could not fully express their feelings or opinion in 
a group, whereas, in private, during a one-to-one interview sessions, they 
felt more able to do so. The advantage of the in-depth interview is that the 
researchers can ask questions which fit the individual and can explore their 
“own opinions” (Bryman 2004:110). It is possible to clarify questions and 
dispose of misunderstandings in the context of language. Moreover, it is 
possible to collect firsthand information from participants without family 
members or friends influencing their responses.  
 
In the course of my research, I not only interviewed people from Kurdish 
and Turkish community centres, which share links and goals with the 
Turkish state or political parties, but also people from outside of these 
influences. I interviewed a wide range of people, including politicians in 
local parliaments with Kurdish and Turkish ethnic backgrounds, journalists 
in local and national Turkish and Kurdish media and community leaders.  
In-depth interviews were mixed in term of age, gender, education, and 
political viewpoint, citizenship, occupation, and immigration status and 
length of residency, religious background, first and second, even third 
generation and place of residence (Berlin, London and Stockholm).  
4.3.3. Preparation of the interview questions 
Although questions for the in-depth interview were prepared, I let 
participants talk freely about the issues which they found important 
regarding their media use. This structure was chosen following pilot 
interviews in London. 
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In-depth interview questions were divided into five sections: 
1. Interviewees’ background in the country of origin and in the settlement 
country and their attachments, allegiances and roots. This helped me to 
pitch the other questions to make them intelligible to the interviewee. At the 
same time I wanted to create a friendly confidence which was essential in 
order to move onto the more sensitive questions (Lee 1993, Düvell et al. 
2010). 
 
2. Use and consumption of different print and visual media. My focus was 
on finding similarities and differences  between both ethnic groups’ use of 
media in three different locations (Zulauf 1999, Arber 1993, Quilgars at el 
2009, Hantrais 1999). 
 
3. The Turkish and Kurdish ethnic conflict and their positions: The third 
section focused on conflict in the homeland and their position with regard 
to the conflict. Here I focused on the worries and concerns amongst both 
groups in the context of conflict. How did they view it? How did the conflict 
affect their lives and livelihoods? What was the relationship like between 
both groups and with their settlement countries? This section helped me to 
explore and develop key themes (Mangen1999) around their political 
involvement in the community and links and obligations to their homeland 
and their future aspirations for it. This could help me to compare the 
similarities and differences and the perception of key themes by both 
ethnic groups in the different locations.  
 
4. Knowledge about the settlement country and its media: The fourth 
section referred to the integration issue and use of settlement country 
media, the relationship between minority and majority and everyday life in 
the settlement country. 
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5. The use of new media: Finally I asked questions regarding new media 
(internet) in order to know which web newspapers they read. These web 
newspapers play a crucial role in the life of politically engaged people, 
potentially mobilizing many people in a short space of time.  In addition, as 
many migrants cannot obtain newspapers in small towns in their settlement 
countries, they can access them via the internet. Therefore they can follow 
what is going on in the homeland and in the settlement country. Those 
second-generation individuals interviewed in the three countries indicated 
a similar tendency, that they read the news on the internet. I asked 
questions regarding their connection with the homeland and other 
countries via the internet in order to conceptualize my understanding of the 
transnational community which could be theorized in terms of 
transmigration, transnationalism and transmobilization through the use of 
media. 
4.3.4. Problems with In-depth Interviews 
I will discuss here the different implications of the in-depth interview: 
During the first interviews I tried to find an appropriate way to ask the 
sensitive questions about the conflict in the homeland as a common 
definition of the conflict does not exist for either group. For example, if I 
had started to ask a Turkish participant about “the Kurdish and Turkish 
ethnic conflict” or “the Kurdish question”, the interviewee would have felt 
uncomfortable. Maybe s/he would have withdrawn. For many Turkish 
participants there is not an “ethnic conflict” or a “Kurdish question” but a 
“separatist terror problem” (Interview with Fatih, London, 02 April 2008).  
Therefore I posed the question indirectly to elicit their personal 
interpretations in the form of:  “Do you have any concerns regarding 
Turkey?” or “What disturbs you when you read/ watch news regarding 
Turkey?” When they started to talk about the conflict, I would then develop 
some of my questioning following up their comments. 
 
The same difficulty emerged with Kurdish participants when I started 
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asking questions about the strict control of the Kurdish public sphere by 
Kurdish parties and its ideologically biased media. After the questions, 
which caused some controversy, I asked, “How do you feel in London?” or 
similar questions which eased the situation and made it possible to 
continue the interview in a more relaxed atmosphere. 
 
Finally following the questions about the internet, I talked with the 
interviewees about their communication with their family and friends which 
enabled them to relax after all the difficult questions.  Although I mentioned 
at the beginning of the interview that the results would be anonymous, it 
was still hard to win the confidence of participants. The best way that I 
found of solving this problem was to create a friendly atmosphere, talking 
about everyday life – such as their family and children. Moreover it helped 
to be referred participants by their acquaintances, as this inspired trust. 
 
My language skills and knowledge of everyday life in Sweden, Germany 
and the UK helped me to win the confidence of participants. Speaking 
Kurdish with the Kurdish participants created a greater atmosphere of trust 
with some. However, some Kurdish participants were not able to 
understand Kurdish because of the linguistic genocide in Turkey.  
Therefore I asked my questions either in German, English or Turkish. 
Furthermore many second-generation participants and even first 
generation ones used mixed or different languages in the same sentence. 
In contrast to Germany, in Sweden where the Kurdish language is taught in 
school, most of the participants, even third-generation migrants, were keen 
to give interviews in Kurdish. In the UK, the second generation tended to 
speak English and the first generation tended to speak Kurdish or Turkish. 
 
Another important issue was carrying out the interviews at participants’ 
homes. Traditionally if Kurds or Turks invite you to their home, it means 
you have won their confidence. It is time-consuming, but good way to do 
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an in-depth interview because people open their private sphere to you. 
5. Ethical issues in this research process 
ESRC Framework for Research Ethics (2010:40) describes research ethics  
as “the moral principles guiding research, from its inception through to 
completion and publication of results and beyond”. They emphasise that it 
is crucial to avoid or minimize “harm to participants… in all instances” 
(ESRC 2010:3). 
 
As this research topic is controversial and sensitive because it examines 
the representations of conflict in highly politicized media to diverse 
individuals and communities in relationship to each other. Therefore the 
data too is “ethics sensitive” (ESRC 2010:26).   
 
The ESRC considers as sensitive topics:  “participants’ sexual behaviour, 
their illegal or political behaviour, their experience of violence, their abuse 
or exploitation, their mental health, or their gender or ethnic status 
(2010:8).  Ethical issues are raised at the start of a project in the 
formulation of questions, access to research participants, transcribing and 
translation, analyzing data and disseminating the research findings at 
different conferences to minimize the risk (ESRC 2010:3). “Risk is often 
defined by reference to the potential physical or psychological harm, 
discomfort or stress to human participants that a research project might 
generate…These include risk to a subject’s personal social standing, 
privacy, personal values and beliefs, their links to family and the wider 
community, and their position within occupational settings” (ESRC 
2010:26). 
 
To address these issues, information about the project was prepared in 5 
languages to explain what my research was about. Transparency is very 
important in collecting sensitive research. Some of the participants wanted 
to see my University ID card, some of them wanted to know who was 
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financing my research and what I will do with the interviews. Some 
participants wanted to see the topic guide before being interviewed. I 
provided my ID and topic guides to the participants. After scanning them, 
some participants refused to be interviewed owing to the content of the 
questions. However it was important for me to inform potential participants 
about the aims and objectives of the research and how I would 
disseminate the results, as this is a crucial component of gaining informed 
consent. In some cases, people wanted to be interviewed but refused to 
sign the consent form which was understandable for me because they did 
not want to be identified (see Düvell 2010). 
 
Issues surrounding privacy and confidentiality have been widely discussed 
in the literature (Bloch 2007, Düvell 2010). It has been suggested that 
researchers with a similar ethnic, linguistic and cultural background as 
research participants “might find it easier to carry out sensitive research 
due to shared language and culture” (Bloc 2997:242). However this raises 
some ethical questions of confidentiality, as participants might fear that the 
researcher would disclose information to co-ethnics.  
 
I carefully considered issues of privacy, confidentiality and informed 
consent in order not to harm people who took time to participate in this 
research. The consent forms made clear what the research was about, that 
the information they provided me with would be treated confidentially. It 
also informed them that that they could withdraw from the study at any 
time. My mobile number and email address were printed on the bottom in 
case they wanted to contact me if they had any questions about the 
research or concerns about what they had told me and how I would use it. 
Two participants from Berlin have contacted me to withdraw from the study 
and I deleted the interviews I had conducted with them. Some participants 
preferred to give me a fictional name but some participants used their real 
names. It was important to assure participants that their names would be 
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anonymized. Some participants were keen to know when I would publish 
my research so that they could see their name in print. After telling them 
that I would anonymize their names, one participant stated that “then why 
did you interview me when you do not intend to publish my name?” 
 
Many people who have participated in my research live in large cities but in 
a “small world” because as a migrant groups from the same geographical 
areas they know each other directly or indirectly, owing to cultural, political, 
community activities or just sharing spaces such as cafes, restaurants, 
entertainment spaces (Keles et al. 2010). Therefore researching such 
communities requires greater awareness of the ethics involved.   
 
Moreover the issue of anonymising data is often complex and hard work 
because people mentioned their neighbourhood, their relatives who live in 
Britain, their political parties which are outlawed in Turkey, their names and 
where they work, their relations with their partners and relatives. As Ali 
(2005:119) state “[t]he harm that may result from unwitting disclosure of 
personal information are both foreseeable and unforeseeable harms and 
the researcher has a duty to protect people from both”. All the information 
has been anonymised during the writing-up of this thesis because as 
researcher, I have an obligation towards research participants (Düvell 
2010:236). 
 
I am aware of the power relationship in terms of gender and education and 
tried to reduce this by starting the interviews with informal chat about 
everyday life.  
 
In terms of storing the data, I avoided storing them on my desktop but I put 
them on two memory sticks which were removed from my computer after 
use and locked in a safe place. During the translation of the interview 




All data was recorded on audio-tape with the permission of the group or 
the individual. As this was a controversial topic, it was particularly 
important to assure participants of their anonymity. Gaining the trust of the 
participants  through  establishing a friendly relationship was vital as it 
allowed them to “speak openly” to the researcher (Düvell 2010:231). This 
was particularly important for the Kurdish participants as they may be in 
fear of state repression. One way of reassuring them was by speaking to 
them in Kurdish.  Through working as a social worker and interpreter with 
Kurdish and Turkish communities, I got to know some gatekeepers who 
helped me to gain access to research participants and win their trust. For 
the Turkish participants, the issues of the study were equally contentious 
but they may not have felt under the same pressure. I gained their trust by 
assuring them of the confidentiality of the research. 
6. Reflexivity 
Any researcher needs to reflexively position themselves within the 
research process. My own position as a former journalist for Turkish 
newspapers and a former human rights activist has given me a particular 
perspective and experience. My professional experience helps me to 
understand critically how news is made. My background as a human rights 
activist reflects the values I still hold, which inform the research project. 
Thus, freedom of the press and freedom of information are key values. I 
am in favour of Turks and Kurds living together in peace and equality and 
free from racism. During my activism I have defended the rights of the 
Kurds to self-expression on political and social issues and to use their own 
language and reproduce their culture. My Kurdish background means that I 
speak Kurdish as well as Turkish. I support minority rights, be it in Turkey 
or Europe. Therefore, I welcome Turkish and Kurdish migrants’ access to 
transnational media and see this as one way of integrating into a hybrid 
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European identity. I am also aware that “[t]he researcher's own cultural and 
linguistic knowledge, disciplinary affiliations …. logistic resources also 
serve as important determinants of the choice of topic, the country mix, the 
contextual variables and the approach adopted” (Hantrais 1999:102). By 
being open about my own position, I hope to achieve greater transparency 
in the research process. I hope that this openness means that my findings 
and interpretations can contribute to academic knowledge about migrants 
and their use of Turkish and Kurdish media, rather than being seen as me 
following a “hidden agenda” as is so often the case in debates about this 
































Chapter III:   Mediating the Turkish and Kurdish Ethno-National 
Conflict 
1. Introduction  
In the theoretical framework chapter, I briefly focused on the construction 
of the Turkish imagined community. This was created through the force of 
the Turkish state and its policies to construct Turkish history, language, 
myths and symbols (McDowall 2004, Hirschler 2001, Besikci 1977) on the 
denial of the existence of other ethnic groups, forcing them to adopt 
Turkishness in order to create a Turk Ulusu - Turkish nation - after the 
collapse of Ottoman Empire (Vali 1998, Hirschon 2003). These policies 
have caused a hegemonic struggle between the Turkish state and the 
second largest ethnic group, the Kurds in Turkey (Kutlay 2000). I will 
highlight the central role that the Turkish and Kurdish media have played in 
Turkey and Europe in disseminating and legitimizing the respective Turkish 
and Kurdish positions in the conflict.  
 
In the attempt to keep a homogenous and unified nation, the hegemonic 
struggle spread to Europe through the migration of people and media from 
Turkey to Europe. Therefore, it is important to focus on the attempt to 
create an imagined Turkish community, putting the hegemonic struggle 
between the state and the PKK in historical perspective, and explaining the 
role of the media in transnationalizing the Turkish and Kurdish ethno-
national conflict. 
 
Consequently, this chapter focuses on the construction of a “political 
imagined community” (Anderson 1991:6) in a multi-ethnic and multi-faith 
region of Anatolia and the problems caused by conceptualizing 
“Turkishness” by denying others’ culture and history, forcing them to adopt 
“Turkishness”. The chapter explores how Kurdish identity and nationalism 
have challenged the Turkish nationalization project since 1920. In a 
historical perspective, it examines how the suppressed Kurdish ethno-
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national movement has developed different strategies and concepts to 
oppose the Turkish state’s turkifying policies (Hirschler 2001, Bozarslan 
1992). 
 
In the process of constructing an “imagined community”, Turkish 
institutions and mainstream media have played a crucial role in creating 
commonalities amongst ethnic Turks and imposing an identity on non-
Turkish ethnic groups. The Turkish media have promoted Turkishness 
(Bulut 1992, Sezgin and Wall 2005) openly or “unnoticed” (Billig 1995:4). 
The Kurdish media has contributed to challenging Turkish state policies of  
Turkification of Kurds, and have also given a voice to other ethnic and 
religious groups like Laz, Assyrian and Elewî believers (Hirschler 2001) to 
create an alliance against the organized dominance of Turkish official state 
nationalism and its “patterns of common sense” (Billig 1995:20).  The 
Kurdish media has also normalised a Kurdish ethno-nationalist outlook and 
symbols (Hassanpour 1998) in order to counteract Turkish nationalism. Its 
representations of time and place have created an “alternative nationalism 
and other ways of imagining peoplehood” (Billig 1991:28) amongst some 
Kurds in Turkey/ Kurdistan and Europe. These representations are part of 
a struggle between two contested nationalistic projects, an expression of a 
permanent crisis of the hegemonic project of Turkification in Turkey. 
 
The Turkish media, including European editions and the main Kurdish 
newspaper and TV stations published or broadcast and consumed in 
Europe, have a significant effect on the 2.5 million Turkish and 1.5 million 
Kurdish migrants who came to Europe, first as guest-workers, and later as 
family migrants or political refugees. Therefore, it is important to look at the 
role of the Turkish media in disseminating Turkishness and delegitimizing 
Kurdishness historically over time in order to understand the ongoing 
struggle for hegemony between these two ideologies and movements in 
the European diaspora (Rigoni 2002).  
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2. Constructing an Imagined Turkish National Identity: the Origin of 
Turkey’s “Kurdish Question” 
Nationalism as a political and ideological project has caused bitter 
struggles between different ethnic groups5 in Anatolia since the nineteenth 
century. Turkish nationalism was the ideological basis for the massacre of 
the Armenians (Akçam 2004) and the deportation of Greek Ottomans to 
Greece (Hirschon 2003). The minority population  who remained in the 
territory of the Turkish Republic was ideologically relegated to the status of 
second class citizens, who had only the right to be “servants and slaves” 
according to Justice Minister, Mahmut Esad Bozkurd, in a statement  in 
1930 (Milliyet Newspaper 1930 in  Bulut 1992) 
 
During the establishment of the Turkish Republic, nationalists aimed to 
create a hegemonic order, constructing common values, language, and 
identity. Ethnic groups other than Turks were excluded and marginalised 
by coercion and consent, subjecting them to the dominant ethno-centric 
nationalism. Thus, rather than creating a “deep, horizontal comradeship” 
(Anderson 1991:7) among all people in Anatolia, those who did not identify 
as Turks were ostracized as the “other” within the previously multi-ethnic 
Turkish Republic. However, this was not simply accepted, but led to a 
series of struggles which caused a  “permanent crisis” (Chernilo 2006:15) 
in the ethno-centric nation state. This “permanent crisis” led to the 
enactment of the anti-democratic state of emergency law.  
 
Theories of the state have been an important subject of debate within 
political theory.  The state as both an ideological construction (Billig 1995, 
Anderson 1991) and a coercive organization has been the subject of 
different thinkers.  The debate around Hegel’s conception of the state as 
an “ethical idea”, where the state embodies a unified will with civil society 
as the invisible hand, has influenced many thinkers including Gramsci.  
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Gramsci reconceptualised Hegel considering the state as “political society 
+ civil society, in other words hegemony, protected by the armour of 
coercion (Gramsci 1971:160). Thus, he associated physical force with the 
public sphere denoted by “political society”.  
  
Civil society in countries torn by ethno-national conflict is split with people 
having to take positions either on the side of the dominant power and 
ideology and or in resistance to it. Since its inception, civil society in Turkey 
has been structured to support a homogenous, Turkish imagined 
community. A weakness of Anderson’s work is that he tended to underplay 
the responses of subordinated, marginalized groups to the dominant 
imagined community (Chernilo 2006, Escolar 2001, Gutierrez 1999, 
Itzigsohn and vom Hau 2006, Lomnitz 2001, Mattiace 1997, Yiftachel 
1999). Here subordinated groups refer to “a variety of non-dominant social 
groups, including not only the working class, peasants and slaves but also 
religious groups, women, and various racial groups. One of the central 
aspects that makes all these social groups subaltern is that they lack a 
coherent philosophy or world-view from which to understand and interpret 
the world” (Ives 2004:79). Many Gramscian scholars (Hall 1986, Ives 2004, 
Laclau and Mouffe 1985) have criticized Gramsci for ignoring the unequal 
power relations between ethnic groups and men and women, considering 
them also as the object of hegemonic struggles (Cox 1992:35).  While Ives 
argues the working class’s “world-view (and interests) will be the core that 
is expanded to include other groups in an alliance, but never 
compromised” (Ives 2004:113), feminists and antiracists have raised 
objections to the idea of being subsumed by working class interests (Ives 
2004:113). Gramsci also idealized the political party as the “modern 
prince”. As the history of the colonized world shows, armed movements or 
parties which fought against colonial powers can subsequently create their 
own power structure which continues repressive policies.  
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Since 1923, the motto of the Turkish state has been “one state, one 
language and one flag”. However, the construction of Turkish nationhood 
in Anatolia was a difficult process due to the multi-ethnic and multi-faith 
composition of the region and as a consequence of policies of denial, a 
bitter power struggle began between the dominant Turkish state and the 
subordinated Kurds. Yegen (1999:555) states that 
 “the Turkish state has, for a long time, consistently 
avoided recognizing the Kurdishness of the Kurdish 
question…..From the mid-1920s until end of the 
1980s, the Turkish state ‘assumed’ that there was no 
Kurdish element on Turkish territory”.  
 
Yet, during the Ottoman Empire, ethnicity was not an important marker of 
identity. Religion defined the core element dividing peoples in the Ottoman 
political system. Therefore, Kurds were not alienated and were not seen as 
a “minority”. The Sunni Kurds were “equal” with Turks and Arabs within a 
multi-national empire and had independent principalities, autonomous from 
the central government.  The duties of the Kurdish tribes vis-à-vis the 
Ottoman Empire were to defend the border, provide soldiers and pay 
taxes. However in the nineteenth century, Kurds started to stand up for 
their national interests as witnessed in the Rewanduz (1830-1833) and 
Bedirxan Bey (1843–1847) uprisings. At the end of the nineteenth century 
when the nationalist idea reached the border regions of the Ottoman 
Empire, the Kurdish national movement organized insurrections. As part of 
this movement, the first Kurdish language newspaper called “Kurdistan” 
was published in exile in 1898 (Vali 1998). 
 
After the WWI, the defeated Ottoman Empire signed the Treaty of Sèvres 
which “envisaged interim autonomy for the predominantly Kurdish areas of 
Turkey with a view to full independence if the inhabitants of these areas 
wanted this” (McDowall 1996:17). This Treaty was later replaced by the 
Lausanne Treaty which recognized a new state: the Turkish Republic and 
left Kurds without any statutory protection. They became the largest 
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stateless ethnic group in the Middle East. The division of Kurdistan had 
first taken place between the Ottoman Empire and the Persian Empire 
following the battle of Chaldiran in 1514. After World War I, Kurdistan was 
divided by the Allies (mainly by the British Empire and French colonial 
forces) into five different states. Turkey occupied 43% of Kurdistan under 
the Lausanne agreement, Iran 31%, Iraq 18%, Syria 6% and the former 
Soviet Russia 2% respectively (Izady 1992). The Kurds, with an estimated 
30 million population, form the largest ethnic group after the Turks, Arabs 
and Persians in the Middle East. They constitute the largest ethnic group in 
the world without a state. (Vali 1998:26) 
 
The founder of Turkey, Kemal Mustafa, was supported by some Kurds6 
during the Turkish War of Independence. He promised the Kurds a Turkish 
and Kurdish multi-ethnic state. This historical promise is kept alive in 
contemporary politics by the demands of the PKK and the pro-Kurdish 
party DTP (shut down in 2010) (Milliyet Newspaper,11.06. 2009). Moreover 
he offered the Kurds autonomy in the territory where they constituted a 
majority. After the war and the establishment of the Republic, the new 
regime turned against the Kurds (Barkey and Fuller 1998). The Prime 
Minister, Inonu explained the direction of the newly established republic in 
1924:  “We are frankly nationalists . . . and [n]ationalism is our only factor 
of cohesion. In the face of a Turkish majority, other elements have no kind 
of influence. We must turkify the inhabitants of our land at any price, and 
we will annihilate those who oppose the Turks or “le turquisme” (Simsir 
1991:58 quoted in Barkey and Fuller 1998:10).  
 
However, the Kurds opposed this nationalistic approach and have 
attempted to challenge the Turkish nationalistic discourse and fought for 
the recognition of their existence in Turkey. The insurrections of Shaykh 
Said in 1924, Agri in 1930 and Dersim in 1937-1938 followed each other 
unsuccessfully and the Turkish nationalists suppressed the Kurdish 
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demands for recognition with the Law for the Maintenance of Order7 and 
İstiklal Mahkemeleri  - (special courts established for the express purpose 
of suppressing opposition groups in the country) (Adak 2004).  
 
In such cases where the contested ideologies are struggling for dominance 
for their economic, political and cultural interests, “[a] social group 
dominates antagonistic groups which it tends to “liquidate”, or to subjugate, 
perhaps even by armed force” (Gramsci 1971:57–58). The state used all 
means available to ensure it was ethnically homogenized in Anatolia. This 
included the state of emergency laws in Kurdish regions which were in 
force from 1925 – 2002. Furthermore, Kurds were displaced from where 
they lived and moved to other regions of Turkey (Olson 1989), in order to 
“create a country speaking with one language, thinking in the same way 
and sharing the same sentiment…” (Law of Settlement 1934, TBMM Zabıt 
Ceridesi, Devre:IV, Cilt:23, İçtima:3, 14/06/1934, p. 141, quoted in Ülker 
2008). 
 
After the use of authorized and legitimized violence, gradually the state 
started to change the names of Kurdish people and Kurdish cities into 
Turkish names and the Kurdish language was banned from public places.  
Education was used to assimilate Kurdish children “into the dominant 
culture” (Sezgin and Wall 2005:788). All these repressive, ideological 
measures aimed to create an “imagined community” and through it, the 
Turkish state defined the Kurds, who form 25% of Turkey’s total 
population, as its eternal, “imagined enemy”. This Turkish national project 
precipitated a continuous struggle between the Turkish state and the 
Kurds, who constitute the major challenge to the nationalistic practice of 
the Turkish state. 
 
Gramsci highlighted that “[a] social group…. subsequently becomes 
dominant when it exercises power, but even if it holds it firmly in its grasp, 
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it must continue to “lead” as well” (Gramsci, 1971:57–58).  This close 
intertwining of control and consent means that “to the extent the 
consensual aspect of power is in the forefront, hegemony prevails. 
Coercion is always latent but is only applied in marginal, deviant cases. 
Hegemony is enough to ensure conformity of behaviour in most people 
most of the time” (Cox 1983:127).  
 
The dominant group will attempt to “attain or retain… ideological power” 
(Aronowitz 2009:13) in its intellectual and moral leadership within civil 
society, generating  consent amongst allied and  subordinated groups 
(Degiuli and Kollmeyer 2007). This ideological power, articulated by 
intellectuals justifies the dominant group’s “privileged socio-economic 
position … by exerting daily influence over the ideas, values, and norms 
promoted across civil society – for example, by influencing the ideological 
messages espoused by churches, community groups, political parties, the 
media, schools and universities, and trade unions” (Degiuli and Kollmeyer 
2007:500).  
 
The ideological power of the dominant Turkish group has succeeded to 
some degree in subordinating the different ethnic groups (the Kurds, the 
Lazs, the Caucasians) by using its monopoly of state power to impose a 
standardized Turkish language, education and invented history of the 
“Turks” during the construction of Turkey’s national unity.  This established 
a “unified”, “homogenous” Turkish nation without regard for the non-
Turkish, multi-ethnic groups.  
 
The Kemalist regime with its official ideology known as Altı Ok - the  Six 
Arrows8 - equated citizenship with Turkishness in the 1924 constitution 
which aimed to turkify all the ethnic groups through force and a consensus 
of silence. Therefore, other ethnic groups’ linguistic, cultural and social 
existence was diluted through repression, massacre and assimilation. 
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Some ethnic groups and refugees from the Balkans “accepted” the 
nationalist Turkification policy. “In the new state structure, still in place, any 
identity conflicting with the national state identity – based solely on Turkish 
culture, language and identity – is not accepted and faces punishment 
under criminal law” (Sezgin and Wall 2005:788). But this brutal process 
created an opponent – the Kurdish national movement with its imagined 
Kurdish nation – in opposition to the Turkish nationalist conception of the 
nation-state.  
 
After the Dersim massacre in 1938 the Kurds and Kurdish identity 
disappeared from political view and for a decade fell silent. (Olson 1989, 
McDowall 1996)  Yet, as Gramsci argues gaining political and economic 
power is not enough to gain hegemony. To achieve hegemony requires 
that a specific conception of the world be disseminated which acquires the 
consent of subordinated groups. In this sense the dominant power needs 
“to win intellectual power” (Gramsci 1985:41) and cultural dominance to 
neutralise others and gain their consent. Therefore to achieve hegemony, it 
is necessary for dominant and aspiring groups to organize themselves 
culturally and ideologically – developing their own intellectuals and world 
outlook.  
 
The Turkish nation-building process aimed to remove all barriers to their 
imagined community by using force and building consent. Therefore the 
state started assimilation policies through ideological institutions such as 
the education system, and in every city and town cultural centres, the 
Halkevi, were established to disseminate Turkish culture and language. 
Moreover, theories legitimating Turkish supremacy such as the “Turkish 
Historical Thesis” and the “Sun Language Theory” were disseminated in 
through state institutions and the media. This shows that the nationalist 
project did not simply rely on the media as Anderson suggests, but was 
created by active intervention of both political and civil society. Critical to 
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this was the role of intellectuals in the broadest sense educationalists, 
journalists, academics in formulating and articulating leading ideas in civil 
society:  in schools, in history texts, in the media. The aim was to imply that 
all other ethnic groups had given up their autonomous, social, political and 
linguistic existence and accepted the “common sense” that all citizens in 
Turkey were included in the homogenous Turkish nation. 
 
However the concept of common sense, sets “a certain limit to the 
effectiveness of ideology …and also implied is a re-evaluation of the 
significance of culture [politics, ideology] as a strategic battlefield in the 
struggle to define the terms of conflict” (Texier 1979 in Mouffe 1979:74). 
The subordinated group can only challenge the dominant common sense 
by proposing practical alternative understandings of the world and 
possibilities of change (Elmhirst 1999; Escolar 2001; Fachry 1997; 
Gutierrez 1999; Hefner 1989; Itzigsohn and vom Hau 2006; Lomnitz 2001; 
Mattiace 1997).  
 
Crucial in this role was the development of a group of Kurdish intellectuals 
and activists capable of independent thought. After the introduction of the 
multi-party system in 1946, the Kurds returned to the political arena and in 
the elections, the opposition party DP wiped out the Kemalist CHP party in 
Kurdistan. However this freedom was short-lived, as following the 1960 
coup d’etat, the first democratically elected Prime Minister, along with two 
other cabinet members, were sentenced to death and executed by the 
military junta in 1961 and 49 prominent Kurdish intellectuals were arrested. 
They were later to become the motor force of the Kurdish movement in the 
1980s up to 2009. One of them was Yasar Kaya, the owner of the Ulke 
newspaper which was bombed with the permission of the Ciller 
government in 1994 (Duran 1998). 
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In the 60s and 70s Kurdish intellectuals found new opportunities to express 
their ethnic identity, by highlighting their poverty and oppression and the 
class struggle in the left-wing Turkish parties and organisations, in 
particular the Turkish Worker Party (TIP). Although it was under the 
influence of a centralist Kemalist ideology, it tolerated the expression of 
Kurdish identity to a certain degree. Yet they were criticised within the 
party for being too Kurdish nationalist, and subsequently Kurds established 
their own cultural and political organisations and “outlaw” parties9. Indeed 
the PKK’s roots go back to those times when the Kurdish social and 
national movement was founded.  
 
Many legal and illegal newspapers and magazines were published, for 
example, Riya Azadî – Path to Freedom - (in Turkish: Özgürlük Yolu). 
Mehdi Zana, one of the first pro-Kurdish mayors of the unofficial capital city 
of Turkish Kurdistan, (which many of the people interviewed referred to as 
Northern Kurdistan) Amed (Turkish: Diyarbakir) spoke openly: 
“about the need to defend Kurdish culture and community, forcefully 
advocating the right to use one’s mother tongue and to identify oneself as 
Kurdish. He gave many of his election speeches in Kurdish, arguing that 
Kurds in Turkey had been subject to ‘colonialist’ and ‘fascist’ aggression 
and that he was a candidate who would forcefully resist this. He thus 
clearly posited a Kurdish ‘we’ against an official and nationalist Turkish 
‘they’” (Dorronsoro and Watts 2009:471-472). 
 
The Kurdish national movement can be understood as resistance against 
the Turkish imagined political community. Kurdish intellectuals, producing 
an imagined Kurdish community could be defined as “organic” intellectuals 
(Gramsci, 1971:9) of the Kurdish national movement, who have contributed 
to the transformation of consciousness of a subordinated people. Gramsci 
stated  
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"the mode of being of the new intellectual can no longer consist in 
eloquence … but in active participation in practical life, as constructor, 
organizer, "permanent persuader" and not just a simple orator…” 
(1971:10). Indeed Kurdish intellectuals, who were influenced by the social 
movements of the 60s and 70s, were indeed active organizers.  As Mehdi 
Zana indicates, the Kurdish left-nationalist oriented politicians and groups 
saw the Turkish state in Kurdistan as a “colonialist power”, a theory 
developed by the well-established sociologist of the Kurds, Ismail Besikci. 
The 1980 military coup and the unimaginable abuse of Kurds’ human rights 
brought Kurdish nationalism to its peak.  
 
Today many Kurdish politicians, who were arrested and tortured as a 
consequence of the 1980 coup d’etat, are the main protagonists of the 
Kurdish national movement in Turkey/Kurdistan. They are also the main 
group who created Kurdish communities in the diaspora. I interviewed 9 of 
them in Berlin and Stockholm, including the president of the Kurdistan 
Socialist Party, Kemal Burkay in Sweden and Recep Marasli who spent 15 
years in Diyarbakir prison and now lives in exile in Germany. From there 
he runs his own internet newspaper which receives 10,000 hits per day 
and publishes articles from Kurdish intellectuals who were tortured and 
humiliated in the junta prisons in the 1980s. 
 
Since the foundation of the Turkish Republic, the Kurds have been 
denounced as the “state enemy”. Turkey’s “Kurdish question” has been 
defined by the Turkish authorities and the media which for decades, has 
demonstrated its loyalty to the state. After the Kurdish uprising in 1924, the 
Kurds were represented in the media as instruments of the imperialists, 
threatening national unity; from the 1950s to the 1980s, they were 
identified with feudal backwardness (Bulut 1992); from 1980-85 they were 
defined as “mountain Turks” (see below). 
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However, it was not just the demonisation of Kurds that was contentious. 
The Turkish state also suppressed the Kurdish language. This policy was 
crucial to create an imagined Turkish political community and to exert 
moral and intellectual dominance over potential revivals of Kurdish 
nationalism. While the Turkish state has created, institutionalized and 
propagated Oz Turkce - pure Turkish - the Kurdish language was 
“subjected to state violence” (Hassanpour 2000:33). In 1924, Kurdish was 
banned from being published and spoken in schools or public places. The 
Kurds were displaced from Kurdistan to different parts of Turkey and many 
Balkan migrants were resettled in the Kurdish region in 1934. Kurdish 
names and the names of Kurdish cities were replaced by Turkish ones. 
The ideological apparatus of the Turkish state invented a new theory that 
the Kurds were Dagli Türkler, “mountain Turks”, to put them under 
psychological and symbolic pressure, to shame them from mentioning their 
ethnic background or speaking Kurdish (Hassanpour, 2000). 
 
 While the primordalists consider language as one of the crucial roots of 
the nation (Smith, 1998), the modernists (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1988, 
Gellner 1983) consider language as a means to shape national 
consciousness and identity. The use of a common language creates and 
reproduces a shared feeling of belonging to a particularity (Brubaker 2004).  
Anderson argues that the standardization of language and privileging of 
certain dialects and vernaculars at the expense of others created “unified 
fields of exchange and communication”, a crucial step in the historical 
formation of the modern nation state (Anderson 1991:67–82). This can 
account for the language policy of the Turkish state of prescribed 
monolingualism, imposed on the Kurdish population. As Billig argues that 
“nationalism creates languages…as markers of boundaries between “our” 
nation and others” (Billig 1995:30-31).  In this sense a shared language is 
a key element for an imagined community and national identity (Edwards 
2009, Joseph 2004, Sheyholislami 2010) because “the creation of a 
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national hegemony often involves a hegemony of language” of the 
dominant ethnic group (Billig  1995:29).   
 
Gramsci focused on the role of language in achieving hegemony through 
dissemination of the culture and world-view of the dominant group, while 
studying the standardization of Italian and how a middle class Tuscan 
dialect was imposed on Sicily and Sardinia (Gramsci’s homeland) during 
the unification of the Italian state in 1861. Although Gramsci favoured the 
creation of a common national language he was against imposing a 
reconstructed Florentine dialect onto people as the official language of Italy 
(Gramsci 1985:182).  He considered the creation of a national language by 
forcible imposition as alien to people’s life, history and experience, 
advocating instead that the dialects and subaltern languages in daily use 
be combined to construct a “normative grammar” (Gramsci1985:181) 
which would reflect the common life and experience of people in Italy. 
Thus, he favoured keeping regional dialects and languages: 
 “Language is transformed with the transformation of 
the whole of civilisation, through the acquisition of 
culture by new classes and through the hegemony 
exercised by one national language over others,. …, 
and what it does is precisely to absorb, in 
metaphorical form, the words of previous civilisations 
and cultures “ (Gramsci 1971:452).   
 
Language, to Gramsci, is a part of the process of establishing hegemony 
because “in language, there is contained a specific conception of the 
world” (Ives 2004:85). This had a political, as well as cultural import: 
“Every time that the question of language surfaces, in 
one way or another, it means that a series of other 
problems are coming to the fore: the formation and 
enlargement of the governing class, the need to 
establish more intimate and secure relationships 
between the governing groups and the national–
popular mass, in other words to recognize the 
cultural hegemony” (Gramsci 1985 183–4). 
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The cultural nature of language produces meaning and sets up boundaries 
which also exclude other groups of people (Fairclough 1989:3). This 
exclusion can lead to conflict, in which linguistic struggles play an 
important role in winning hegemony. Dominant ethnic groups can ban or 
suppress the language of subordinated ethnic groups in order to create a 
fixed national identity (Kymlicka and Patten 2003, Kymlicka and Straehle 
1999). In the case of Turkey, the government officially denied that its 
Kurdish citizens are Kurds and that there is a Kurdish language: the Kurds 
are deemed “mountain Turks” who have forgotten their native, Turkish 
tongue (Billig  1995:34) or are dubbed  “Turks Who Don’t Speak Turkish” 
(Murat 2005:602) Ostensibly, they speak differently because of their lack of 
education while being essentially Turkish (Kutlay 2000). From 1985-2000 
the Kurdish question was defined as a “terror problem” in Turkish political 
discourse and in the media.  
  
However, the politicians and media also started to acknowledge Kurdish 
existence, as former Prime Minister, Ecevit did, without using the word 
“Kurds” (Murat 2005). At the same time, the extreme nationalists continue 
to deny Kurdish existence and reduce the Kurdish question to one of 
“terror”. The former Turkish Prime Minister and State President, Suleyman 
Demirel, made clear the hegemonic power struggle between the Kurds and 
the Turkish state when he stated that the Kurds had resisted “29 times” in 
Turkey, adding that each time “we put down the separatists” (Candar 2005) 
promising the PKK, to put down this “last separatist terror”. The Kurds as a 
subordinated group are seen as a threat - “separatist terror” - for opposing 
the imagined Turkish political community. However as Gramsci pointed 
out, even if the dominant group dominates others through coercion, “it 
must continue to “lead” as well (1971:57–58 ). The use of the Turkish 
state’s monopoly of force caused a huge reaction amongst the 
subordinated Kurds and gave rise to political, military and cultural 
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contestation of the imagined Turkish community that resulted in the rise of 
the Kurdistan Workers Party. 
 
2.1. The Turkish state, PKK and power struggle for the “nation” 
The PKK was established as a Marxist-Leninist student movement in the 
Turkish capital city, Ankara, in 1978 and its initial aim was to establish a 
unified, independent socialist Kurdish state. The organizational structure of 
the early period was characterised by “Leninist democratic centralism”. 
While many Kurdish left-wing, “outlawed” organisations and parties (PSK, 
DDKO, KUK, KAWA and Rizgari)10  in Turkey fought politically for the 
rights of the Kurds, the PKK started an armed struggle against the Turkish 
state in 1984. Within a short time its guerrilla war developed.  By the 1990s 
it could control Kurdish cities after dark and  was judged to “have gained 
strong support since the inception of the armed struggle in 1984” from both 
the Kurds in Turkey and in Europe (Hirschler 2001:146). 
 
For a long time, the Turkish state and media have claimed that the nation 
is unified in its war against the “separatists”. In so doing, they have created 
the political slogan “All together from Hakkari to Edirne” - an imagined 
community stretching from the Kurdish populated city on the borders with 
Iran and Iraq in eastern Anatolia, to a Turkish populated city on the border 
with Greece, in western Turkey. Thus, this slogan is both a geographic and 
political, symbolic image of the forcible assimilation of ethnic “others” by 
the Turkish state.  
 
The Turkish state’s response to the PKK was characterised by 
indiscriminate violence against all Kurds who lived in the Kurdish regions of 
Turkey and even Istanbul where Kurdish young people had been 
radicalized to participate in the PKK. The Turkish military destroyed and 
burned three thousand Kurdish villages11, leading to the internal 
displacement of the Kurds in Turkey. This caused more problems rather 
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than providing a solution for the Turkish state. The war spread from 
Kurdistan to Turkey. Kurds became internally displaced, causing ethnic 
tension and hostility between Turks and Kurds. Many of these displaced 
people were forced to move to large cities like Amed (in Turkish 
Diyarbakir), Istanbul, Izmir, and Mersin and also to Western Europe. The 
internally displaced Kurds suffer from massive unemployment, housing and 
health problems. Moreover, internally displaced Kurds face daily attacks 
from the police and nationalist groups, and multiple forms of discrimination. 
According to the official estimate, 40,000 people were killed during the 
conflict. The human rights organisations’ estimates exceed 40,000, 
blaming the government for the killing and “disappearances” of human 
rights activists, journalists, Kurdish politicians and other civilians (Beşikçi 
2009).  
 
At the end of the 1980s, the state and the media began to use the term 
“Kurdish”, but did not accept the claim for a separate national identity. They 
saw Kurdishness as just one folkloric variation among many within the 
mosaic of Turkey’s people. Nevertheless, accepting the “separatists” as 
Kurds, created a dilemma for the state and media because state ideology 
had denied Kurdish existence up till then. If the state accepted that the so- 
called “separatists” were Kurds and citizens of Turkey, then this meant 
firstly, the recognition of Kurdish identity, and secondly, according to the 
state’s own ideology, the existence of an ethnic group other than the Turks 
within the borders of the state which could endanger the integrity of 
Turkey. For this reason, the state and media reinforced a hegemonic 
construction of the Turkish nation-state as a homogenous, unified, 
inclusive imagined community, using the geographic term “the people of 
East and Southeast Anatolia” to denote the Kurdish people. 
 
However, “[a] movement of national independence will not only claim that 
‘we are a nation’, but, in so doing, it will be demanding the political 
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entitlements which are presumed to follow from being a nation” (Billig  
1995:63). Therefore, the Kurds established their own legal pro-Kurdish 
political parties12  which have been banned by the Turkish Constitutional 
Court on the grounds of separatism and/or supporting the Kurdistan 
Workers Party. After all the Kurdish political parties were closed down, 
other pro-Kurdish parties replaced them. These parties play a crucial role 
in legitimizing Kurdishness and running local government in Kurdish 
populated regions, highlighting Kurdish issues in the Turkish Parliament. 
 
Öcalan's capture and handover to the Turkish state by the CIA in 1998, 
(see chapter VI) brought a shift in the political strategy of the PKK. The 
PKK’s initial aim of establishing a unified, independent socialist Kurdish 
state shifted to establishing a democratic confederation of Kurds in Iran, 
Iraq, Turkey and Syria without changing the respective states’ national 
borders13 and a democratized “nation” in Turkey. This has caused anger 
amongst Kurds in Turkey and also in the diaspora. 
 
The PKK was not able to reach the large and diverse Kurdish population 
through armed struggle alone and has attempted to transform itself from a 
military power to a legal political movement in Turkey. It decreased the 
intensity of armed struggle and changed its political demands so they were 
more acceptable to the Turkish public.  Moreover, the PKK as a political 
organization aimed to create a movement of diverse identities and broader 
appeal, going beyond the “corporate” interests of the Kurdish population, 
through legal political, cultural and economic struggles  to create a 
“national–popular collective will” (Dalmaz 2011) for a “war of position” – the 
long haul contesting within the institutions of civil society. This could be 
described as “building up a broad bloc of varied social forces, unified by a 
common conception of the world,” (Simon 1991:25) capable of challenging 
the hegemony of the dominant social group and state policies.  
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This transformation has caused PKK sympathisers deep disappointment 
and the organisation has lost a significant number of members and 
financial support from diaspora Kurds. However the PKK’ support extends 
to thousands of communities in Europe, North America, and the Middle 
East. Over the years, it has been transformed into a contemporary 
transnational party which also addresses ecological issues and multi-
cultural society in the fight for the democratisation of Turkey and the rights 
of all the Kurds in Kurdistan and in the diaspora. While the other Kurdish 
parties’ influence remained confined to the social circles, region, dialect 
and tribe of their leaders, the PKK’s origins in left-wing movements 
ensured it mobilized against regionalism and tribalism. While PKK left-wing 
ideology clearly diverges from a primordialist argument, it has constructed 
an imagined political community, based on secularism, the rejection of 
regionalism and tribalism, and the dissemination of Kurdish language and 
culture. It has promoted the linguistic and cultural aspects of its political 
discourse in Turkey and internationally to force Turkey to change its 
exclusivist nation-building project.  
 
Moreover as Anderson (1983), Gellner (1983) and Billig (1995) argue the 
creation of national consciousness is “accompanied by the creation of 
national histories” (Billig  1991:71). The nation is not only a political 
concept. National movements and nation-states “create their own histories 
or interpretations” (Billig 1991:71). The construction of contemporary 
Kurdishness needed to invent a historical root. The new imagined Kurdish 
political community invented different myths to explain Kurdish roots, in a 
similar vein to the Turkish Historical Thesis (Turk Tarih Tezi) and The Sun 
Language Theory (Gunes Dil Theorisi), published in 1936, which claimed 
that “the Turkish language is the source for all existing languages in the 
world”  (Hirschler 2001:147, Beşikçi 1974, Hassanpour 1992) 
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Kurdish nationalists reinterpret these myths to legitimate their resistance to 
the Turkish state. A key example is the celebration of the New Year, 
Newroz. The celebration welcomes the spring and New Year according to 
Zoroastrian tradition. Since the 1980s, the PKK has reinterpreted this 
celebration in a politicised vein, turning it into a day of opposition to the 
“Turkish occupation”, demanding recognition of a distinctive Kurdish 
identity. It is claimed that New Year commemorates the liberation of the 
ancient Kurds from the tyrant Dehak who used to eat the sons of his 
Kurdish subjects. The smith, Kawa successfully rebelled and killed the 
tyrant, thereby freeing the Kurds. The PKK identify themselves with the 
“hero Kawa” and the Turkish state with the tyrant Dehak, thus re-
interpreting this ancient myth in a nationalist manner.  The Turkish state 
had banned the Newroz celebrations until the 1990s. However, in 1995 the 
state introduced for the first time on TV and through other media its own 
interpretation of Newroz: “In 1995, Newroz was declared to be a Turkish 
holiday commemorating the day the Turks left their Central Asian 
homeland, Ergenekon. Newroz was now referred to in its Turkified version 
as Nevruz”(Hirschler 2001:154). 
 
But despite the use of ancient myths and historical figures, the Kurdish 
national movement has a modernising function in Kurdish society while the 
Turkish state has relied on traditional Kurdish leaders, the religious and 
feudal tribal chiefs who have co-operated with it. The Turkish state has 
ruled in Kurdistan through a state of emergency, military force, the use of 
Islam and by exerting influence over the Kurdish feudal chefs in Kurdistan. 
But the Kurdish national movement, including the PKK as an alternative 
nation-building movement, has focused on secularisation of the society, 
dissolving the feudal system amongst Kurds and establishing their own 
political parties, newspapers and other civil society institutions. Kurdish 
nationalists use elements of what they claim is ancient Kurdish culture to 
construct a new, imagined Kurdish community. Their view of history and 
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historical rituals and practices reconstructs an ancient Kurdish community 
for the purpose of creating a viable modern Kurdish identity with a view to 
reinforcing the project of Kurdish nationalism.  
 
In August 2005, the current Prime Minister, Erdogan spoke of the Kurdish 
question in the Kurdish area, acknowledging “there is a Kurdish question 
and the Kurdish question is my problem. The state made some mistakes 
and we will solve this problem in a democratic process” (Yeni Safak 2005). 
But such statements of responsibility and commitment to broadcasting in 
Kurdish have not been anchored in the constitution. It is still possible that 
this recognition could change into a denial of Kurdish existence. Recently 
Erdogan  stated that “there is not a Kurdish question in this country 
anymore. I reject this claim… There are the problems of my Kurdish 
brothers but there is not a Kurdish question anymore” (Erdem 2011).  
 
However when the armed struggle between the Turkish military and the 
PKK started again, destabilizing the flow of petrol and gas from Asia and 
the Middle East through the Kurdish region of Turkey, international 
pressure on the Turks and the PKK increased. The hopes of the Turkish 
government of winning the local election in Kurdistan proved hollow 
because the former pro-Kurdish DTP party won a majority. Therefore, the 
Turkish government talked publicly about a “Kurdish Opening” or “Kurdish 
Initiative”, later renamed the “Democratic Initiative”. But this Turkish 
government initiative lasted only a short time and mass arrests of elected 
Kurdish politicians followed in 2009 and 2010. Constitutional jurist Prof. 
Mustafa Erdoğan states in an interview with journalist Nese Düzel of the 
Taraf newspaper that “indeed the ruling AKP government aims to get the 
Kurds on its side and integrate them in the system”(Düzel 2010) 
demonstrating the  continuing hegemonic power struggle between the 
Turkish state and the Kurds.  
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As this brief history has shown, the ethno-national struggle continues 
through the struggle for hegemony. The Turkish-dominated state has 
attempted to impose “a national identity that is based on a 
conceptualization of a Turkish nation whose cornerstones are cultural unity 
and homogeneity, “ (Kirisci 2009:8) political, as well as ideological 
hegemony over other identity groups. In doing this, the Turkish state has 
sought to create a common sense of Turkish nationalism. The Turkish 
state has sought to build a “historic bloc” in the Gramscian sense of the 
term, against the potential threat to their “imagined community”.  This 
constitutes more than simply a political alliance between social forces 
represented by classes or social groups. It indicates the integration of a 
variety of different class interests expressed within the society (Morton 
2010:6) to bring “about not only a unison of economic and political 
aims, but also intellectual and moral unity . . . on a ‘universal’ plane” 
(Gramsci 1971:181–2). However this attempt to create a nationalistic 
common sense has been rejected for decades by the second largest ethnic 
group in Turkey, the Kurds. So Kurdish nationalism has, over a long 
period, created its own imagined community and constructed an alternative 
common sense. This can be interpreted in political and cultural terms as a 
counter-hegemonic “historic bloc”.  
2.2. Hegemonic Struggle over the “Imagined Community” 
According to Gavrilos, identities are “relationally constructed and 
negotiated between differently empowered groups” and therefore can only 
be understood by historicizing their struggles (2002:427). Therefore a 
historical overview is required to see how identity has been articulated in 
the struggle for hegemony.   
 
The Turkish republic gradually established its ideological base through 
institutionalization and standardization of an invented Turkish history and 
language.  As Colak has argued:  
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“With the first attempts to build the institutions of a 
nation-state during the early years of the Republic of 
Turkey, a common national language was seen to be 
essential to the development of a mass 
consciousness of being a part of a cultural whole” 
(Colak 2004:67).  
 
Therefore, the Turkish nationalists invested in the construction of a new 
Turkish language. The Turkish Language Society (Turk Dil Kurumu) was 
established to create a pure Turkish (“oz Turkce”). In order to distinguish 
the Republic from the Ottoman Empire, the new, pure Turkish used Latin, 
rather than Arab, script.  Mustafa Kemal introduced “new Turkish letters” 
on 9 August 1928, purging the Turkish language of Arabic and Farsi in 
order “to spread culture among the people. It should be a language 
through which the flow of thought and idea from above is possible in order 
to publicize and inculcate culture” (“Gazi Turkcesi”, original publication 
1932:114 quoted in Colak 2004:68). The official “scientification of 
language” (Colak 2004:81) was associated with stress on its political role in 
the formation of a new culture from above.  
 
In order to establish and consolidate the imagined Turkish political 
imagined community, the Turkish state punished Kurdish intellectuals who 
published articles, books on or in Kurdish and imprisoned them on charges 
of separatism. As a result of the Turkish military coup in 1981, an article 
was added to the Turkish constitution stating that “Freedom of expression 
and dissemination of thought is not allowed in languages (Kurdish Y.K) 
prohibited by law” (1982 Constitution Article 26, par. 3 and also Article 28, 
par. 2), and in 1985 another article (No. 2987) was passed proscribing the 
use of written and spoken languages other than the “mother tongue of 
Turkish citizens”. Billig argues that:  
 
“the achievement of national hegemony is well 
illustrated by the triumph of official national 
languages and the suppression of rivals...to 
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consolidate their hold on state power. The 1982 
Constitution of Turkey specially forbids any party 
from concerning itself “with the defence, development 
or diffusion of any non-Turkish language or culture” 
(in Entessar 1989 quoted in Billig  1995:27-28). 
 
However the suppressed Kurdishness has been reconstructed in Turkish 
prisons, in the diaspora and in the mountains. This subordinated 
Kurdishness caused “an organic crisis” which the Turkish state faced a 
challenge. Therefore, during Turgut Ozal’s period as Prime Minister in 
1991, the Turkish government repealed the bill forbidding the use of non-
Turkish languages in the hope of defusing the ethnic armed struggle. Billig 
argues that “sometimes when hegemony is assured, or when it is later 
threatened, this legal suppression of language is relaxed, either in the 
interest of recapturing a harmless heritage, or to ward off demands from 
separatist irredentist group” (1995:37). Yet, while after 1991 speaking 
Kurdish was allowed, writing and learning Kurdish remained criminalized. 
 
The contradictions of Turkey’s language policy with regard to Kurdish can 
be shown by two examples. The co-chairperson of the Democratic Society 
Party (DTP), which was banned in 2009, Ahmet Turk stated that the 
government “are spreading the propaganda that Kurdish is freely spoken. 
We wanted to see whether this was true”. He announced that he would talk 
in Kurdish in the parliamentary meeting of the DTP on February 24 2009, 
during UNESCO’s World Languages Week. When he started to talk in 
Kurdish, the state television channel TRT 3 cut the broadcast and a TV 
announcer read a statement: “Since no language other than Turkish can 
be used in the parliamentary meetings according to the Constitution of the 
Turkish Republic and the Political Parties Law, we had to cut our 
broadcast”. 
 
Another example is the prosecution of Kurds for using letters not found in 
the Turkish alphabet e.g. q, w, and x, so-called “non-Turkish letters” which 
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are used in Kurdish. Many families who gave their children Kurdish names 
containing “Kurdish letters”, and Kurdish politicians like Diyarbakir Mayor, 
Baydemir faced criminal prosecution for using “illegal letters”. The 
constitution and laws are designed to maintain Turkish ethnic and cultural 
dominance: “The Turkish state, with its territory and nation, is an indivisible 
entity. Its language is Turkish” (Turkish Constitution Article 3, 1982). Act 
1353 of November 1, 1928 on Adoption and Application of Turkish Letters 
forbids the use of any “non-Turkish letters”, though this law is not enforced 
with respect to the use of English in schools or universities. These articles 
are only used to criminalize Kurdish. 
 
In 2001, the Turkish government commissioned the Radio and Television 
Higher Board (RTUK) to prepare regulation of “Radio and TV Broadcasts in 
Languages and Dialects Traditionally used by Turkish Citizens in Their 
Daily Lives”. Following this regulation, the state started its first Turkish-
subtitled television broadcast in Kurdish for 30 minutes a day, 2 hours a 
week. In 2009, before the local elections, the Turkish Prime Minister, 
Erdogan became the first Turkish politician to greet Kurdish audiences in 
Kurdish on the newly established Turkish state, 24-hour broadcasting 
channel, TRT6 (in Kurdish TRT Şeş) which “aims at the unity of the country 
and to protect interests of states and individuals in line with the 
Constitution and provide broadcasts contributing to the democratic 
awareness of the country’s people” (TRT6 2009). This “structural change” 
(Gill 1990) can be analysed from a Gramscian perspective that hegemony 
is not static, but a struggle to “lead”. Providing news and other 
programmes for Kurds in Kurdish language is the state’s attempt to 
maintain popular consent in a society in which the national project is 
contested by an alternative imagining of peoplehood. This has forced the 
Turkish state to adapt its language policy in the face of Kurdish 
oppositional positions.  
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The journalist Akyol (2009) states : 
“TRT 6's real aim, it appears, is to undercut the 
appeal of Roj TV, a Kurdish satellite network 
broadcasting out of Europe that is extremely popular 
among Turkey's Kurds. Ankara has accused Roj of 
being a mouthpiece for the outlawed Kurdistan 
Workers Party (PKK) and of spreading anti-Turkish 
propaganda. But the channel, which shows a mix of 
news, music videos and other programs, has been 
able to become as popular as it is, because there has 
been no other alternative out there”(in 
byegm.gov.tr,15.01.2009) (See Turkish state 
attempts to close down the Europe-based Kurdish 
transnational MED TV and its successors Medya TV 
and Roj TV  in chapter IV). 
 
The state broadcasts now in Kurdish but that does not mean that the 
Turkish state and its ideological institutions is willing to share political 
power with the Kurds. Kurds are still not allowed to broadcast in Kurdish. 
This policy is a good example of how hegemony in civil society is:  
“only possible through public protection by the state. For example, 
government agencies will grant television licenses to stations that run 
approved programming, and the governmental authorities reserve the right 
to approve textbooks for use in public schools. These relations are 
maintained by force in the last instance (the police will shut down a ‘pirate’ 
television station or remove a book from the shelves of a school library” 
(Litowitz 2000:526).  
 
This brief survey of the historical struggles around Turkish and Kurdish 
language shows how means of coercion (legal prohibitions, imprisonment 
of writers and speakers of Kurdish) and consent (educating children in 
Turkish), as well as mixtures of both, characterize the struggle for 
hegemony. Relaxing the prohibition of Kurdish and most Kurdish language 
broadcasting by Turkish state television can be seen as an attempt to 
recapture hegemony against an increasingly strong Kurdish counter-
hegemonic public. Language is a key issue negotiated within changing 
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political and social contexts by the state and the Kurdish nationalist 
movement (Kaplan 2006).  
2.3. The Kurdish nationalist movement 
The Kurdish nationalist movement has employed changing notions of 
common sense to disseminate its nationalism to Kurds within Turkey. It 
had to change its concepts and dreams of a nation state. At the beginning 
of the 70s and increasingly in 80s, the discursive politics of the Kurdish 
nationalists was to fight against “colonization of Kurdistan” through armed 
struggle. The following statement of PKK’s first manifesto makes clear that 
“Kurdistan is an inter-state colony. A national liberation struggle is 
unavoidable duty in order to gain the freedom and independence of the 
Kurdish people” (Ozcan 2005:93 ). 
 
However later they came to understand that they could win consent in the 
Kurdish population whose internal and external world were being 
“colonized” by the language policy and education system into accepting 
Turkish ethnic domination as common sense. Moreover the Kurdish 
nationalists understood that they would not be able to challenge the 
coercive control of the state through its police and military power, so they 
set about building alliances with the Turkish people. Therefore in the 90s, 
the Kurdish national movement started to establish legal parties within the 
framework of Turkish law, a strategy called “becoming part of Turkey” 
(Turkiyelilesmek) and later named “democratic confederation” and now 
“democratic autonomy” 
 
 The question of political agency has been a subject of some controversy 
in recent years within the Kurdish political establishment. This new strategy 
rejected the idea of an independent Kurdistan and advocated solving the 
Kurdish issue through the democratization of Turkey. It aimed for the 
democratization of the Turkish nation-state, and within this framework 
sought autonomy for the Kurds without touching the national border of 
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Turkey. The PKK and its imprisoned leader Öcalan wanted to achieve a 
federation between Turkish and Kurdish people. This new political strategy 
turned the struggle for domination from a coercive moment into a struggle 
for consent in civil society. This means that “the war of position”, rather 
than a frontal war of attrition, became the crucial way to change the 
system. 
 
In the meantime, the Kurdish national movement discovered the power of 
the diaspora, which is distant from the direct experience of coercion by the 
dominant group in Turkey. In the diaspora, Kurdish nationalists can more 
freely disseminate their messages, symbols and language through different 
agencies, including transnational media. Therefore, they started to publish 
newspapers and established a transnational TV station in Europe which 
created an interconnected popular Kurdish imagined community within 
Turkey and in the diaspora. 
 
In Europe, Kurdish and Turkish migrants live in civil societies free of the 
direct control of the Turkish state and continue simultaneous and multi-
level struggles on an international level, creating, disseminating and 
legitimizing its “Weltanschauung” (Gramsci 1971:381). Turkish and Kurdish 
migrants lead their hegemonic struggle through demonstrations, media and 
lobbying for the homeland. The hegemonic struggle to create imagined 
communities has spread to Turkish and Kurdish migrants living in Europe 
to whom contesting nationalist symbols, language and meanings are 
disseminated through the media and the migrants interpret and create 
meaning out of these media texts and images. 
2.4. Nationalism and Media “Beyond Geography” 
Agnew claims that nationalism is never “beyond geography” (1989:167, 
quoted in Billig  1995:75) “the nation place has to be imagined, just as 
much as the national community does” (Billig  1995:75). The Kurdish cause 
came to be internationalised through key events: Saddam Hussein’s use of 
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chemical weapons against Kurds in Halabja in 1988, the Gulf War in 1991, 
the collapse of Saddam’s regime in 2003 and the progress of Turkey’s 
application for membership of the EU, begun in 1987. Kurdish migrant 
mobilisation and lobbying have given more power to the PKK in the region 
than that Federal President of Iraq, Jalal Talabani’s PUK or KRG or 
President of Iraqi Kurdistan, Masud Barzani’s KDP. Today the PKK has 
“developed broad organizational structures and displayed an enormous 
capacity to mobilize Kurds both within and without Turkey especially in 
Europe” (Hirschler 2001:146). If we understand hegemony primarily as “a 
strategy for the gaining of the active consent of the masses through their 
self-organization” (Buci-Glucksmann 1982:119), the Kurdish national 
movement’s creation of its own media and cultural centres from the Middle 
East to Europe can be seen as a successful attempt at creating hegemony. 
 
The Turkish and Kurdish migrants moved to Europe at different times for 
different reasons and have reproduced “their nationhood” in Europe. The 
first large-scale migration was the guest-worker wave that started in the 
1960s to Germany, and later to Sweden and other European countries. 
The settlement countries acted generously in allowing Turkish embassies 
to control their citizens in terms of education (Sirkeci 2006). Thus, the 
guest-worker children attended “Turkish schools” run by embassies 
because the guest workers were supposed to return to their homeland. 
Turkey gave permission for the Turkish media to be distributed in Europe 
in order to propagate Turkishness and keep the loyalty to the imagined 
nation alive amongst so-called guest workers. 
 
However after the military coup in 1971, followed by the coup in 1981, a 
significant group of mostly left-oriented Turks and Kurds fled to Europe. 
Here they continued their political opposition to the Turkish military regime. 
This made the Turkish state aware of a possible threat to its system. 
Subsequently the Turkish media in Europe started to portray left-wing 
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individuals and groups as the “enemy of state” and “traitor of the country”. 
Hürriyet and Milliyet led a campaign of slander against some intellectuals 
and artists (Abakay 1988:60). In the late 1970s, the Turkish State created 
“a space of control in the host countries of the immigrants (pressure for the 
ban on illegal organizations, campaigns of Turkish politicians by the 
migrants, exportation of the Turk-Islamic synthesis) (Rigoni 2002:2). 
 
When the Kurds started to establish their communities and focused on 
reproducing Kurdish language and culture in the diaspora, they met with 
resistance from the Turkish state. (Hassanpour 1992:135) For example, 
the Turkish Embassy in Copenhagen tried to stop the Nordic Cultural 
Foundation in Denmark programme of teacher training for Kurdish 
language education of migrants, “by pointing out that participants were still 
Turkish citizens and were, thus, not entitled to break Turkish law, whatever 
country they were in, and in Turkish law Kurdish is a forbidden language” 
(Skutnabb-Kengas 1981:279-80, quote in Hasanpour 1992:135).   Such 
state invention increased at the end of the 1980s and at the beginning of 
the 90s, when politicized Kurdish migrants consolidated their separate 
Kurdish communities, publishing magazines and newspapers and finally 
broadcasting on MED TV and later its successors Medya TV and Roj TV. 
 
Today a 100 Turkish and 17 Kurdish TV Channels broadcast in Europe 
and several Turkish and 2 Kurdish daily newspapers are available to 
migrants in Europe, in addition to 24-hour access to the Internet. This has 
created different identities and political positions amongst Turkish and 
Kurdish migrants. Each of these channels and newspapers tries to create 
their own imagined community in accordance with the projects of these 
diverse political movements in Europe, in Turkey and the Kurdish 
territories. This highlights the deficiency in Billig’s theoretical framework 
which does not take account of the diversity of political views of different 
newspapers. My empirical research shows that people do not automatically 
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agree with these media, even if they use political and geographical terms 
and definitions disseminated by them. Migrants talk about the news in 
cafés, community centres and at home. This awakes an “alternative 
nationalism and other ways of imagining peoplehood” (Billig  1995:28). 
Therefore, the Turkish state sees the Kurdish channels and newspaper as 
a threat to its own imagined community in Turkey and Europe. 
 
Turkey’s battle with the Kurdish media and institutions can be defined as 
the defence and reproduction of Turkey’s imagined community both 
internally and internationally. For example, a crisis arose with Denmark 
over Kurdish broadcasting from Denmark on Roj TV  - formerly Medya TV - 
and the people who gave an interview to Kurdish Roj TV  or who watched 
this channel were punished. The satellite antennae in Kurdish territory (so 
called Eastern and South-eastern Anatolia of Turkey) were also destroyed. 
The invisible negotiated struggle between Kurdish nationalists and the 
Turkish state over their attempts to create their imagined community has 
been transnationalized and deterritorialized and continues in socio-political 
ways. The media is the key tool in this process. 
3. Media and Conflict 
Anderson and Billig have focused on the role of the media in disseminating 
and legitimizing the ideological discourse of the nation, its symbols and 
meanings for the imagined community. Anderson states that “Nationalism 
has to be understood by aligning it, not with self-consciously held political 
ideologies, but with the large cultural system that preceded it, out of which, 
as well as against which, it came into being (1991:13). In this sense, the 
role of the Turkish and Kurdish media in disseminating the imagined 
Turkish and Kurdish communities in Europe will be examined. The media 
are linked with the dominant Turkish or Kurdish power structures and their 
key actors, through their financial and legal dependence on the state, 
socialisation with the politicians, bureaucrats, military and business elites 
and shared ideology. As neo-Gramscians have argued, power structures 
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are “supported and promoted by forms of elite interaction that have forged 
common perspectives among business, state officials, and representatives 
of international organizations favouring the logic of capitalist market 
relations” (Morton 2010:163, see also Gill and Law 1989).  
 
In the framework of these power structures, the “official Turkish and 
Kurdish media” are juxtaposed in their reporting of the conflict, but both 
sides’ reporting  shows things “in black and white” without shades of grey 
(Duran 1998:36). 
3.1. The Turkish media and their position in the conflict 
The Turkish media were established by the state in 1929 which reduced its 
function to propagating the nationalistic and hegemonic ideology of the 
Turkish nation-state. Adak states that: “in 1929, the nationalist discourse 
that was already a dominant part of the new regime turned into a 
hegemonic ideology in Turkey….. [and] found [its] place in its publishing 
organ as well” (2004b:87). The newspapers  “Hakimiyeti Milliye” and 
“Cumhuriyet” – “which was published in a printing house that the state had 
confiscated from its Armenian owner” (Cemal 2005:456) – acted as the 
ideological apparatuses of the new state to create  “attachment”  and 
“meaning” (Anderson 1991:53) to the nation and effect a nationalist 
transformation.  
 
With the introduction of the multi-party system in 1946, many new 
newspapers joined the Turkish media landscape. The state established its 
own Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (TRT) in 1964 to “broadcast 
on behalf of the state” (TRT 2008). While the state kept its monopoly on 
broadcasting with TRT, the print media did not significantly develop until 
the 1980s and confronted state restriction. The 1960s spring was an 
exception, when the 1961 Constitution allowed press freedom and the 
establishment of civil society, including unions and the first legal left-wing 
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Turkish Workers Party (TIP). However the 1960s movement broke up with 
the military coup in 1971. 
 
The influence of global liberalisation reached Turkey in the mid 1980s 
when Turgut Ozal’s government restructured the economy. The 
liberalisation, privatization policies and spread of communication 
technologies forced Turkey to give up the state monopoly on broadcasting. 
The Law on the Establishment of Radio and Television Enterprises and 
Their Broadcasts, Law No.3984 was passed on 20 April 1994 (RTÜK 
1994).  These policies have changed media ownership in Turkey and 
created new media tycoons very much like Berlusconi or Murdoch. The 
new media proprietors not only own newspapers and TV channels, but are 
also operating in financial services, including mortgages and insurance, in 
energy, industry, construction, trade and tourism. Media functions have 
been reduced to reproducing Turkish “common sense”, promoting tycoons’ 
products and their economic interests. “This metamorphosis led to 
sensationalism, manipulation, disinformation and misinformation in the 
news media, in the very best interest of the media conglomerates instead 
of [in] citizens’ interest” (İnceoğlu and Çınarlı 2007:2)14. 
 
Today the conservative, Islamic government has used its power to create 
its own “henchman” media and closed down Cem Uzan’s multi-sectoral 
and multi-media group. They use state power to control mainstream media 
including through customs’ officers, arrests, harassment, intimidation and 
imprisonment of journalists. The monopolized media split into different 
groups with the support of the AKP ruling government like Feza, Albayrak 
Medya Group, Samanyolu Yayin group, Star Medya Yayıncılık A.Ş and 
Çukurova Holding, while the Dogan Group, Ciner Medya Group, DK 
Gazetecilik Yayıncılık A.Ş support Kemalist ideology, the state propagated 
Turkish nationalism, military as well as the liberal ideas and policies. These 
media groups also support Turkey's candidacy to the European Union. But 
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even with this differentiation of the media, the core principles of the 
broadcasting and publishing based on the Turkish nationalist ideology. 
Turkish media with its different nationalist, Islamic, liberal, pro-European 
perspectives  report on Kurdish issues in the perspective of hegemonic 
and ethnocentric Turkish nationalism. Kurdish identity is still associated 
with “terrorist organisation” and individuals with “separatist terror” (Islamic 
Zaman Newspaper 2009). Duran  explains this with reference to the 
media’s dependence on the state (1998:34) but the dependence of the 
Turkish media on the state is not only economic and financial but above all 
ideological in nature because the publishing policies of the mainstream 
Turkish media is based on the Ethnocentric nationalist ideology of the 
Turkish state. Therefore the function of journalistic occupation is reduced 
to reproduce and legitimize the etho-centric state’s ideology, values, 
symbols, meanings.  
3.2. Representations of the “Kurdish” question in the Turkish media 
Until the 1990s, the main discursive strand in the newspapers close to the 
Turkish state was the denial of the existence of Kurdish ethnicity, culture 
and language. Cultural and linguistic differences were represented as 
signs of regional backwardness, tribal culture or feudality. This policy of 
psychological humiliation by the state and its media alienated and 
marginalized the Kurds in Turkey (Bulut 1992).  Psychological humiliation 
refers here to ideological dominance over subordinated people used to 
shame them about being Kurdish, to prevent them expressing their identity 
and make them internalize the Turkish nationalism. The Kurdish identity 
was depicted in various negative, stereotypical ways such as separatist 
and terrorist. This has had a huge negative psychological impact on the 
Kurdish population and made them feel culturally and socially unvalued. 
This approach was reproduced in newspaper headlines and articles until 
the 2000 (Bulut 1992, Duran 2006).  
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When the war between the Turkish state and the PKK intensified, the 
media discourse on the Kurds changed from “mountain Turks” to “rioters”, 
“Ermeni Dölü - Armenian seed - and “terrorists”. The media discourse used 
here can be understood as “a recontextualizing principle for appropriating 
other discourses [nationalistic, cultural, social, militarist] and bringing them 
into a special relation with each other for the purposes of their 
dissemination and mass consumption" (Chouliaraki 1999:39, also see  
Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999) in order to maintain hegemonic 
domination (see chapter VI  for further discussion on media discourse).  
 
Turkey’s strongly militarist policies are reflected in the media: During the 
most intense phase of the war between the Turkish state and the PKK at 
the end of the 1980s and in the early ‘90s, Turkish journalists joined the 
military operations and relied mainly on military sources, when reporting 
the war, instead of doing independent, investigative journalism. The 
Turkish media published the statements of the military and government 
while columnists wrote docile commentaries, acceptable to the generals. 
The ideological and financial dependency of the Turkish media on the state 
has prevented it from developing an independent and critical distance from 
the state and its military policies (Sezgin and Wall, 2005). 
 
Media proprietors have maintained strong financial links with the military 
and government. In particular Ozal’s government in 1980, Demirel’s and 
Ciller’s governments in the 1990s have used this financial link to silence 
the media and make it tow the military line during the conflict they defined 
as “low intensity war”. In 1995, the then Prime Minister, Tansu Ciller, met 
with representatives of the giant media companies and their editors and 
journalists. She spoke of winning the war through the media (Hürriyet, 
22.03.1995). The Hürriyet columnist, Mr. Eksi wrote that the media had to 
support the government in the battle against the separatist terror 
organization, i.e. the PKK, and Defence Minister, Sezgin called upon 
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journalists to co-operate with the police (Çalışlar 2006). Journalists Duran 
(2006), Mahcupyan (2006) and Calislar (2006) blame their colleagues for 
acting as military officers.  Mahçupyan (2006) points out that the media is 
“a strong actor in the political equation. Therefore, the selection of news 
carries a direct political meaning and indeed we don’t learn about reality” 
(Mahcupyan 2006).  Mahçupyan blames the Turkish media for ignoring the 
Kurdish issue and reducing it to a question of terror. Furthermore, he 
accuses them of manipulating the readers, by deliberately distorting 
events.  
 
Issues related to Kurdish identity, discrimination against Kurds and the 
indiscriminate use of violence against them by the military have not been a 
topic in the best-selling, mainstream Turkish media. Instead the notion of 
national security is a value beyond debate. A recent example of 
manipulation from the Hürriyet newspaper illustrates the position of the 
Turkish media in this conflict. The Umut Bookstore, owned by Seferi 
Yilmaz, in the Semdinli (district of Hakkari) was bombed in November 
2005. One person died during this attack. When bystanders caught the 
perpetrators of the attack and delivered them to police officers, it emerged 
that they were two junior military officers, Ali Kaya and Ozcan Ildeniz and a 
PKK informant of the Gendarmerie Intelligence and Anti-Terror Unit JITEM. 
The investigations found evidence that the attack was likely backed by the 
Gendarmerie Forces. Yet, Yaşar Büyükanıt, then Commander of the Army, 
backed these two junior officers. When the Prosecutor, Ferhat Sarıkaya, 
began investigating the gang’s possible connections with high-ranking 
officials including Yaşar Büyükanıt, he was disbarred by the Supreme 
Board of Prosecutors and Judges. The two junior officers were sentenced 
to 39 years, but the Supreme Court of Appeal decided that a military court 
should be in charge of the investigation. Both officers were released after 
their first trial in the military court. 
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During this case, Hürriyet published a report on the alleged connections of 
the bookseller Seferi Yilmaz to a Chairman of the Kurdistan Democratic 
Confederation (KCK), Murat Karayilan. The report suggested that “the 
organisation [i.e. KCK] used this incident to blame the Turkish military. 
[General Fevzi Turkeri] stresses the military did not participate in this 
game” (Gurel and Özturk 2005). Hurried supported this report with a 
manipulated photo-montage showing KCK Chairman Karayilan and 
bookshop owner Mr. Seferi Yilmaz next to each other at the bookshop. 
 
 
3.1. The original photo 
 
3.2. The photo-montage 
 
While the pro-Kurdish Ongar Political and Kurdistan Post denounced this 
media fabrication, other newspapers did not report it.  
3.3. Kurdish media: challenging imagined “Turkishness” 
The first Kurdish newspaper Kurdistan was published in Cairo in 1898 and 
moved from Cairo to the UK and Switzerland owing to financial problems 
and persecution in the Ottoman Empire. Other newspapers like Ark (1908), 
Amid-I Sedan vet Penman (1909), Yuban (1913), Jin (1918) and Iran 
 145 
(1923), Hagar (in Syria, 1923), Galatea (in Mahanadi, Iranian 
Kurdistan,1936), Intiman (1943) which promoted Kurdish nationalism in 
different parts of Kurdistan have been able to publish.   
 
While the restriction on the use of Kurdish language and publishing in 
Kurdish began in Turkey in the 1920s, Kurds founded other 
communications media to maintain their language. So they first broadcast 
on radio in 1924 from Red Kurdistan in the Soviet Union. Other radio 
stations followed:- in 1939 Baghdad Kurdish radio began;  during World 
War II, an anti-Nazi radio broadcast from Haifa in Palestine; in 1955, 
Erivan radio from Radon Rewind broadcast a programme in Kurdish and in 
1957 Egyptian Kurdish radio started up. Iran reacted to Egyptian Kurdish 
radio broadcasting with the establishment of the first Kurdish radio in 
Kermanshah in 1958. Then the first Kurdish television was established in 
Kirkuk in 1968 by the Iraqi government in order to control the Kurdish 
uprising and curb Iranian influence. In 1963, Kurdistan radio was 
established by Kurdish nationalists in Iraqi Kurdistan. Turkey reacted to the 
setting up of Kurdish radio in Egypt with a fierce statement, the first 
documented reaction of Turkey to Kurdish broadcasting, culminating in 
intensified denunciations in the 90s. 
         
Some of these radio stations lasted a decade and disappeared because 
most of them were operated by certain external powers and ideologies to 
control Kurdish nationalism.  But these radios were listened to in different 
parts of Kurdistan and had a huge impact on the development of Kurdish 
culture and language, creating a collective consciousness amongst Kurds 
of being one people - “we “. The most influential radio was Erivan Radio 
(1955) which broadcast in the Kurdish Kumauni dialect and had large 
hidden audiences in Kurdistan region in Turkey where broadcasting and 
publishing in Kurdish was strictly prohibited. 
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According to the chronology set out by Kemal Burkay, the former leader of 
the Socialist party of Kurdistan, whom I interviewed in Stockholm (07 June 
2007), the Kurdish media was set up in Turkish in the 60s and 70s in 
Turkey but met with state harassment and confiscation and was finally shut 
down in 1979.  However, the main shift in government strategy, took place 
under the liberal policies of the Turgut Ozal government in 1991, when the 
ban on Kurdish was officially lifted. “Several Kurdish journals moved their 
offices from Europe to Turkey. New Kurdish journals were also 
established, and there was a veritable boom in Kurdish publishing”  (van 
Bruinessen 1998:2)  
 
However Turkey has continued its censorship. Turkish and Kurdish media 
were and still are not allowed to investigate issues surrounding the 
Kurdish-Turkish ethno-national conflict or and criticize state policies and 
military.  In a democracy, the function of the media is conceptualized as 
watchdog to hold government and state institutions accountable.  However 
the democratic character of a regime plays a vital role in upholding or 
maintaining press freedom and freedom of speech, opinion (Whitten 
(Whitten-Woodring 2009, Popescuy 2001). Without press freedom, media 
cannot act as a Fourth Estate and hold decision makers in accountable.  
 
Current academic debate about censorship in Europe thematises invasions 
of privacy, distinction between  private and public, self-censorship and the 
ownership of media (Belsey 1995). Yet, in Turkey, the official power applies 
coercive control of media because there is no transparent, open and 
democratic system for the citizens (Popescu 2001).  Military, politicians 
and dominant social groups attempt to win public support, credibility or 
legitimize their political and economic position. For this purpose they 
control the media (Poe et al. 1999). Most censorship takes place in the 
name of “national interest” and “public interest’ (Gibert 1995:141) therefore 
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the nature of the regime plays a vital role in censorship policies (Choi and 
James 2006). 
 
Where the democratic system works, there control of the media is not 
coercive but where the regime, law, institutions are highly doctrinated, the 
authorities apply the coercive control of media (Popescu 2001). In addition, 
official and non-official restrictions on freedom of speech become an 
important issue. 
 
In such situations, the pro-government media are sponsored through 
“lucrative government advertising” (Popescu 2001:6), the critical media is 
confronted with constitutional restrictions, financial pressure, confiscation 
of newspapers issues and censorship. 
 
Journalists are subjected to denial of access to official and unofficial 
information, resources intimidation, physical attacks and threats, 
imprisonment and even murders (Popescu 2001).  The voice of 
subordinated social groups and individuals either disappear or are 
represented negatively. In such circumstances, professionalism of 
journalistic occupation and ethics are ignored and journalist self-censorship 
becomes an ordinary practice. Journalists become part of the political 
establishment, rather than acting as a Fourth Estate. These censorship 
policies “exclude certain groups from participation in political debate that 
characterizes the political life of the communities” and “dissentient voices” 
are suppressed (Gilbert 1995:148 -149). Moreover the aim of censorship in 
Turkey is to prevent the Kurds to establish and disseminate their “common 
sense” which challenges Turkishness. 
 
Freedom of speech and belief and press freedom is guaranteed by UN’s 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Turkey is one of the 
signatories. However the implementation remains on paper. Civil society is 
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understood in Turkish state context  as a part of process of constructing 
and dissemination Turkishness (Dikici-Bilgin 2009). 
 
 
Many Kurdish newspapers were attacked through the judicial system and 
the armed forces. The correspondents and distributors of these 
newspapers were arrested. Between 1990 and 1995, 26 correspondents 
and distributors were killed by state forces. In 1994, Turkish Generals and 
Prime Minister, Tansu Ciller openly declared that the “separatist media” 
should be silenced. Two weeks later the pro-Kurdish daily Özgür Ülke’s 
headquarters and another two offices were bombed.  But the government 
could not prevent Kurds from publishing their newspapers again the 
following day. Moreover the state judicial system monitored the 
newspapers before allowing them to be published or distributed.  The 
Kurdish media chose to highlight censorship by the state by publishing 
their newspapers with several pages of empty spaces, with only the news 
headline minus the story. Above the empty space there was only one word 
in bold: “Sansurludur” – censored (See the pictures below).  The state 
understood that this policy was embarrassing and closed down Yeni 
Politika in 1995. 
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3.3. Censored Yeni Politika Newspaper 
 
 
3.4. Censored Yeni Politika Newspaer 
 
In particular, in the 1990s, the state made great efforts to ban pro-Kurdish 
newspapers in Kurdish areas and violated the right to free communication 
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to get the news when the state of emergency (OHAL) was operative in 
every corner of Kurdistan. All the aforementioned newspapers were 
subject to heavy fines, forcing them to close and re-establish themselves 
under new names, disrupting distribution15 and criminalising readers. In 
response to European pressures, the use of Kurdish language in 
publications and broadcasts has been allowed since 2002, but this policy 
has not been put into practice. Even though nowadays the state 
broadcasts in Kurdish, if pro- Kurdish parties or individuals use the Kurdish 
language, they face prosecution and accusations of “helping and 
harbouring terrorist organisations”. With the broadcasting of MED TV from 
London in 1995, and its successors, Medya TV and Roj TV, as well as 
many other transnational Kurdish TV stations from South Kurdistan (“Iraqi 
Kurdistan”), the state has lost its monopoly control of broadcasting which 
violated the right of people in Kurdish populated regions to get information 
in the Kurdish language. 
 
The aforementioned Kurdish newspapers published articles focusing on 
Kurdish history, identity, state terror in Kurdistan and disappearances of 
people who were arrested by the state, the destruction and burning of 
Kurdish villages by the Turkish military, the progress of the war, and most 
importantly, the PKK who were presented to the Kurdish and Turkish public 
in a positive light. Interviews with the PKK leader, Öcalan, news about the 
guerrilla’s life, news of South Kurdistan and other parts of Kurdistan 
entered, for the first time, into the everyday life of Kurds and Turks who 
read the Kurdish media. 
 
Kurdish newspapers bring to mind in the Kurdish people the “Yeni Ulke “- 
New Country – which signified Kurdistan. The name Özgür Ulke  - Free 
Country, Azadiya Welat -Freedom of Country  challenges the idea of 
Turkey as a unified, homogenous nation. It promotes the Kurdish 
nationalist project of an independent and free Kurdistan: Kurdistana Azadi. 
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Even the names of the magazines and newspapers constitute a challenge 
to a unified Turkish nation and divide it in two: the Turkish state and the 
Kurds. As Anderson pointed out newspapers and radio are consumed in 
private. Yet each reader is well aware that this ritual is simultaneously 
shared by millions of others (1991:35) and the “fellow readers, to whom 
they were connected through print, formed . . . the embryo of the nationally 
imagined community” (1991:44). 
 
These papers introduce new concepts through terms like the “Kurdish 
National War of Independence”, “the Kurdish freedom struggle”, “the 
Kurdish revolt” or “Kurdish uprising”, people “of Kurdish descent”. Mention 
of the PKK, the ceasefire, the “call for peace”, the Kurdish flag, the Kurdish 
parliament in exile, the war and  “crimes against humanity”, South 
Kurdistan, Kurdish leaders, Kurdish generals signify the presence of 
another nation within Turkey, whereas the state has, for decades, declared 
“one flag, one nation and one language” in Turkey. This can be seen as 
Kurdish resistance to the Turkish “ideological state apparatus” and its 
media representations of the Kurdish struggle in its “war of position” with 
the Turkish state (see chapter I and chapter IV). 
 
In response to this war of words, in 1999, the Interim Minister decided to 
prepare a “list of forbidden, ‘objectionable’ words” which was sent to the 
state news agency Anadolu Ajansi (Anatolia Agenda), TRT (state 
television), other private and commercial media and state institutions 
(Alkan T, Radikal, 15 June 1999). According to the new rule, the TRT and 
Anadolu Ajansi, university and commercial media had to replace certain 
terms like “evacuated villages”, with “villages which had been abandoned”, 
“the Kurdish state” with “the entity in Northern Iraq” and “the fight against 
terrorism” with “low intensity war”.  
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Moreover, the Kurdish media has broken the silence of the Turkish media 
over Kurdish identity and given voice to the Kurds. It has even represented 
the PKK as an alternative to Turkey’s political and military power in the 
Turkish media landscape.  The current head of the Turkish General Staffs, 
Basbug stated during the military’s regular “media briefing” on 19 July 
2005, that “the spread of support for the separatist terror must be 
prevented”, Justice Minister, Cemil Cicek (currently spokesperson of the 
AKP government) attacked the Ülke de Özgür Gündem newspaper at the 
AGM of the Journalists Association of Turkey on 11 June 2006, 
denouncing it as a “mob that should be stopped” (DIHA 2007).  
 
In response to European pressures, the Turkish government has made 
“some improvements with respect to press freedom and human rights, [but] 
problems still remain” (International Press Institute 2004) (this reference 
predates the examples given above). The use of Kurdish language in 
publications and broadcasts has been formally allowed since 2002; 
however this policy is not put into practice. The transnational Kurdish Roj 
TV (formerly MED TV- 1995) - broadcasting from Europe - can be received 
through satellite dishes. However those who are found to watch it or phone 
into their programmes are prosecuted. Despite these difficulties, these 
media play an important role in articulating resistance to the Turkish 
nationalist common sense, as well as providing information that is 
otherwise not available. 
 
After pressure from the EU, in 2004, the government passed a law to allow 
one hour’s broadcasting on state TV in the Kurdish language and “other 
non-Turkish local languages and dialects”.  The Turkish Parliament passed 
a bill in June 2008 allowing the state-owned television Turkish Radio and 
Television Corporation (TRT) to “broadcast programmes in languages 
other than Turkish”. While “Kurdish TRT” led by a “very special bureaucrat” 
(Ergan 2008) who worked abroad for the Turkish state in the Intelligence 
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Service - has started to broadcast 24 hours in Kurdish, the commercial 
television stations are not allowed to broadcast in Kurdish, except for Can 
TV. This will mean that the state can broadcast in Kurdish but Kurds will 
not be allowed to broadcast in their language. 
 
The meaning and purposes of the nation are redefined and 
reconceptualised over time in order to keep the national movement alive 
(Anderson 1991). These aims and aspirations are disseminated in various 
ways including in print, contributing to the creation of a “popular 
vernacular-based nationalism” (Anderson 1991:139). In this sense, the 
Kurdish media have played an important role in reconstructing Kurdishness 
territorially, through linguistic and cultural means.  
 
Some columnists who have written widely on history, language and culture 
have debated openly for the first time, and created some discussion at a 
popular level among the Kurds.  Some of these authors and journalists 
describe the Kurds “as the oldest people in the region”. This is contrasted 
to “outside” people, who arrived later. “These ‘outside’ people…are 
depicted as invaders or occupiers of the Kurdish regions. “History is seen 
as the eternal struggle between the defending, civilized insider and the 
aggressive, barbaric outsider” (Hirschler 2001:155). The uncivilized Other 
refers to “the Turks” who built their society, “merely on military bases…The 
cruelty of the present–day Turkish army is a heritage of the “plunder 
ideology’” (Hirschler 2001:156). 
 
The Kurdish national movement responded to the Turkish nationalist view 
of Kurds as “mountain Turks” by challenging the official view of Turkish 
history that “Turks” came from Middle Asia to Anatolia and Mesopotamia 
centuries ago and built all the existing civilisations there. “The Kurdish 
national historiography in Turkey has mainly been directed towards, but 
also influenced by Turkish national historiography at a popular level.  This 
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is visible in the focus on geographical area, the redefinition of the central 
myths of Turkish national historiography and the centrality of this discourse 
to contested issues (Hirschler 2001:161). However some Marxist and 
modernist columnists criticized the Kurdish nationalist alternative for 
constructing a “romantic nationalistic view of history” (Hirschler 2001:152) 
in a multi-ethnic region. 
 
Duran’s view of the Turkish media underlined “its strong political, 
ideological and financial dependence on the state” (Duran 2006:33-5). The 
same could also be said of the Kurdish media. Its journalists like to 
describe their Kurdish media as based on an “ozgur basin gelenegi” –
independent media tradition.  However it has not been independent and 
remains like an old-style left-wing party journal which has opened its pages 
to political movements and organisations close to it, as well as to the 
Turkish left. But it has not managed to become a media for all Kurds and it 
has alienated many Kurdish intellectuals as well as ordinary people. If the 
Turkish media has some restrictions on freedom of thought about what 
constitutes the national interest - security, national borders, national 
culture, the untouchable status of the military, some Kurdish media have 
similar restrictions in terms of the immunity of the PKK, its current 
leadership and captured leader, Öcalan from criticism. Many Kurdish 
intellectuals criticize these media for being “party-dominated/led media 
where you are not allowed to criticize some people or party policy” (Banaz 
2008, conference on Kurdish Journalism). Simsek has also argued that 
journalists in party-dominated media use self-censorship as they are there 
primarily to “praise functionaries” (Simsek 2002, online article).  But 
communication technology offers an important opportunity to make other 
voices heard. The internet has contributed to the Kurdish public discussion 





This chapter has presented a brief overview of the construction of an 
imagined Turkish nation-state in its struggle against Kurdish nationalism. 
The Turkish state has used different legal and illegal means to dominate 
the multi-ethnic populations and turkify them. This nation-building project 
has denied the cultural, political and linguistic diversity of Anatolia since 
1923 and attempted to create a collective consciousness of Turkishness 
through force, imposing a common language, politics and education 
system. However Kurdish nationalism has challenged this ethnically 
exclusive nationalist project. Therefore, Turkey has been destabilised since 
its establishment and passed different laws to suppress “other” ethnic 
voices. Displacement and Resettlement Law, Emergency Law, prohibition 
of Kurdish identity in public were common practices of Turkish nationalism 
over decades (Olson 1989). Kurdish ethnic identity has been stigmatized 
as a threat to the integrity of the Turkish nation. The Kurds have reacted to 
Turkish ethno-nationalist policies in different ways including political, 
cultural and armed resistance. This long-lasting struggle for hegemony has 
created a sense of Kurdishness which is opposed to official Turkishness. In 
this way the Kurdish movement and its media has created resistance by 
building an alternative  “historic bloc” against that of the Turkish state, and 
its national cultural and political dominance, manifested in the media, 
education system and political parties.  
 
In this process, the Turkish press and its official discourse has been an 
important instrument in legitimating state policies of cultural and linguistic 
subordination of other peoples. It has served Turkish nationalist discourse 
and justified state violence in defence of “Turkishness”, ignoring its function 
to inform its audience in a truthful, reliable and credible way (Duran 2006) 
about the ethno-national conflict. The Turkish press has positioned itself as 
a significant player in legitimising Turkishness and delegitimizing 
Kurdishness in both Turkey and Europe, where the Turkish media have 
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been distributed among Turkish and Kurdish “guest-workers” since the 
1960s.   
 
The Kurdish media has contributed through its news reporting and features 
to countering the Turkish nationalist discourse and making Kurdish voices 
heard within Turkey and beyond. It has redefined Kurdish identity to create 
an imagined Kurdish political community. The Kurdish media is also 
ideologically and financially dependent on the Kurdish political parties 






























Chapter IV:   Mapping Kurdish and Turkish Communities and Media in 
Europe 
1.  Introduction 
This chapter presents a brief historical overview of the Kurdish and Turkish 
migrant communities in Germany, Sweden and the UK, their arrival, 
settlement, establishment of their communities, ethnic divisions and 
engagement in homeland politics in a transnational setting. Then the 
functions of the Turkish and Kurdish transnational networks linking 
organizations and communities are traced and their engagement in their 
homeland politics through transnational practices (Vertovec 2005). 
Understanding these transnational networks is important because 
transnational networks, organisations and their activities form part of the 
ongoing hegemonic struggle between dominant Turkish notions of 
imagined community and the Kurdish national movement. This has been 
described as an ‘exported war’ by some German politicians and 
commentators, but it can best be interpreted as a hegemonic struggle in 
the countries of settlement to create a sense of belonging to the imagined 
Turkish or Kurdish political community.  
 
The Turkish and Kurdish media have played an important role, over a long 
period of time, in disseminating news and interpretive frameworks, 
interconnecting these transnational networks in different geopolitical 
spaces through information about the homeland and its politics (Rigoni 
2002, Kosnick 2007). A historical overview of the Turkish and Kurdish 
media in Europe and their development from print media to satellite 
broadcasting demonstrates how they have contributed to deterritorialising 
the ethno-national conflict, spreading it to other geo-political spaces (Karim 
1998; Kosnick 2007; Ostergaard-Nielsen 2002a; Rigoni 2002). Then I 
present my empirical work on consumption of these media in the three 
European countries and the debate on their effects in creating a sense of 
belonging to a particular, narrowly defined ethnic group (Georgiou 2005). 
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Finally I focus on the debate on reception and consumption in the countries 
of settlement of transmigrant media and transnational political practices. 
 
My empirical work in the three countries shows that the mediated ethno-
national conflict and imaginary of the homeland has become part of 
everyday life of both migrant groups. It shapes the nature of their ethnic 
identity. They expressed a strong emphasis on their ethnic identity, 
including the second generation who were born and educated in West 
European countries. A large group of both communities in the three 
locations were familiar with political developments in Turkey. They stated 
that they follow the news and political discussion on TV and in the 
newspapers and highlighted their concerns about the ongoing ethno-
national conflict. As a Turkish respondent in Sweden stated:  
What is happening in Turkey affects our life here 
because the Kurds are demonstrating against Turkey 
in Stockholm and that causes a negative image of 
Turkey which reflects on us. So we try to respond to 
their negative representation of Turkey. We try to 
understand what is going in Turkey... therefore at 
home we do not miss the TRT news. I read different 
newspapers on the internet. (Interview with Osman, 
Stockholm, 28th  June 2007)  
 
 
A Kurdish respondent in Sweden makes a similar point:  
Yes I follow the news on Kurdish and Turkish 
channels and also read newspapers on internet...of 
course the ongoing war causes concerns amongst 
the Kurdish community in Sweden. How can we 
close our eyes, when the Turkish state bombs our 
hometown, people who we know? We are here in 
safety and should do something to make it publicly 
known in Europe what is going on there. People in 
Kurdistan do not have this opportunity but here we 
live in a democratic country. (Interview with Zana, 




Both statements highlight the concern, frustration and anger about the 
Kurdish-Turkish ethno-national conflict in Turkey as affecting migrants’ 
lives in the Diaspora. The Kurdish and Turkish transnational media 
disseminate the information which causes migrants concern about the 
homeland. In addition, the transnational political activity for the homeland 
by both groups of migrants causes confrontation between them. Beyond 
the immediate concerns about the ethno-national conflict, the marginalized 
position of migrants in the countries of settlement may also contribute to 
them prioritising the homeland struggle over engagement with social and 
political issues in the countries of settlement. Migrants continually face 
being categorised as a separate group, as opposed to the nationally 
defined ‘us’ in the countries of settlement (Räthzel 2006). Research has 
shown that migrant experiences of discrimination and exclusion from the 
labour market and political participation have contributed to strengthening 
their transnational communities (Portes et al. 1999; Schiller 2009; Smith 
2003). In response to these experiences of exclusion, migrants seek out 
alternative media, where they find themselves, their culture and community 
better represented (Becker and Behnisch 2001).  
  
My interviews show a strong sense of belonging and attachment to the 
homeland which is manifested in Turkish and Kurdish migrants’ 
transnational political activities as two groups in conflict over their 
“homeland”. Anderson (1992) considers such attachment and activities as 
‘long-distance nationalism’ lived out through e-mail: “His political 
participation is directed towards an imagined Heimat in which he does not 
intend to live” (1992:11).  Unable to integrate into the country of settlement, 
the long-distance nationalist migrant  can play the role of ‘national hero’ in 
the homeland, “all of which can have incalculable consequences in zones 
of their ultimate destinations” (Anderson 1992:12)  Yet, scholars of 
transnationalism have criticised this view that migrants engage in 
homeland politics as they are not fully part of the polity of either the 
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settlement - or the homeland - country. Instead, scholars of 
transnationalism argue that transnational activities and integration are not 
incommensurable. In addition, they suggest viewing transnational migrants 
as part of an interconnected transnational field, rather than as actors 
influencing the homeland from the outside. Schiller elaborates, that  long-
distance nationalism constitutes:  
“a set of identity claims and practices that link 
together people who claim descent from an ancestral 
land. These people see themselves as acting 
together to constitute, strengthen, overthrow, or 
liberate a homeland. Long-distance nationalism 
brings together transnational social fields and identity 
claims. It unites people settled in various locations 
abroad and those in the homeland in political 
processes organized within a transnational social 
field” (2009:33).  
 
In place of “long distance nationalism”, I prefer the term transnational 
communities, as there is a lively, incisive field of transnational scholarship 
on which to build (Portes 1999; Schiller and Georges 1999; Vertovec 
2001).  Transnational media, in particular satellite TVs and the Internet, 
have compressed time and space. Homeland is not only imagined, but 
deterritorialized (Appadurai (1995). Therefore ethno-national conflicts 
cannot anymore be viewed as limited to the territories where the conflict 
takes place. Migrants in settlement countries have become part of the 
ongoing conflict and can play an important role in the nation-building 
project at the international level through demonstrations and lobbying for 
the homeland (Curtis 2005, Basch et al. 1994, Danforth 1995). 
Transnational communities’ ‘invention’ of the homeland (Appadurai 
1990:11) is a product of the imagination of deterritorialised 
groups(Demmer 2002:95). Therefore transnational networks, communities 
and organisations become part of the nationalist struggle. Researchers 
have explored these issues with reference to Tamils (Eriksen 2007, 
Wayland 2004), Kurds (Curtis 2005; Eriksen 2007; Faist 2000b; Vertovec 
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and Cohen 1999), Palestinians (Bamyeh 2007) and members of the former 
Yugoslavia (Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina) (Al-Ali et al. 2001a).  
 
Before the transnational media became widely available, migrant 
participation in homeland politics was limited. In contrast today the media, 
in particular TV and the internet, play a crucial role in connecting people 
with the same ethnic, religious, political backgrounds in different localities 
to homeland politics (Appadurai 1995; Danforth 1995; Eriksen 2007; 
Hassanpour 1997; Portes et al. 1999; Rigoni 2002; Romano 2002; Schiller 
and Georges 1999; Sheyholislami 2010) Appadurai calls such connections 
“virtual communities” (1995:219) where the nation, kinship, ideas of 
nationalism are produced, retold and disseminated. But among these 
transnational networks, the media has also contributed to heightening an 
awareness of the conflict between the groups, as we have witnessed 
between some Turkish and Kurdish migrants in Germany.  The elites of 
these transnational groups play a crucial role in producing transnational 
media and are active in politics in the settlement countries as well as the 
homeland. This is illustrated by the fact that many ministers in the Kurdish 
regional government are former exiles in Sweden or in the UK.  This does 
not mean that transnational migrants have the same ideas or coherent 
ethnic identities. Such groups are “internally heterogeneous. Different parts 
of the same diaspora can and do have different interests, defined among 
other things by class, gender, generation, occupation or religion” (Smith 
2007:5).  
 
Yet, the ethno-national conflict brings these heterogeneous groups 
together to engage with homeland politics and create an imagined national 
community of the homeland through transnational political activity. (Basch 
et al. 1994; Curtis 2005; Danforth 1995; Portes 1999; Schiller 2009). 
Nationalism and political transnationalism have become important 
identifications in migrants’ everyday lives.  This helps them also to find 
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social orientation, stabilising their ethnic and individual identities and sense 
of belonging in the settlement countries.  Over time they create and 
reproduce the homeland on a local scale and a more global scale, such as 
through contributing to “conflict resolution” (Al-Ali et al. 2001a:617, Koser 
and Black 1999b). Therefore the attachment and sense of belonging to the 
homeland is neither nostalgia towards the past nor simply ‘long distance 
nationalism’. In the light of new scholarship on transnationalism, 
Anderson’s view of the long-distance nationalist as s passive and 
marginalized actor in the settlement country who nurtures heroic 
daydreams of virtual activism in the homeland without being accountable 
for his political actions needs to be revised. Transnational imagined 
communities are complex and hybrid. They do “double duty”, integrating 
and activating migrants with regard to both the homeland and the 
settlement countries (Radhakrishnan 1996:12).  
 
Like the nation, transnational communities are not a given but need to be 
actively imagined through homeland political projects. They establish a 
particular political project to maintain the established imagined community 
or establish a new imagined homeland.  As Joseph highlights,  
“hegemony has been connected to the national 
project……. nationalism can act in passing off the 
interests of a certain group as the national interest, in 
constructing belief in a shared community that cuts 
across notions of class, and other forms of social 
stratification. The ideology of nationalism therefore 
acts to legitimate the political practice of a leading 
group, and its struggle either to maintain power or to 
achieve it… to create their own … nation” (Joseph 
2002:136).  
 
From this perspective, Kurdish and Turkish transnational activities can be 
seen as part of a hegemonic ethno-national struggle in the homeland.  
 
The debate on the impact of transnational communities has sharpened 
since the transnational media have begun to shape and politicise migrant 
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communities’ attachments in the countries of settlement (Georgiou 2005; 
Kosnick 2007; Tsagarousianou 2004; Vertovec 2001). Information and 
cultural resources do not anymore flow only from West to East, but also in 
the other direction (Becker and Behnisch 2001, Sheyholislami 2010). 
Migrant groups have turned their satellite dishes to different political and 
cultural spaces (Georgiou 2005). This has been considered a challenge to 
the imagined community of the countries of settlement which have tried to 
integrate migrants (Georgiou 2005, Faist 1998, Solomos 2003). 
 
Ethnic incorporation in the settlement countries 
Migration has changed and challenged the imagined community, notions of 
citizenship and national identity in Western countries since WWII and the 
economic boom in the 1950s and ‘60s (Kofman 2005). While some 
countries like the USA, Canada, and Australia, consider migrants as new 
citizens, other countries like Germany incorporated migrants into the labour 
market but excluded them from political participation, trying to regulate and 
control rights of family reunion and settlement and preventing citizenship 
since the 1960s. Over time, migration and incorporation policies have 
changed. During the 1970s, Sweden, Britain, Canada, USA, Netherlands 
gradually recognized cultural, linguistic, ethnic and religious diversity and 
supported equal opportunities and the social and cultural participation of 
migrants (Parekh 1997). However in Britain. Germany and Sweden, as 
elsewhere, “immigration, the position of minorities and growing numbers of 
refugees have become key issues on the political agenda, shaping the 
ideologies” (Solomos 2003:3).  
 
Each European Union country has a historically distinct pattern of 
migration, racial and ethnic diversity and integration regime. Therefore it is 
still difficult to compare these countries in terms of ethnic incorporation 
(Solomos 2003:5, Ackers 1999). The situation is often ambiguous and 
growing racism and the popularity of right-wing parties occurs at the same 
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time as policies are introduced to address migrants’ social and economic 
problems. Despite these differences it is clear that mass migration since 
WW II has contributed to “uncertainty and confusion about economic and 
political orientation of the ‘new Europe’, the new ‘European identity’ and 
the dissolving of established national and ethnic boundaries...” (Solomos 
2003:7). The globalisation of economic, political and cultural life, increasing 
human mobility, the internet and “the emergence of ethnic identity politics” 
(Solomon 2003:xii) have changed the imagined political communities and 
national identities in Western countries (Itzigsohn et al. 1999, Castles and 
Davidson 2000). Therefore nation-states with large migrant populations try 
to deal with issues of national cohesion within their national political 
imaginary to create a national consensus (Glazer 1997; Scannell 1992; 
Staeheli et al. 2002).  This challenges the nation states to address 
transnational migrant mobility, the globalization of communication 
technologies and culture (Georgiou 2005; Holston and Appadurai 1999; 
Kosnick 2007; Sassen 1999). These issues have been widely discussed in 
Germany (Cyrus 2005), Sweden (Ålund 1999) and the UK (Castles 2000; 
Castles and Davidson 2000; Favell and Geddes 1999; Isin and Wood 
1999; Modood 1997; Schuster and Solomos 2002; Solomos 2003). 
 
In the light of substantial transformation of societies through mass 
migration, one can question the saliency of concepts of imagined 
community and banal nationalism applied to Western countries. The 
nascent multiple narratives and ethnic identities (Solomos 2003, Hall 2000, 
Bauman 2000) have changed the nature of the imagined community. In 
addition to this, global forces such as supra-national organisations such as 
the EU, IMF, World Trade Organisation (Cox 1993) and global media 
conglomerates (Barwise and Gordon 1998, Thussu 2007, Doyle 2002, 
Downey 2006) have led to a decline of the power of the nation states and 
media  to construct their own national identity.  
With an increasingly globalised consumer culture, some scholars argue 
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that national cultures become increasingly similar. This argument 
underlines that media conglomerates are attempting to standardise 
audience tastes and cultures of consumption globally to sell their products 
to a mass market of people in different spaces. This may be seen as an 
erosion of the nation-state’s power to maintain itself as an imagined 
community (Murdock 1982, Nordenstreng and Schiller 1993, Barwise and 
Gordon 1998, Chadha and Kavoori 2005, Herman and McChesney 1997, 
Thussu 2007). Other researchers point out that with increasing ethnic 
diversity within a nation state, concepts such as banal nationalism and a 
unified imagined national community come into question. (Jones and 
Desforges 2003; Jones 2003; Rosie et al. 2006; Schlesinger 1998). 
 
However the national imagined community has spread to every 
contemporary society (Anderson 1991:157). This is evident in current 
European debates on national identity, social cohesion and ‘the death of 
multiculturalism’ (Back 2009:204). These debates continue to utilise 
rhetoric which “distances ‘us’ from ‘them’ [foreigners], ‘our’ world from 
‘theirs’ “(Billig 1995:49).  This rhetoric “‘is embedded in habits of thought 
and life” (Billig  1995:63) in every national society which constructs 
‘outsiders, ‘foreigners’ and ‘enemies’ (Solomos 2003:7). Contrary to these 
trends Billig argues that “the sense of the importance of a bounded 
homeland, together with the distinction between ‘us’ and ‘foreigners’, have 
not disappeared” (Billig  1995:39) Immigration is again a central topic in 
Western countries where the distinction between European nation-states 
and “”non-Christian, non-European and non-civilized worlds” (Billig  
1995:142) is constructed: “concern about immigration is today almost 
invariably expressed within nationalist ways of talking, as speakers wonder 
what is happening to ‘our’ country, ‘our’ homeland” (Billig  1995:142). 
These distinctions are produced through media rhetoric. Chadha and 
Kavoori concur with Billig that “the nation state still plays a crucial role in 
determining the structure, nature and organization of media industries” 
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(Chaadha and Kavoori 2005:86).   
 
Moreover the dominant ideas and representations in a given social order in 
particular nationalist ideologies reproduce relations of domination in terms 
of race, ethnicity, gender, migration. The institutions of nation states are 
constantly at work to legitimate ‘our’ cultural norms. This contributes to the 
subordination of groups of people who have been racialized or ethnicized 
in different ways, and is reflected in the dominant uses of ‘we’ and ‘they’ in 
the media. However, the issues of imagined community and banal 
nationalism have become more complex within a transnational frame even 
though they remain valid as analytical tools. 
2. Turkish and Kurdish Migrants in Western Europe 
The significant history of Kurdish and Turkish immigration in Europe 
started in the 1960s as work migration, family re-union and refugee 
migration and settlement. Today the estimated number of Turkish 
and Kurdish migrants from current day Turkey is around 3.5 million. 
The majority of the Turkish and Kurdish migrants (2.5 million) live in 
Germany. Germany is the centre of the Turkish and Kurdish print 
media where most of the discussion about these media takes place. 
In contrast to the UK and Sweden, Germany has different integration 
policies for migrants (Kosnick 2007, Østergaard-Nielsen 2003, Erel 
2007). But the debate about the integration of migrants and 
multiculturalism remains a topical subject in all European countries. 
For example in Britain: “in the wake of the London bombings of 7th 
July, 2005, public commentators routinely pronounce the death of 
multiculturalism in Britain…., summed up in the idea that 
multiculturalism failed and that the advocates of a multicultural 
future were deluding themselves” (Back 2009  :205)  Many European 
countries, on the one hand, passed legislation to govern the new 
ethnic and religious diversity in their territories, while, on the other 
hand, talking about “the moral/political controversies about national 
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belonging” (Back 2009:204) and national cohesion.  
2.1. Sweden 
Swedish immigration and asylum policy is usually characterized as ‘liberal’ 
(Cederberg 2006:14). Sweden has introduced different social and cultural 
equality policies to integrate migrants into the wider society (Ålund, 2002, 
Ålund & Schierup, 1991). While the ‘Swedish model’ in the 1960s  was 
based  on inclusion of  migrants in the labour market  and health system, in 
the 70s, the government introduced  multicultural policies to include 
migrants socially, politically and culturally in the wider society (Cederberg 
2006). The Swedish model guaranteed “equal access and equal rights to 
the different spheres of society… including the right to retain their culture” 
(Cederberg and Anthias 2006:19, also see  Castles and Miller 1998).  
 
Swedish governments, in particular Social Democrat governments, 
enabled migrants to express their ethnic and cultural identities from 1975 
to the mid 80s through Swedish corporatist political structures. 
“Corporatism implies that people are perceived of as collectives, whereby 
social identities are created largely through expressions of collective 
experiences” (Cederberg 2006:19). Therefore these were central to how 
multiculturalism took shape in the Swedish context. (Cederberg 2006:19, 
also see Ålund and Schierup 1991, 1993; Geddes 2003, Soysal 1994). 
Social and political movements, especially trade union movements have 
been “the traditional vehicle(s) of political socialization and moral 
supervision in Sweden … (and) form the cornerstone(s) of Social 
Democratic strategies of popular mobilization and national integration’” 
(Ålund and Schierup 1993:111 quoted in Cederberg 2006:19). The 
‘Swedish corporate model’ is significant also in terms of political decision-
making because “citizens can exercise political influence, namely through 
the organizations in which they are members. Multiculturalism in the 
Swedish case then implied collective and representative rights for 
migrants, through their national/ethnic groups” (Cederberg 2006:19 also 
 168 
see Schierup et al 2006). The Swedish government incorporated state- 
funded migrant associations as part of the decision-making process and 
considered them as social agencies with rights and obligations. They are 
expected to reproduce their ethnic culture and provide help, advice to 
migrants to integrate them into majority society (Cederberg and Anthias 
2006). The associations were thus charged with retaining their cultural 
heritage and acting as a “channel for political influence” (Borevi 2004:31, 
quoted in Cederberg 2006). In addition to this, the Swedish government 
provides mother-tongue teaching. This aimed to create ‘freedom of choice’ 
for migrants (Cederberge 2006, see also Borevi 2004:42). However this 
’Swedish model’ has increasingly been blamed for creating ‘cultural 
differences’, ‘segregation’, ‘isolation’ and hindering migrants’ integration 
into Swedish majority society (Cederberg 2006, also see Borevi 2004, Pred 
2000). Therefore, Swedish government policies moved from seeing 
migrants as part of a collective corporate identity to treating them as 
individuals, focusing instead on anti-discrimination legislation and 
integration e.g. the 2003 Act  to deal with discrimination at work, education  
and in society (Cederbersg 2006, also see Geddes 2003, Schierup et al. 
2006). However Sweden retains some progressive policies in 
comparison with other European countries. For example migrants 
have had the right to vote in local elections since 1976 and the  
naturalization process is easier than in other European countries. 
 
While the Swedish government believes in promoting cultural diversity, 
multiculturalism has failed to integrate migrants into Swedish majority 
society. Researchers such as Geddes (2003) and Kamali (2005) point out 
that discrimination and exclusion of migrants has led to segregation. This 
move away from multiculturalism is also a consequence of the growth of a 
far-right Swedish movement which took its anti immigrant arguments into 
the wider society and political system (Cederberg 2006, Floya Anthias 
2006). Multicultural policies have been gradually abandoned in Sweden 
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since the 1990s (Kamali, 2005, Schierup, et al., 2006, Ålund & Schierup, 
1991). The keywords of the 1970s and 1980s were jamlikhet, valfrihet, 
samverkan - equality, freedom of choice, and co-operation, 
emphasizing support for maintaining minority cultural identities. This 
has been replaced by an emphasis on national identity and 
cohesion, summed up in the keywords Sverige, framtiden och 
mångfalden - Sweden, the future and diversity.  
 
There is a strong political and public pressure on migrants to adapt 
linguistically and culturally to the majority society. The integration classes 
and language tests for migrant have become important topics for 
public debate on asylum seekers and migrants. The 1989 Aliens Act, 
1997 Aliens Act, the 2005 Aliens Act have been changed to promote 
“integration” of migrants into Swed ishness. This integration is 
racialized, as  skin colour, culture and religion become key markers of 
Otherness, for example the term migrants is not applied to a significant 
new group of German migrants to Sweden who are seen as easily 
integrated. Migrants from Africa and Muslim are however often seen as 
hard to integrate in public discussion.  The division of “us” as Sweden or 
“us” as European and “other” as “migrants” is part of everyday discourses 
and speeches of politicians and media (Kamali, 2005, Ålund, 1991b, Alina 
2005). This has become particularly acute after 11 September, when 
migrants from Muslim countries were seen as a potential danger to 
Swedish values, democracy and gender equality (Räthzel 2006). My 
interviews with Kurdish and Turkish males show that they complain of 
being stereotyped by media and public in Sweden. While many 
interviewees stated that Sweden is their home where they enjoy their rights 
as citizens, they mentioned discrimination, unequal opportunity at schools 
and in the labour market (Räthzel 2006).  
 
 
The history of Turkish and Kurdish migrants in Sweden goes back to the 
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mid 1960s when Swedish industry needed labour power. Kurdish and 
Turkish migrants emigrated primarily from the Konya district of Kulu to 
Sweden (Alakom 2006). In the meantime, ethnically and religiously diverse 
migrant groups from the Kurdish and Syriac populated region came to 
Sweden: the Syriac minority who faced ethnic and religious discrimination 
and persecution in Turkey. Later, in the ‘70s and ‘80s, Kurdish left-wing 
groups escaped “persecution and repression” of the military regime by 
going to Sweden (Westin 2003:992). The political refugee influx from the 
Kurdistan region began in the 1980s, similarly to Germany.  The Swedish 
government registers migrants according to their nationals and country of 
birth. Therefore there are no statistics on the number of   Assyrian/Syriac, 
Kurdish and Turkish migrants (Westin 2003). The estimated number of 
migrants from Anatolia now amounts to 60,026 (54% born in Turkey, 46% 
in Sweden) (Westin 2003:990). Bozarslan (2006) estimates the number of 
Kurds in Sweden as around 50.000 – 60.000 including all the Kurds from 
different countries. 
 
The Turkish migrants in Sweden are an invisible community in public due 
to their small number but also due to the dominance of Kurdish and 
Assyrian/Syriac communities. The Turkish government attempted to 
organise this small group, however it did not work (Interview with Osman 
Özkanat, Stockholm 24th June 2007). When the Turkish migrants from 
communities in different localities set up the first umbrella organization, the 
ITIDF in 1973, it was based on Social-democratic values under the 
influence of the Swedish Social Democrat system. This contrasts with the 
Turkish migrant organizations in Germany and the UK which are more 
religious and nationalistic and often sponsored by the Turkish embassies.  
However in recent years, there has been a significant change in the 
political nature of Turkish networks and communities. This was in reaction 
to the political activities of the Kurdish and Assyrian/Syriac communities. 
Since 2010, the consulate attempted to organise Turkish communities 
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including the nationalist Kemalist Thought Association in Sweden and 
mobilized against the recognition of the Armenian Genocide Resolution. 
 
Since the 1970s, Kurdish intellectuals have established themselves. 
Through Swedish government funding, Kurdish literature and arts have 
flourished and spread to other parts of the Kurdish Diaspora “because of a 
generous immigration policy initiated by Prime Minister Olof Palme and the 
material incentives for publication and artistic creation was able to attract a 
major part of the Kurdish intelligentsia while Germany mainly took in 
immigrant workers” (Institut-Kurde de Paris 2002). Furthermore, Kurdish is 
taught in Swedish schools which has led to the creation of a Kurdish 
linguistic elite in Sweden, constituting the majority of staff in transnational 
media production. Thus, Swedish multiculturalism has been instrumental in 
a renaissance of Kurdish cultural production and identity transnationally.  
Many Kurdish migrants testify to the Swedish government’s ‘generosity’ in 
helping ‘stateless Kurds’ to develop their culture. 
 
Thus ten years ago, Sweden became the centre of modern Kurdish 
culture, language and publishing. (Izady 1992). Many Kurdish novelists 
including Mehmet Uzun and Mahmut Baksi have written modern Kurdish 
literary works in Sweden as well as books for children, because of the 
promotion of formal education in Kurdish. Today still Swedish Kurds play 
an important role in Kurdish media production. Roj TV or Kurd1 have 
journalists and program makers from Sweden and there are even some 
Kurdish satellite TV broadcasts from Sweden e.g. Komala TV broadcasts 
via satellite to the Kurds in Iran. 
 
Furthermore Kurds have become part of the Swedish political system, 
occupying key roles (such as Member of Parliament: Gülen Avcı and 
former Member of Parliament and now head of a women's organization 
and a member of the Swedish Democratic Social Party, Nalin Baksi), which 
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contrasts with both Germany and the UK. 
 
2.2. Germany 
When large-scale labour migration in the 1960s began, migrants 
were considered as temporary workers. Political participation of 
migrants from outside Europe is still not allowed even in local 
elections. Therefore migrant political participation is low in Germany 
(Assimenos and Shajanian 2001) and in comparison to Sweden and 
the UK, the establishment of migrant associations are restricted by 
specific rules (see § 14 Association Law and § 47 Residence Act). 
Simultaneously the migrant organisations are financially supported 
by local authorities and the federal government to advise migrants 
and integrate them into the German system (Cyrus 2005).  
 
Until 2000, the German government emphasized its self -
understanding as an ethnic nation, so citizenship could mainly be 
acquired through birth to German parents. In 2000, the Social 
Democrat and Green coalition government changed the citizenship 
law. The new Nationality Act, in combining the principle of the ius 
sanguinis (right by blood) and ius soli (right by territory i.e. 
residence), makes it easier for migrants to acquire German 
citizenship. While many children born to migrant parents can now 
acquire German citizenship as a rule, adult naturalization still 
depends on several complexities and conditions including attending 
an integration course, taking a language test, swearing allegiance to 
the democratic order, having sufficient income to support 
themselves and their family and having resided in Germany for at 
least 7 years. The same coalition has passed the Anti-Discrimination 
Law in 2005 which was designed to prevent discrimination on the 
grounds of race, gender, age, disability and sexual orientation.  
The CDU and SPD coalition government subsequently passed the ‘Act for 
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the Control and Limitation of Immigration and for Regulation of the 
Residency and Integration of Citizens of the European Union and 
Foreigners’ (Zuwanderungsgesetz) after a long and fierce debate in 2004 
to incorporate migrants in the wider German society (Cyrus 2005). 
After 11 September 2001, migrant communities from ‘Muslim’ countries 
were stigmatized as potential terrorists and a potential danger to ‘our’ 
democratic values. In addition, the discourse of segregation, ghettoization, 
and parallel societies became an important element in public debates on 
social cohesion. Migrants are expected to integrate culturally, linguistically 
and economically into the ‘host’ society. Therefore integration courses 
have been started for migrants to learn German language, history, culture 
and the legal system. While public debate revolves around the German 
state’s demands of migrants, it does not take migrants’ perspectives into 
account. As a policy- maker of Kurdish parentage emphasized during my 
fieldwork in Berlin:  “Integration is not only from one side. Every society has 
to find the way to live together” (Interview with Sunbul, Berlin, 11th August 
2007). 
 
The history of Kurdish and Turkish immigration into Germany could 
be divided into four distinct periods. Labour migration, family re-
union, refugee migration and settlement of the second and third 
generation. The German government desperately sought to import 
labour power to fuel its economic boom and overcome labour 
shortages in the 1960s. Therefore, it signed several Anwerbe 
Abkommen – bilateral labour recruitment treaties in 1960 and 1961 
with different southern Mediterranean countries - Italy, Greece, 
Spain, Portugal, Turkey, Yugosavia (Goldberg et al. 2004). 
 
Germany sought a temporary solution to its labour shortages as it 
wanted to prevent long-term stays of workers of Muslim background. 
(from Turkey, Morocco and Tunisia). There was no intention for 
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migrant workers to stay and settle. The Turkish and German 
authorities, as well as the migrants, expected that their stay would 
be short-term as the term “guest-workers” implies (Hunn 2005). 
 
In 1973, the German government imposed a stop on recruitment 
owing to the oil crisis. By then, some migrants had already brought 
their families and the tendency of family reunion and marriage grew 
in the ‘70s and ‘80s. After the Anwerbestopp, most migrants came to 
Germany through family reunion, marriage or as refugees, 
particularly after the military coup in the 1980s which preceded the 
Turkish and Kurdish ethno-national conflict. The political and 
economic crises in Turkey forced migrants to change their plans to 
return to their respective ‘homelands’. But the dream of returning 
home remained a psychological myth until the 90s amongst the first 
generation. So migration turned willy-nilly into permanent settlement. 
During the late 1980s to the mid-1990s, the intensive war between 
the Turkish state and Kurdish guerrillas cost thousands of lives, the 
burning of 3,000 Kurdish villages and deportation of millions of 
people from Kurdistan to Turkey or refugee flight to West European 
countries, especially Germany, according to one human rights 
organization (Skubsch 2000, Feigl 1995). This was the largest and 
most significant Kurdish influx into Europe (Amman 1997) especially 
into Germany because it was no longer unknown territory for many 
Kurdish and Turkish people. 
 
In 1985, as the war between the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) and the 
Turkish state became more severe, the conflict spread to Europe 
especially to Germany, through Turkish and Kurdish organizations and 
media.  The conflict created a strongly politicized Kurdish ‘diaspora 
community’ or ‘transnational political and cultural spaces’ and a nationalist 
Turkish movement which already existed in Europe, especially in Germany 
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(Østergaard-Nielsen 2003, Rigoni 2002, Aslan and Bozay 1999). In the 
meantime this ethno-nationalist conflict mobilized Kurdish and Turkish 
migrants for and against the Turkish state and the Kurdish national 
movement. This gave rise to several political and cultural problems, not 
only between Kurds and Turks but also between Kurdish and Turkish 
groups and the German authorities.  Some Kurdish organizations and 
media were banned, among them the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) 
in1993, and the Kurdish newspaper Ozgur Politika. The Turkish media 
tycoon, Aydin Dogan was warned not to polarize the Turkish and Kurdish 
communities and target individuals who voiced criticism of Turkey’s 
Kurdish policies. (Rasche 2005, German newspaper F.A.Z 05.04.2005) 
 
In 2008 about 6.75 million people with a migration background were living 
in Germany. (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge 2007) Of these, 2.6 
million people were from Turkey/Kurdistan. It is estimated that this includes 
1.6 million Turks and 1000,000 Kurds who form the largest ethnic 
minorities in Germany.  Due to the history of guest-worker migration, the 
Kurdish and Turkish communities, though ethnically diverse are relatively 
homogeneous in terms of class and education. Both communities are 
settled and visible in German political, economic and cultural life including 
in the media.   Whilst the first generation worked in manual jobs in 
factories, many second generation of Turkish and Kurdish descent who 
have become German citizens, have moved into professional occupations. 
However both communities suffer from high unemployment since the 
Deutsche Wiedervereinigung - German reunification - in 1990 and the 
transformation of the economy from heavy industry to services. 
While the German media mainly offers TV programmes and news to their 
national audiences, migrant audiences have been ignored or portrayed 
through negative images (Hafez 2000, Becker and Behnisch 2001). In 
particular Kurdish and Turkish media have been blamed for creating 
parallel societies which are viewed as obstacles for the integration of the 
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migrant population. (Hafez 2000). Compared to Kurdish migrants, Turkish 
communities and organizations have more visibility and are represented in 
different mainstream parties in the German parliament (Bundestag). This 
contrasts with both Sweden and the UK where the Kurds are politically and 
culturally more visible. 
 
2.3. The UK 
The UK has been a country of immigration and emigration for decades 
(Castles 2000; Castles and Davidson 2000; Favell and Geddes 1999; Isin 
and Wood 1999; Modood 1997; Schuster and Solomos 2002; Solomos 
2003; King 2008, Keles al et 2010). It brought in workers on a large scale 
from the Caribbean and other Commonwealth countries in the 1960s and 
70s because of the post-war economic boom and labour shortages 
(Holgate et al 2009a). This has also intensified the debate on ‘race and 
nation’ which “have become a central component of British political culture” 
(Solomos 2003:33) as well as academic scholarship. This has meant that 
debates took place on institutional racism and black people and other 
ethnic minorities began to mobilise (Solomos 2003). Key themes in public 
debates on ethnic incorporation were the representation of these minorities 
in the media and their challenge to the set definitions of Britishness 
(Modood et al 1994).  The dominant ideology has described and 
categorised people in accordance with their skin colour (Holgate et al 
2009a) and groups became racialized as “Black” and “Asian” (Modood et al 
1994). Migration policy was racialized and British governments used 
legislation to prevent ‘black’ migrants from settling in Britain. The 1962 
Commonwealth Immigrants Act was formulated in a way to exclude mostly 
Black British colonial subjects from settling in Britain.  
 
Yet, parallel legislation to prevent discrimination was also passed, such as 
the 1976 Race Relations Act, later amended by the Race Relations 
Amendment Act 2000. Additional legislation to cover religious 
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discrimination - the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006 – was later 
introduced. State institutions, and in particular Labour governments have 
developed policies to promote ‘race equality’. Government policies, in 
particular of the Labour Party have changed the understanding of national 
identity (Solomon 2003, Modood 1992, Parekh1991) and created a 
broader definition of multiculturalism to incorporate minorities within the 
broader British society.   
 
Among the post-war migrants were Turkish-speaking Cypriots who had 
arrived in the 1940s and 50s to escape from poverty and find a better life, 
before the mainland Turkish and Kurdish migrants left. (King, 2007). A 
large proportion came during the ethno-nationalist conflict between Greece 
and Turkey during the 1960s and ‘70s. Cyprus was a UK colony so 
Cypriots held British citizenship (For the background on this see (King et 
al. 2008b, Enneli et al. 2005). While the Kurdish and Turkish migrants in 
continental Europe were invited as so- called “guest workers”, the UK 
received a small number of Kurds and Turks in 1960s and 70s as 
students or workers who were employed mainly in Turkish Cypriot 
small businesses (Ali 2001, King et al. 2008b). 
 
However, the nature of migration from Anatolia changed from labour to 
political migration when the Turkish military seized power in 1980 and 
dissolved the Parliament, banning political parties and suspending the 
constitution. Many Kurdish and Turkish intellectuals, union officers and left-
wing sympathizers fled from the repression to the UK where they were not 
obliged to have a visa until 1989. The second wave of migration to the UK 
in the late 1980s consisted in the overwhelming majority of Kurdish political 
refugees who fled the ethnic discrimination and war (Wahlbeck 1998b, 
Griffiths 2002). Therefore the nature of immigration is different from the 
guest worker migration to Germany. Østergaard-Nielsen (2003) makes this 
difference clear: “Kurds in London, who spend their day illegally working 
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long hours under harsh conditions in the sweatshops of northern London, 
use their sparse free time to mobilize around homeland political agendas 
which are untenable in even the most optimistic analysis of Turkish and 
Middle Eastern regional politics” (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003:776). The 
British multiculturalist system encourages ethnic self-organization in 
marked contrast to the German migration and integration regime. As a 
result, the Kurdish and Turkish migrants became well organized and 
politically mobilized.  
 
Turkish and Kurdish media consumption is high amongst both migrant 
groups and there are even several local newspapers in Turkish and 
Kurdish produced by migrants. However compared to the large ethnic 
groups such as the Indians, Pakistanis and  African Caribbeans, the 
150.000 Kurdish and 80.000 Turkish population16 (King et al. 2008b) are 
insignificant minorities and some researchers describe them as ‘invisible’. 
(Enneli et al. 2005, King et al. 2008b, Holgate et al. 2009b, Erel 2009, 
Holgate et al. 2009a). Therefore, the media consumption of Kurdish and 
Turkish migrants has received less attention than that of their counterparts 
in Germany (for exceptions, see Aksoy and Robins 2000, Laçiner 2000) 
 
3. The Transnational Impact of Kurdish and Turkish Migrant Networks 
on Homeland Politics   
 
When the nation- state is undergoing crisis (Chernilo 2006) its imagined 
community is destabilised. In these circumstances, the dominant nation 
through its ‘national identity’ seeks to control all elements of society and 
their social relations, including economic, cultural and political activities in 
order to establish a unified and subtle hegemony with the help of ‘so–
called private organizations, such as the Church, trade unions, schools.’ 
(Gramsci 1971:137).  
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Hegemony does not only occur “within a nation, between the various 
forces of which the nation is composed, but in the international and world-
wide field between complexes of national and continental civilisations” 
(Gramsci 1971:350). In this sense civil society is the transnational location 
where the ideology of the dominant group amongst migrants is reproduced 
(Portes 1999).  
 
When the Turkish and Kurdish migrants came to Germany in the 1960s, 
the Turkish state took control of migrants through its consulate, giving 
permission for them  to stay or leave the ‘host country’ and schooling 
migrant children in Turkish, inculcating the national anthem. This was very 
important in disseminating the dominant nationalist ‘conception of the 
world’ (Gramsci 1971:462, 386–8) based on the Turkish ethnic imagined 
community to guest workers and their children. Turkish state institutions 
also created religious structures for its ‘citizens’, operating through the 
Turkish General Directorate for Religious Affairs (TGFRA)17 (Rigoni 2002) 
and supported selected migrant organisations. The consulate, religious 
directorate and some of the Turkish migrant organisations actively 
promoted Turkishness amongst migrants.  
 
 This nationalist culture constitutes a form of hegemony and domination 
(Gramsci 1971:246).  The dominant group’s belief system and values were 
disseminated and reproduced in a transnational ‘civil society’ (Sirkeci, 
2006). The aim was “the construction of consent and the exercise of 
leadership by the dominant group over subordinate groups” (Joseph 2002) 
to disseminate the ruling ideology to sustain the dominant nationalist order. 
Every attempt by Kurds to establish their community organisations has 
been strongly opposed by the Turkish consulates as the state has sought 
to maintain control over Kurds abroad. It has exerted its political and 
diplomatic power to hinder the development of Kurdish civil society which 
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could counterpose the Turkish imagined community (Rigoni 2002, 
Hasanpoor 1994, Sirkeci 2006).  
While in Germany the social order was reproduced through the 
involvement of Turkish consulates, media and some migrant communities, 
the state’s attempt to establish such mechanism in Sweden and in the UK 
failed because the majority of Kurds were political refugees and had no 
intention of returning to their homeland. In addition they arrived in these 
countries at the time when the Kurdish national movement had started in 
1970s and ‘80s 
 
The hegemony of the Turkish state and its ideology were attained for 
decades through the Turkish consulates, Turkish migrant organisations 
and predominantly Turkish media over the Kurds. The first Kurdish 
generation did not have a political consciousness of being Kurds or of the 
struggle for “their” identity or homeland in the diaspora. The lack of 
coherence and intellectual leadership amongst the Kurdish diaspora 
prevented them from constructing their own ethnic consciousness and 
“conception of the world’ (Gramsci 1971:462, 386–8). Consequently, the 
Turkish state managed to achieve hegemony amongst Turkish and Kurdish 
migrants until the 1980s (Rigoni 2002). 
 
After the military coup in 1980, the flow of refugees from Turkey/Kurdistan 
challenged the hegemonic domination of Turkish institutions, creating new 
transnational communities.  
The Kurds have gradually developed their civil society and media through 
their political forces. In particular “the PKK began to organize within 
Germany in the early 1980s, bringing a Kurdish separatist movement to 
Germany” (Curtis 2005:8). Since 1985, the PKK has operated ‘across the 
borders of multiple nation-states.’ (Faist, 2000:189) mobilising Kurdish 
refugees and second-generation Kurdish young people for homeland 
politics (van Bruinessen 1999). This shows us that  ‘ordinary’ people are 
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not passive recipients of dominant ideology. The war between the Turkish 
state and Kurdish national movement was no longer confined within the 
territory of Turkey. Scholars have highlighted that “Intra-state violent 
conflicts are no longer fought solely in the actual war territories.... 
Increasingly, conflicts seem to become dispersed and delocalised,” 
(Demmers 2002:88) therefore the relationship between identity groups and 
nation-states is no longer confined within an established imagined 
community.  This is the case of the Turkish-Kurdish ethno-national conflict 
as it has become deterritorialized, “now with diaspora communities and 
international organisations playing important roles in nationalist struggles 
throughout the world” (Demmers 2002:88).  
 
In the ethno-national conflict, transnational networks play a crucial role in 
highlighting the homeland politics through lobbying, demonstration, and 
fundraising (Portes 1999), struggling to acquire intellectual, moral and 
political leadership within their given transnational communities but also 
externally to legitimize their ethno-national struggle. These networks are 
‘multi-connected, multi-referential’ (Soysal 2000:13) relationships, and 
political practices between trans-ethnic, religious groups and settlement 
societies and country of origin. (Basch, Glick Schiller, & Blanc, 1994) so 
their ‘incorporation’ is not limited to a single nation state. In this sense the 
‘delocalised’ and deterritorialized nature of the ethno-national conflict has 
caused a hegemonic struggle between the Turkish state and Kurdish 
national movement for dominant influence over the migrant communities. 
According to Demmers: “Contemporary nationalist struggles are largely 
counter-nationalistic: identity groups resist assimilation into the nation-
state”, (Demmers 2002:92) hence in “civil wars and intra-state conflict 
‘ethnic marking’ is very important”. As these conflicts are transnationalized  
“National communities are being “imagined” in a new (delocalised) way. 
We are witnessing the construction of transnational national communities. 
People remain loyal to a national homeland they no longer inhabit” 
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(Demmers 2002:9, see also Danforth 1995:80). 
 
The Kurdish and Turkish guest-workers and refugees have gradually 
developed effective political structures and influence through their local 
and transnational organizations and media in the European countries18. 
These highlight ‘immigrant politics’ - rights for migrants- and ‘homeland 
politics.’ Homeland politics “denote migrants’ and refugees’ political 
activities pertaining to the domestic or foreign policy of the homeland. That 
is, it means opposition to or support for the current homeland political 
regime and its foreign policy goals” (Østergaard-Nielsen 2001:262). 
 
The homeland dispute around Turkey's Kurdish question, religious, class 
and other political issues are reflected in the local and transnational 
migrant organizations and play an important role in their structures, policies 
and relationships to each other. These may revolve around differences of 
an ethnic - Turkish-Kurdish - religious -Sunni-Elewî- or political - left-right - 
kind, as well as the institutions in the country of settlement.  All these 
differences, even within the Islamic groups (Süleymanci, Milli Gorus, 
Nurcu) are reproduced in the countries of settlement in the organizations 
and consumption of media (Steinbach 1997, 1998). Some of these 
organizations have their own media including satellite TV stations e.g. the 
extremist Islamic group Kaplancilar, which in Germany mainly go under the 
name of the “Association of Islamic Society and Community” and its  HAKK 
TV station. 
 
Indeed the Kurdish and Turkish homeland-oriented organizations are an 
extension of the various political and religious tendencies in Turkey and in 
the Kurdistan region. The nationalistic Ataturk Thought Associations (ATA) 
abroad are linked to the ATA in Turkey and to the Republican People's 
Party – (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP) in Turkish). The Federation of 
Idealistic Democratic Turkish Communities in Europe (the Grey Wolves) is 
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connected to the Turkish Nationalist Action Party and even its leader is 
approved in Ankara, (Hafez 2002, Hafez 2000), while the Union of Turk-
Islam in Europe has links to the Great Union Party (Zentrum für 
Türkeistudien 1995, Zentrum für Türkeistudien 1997).  Milli Gorus-National, 
one of the huge transnational religious and nationalist Turkish 
organizations in Europe, is an extension of the religious Fazilet party in 
Turkey. The Federation of the Union of Elewîs in Europe (a heterodox 
religious and philosophical belief consisting of a mix of Zoroastrian, 
Mazdeic, Christian and Islamic elements) represents the Elewî faith in 
Europe, and is connected to other Elewî organizations in Turkey.  
The PKK has operated transnationally since 1985, in particular in Germany 
(Curtis 2005) where, as we have seen, the hegemony of the Turkish state 
and its ideology over Kurds was previously unchallenged. The change in 
the ethno-national conflict in the diaspora came through the 
transnationalization of the Kurdish political movement, with increasing 
negative representation of Kurdish ethnic identity in the Turkish media 
(Keles 2008) countered by the development of autonomous Kurdish media. 
 
The Kurdish Parliament in Exile (KPE) was established with the 
participation of almost 400 delegates from different Kurdish organizations 
and with some DEP MPs who fled Turkey due to the banning of the pro 
Kurdish DEP from the Turkish Parliament and the arrest of DEP MPs 
including Leyla Zana, a prominent Kurdish woman politician. The KPE was 
one of the most important transnational organizations in mediating 
diplomatically with different European politicians and EU states. This 
caused great tension between Turkey and those European countries which 
had contacts with the Kurdish Parliament in Exile. For instance, the 
announcement of the meeting of the Kurdish Parliament in Exile with the 
Basque Parliament and the Turkish uproar and diplomatic efforts to hinder 
the meeting, created a political crisis between the central Spanish and 
regional Basque governments (Azbarez, February 1999). Moreover, the 
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KPE organized an election campaign in the Kurdish diaspora to vote for 
the Kurdish Parliament in Exile which was, as Garzan, the PKK 
representative in Europe put it: “a first step towards the creation of a 
National Parliament… that will represent all Kurds and form a government” 
(Kutschera 1995, online article). 
 
The Federation of Kurdish Associations in Europe (KON-KURD) and the 
Federation of Associations from Kurdistan (KOMKAR) are the main 
Kurdish transnational organizations which have member organizations in 
all European countries and strong political connections with pro-Kurdish 
parties in Turkey (Faist 2000, Østergaard-Nielsen 2001).  While these 
organisations try to create a sense of Kurdish imagined community in the 
Diaspora and in Kurdistan, the hegemonic struggle translates into 
struggles against other organizations in Europe.  Many migrants and their 
communities participate in this hegemonic struggle by creating public 
awareness, lobbying for the homeland and sometimes through street battle 
between rival migrant groups. 
 
Different claims are made about the rise of transnational communities. 
Some argue that these networks emerged because of the exclusion of the 
migrant population in the countries of settlement, while others claim that 
the transnational organizations operate successfully because of their 
inclusion in the society of settlement which helps to integrate the 
marginalized migrant population into mainstream society (Østergaard-
Nielsen 2003). The ongoing debate over transnational organizations and 
their practices revolves around whether and how they reconnect migrants 
to their religion, homeland and nation in real and symbolic ways and export 
the homeland conflict to the countries of settlement (Vertovec and Cohen 
1999, Faist 2000b, Østergaard-Nielsen 2000). On the other hand, some 
settlement countries view these organizations as a significant obstacle to 
their integration policies (Heitmeyer et al. 1997).  
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Kurdish and Turkish homeland political organizations are deterritorialized 
in their transnational practices but reterritorialized through their local, 
everyday practices in the countries of settlement.19 The function of the 
local organizations consists of organising politically for the rights of 
migrants in the individual countries of settlement and getting involved in 
homeland politics in the broadest sense.  The relationship between being 
deterritorialised and reterritorialised or, as Østergaard-Nielsen  puts it, 
‘unboundedness and groundedness’ (2000:262) is fluid. Taking the 
example of Kurdish nationalist organizations, we find that they are 
connected to each other in several ways: through the establishment of the 
Kurdish communities in London which support Kurdish councillors, to get a 
representative Kurdish voice in the area, but these communities also lobby 
for the homeland in the UK Parliaments. They also maintain close relations 
with transnational Kurdish organizations in Europe and in Turkey/Kurdistan 
and mobilise for, or organise certain demonstrations and festivals, together 
with European-based Kurdish organizations in Germany, such as Turkish 
Day in July. 
 
Moreover the country of origin –Turkey as defined by the Turkish state - is 
involved directly and indirectly in encouraging Turkish migrants to become 
citizens of the countries of settlement in order to be active in pro-Turkey 
politics in the country of settlement. Consequently, “there are at least two 
political systems and socio-economic contexts to consider in the analysis 
of transnational political practices” (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2001:263).  
 
Gramsci considered civil society as ‘private society’ and ‘political society’ or 
‘state’ (Gramsci 1971:12) a part of a totality and ‘one and same’. (Gramsci 
1971:160). However, civil organisations in a country can oppose the 
‘common sense’ of a dominant social group or state-disseminated values 
(Kaldor et al 2003, Dikici-Bilgin 2009) for example, in a human rights 
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organisation. Such transnational organisations cannot be reduced to the 
Turkish state or Kurdish national movement, but are heterogeneous and 
not “one and same” as the state. However, these transnational networks, 
communities, organisations can be contested within each group. 
Nevertheless, my interviews with the community networks, leaders of 
migrant associations, workers and visitors to migrant centres confirm that 
the majority of Turkish and Kurdish organisations in my sample, are 
struggling with the two competing nationalistic projects of ‘Turkishness’ and 
‘Kurdishness’. This causes an ongoing struggle between them to 
disseminate and reproduce their respective nationalist concepts and to 
exercise political and cultural leadership over the Turkish and Kurdish 
communities, but also beyond these communities, to the wider public in the 
settlement countries.  Therefore the transnational Kurdish and Turkish 
network organizations exert huge influence over the local organizations, 
mobilizing different campaigns around homeland issues. The disputed 
homeland politics has spread through this transnational political 
organization from the country of origin and its media to the localities of 
Berlin, London or Stockholm.  
 
For example, when the Turkish military started to prepare the Turkish 
people to support its cross-border operation against the PKK in 2008, 
during the operation, the conflict spread to Europe and affected Turkish 
and Kurdish communities in Berlin worse than elsewhere. The German 
media declared the “Turks hunt the Kurds” and identified “a kind of pogrom 
mood” (Peters 2007b, Die Welt Newspaper 2007). The conflict between 
nationalist and religious-oriented Turkish and Kurdish European 
organizations and their members became visible in different European 
cities. 
 
4. The Transnational Media 
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Since the 1960s, the migrant population consumed only homeland print 
media and the TV programmes of the respective country of settlement. 
Video from the homeland entered into migrants’ lives in the 1980s. But the 
turning point came in the late ‘80s and ‘90s, when transnational satellite 
TV, the internet and digital technologies inter-connected people from 
different geo-political spaces and took them virtually ‘home’. This ended 
the dependency of migrant audiences on  the media of the settlement 
countries and has lead to different identities and political positions in the 
world as the more sensitive new communications technology has 
demonstrated ‘a liberating potential’ (Romano 2002:128) for those whose 
identity is denied as in the case of the Kurds. The new communications 
technology has enabled the Kurds to “redefine themselves and challenge 
dominant states” (Romano 2002:128). 
Transnational broadcasts have become frequent and the audiences for 
them have grown remarkably large, such as Fairchild TV for Chinese 
speaking communities, Al-Jazeera, Al Hurra and ART for Arabic speaking 
communities, Antenna for Greek-speaking communities, the Russian 
WMNB, the Italian Telelatino, Spanish Telemundo, Kurdish Roj TV, the 
Turkish TRT INT (1990) the Indian Network Asia and the Star, Zee TV, 
MBC, Phoenix and many more. Some of these channels broadcast in a 
number of languages. Arabic Orbit TV, for example, broadcasts in Arabic, 
English and French and programmes are also exported to the West, such 
as CNN and the BBC. The Islamic Ahmadiyye International broadcasts 
from London around the world and has offices in Germany, Pakistan, 
Canada and the United States.  The common features of these media are 
that they broadcast across national borders, in different languages, to 
different commercial, linguistic, ethnic and religious communities. 
 
The broadcasts from several geographic areas have begun to send 
television signals about an “imagined geography” in order to make 
ideological, nationalist, religious or commercial gains. Among the 
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developing, as well as the developed, countries, this trend has raised 
among nation-states the “fear that digital broadcasting satellites (DBS) 
would erode their sovereignty by transmitting foreign programming to their 
populations in unregulated manners” (Karim 1998: 9). Karim draws a 
parallel between the increasingly ideological nature of movements of 
“nationalism, ethnicity, religious fundamentalism, racism, sexism and other 
forms of exclusion” and sustained communications technologies (Karim 
1998, Aksoy 2001, Georgiou 2005, Becker and Behnisch 2001, Robins 
and Aksoy 2001, Aksoy and Robins 2000). Another important conclusion in 
an increasingly interconnected world, is that “people who live in close 
physical proximity, may share less on a cultural level than they do with 
dispersed people elsewhere” (Shuval 2002:43). However, at the same time 
this condition has been enhanced by “merging into the mainstream of the 
host society” (Karim 1998:9) and spreading  information from other regions 
to the West.  Appadurai concludes that 
 
We need to look closely at the variety of what has 
emerged as diasporic public spheres. […] As mass 
mediation becomes increasingly dominated by 
electronic media (and thus de-linked from the 
capacity to read and write), and as such media 
increasingly link producers and audiences across 
national boundaries, and as these audiences 
themselves start new conversations between those 
who move and those who stay, we find a growing 
number of diasporic public spheres. (Appadurai 
1997:21-22). 
 
The term “transnational communities’ public sphere” is closely connected 
to the term “diasporic public spheres” as Shuval indicates:“Diaspora theory 
is also linked to the theoretical discourse on transnationalism and 
globalization” (Shuval, 2000:3) and   “Diasporas are the exemplary 
communities of the transnational moment” (Tölölyan 1991:3), for further 
discussion, see chapter I). So the terms are used interchangeably. 
However, I prefer to use the term the public sphere of transnational 
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communities since it directly relates to the positioning of migrants in-
between two points of reference the country of settlement and the country 
of origin: “In the contemporary world, group identities are no longer 
spatially or territorially bounded. People support, produce or cling to 
territorially based identities even though they do not actually live in the 
territory” (Demmers 2002:89). Migrant consumption of different 
transnational ethnic media in different languages has created a new 
transnational public, social and cultural space where migrants reproduce, 
negotiate and create meanings out of their ethnic and religious identities. 
Their lives are now shaped by more than one source of media and culture.  
 
4.1. Turkish and Kurdish media in Europe 
The Turkish and Kurdish media present in Europe play an important role in 
transmitting political information, knowledge, ideologies which influence 
migrants' mental models and outlooks. These media mobilize migrants 
around homeland politics, and the media content is invoked by migrants in 
dialogue around homeland issues, in particular about the ethno-national 
conflict and ‘our martyrdom’ in everyday life, in workplaces, cafés, 
community centres and homes. 
During the Turkish and Kurdish so-called “guest worker” migration in the 
late 1960s, the nationalist Turkish Tercuman and Aksam were the first 
newspapers to be distributed in Germany. They were followed by the 
nationalist Hürriyet, Milliyet, Sabah,  the nationalist-religious Zaman, Milli 
Gazete, Turkiye newspapers, the weekly  Cumhuriyet (Kemalist)  and the 
left-wing Evrensel (1995). In the 1970s and ‘80s newspapers were 
produced for Turks in Turkey (Istanbul) but distributed in Germany too. But 
since the 1990s, the media added European editions to the national papers 
for distribution in Europe. Today some of the newspapers have their 
editorial offices and even printing facilities in Germany. 
 
The most powerful newspaper is Hürriyet which has been published since 
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1971 in Germany and has claimed that “For the past 40 years, Hürriyet has 
been fulfilling the need for news and commentary of Turkish people living 
in Europe” (Hürriyet kurumsal, 2008). Hürriyet and Milliyet belong to media 
tycoon Aydin Dogan20 whose other 7 newspapers are also present in 
Europe. The second best-selling newspaper Zaman is owned by the Feza 
group which is a mouthpiece for the Islamic cleric and Turkish intellectual” 
Fethullah Gülen. (Balci 2008, Zaman  Newspaper  24.06.08). Zaman uses 
the resources of religious community organizations like Fethullah Gülen 
community and Milli Gorus to expand its distribution. Evrensel is the only 
left-wing Turkish newspaper which has much coverage of working-class 
issues, both German and migrant. The newspaper is close to Emek - the 
Labour Party - (a small party without any representatives in the Turkish 
Parliament).  The weekly, Cumhuriyet is the mouthpiece of the Kemalist 
regime in Turkey. The readers of this newspapar are older-generation 
Kemalists. But in comparison to other newspapers, Cumhuriyet has no 
significant readership in Europe. 
 
In the 1970s and’80s, these newspapers informed their audiences about 
the socio-political situation in Turkey acting as ‘a bridge to the homeland’. 
In the 1980s, video took an important place in the life of Turkish and 
Kurdish migrants and an ethnic Turkish video industry was born in 
Germany.  Since the 1990s European editions of the Turkish print media 
have focused on news from the countries of settlement (mainly Germany) 
which primarily relate to Turkey and Turkish migrants, presenting them 
culturally, linguistically in a positive light while stereotyping the 
subordinated Kurds negatively.   
 
The imagined political Turkish community was reflected in media texts 
produced in Turkey and disseminated and consumed in Europe. At that 
time there was no significant Kurdish daily media and Kurds followed 
mainly Turkish media to inform themselves about their homeland. However 
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as hegemony is not static but contested, the Kurdish media came to play 
an important role in challenging the dominant Turkish nationalistic 
discourse which had been accepted for decades as ‘normal’, disseminating 
its own Kurdish nationalist world view. 
 
The Kurdish media emerged in the 1970s, again printed in Turkey and 
distributed in Europe. But when the military coup took place, “the Kurdish 
media were prohibited therefore, the period of silence of Kurdish media 
had begun” (Interview with Kurdish politician and Journalist, Kemal Burkay, 
Stockholm, 17th June 2007) in Europe. It lasted until the 1980s with the 
publication of the Kurdistan Socialist party newsletter and monthly 
magazine, the PKK Serxwebun and, at the end of 80s, the Kurdish Roja 
Nû. These monthly magazines contained ideological and propaganda 
material. Also different parties and groups published some magazines 
dealing with political, cultural and gender issues. 
 
The first Kurdish dailies were Özgür Gündem and Özgür Ülke, produced in 
Turkey and distributed with a European edition in Europe. But when Özgür 
Ülke newspaper headquarters and other two offices in Istanbul were 
bombed in 1994, the newspaper began publishing in Germany with the 
name of Özgür Politika - Free Politics. Two weeks before the German 
general election in 2005, the German Interior Minister, Otto Schily closed 
down Özgür Politika because of an allegation of links with the PKK. The 
Kurdish sources talked about a deal between the Turkish and German 
governments that the German SPD would close down the newspaper and 
the Turkish government and media would encourage Turkish German 
citizens to vote for the SPD. The same press company began publishing 
Yeni Özgür Politika in 2006 which is still being published today. In 2004, 
Peyame, an independent Kurdish weekly began publishing but closed 
down because of financial problems in 2006. The new Rudaw and Le 
Monde Diplomatique are other important media printed in Kurdish which 
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disseminate a Kurdish ‘conception of the world.’ (Gramsci 1971:462, 386–
8).  
 
4.2. Transnational Turkish and Kurdish satellite TV stations 
Since the early 1990s, the transnational Turkish and Kurdish media have 
changed Turkish and Kurdish society in Turkey and in the diaspora, 
deterritorialising nationalism and remapping its imagined borders.  The 
ethnic and religious conflicts in the homeland enter through the media into 
migrants’ lives, recasting migrant political and religious orientations. (Hafez 
2002) 
 
A broader classification of these transnational satellite TVs is: 
 
4.2 i) State-controlled nation-building television TRT 
The mouthpiece of the state nationalist discourse has broadcast since 
1964 in Turkey, and since 1990, has been broadcasting TRT INT 
(renamed TRT Türk since 2008)  to reach  “the population of Turkish 
migrants in Europe ….drawing them back into the Turkish national 
imaginary,” (Aksoy 2000:6) in order to “create an expanded imaginary 
space of Turkishness” (Aksoy and Robins 2000:6).  
 
TRT TÜRK (Formerly known as TRT INT), the main Turkish state TV 
channel for migrants in Europe presents the ‘aims of programs for citizens 
living outside’ on its website as: 
“[to] become conscious against separatist, 
destructive and  reactionary terror organization, in 
favour of the Turkish Republic, helping in organising 
with their leadership and initiative  for lobbying 
activities” (TRT general broadcasting plan 2006, aims 




These aims should cover broadcasts of drama, religious, news and 
documentary programmes.  Moreover programmes have to be opposed to 
the “smear campaigns” of the so-called Armenian genocide, the PKK and 
others. The 140 page document vividly exposes the fears of the Turkish 
state.  The state channel TRT broadcasts programmes like Arayis on ‘the 
Armenian question and Terror’ (2005 and 2006) on TRT INT for migrants in 
Europe and discusses the ‘so-called Armenian genocide’21 when some 
European parliaments in Germany, Sweden, France, Belgium and 
Switzerland discuss these issues. The same TV channel also reports on 
‘North Iraq and Terror’.  The Turkish media use different terms to define 
certain hot issues – such as ‘separatist terror’, ‘the entity in Northern Iraq 
(Kurdish federal region)’, the ‘so-called Kurds’, ‘people, who believe that 
they are Kurdish’, the ‘so-called PKK’, and  ‘so-called Kurdish question’. 
This coverage is intended to build a front against the ‘enemies’ of Turkey 
within the Turkish community in Europe. The media and Turkish military 
(former Turkish general of staff, Buyukanit) call on migrants to lobby in 
favour of Turkey. (Star TV, 15.02.2007). 
 
The interviews show that the Turkish media has influenced some migrants 
in terms of creating a ‘front’ against ‘…separatist, destructive and 
reactionary terror’ (TRT general broadcasting plan 2006, aims of  programs 
for citizen living outside, article 6:28). But this cost the Turkish media 
credibility amongst Kurdish, and some Turkish, migrants. Nationalistic 
media messages contribute to creating a sense of alienation among 
Kurdish audiences. The Kurdish migrants I interviewed felt that these 
Turkish media messages singled them out so they became aware of their 
Kurdishness as an object of hostility. 
Kosnick’s research (1994) on migrant media in Berlin points out that the 
use of a range of different media to make sense of events is an important 
part of Kurdish migrants’ media habits: 
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“… Deniz and Zerdi, both in their early 30s, were 
firmly placed in front of the television, channel-
zapping as they tried to catch news on the Kurdish 
rally that had taken place earlier that day in Frankfurt. 
They had wanted to go, but could not leave their 
newspaper store… Deniz got lucky with the German 
public service channel ARD, which briefly covered 
the rally in its evening news program. The report 
stated that 15,000 people had attended the rally from 
all over Germany. Deniz exclaimed, ‘Not true- there 
were twice as many!’ Zerdi told me that they had 
heard about the numbers who attended the rally from 
relatives who had participated. ‘But television always 
lies,‘ Deniz said, adding that ‘the Turkish channels 
are fascist anyway, and the only place where you can 
get the truth is the Kurdish programs on the Open 
Channel”(Kosnick 2007:1) . 
 
At the time of Kosnick’s research there were no transnational Kurdish 
channels broadcasting. But now the number of transnational Kurdish 
channels has reached fifteen and the potential sources of information 
which Kurdish migrants can access has increased manifold. Kurdish 
migrants are keen to zap from Roj TV to Kurdistan TV or from Turkish TRT 
to German ARD to get ‘true’ information. This means they are more likely 
to be confronted with a range of terms denoting Kurdish issues and 
interpret these terms in a variety of ways. 
 
4.2 ii) Private, commercial TV stations 
Private TV stations (Show, Kanal D, ATV, Star 1 etc) were a part of the 
globalization and liberalisation of the national market and growth of 
consumer society. The first Turkish private broadcasting, Magic Box, 
started in Germany in 1991 and sent TV signals from Germany to Turkey, 
thus ending the state TRT monopoly over broadcasting. Turkey was forced 
to change its legislation on broadcasting in 1994.  The private and 
commercial TV stations broke the standard linguistic and cultural state 
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broadcasting format and brought a range of topics into migrants’ lives: 
political discussion on issues like homosexuality, the breakdown of the 
traditional, conservative Islamic code for women, and even Kurdish issues 
which were new for Turkey, but also for the more conservative diaspora. 
 
Aksoy argues that “These companies [Turkish media tycoons] invested in 
media channels for the Turks in Europe for business reasons (rather than 
out of a political concern with the Turkish nation in imagined 
Diaspora)”(2000b:7). This uncritical approach ignores the fact that many 
Turkish intellectuals criticized the ideological and financial dependency of 
the media on the state (Duran 1998).  Further they also anticipated the 
consequences of the competition for advertising revenues and audience 
ratings with private TV channels which have pushed them to broadcast 
sensational news and to toy with the nationalist feelings of viewers in 
Turkey and in Europe following official guidelines in order to avoid getting 
into trouble with state institutions. (Interview with former media tycoon. 
(Düzel 2010, Taraf Newspaper 15 .03. 2010) This dependency on the state 
and official ideology poses obstacles to informing audiences about all 
aspects of the news. These TV channels belong to media tycoons who 
own newspapers, banks, insurance companies and distribution outlets. 
There are now over 100 Turkish-language private transnational TV 
channels. (See appendix Table 1 – The Transnational Turkish satellite TV 
and its establishment in Europe). 
 
iii) Islamic-nationalist TV 
Different tendencies - Milliyetci-maneviyatci (nationalist-moralist), Milliyetci-
mukaddesatci (nationalist followers-of-the-Holy), muhafazakar-müslüman 
(conservative-Muslim) (Öncü 2000) - come to the public through the  
Islamic –nationalist TGRT (1993) via satellite from the UK, the Nur 
religious order’s STV (1994), the Fazilet party’s Kanal 7, Kadiri order’s 
Mesaj TV. According to Öncü: 
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“Despite differences in their sectarian affiliations, 
these channels share a number of broad 
commonalities. They are ‘private’ but not 
‘commercial’ because they are sponsored by 
religious orders, and hence are not dependent upon 
advertising revenues (audience ratings) for survival. 
They define themselves as ‘civil initiatives’ against 
the ‘moral degeneracy’ of infotainment channels, on 
the one hand, and the official ‘secularism’ of the state 
broadcasting agency on the other.  Yet for Turkish-
speaking viewers, ‘watching’ Muslim channels means 
entering a very different discursive ideological realm 
from that of state television, because of the 
distinctive language which controls the gaze” (Öncü 
2000:309). 
 
Islamic TV stations disseminate an ‘Islamic, huzur life-style’ which is 
“referring to a mental state which makes it possible to be in the presence of 
God”(Öncü 2000:312). In their programme and advertising, the Koran 
becomes the main symbolic power in promoting Islamic dress code, a 
traditional Islamic family structure, the Islamic bank and Shopping Centre. 
 
iv) Elewî-oriented TV 
Su, Cem, Dem, Yol and Düzgün are based in Germany, the Netherlands 
and Turkey but broadcast via satellite to different countries including the 
UK.  These TV stations have significant audiences in Germany and the UK 
and have created a fierce debate about Elewî beliefs and identity. The 
owners and audiences of these TV Channels are mainly Kurdish Elewîs. 
Therefore the music programmes and the discussion are mostly focused 
on Turkey’s Kurdish question and Elewî identity which goes recognized. 
 
v) Left oriented TV 
There is only one ‘left-wing’ TV, Hayat – life- which broadcasts from Turkey 
to Europe. However it does not have significant audiences. 
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vi)  Kurdish transnational satellite TV and Turkish government:  
hegemonic struggle in the sky 
 
With the broadcasting in 1994 of MED TV from London and Brussels, the 
Kurds, transcended 
“the international borders which since 1918 have 
divided the land in which Kurds live. The channel 
allowed the Kurds, for the first time in their history, to 
establish a powerful mode of communication among 
themselves, and undermine the state-centred 
geopolitical order that has reduced them to the status 
of helpless minorities” (Hassanpour 1998:53) 
 
MED TV, Medya TV, Roj TV, Kurd1 and other new Kurdish TV channels 
have created juxtaposition to the Turkish nationalistic discourse by 
broadcasting in Kurdish, providing news from a Kurdish perspective and 
discussion, far removed from Turkish coercive power, about self-
determination, Kurdish culture and language. The reconstruction of Kurdish 
identity, history and language (“Kurdiya MED TV- MED TV Kurdish” 
referring to high Kurdish) has challenged the “state discourses that deny or 
suppress Kurdish identity …..now pursued through the use of technologies 
such as satellite broadcasting, Internet and desktop publishing” (Romano 
2002:148) and  has made Turkish law on Kurdish identity and language 
meaningless. 
 
Hassanpour argues that 
“... it is clear that every second of MED TV’s 
broadcasting seriously undermines Turkish sovereign 
rule. The logo “MED TV,” which is always present in 
the upper left comer of the screen, is an assertion of 
Kurdishness (the Kurds are Medes not Turks). It also 
asserts Kurdish rights to statehood. The logo's 
colours of red, yellow and green are the colours of 
the Kurdish flag; moreover, the flag itself appears 
frequently in the programming, ranging from news 
and information to entertainment and culture. The 
daily menu begins with a grand orchestra performing 
the Kurdish national anthem, Ey Requib (O Enemy!). 
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The ever presence of the Kurdish national flag and 
anthem means that MED TV has the power to treat 
the Kurds not as an audience, but as citizens of a 
Kurdish state”. (1998b:59) 
 
 
Turkey uses “its coercive forces to prevent the reception of the airwaves 
within Turkey” (Hassanpour 1998:54) including destroying or banning  
satellite dishes, arresting and jailing audiences for watching Kurdish TV, 
banning people from giving interviews to these TV stations (Hassanpour 
1998). MED  TV’’s license was revoked by Tony Blair’s government in 
1999 on the grounds that it was not “in the public interest to have any 
broadcaster use the UK as a platform for broadcasts which incite people to 
violence” and which are “likely to encourage or incite crime or lead to 
disorder”. However the Kurds established Medya TV and started to 
transmit via a satellite link from France from 1999 to 2004.  The French 
authorities took away Medya TV’s license in 2004 because of its links with 
the PKK. But this time the TV moved to Denmark under the new name of 
Roj TV and began transmitting from there in 2004. Turkish efforts to close 
down the Kurdish TV stations have made the Kurdish broadcasting 
situation more public and “a British cultural television station (CTV) has 
also begun allowing several hours a day of Kurdish cultural programming 
on its satellite waves” (Romano 2002:143). MED  TV, Medya TV and Roj 
TV face “resistance not only from the various states straddling Kurdistan, 
but also from anti-terrorist police forces in the UK, Belgium and Germany” 
(Karim 1998:10) Recently the Roj TV studio in Brussels was raided again 
by Belgium police. According to Hürriyet  newspaper “the operation was 
planned by the Turkish secret agency (MIT)” (04.03. 2010). The Kurds 
blamed the Belgian government for accepting the Turkish order to close 
down their studio. 
 
The use by the Kurds of new communications technology has forced 
Turkey to change its policy on broadcasting in Kurdish to tackle Kurdish 
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nationalism and so it has created its own TV TRT 6 to propagate the 
national unity of Turkey in Kurdish. As the Turkish political establishment 
see Kurdistan as part of their imagined territory due to its regional and 
international importance, strategic political and economic importance for 
energy, transportation and water resources. Yet Kurdistan is seen as a 





The Turkish and Kurdish migrants came to Europe as “guest workers” in 
the 1960s and later for family reunion or as political refugees. The 
suppressed identities of different ethnic and religious communities in 
Turkey found opportunities to develop as Kurds and Elewîs in the liberal-
democratic Western countries (Griffiths 2002, Faist 2000b, Østergaard-
Nielsen 2000, van Bruinessen 1999b, Alakom 2006, van Bruinessen 
1998).   However the Turkish state has tried to intimitate the political 
dissidents  in several ways including through the Turkish embassies, some 
nationalistic migrant organsiations and the state financed, the Turkish 
General Directorate for Religious Affairs. Since the end of 1960s, the 
Turkish media has taken the place of the nation-state in Europe, targetting 
those voices critical of its policies (Rigoni, 2002).  The development of 
global flows and communications technologies and the intensification of 
the ethno-national conflict in the homeland strengthened the suppressed 
identities of Kurds in hegemonic struggle with the Turkish state in Turkey 
and in Europe in the 1990s.  Turkey established its TRT INT and the Kurds 
their MED  TV and their own newspaper in Europe in order to develop their 
counter–hegemonic imagined community through both banal and hot 




The Turkish and Kurdish actors have used these new communications 
technologies including transnational satellite TV channels, print media, the 
internet and other digital technologies to create ‘new conversations’ 
between homeland politics and the Turkish and Kurdish diaspora through 
banal nationalist symbols, reminding the audience of ‘our’ nation, talking on 
its behalf. Thus Kurds have been engaged in highlighting the abuse of 
Turkish state power, which is turned against them and against Kurdish 
culture. This has created a hegemonic struggle in the sky between the 
Turkish state and the Kurds. Moreover, the Kurdish media has created 
Kurdishness within the Turkish imagined community in Turkey as well as in 




























Chapter V:  Media Consumption, Identity Formation and Conflict of 
Terms  
1. Introduction 
In chapter IV, I have argued that the Turkish and Kurdish actors deploy 
various means in their hegemonic struggle to maintain the Turkish state or 
build the Kurdish imagined community. One of these means is using the 
media to disseminate their “common sense”, symbols of “their” imagined 
nation, its meaning and necessity for the people. Especially since 
communications technology has advanced so rapidly, the hegemonic 
struggle for an imagined community has become very effective at reaching 
Turkish and Kurdish migrants in the different countries of settlement (Curtis 
2005b; Hafez 2000; Kosnick 2007). 
 
The media is used to legitimate their position amongst the Turkish and 
Kurdish people in Europe, mobilising them around homeland issues, in 
particular in the ethno- national conflict. The Turkish state has, through the 
state-owned or -affiliated private media, aimed to make Turkish migrants 
“consciously opposed to the separatist, destructive and reactionary terror 
organisation” (TRT 2006, Article 6:28) and speak out for “their” nation in 
the countries of settlement. This militarist recruitment programmes for the 
Turkish nation in the Turkish media are produced and sent to the Turkish 
and Kurdish migrants’ households.  
 
The Kurdish media has challenged the official state discourse and common 
sense which is based on the denial of diverse ethnic, and even religious 
groups, and the propagation of the idea of a homogeneous Turkish nation. 
Both migrant groups have been confronted with banal nationalist 
terminology in the media, within the framework of “the nation”, and 
“nationhood”: such as “enemies of our nation”, “separatists” and 
“terrorists”, and other expressions of hatred and racism towards “othered” 
peoples. On the other hand, the Kurdish media has created its own 
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terminology again within the framework of nation and nationhood, for 
example renaming the “East and South East” of Turkey “Northern 
Kurdistan”, referring to the Turkish state as the “occupier”. The attempts to 
legitimate their position amongst migrants and also define migrant 
identities and the position of migrants in the Turkish-Kurdish ethno-national 
conflict in their homeland. The struggle around these conflicting 
terminologies is an attempt to align individual ethnic identities – the 
“attachments, allegiances, loyalties, and bonds…” of people politically. 
(Robins and Aksoy 2001:254). These bonds are also reproduced through 
transnational vernacular media amongst Turkish and Kurdish migrants in a 
transnational social and cultural space where people have social, political 
and economic relations in two or more countries (the country of settlement, 
the country of origin and third places). 
 
The chapter highlights the different banal nationalist terminologies 
deployed in the process of shaping migrant identifications, analysing 
mediated identity categories and the ways Kurdish and Turkish migrants 
themselves deploy these terms. The imagined community draws on banal 
nationalism within the two communities, in which the Turkish and Kurdish 
sides in the homeland and diaspora carry on a struggle between each 
other. I see this struggle as a Gramscian struggle of hegemony and 
counter hegemony. Most importantly this is now played out through the 
transnational media and Turkish and Kurdish “civil society” in Europe.  
 
I start by presenting the research findings of different studies, including my 
own, on the media consumption of Turkish and Kurdish migrants in 
Germany, Sweden and the UK.  Then the relationship between ethnic 
identity formation and media consumption amongst the Turkish and 
Kurdish migrants will be examined. This will focus on: how migrants make 
sense of the mediated hegemonic struggle between the Turkish state and 
the Kurdish national movement; how this hegemonic struggle shapes the 
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migrants’ own ethnic identity in particular through their media consumption 
in the three countries of settlement.  It is important to see whether the 
hegemonic struggle for an imagined community, through the banal 
nationalistic terminology deployed by the media, has real effects which 
impact on the Kurdish and Turkish in defining their ethnic identities, their 
attachments and sense of belonging.  
2.  The Migrants’ Media Consumption  
The research conducted in Turkish and Kurdish migrants’ media 
consumption (Zentrum für Türkeistudien 1997; Aksoy and Robins 2000; 
Simon 2007; Bayram, Nyquist et al. 2009) shows that it has changed since 
satellite TV stations have appeared on the scene. Before they mainly 
watched TV broadcasts in the country of settlement, but by the new 
possibilities of the print, digital and satellite media have reconnected 
migrants to their homeland. This kind of media consumption plays a crucial 
role in reconstructing cultural, national and religious identities and 
legitimising cultural, ethnic and religious affiliations and attachments. 
 
It is complicated to explore the media consumption habits of Kurdish and 
Turkish transnational audiences because of the diversity of their identities 
and profiles – length of residency, age, gender, education and psychology 
- and the diversity of socio-political spaces in which the media are 
consumed, in an age of globalization.  Their ethnic, religious and political 
belief systems play an important role in the consumption of print and 
satellite TV (Hafez 2002). However, they are not limited to these particular 
media and follow a range of media which are not directly related to their 
ethnic or religious affiliations. For example, Kurdish audiences follow the 
Kurdish media, but also the Turkish media and media of the country of 
settlement. A person affiliated to Islamic Milli Gorus watches Islamic Kanal 
7 and reads Milli Gazete (National View newspaper) and mainstream 
Turkish TV, as well as following the media in the country of settlement.  
Although they follow different media in different languages, some 
 204 
audiences have a strong sense of belonging to “Turkishness” or 
“Kurdishness “ due to the ethno-national conflict in the homeland, as a 
Kurdish participant in London makes clear:  
“I mean if I wasn’t a Kurd, if I was English or a 
European, I would be more interested in global 
warming, I would be in Greenpeace something like 
that, something else. But I, as an individual, and the 
Kurdish people are facing the Turkish racist ethnic 
discrimination policies and registrations because of 
our cultural, linguistic or ethnic identity background 
and there is an ongoing brutal war against my people 
in Kurdistan.  Therefore I consume more Kurdish and 
Turkish media than the British media, to inform 
myself about  what we can do from here to get equal 
rights like the Turks in Turkey”  (Interview with Peri, 
London, 2nd April 2008). 
 
Numerous studies have been conducted on the media consumption of 
Turkish audiences in Germany including the Zentrum für Türkeistudien’s 
research (1997), Weiß and Trebbe’s (2001) and (Schulte 2002). According 
to the Zentrum für Türkeistudien (1997), the migrants used the German 
and Turkish media in complementary ways. Weiß and Trebbe’s (2001) 
research found that migrants were more interested in Germany than 
Turkey. But the young people were not interested in German politics. While 
the young people used German TV, the elderly used the Turkish media. 
However the Data4U research on 60,000 people found that Turkish 
migrants watch Turkish television, the German channels do not play an 
important role in their lives (Schulte 2002). Study of the German public 
broadcasters ARD/ZDF among Turkish, Italian and Greek, Bosnian, 
Montenegrin, Croatian, Serbian and ethnic German migrants from Russia 
(russische Spätaussiedler) found out that only 14% watch solely in their 
homeland language. The Turkish audiences more than other migrant 
groups, used the media in their homeland language (Simon 2007). 
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Robins and Aksoy’s research on Turkish migrants (again encompassing 
Kurds with “Turkish migrants”) provides rich empirical material on Turkish 
transnational audiences. They found out that migrants from “Turkey” follow 
both British and Turkish media (Aksoy and Robins 2000, Robins and 
Aksoy 2000, Aksoy 2000). 
 
These studies encompassed Kurds in the term “Turkish migrant” in 
Germany and in the UK, a term which “is obviously disputed by the Kurdish 
diaspora in Europe, and is seen as a deliberate attempt to import a Turkish 
hegemonic and nationalistic ideology into the European context” (Thomson 
et al. 2006:9). This approach ignores the ethnic and cultural differences 
and diverse media consumption habits between Turkish and Kurdish 
audiences.  Therefore it is impossible to understand how the both 
conflicted migrants group create meaning of their ethnic identities, 
imagined homeland and ongoing ethno-national conflict through 
consuming Turkish, Kurdish media which remind them homeland and flag 
certain banal nationalist symbols. Again, the research on Turkish 
audiences in Sweden (Bayram et al. 2009) suggests that the consumption 
of Turkish-originated media amongst Turkish audience is higher than the 
consumption of Swedish media.  
The Zentrum für Türkeistudien (1997) and GöfaK-Studie (2001) claimed 
that only a small number of migrants used the Turkish media. However my 
research shows that the media consumption in Turkish and Kurdish 
languages has increased amongst Turkish and Kurdish audiences owing to 
the dispute between the Turkish state and the Kurds, as well as between 
the Islamic- oriented AKP government and the military in recent years. 
Therefore I see parallelity between media consumption and the ethno-
national conflict between Turkish and Kurdish migrants and their 
mobilisation, engagement for homeland.  Both media connect them to 
“homeland” and reproduce the constructed and conflicted ethno-national 
identities, imagined “our “nation.  The sensations, dynamic of societal 
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change towards nationalistic directions, the brutal attach of Turkish police 
on Kurdish children, the tortured bodies of death guerrillas, the killed or 
“martyrized”   Turkish soldiers’ partners or mothers’ tears at well designed 
and mediated funeral ceremonies, the oat of shouted soldiers at mediated 
funeral ceremonies for revenge on “terrorists” are transmitted into everyday 
life of migrants. This creates mediated experiences through print, visual 
and digital media amongst migrants and a routine habit to news from 
“homeland” and new form of nationalism which has been described by 
“virtual nationalism” (Appadurai 1996) “because of the speed of 
communications and high mobility of people diaspora are increasingly 
capable of forging and sustaining social relations that link their societies of 
origin and settlement. Practically, this means that diaspora communities 
can easily participate in conflicts in their homelands and live their politics 
long-distance” (Demmers 2002:88). Demmers states that although 
migrants are living in different geographical and political spaces and “are 
physically separated from ‘the core conflict’ however “they are likely to 
experience different emotions and develop different behaviour during the 
course of the conflict. Whereas the ‘homeland’ groups that are physically 
engaged in the conflict will experience fear, hunger, pain, and stress, 
diaspora groups will probably feel anger, frustration or alienation. 
Consequently, these differences in attitudes will effect their behaviour and 
perception of the contradiction, and so forth” (Demmer 2002 95). 
 
Most of the participants I interviewed stated that they watch “too much 
news”. A Kurdish immigration advisor in Berlin affirmed that:  
 
The Turkish and Kurdish audiences consume the 
news with an excitement of a football match which 
makes them a bit aggressive to each other. But I can 
understand them because the media presents the 
news in the style of a game of football.  The Turkish 
media approves of the killing of “separatist terrorists” 
and the Kurdish media approves of the killing of 
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“soldiers” and “occupiers” (Interview with Dara, Berlin 
14 August 2007). 
As a Turkish participant who has been living in Berlin for 21 years, 
explained:  
“Efkan: I watch the same news several times over. I 
am addicted to the news on Turkey. I am sad to see 
what has happened to the country of Ataturk. If he 
could see the situation of his country now he would 
definitely have a heart attack. On one hand, the 
separatist Kurds, on the other hand, the hypocritical, 
religious government. But I hope the Ataturk military 
will do something. We are at the and of our tether 
Yilmaz: I think recently the general staff; Buyukanit 
has said that they are at the end of their tether. Do 
you agree with him? 
Efkan: Yes, yes”  (Interview with Efkan, Berlin, 25 
July 2007). 
 
While Robins describes such audiences as “passive and vulnerable to the 
influence of ‘Turkish television’” (2000:293 ). Hafez describes such 
audiences in Europe as loyal individuals, who see themselves as an 
“integral component of the Turkish state” who “identify themselves with the 
Turkish state and its interests, through groups like the Grey Wolves and 
Islamic-nationalist Milli Gorus” (Hafez 2002:23).  
 
“In Germany, nearly a million televisions are tuned 
into Turkish [Kurdish, Elewî] television by satellite 
during prime time  every night” (Brochure of the 
Turkish EuroD channel in Aksoy 2000:1). Certainly 
this media consumption habit has created 
opportunities for some ethnic, religious groups whose 
identity was denied by the Turkish state. In particular 
the Kurdish, Assyrian, Chaldian and Syrianic  ethnic 
groups and those of Elewî belief have for the first 
time seen traditions, history and political struggle for 
recognition in public life in Turkey but also in Europe, 
represented on screen.   These TV stations give 
voice to the different identities and perspectives of 
people but also re-conceptualize them in political, 
ideological, religious and ethnic terms and draw out 
commonalities. Despite the Turkish state having 
 208 
suppressed the different identities, they have now 
found their voice through these satellite TV channels 
where they can communicate and discuss their 
identities. A Kurdish Elewî stated in Berlin, that she 
had not learned anything about Elewî identity in 
school in Turkey, so she watches Elewî Dem and 
Düzgün TV regularly to learn about Elewîsm.  
Similarly other Kurds stated that they see Kurdish TV 
as “our window to the world “(Interview with Arinas, 
Berlin, 18.08.2007). 
 
It have been pointed out already that Turkish and Kurdish migrants in 
Germany watch more than 3 hours of German and Turkish TV (Simon 
2007). Some other research has indicated this reaches 5 hours (Schulte 
2002). The German audience watches on average 3 hours daily.  My 
research shows that the Turkish and Kurdish audiences in Germany watch 
on average 4 hours daily, while the figures are 2.45 hours in Sweden, 3.15 
hours in the UK: 
“Yilmaz: How many hours do you spend watching TV 
or reading newspaper every day? How many hours 
do you watch Kurdish channels/ read Kurdish 
newspaper?  
Rebeen: Quite a lot of ….. 
Yilmaz: How many hours? 
Rebeen: to be honest I will say 3-4 hours 
daily.[Laugh] 
Yilmaz: OK 
Rebeen: it is probably about 20-25 hour per week. 
[Laugh] it is quite a lot”   
(Interview with Rebeen, London, 19 March 2007).  
 
The outcome of my research shows that the Turkish audiences in all three 
countries usually watch the Turkish originated state TRT INT, followed by 
Kanal D, and ATV for their news, “good entertainment, football 
programmes“. The religious TV station e.g. TGRT, STV, Kanal 7 are 
watched mostly by conservative Turkish audiences in Germany but not in 
the UK and Sweden. Hürriyet newspaper is read widely by migrants in all 
three countries, followed by Zaman of Fettullah Gülen group, Milliyet, 
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Sabah. The ultra nationalist Yeni Cag and Ortadogu gazetesi are followed 
mainly on the internet. 
 
The Kurds watch Kurdish originated Roj TV  and the MMC music channel 
in the UK and Germany, while many Swedish Kurds preferred Kurdi1, 
MMC, Roj TV, Kurdistan TV and Zagros TV (from the Kurdistan region of 
Iraq). This is a quite an interesting finding because it shows that they have 
turned away from Turkey to Kurdistan in terms of consuming media in 
Kurdish and media from different parts of Kurdistan. The main daily 
newspaper is Ozgur Politika in Kurdish and Turkish which has significant 
readers in all three countries, in particular in Germany. Azadiya Welat 
Kurdis language newspaper is another paper which has mostly a Swedish 
Kurd readership.  
 
The Turkish media consumption amongst Kurds in Sweden is lower than 
that of Kurds in Germany and the UK. Some participants stated that they 
watch or read Turkish media “only if there is some discussion of Kurdish 
issues “. The Kurds in Germany and the UK follow the Turkish media daily 
in order to “know how the Turkish fascist media deal with Kurdish issues “. 
It is quite interesting that Kosnick (2007) and Hafez (2002) both found in 
their research that the Kurds refer to the Turkish media as  “fascist media 
“(Hafez 2002:53 ). The “fascist media” terminology was used mainly by the 
Turkish and Kurdish left-wing media in the ‘80s. Although they called the 
Turkish media, “fascist”, they still consume it, both for news of the ongoing 
debate about the Kurds and also for entertainment because  “the Kurdish 
media offers mostly political discussion and “does not have many 
programmes for relaxing” as one participant in London put it (Interview with 
Arjin, London, 4th March 2008). The most watched Turkish TV stations 
amongst the Kurds are the liberal NTV, CNN Turk, followed by ATV and 
Kanal D. Again the Hürriyet is the only Turkish  newspaper they read if 
they see at a café or restaurant but many of the participants stated that 
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they never buy it because “it is the official  newspaper of the racist state”  
(Interview with Peri, London, 2nd April 2008). The second newspaper is 
the liberal Radikal which has been replaced by the Taraf newspaper in 
regular media consumption of Kurds. Taraf is the only newspaper which 
criticises the Turkish military and its function in shaping Turkish political life 
and openly advocates a peaceful solution to Turkey’s urgent Kurdish 
question.   
 
70% of Kurdish audiences have stated that they regularly watch the Roj TV 
Tûrikê Derwêş documentary which is based on interesting stories about 
people from the arts, sciences, music and politics accompanied by images 
of Kurdish populated cities in Anatolia. Many migrants complain about the 
Turkish and Kurdish newspapers that they are primarily concerned with 
Germany and ignore the Swedish and British migrants.  
 
In terms of the media in the countries of settlement, Turkish and Kurdish 
audiences prefer to watch the German RTL, Pro 7 and SAT 1 for their light 
entertainment value. This finding is similar to the GöfaK-Studie (2001) 
research. The educated participants tend to watch ARD. Some Kurds in 
Berlin state that they regularly watch the ARTE, a Franco-German TV 
network, because “they have some documentary and news on Kurdistan” 
(Interview with Dilsad, Berlin, 18 July 2007). Neither group has much 
interest in the German print media but occasionally read the Berlin-based 
Berliner Zeitung, Taz, and Tagesspiegel. In Sweden, the Turkish and 
Kurdish migrants follow Swedish 1, 2 and 4 and mainly read the free 
newspaper Metro in Stockholm. Aftonbladet and Svenska Dagenblatt are 
mostly read by the second generation. In the UK, the BBC is the most 
watched TV station because  
“British media is more objective (if not objective 
enough) than the Turkish media. The BBC is 
objective compared to much of the world media. 
Pictures of the Kurdish and Turkish conflict or the 
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Kurdish issue in Turkey are regularly broadcast on 
BBC World - at the time of writing- just the week 
before during Newroz.  Clashes took place between 
the Turkish police and Newroz participants. BBC 
World showed that for just a few minutes” (Interview 
with Azad, London, and 3rd May 2008). 
 
However another Kurdish participant stated that: 
“When we came here in 1990 up until 2001 we didn’t 
see satellite TV. Until 6 years ago, we watched only 
British TV. Now we have satellite TV. We have 
British, Kurdish and Turkish channels. But I would 
say for the past two or three years I have been 
mainly watching Kurdish TV. “(Interview with Sozan, 
London 29th March 2008).  
 
2.1. Identity formation and media consumption:  
Case One: The first generation22 
A Turkish participant stated that they have satellite TV and watch mainly 
Turkish TV because “there are a lot of exciting events in Turkey. 
Everybody is fighting to have power and I watch the power struggle as a 
soap opera and to be honest, I have very little time to watch British 
television” (Interview with Devrim, London 03 March 2008). 
 
The British print media plays a minor role in the lives of the Kurdish and 
Turkish migrants. Many of them testify that they read only free papers like 
Metro: “For a while I bought the Guardian. But now I sometimes read it on 
internet. Unfortunately I have lost the habit of buying a newspaper. I read 
English and Kurdish newspapers on the internet. “(Interview with Arjin, 
London, 4th March 2008). Local Turkish and Kurdish  newspapers and 
radio (Zeitschrift Etap, Radyo Metropol FM in Berlin, Telgraf, Haber 
postasi, Toplum postasi, Olay, Bizim Radio in London, and Sirwan in 
Sweden) are also important sources of information for migrants. 
 
It is clear that the first generation of Kurdish and Turkish audiences find 
themselves - their individual identity, behaviour and social norms - more 
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reflected in the Kurdish or Turkish media. The first generation of Turkish 
and Kurdish migrants, who had no formal education and are unskilled, tend 
to consume Turkish media, but also the educated and skilled first 
generation, who have strong political links and would like to keep 
themselves up-to-date with ongoing events in their homeland, are the main 
consumers of the Turkish and Kurdish media. They have been involved in 
varying degrees in cultural and political life and debate in Turkey, and later 
on, either as refugees or as voluntary migrants seeking a better life. 
However the myth of returning “home” is still alive amongst this group. The 
myth of return has a long history and is still reiterated by the first 
generation. The narrative constructed around the ‘myth of return’ bears 
close relationship to the notion of an idealized home:  “the concreteness of 
a familiar home “(Zetter 1999:4) in the country of origin, idealized imagery 
of the past, the substratum of “the memory of collective loss“ (Zetter 
1999:5), attachment to the place and its meaning in people’s lives keep  
the imaginary home and  myth of return alive. These help them to 
reconstruct “a cultural inventory” in the diaspora. Zetter (1999:3) states that 
the notion of returning home  has been “a dominant theme” for many 
refugees and diasporic  communities  for whom “return remains a profound 
conviction”. Zetter provides a useful concept of “how refugees perceive the 
relationship between their past” (Zetter 1999:5), their aspirations for the 
future and the mediating role of the present. The 'myth of return' is 
constructed because protracted exiles are living in a condition where they 
feel that “their exile is temporary and that they will eventually return home” 
(Zetter 1999:5). Although they make “numerous failed attempts at 
reconciliation” and return ’home’, simultaneously they resettle and integrate 
rather than becoming temporary residents. This means that they create 
their economic and social spaces within majority society in settlement 
countries where their lives, livehoods, identities are reshaped in 
accordance with where they live. But they live in a situation where 
interaction between myth and reality becomes part of everyday life and 
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“overlaid with an abstracted or imagined realm“(Zetter 1999:4). Zetter 
conceptualizes the complexity of the idea of returning as “a future in the 
past' and 'a future without the past' of diasporas in settlement countries 
(Zetter 1999:3 and also see Zetter 1994:311- 318).  The idea of returning 
home “not only encapsulates this sense of a fictitious past, or at least one 
that is idealized and reinvented, but also a fictitious future” (Zetter 1999:4). 
Zetter states that “the construct of the myth of return home also offers 
insights into how refugee groups frequently manage to sustain both their 
social cohesion and distinctiveness during exile, despite the countervailing 
forces of time and assistance programmes. Repatriation constitutes a 
material objective and the aspiration to an ideal—essentially the restitution 
of a past shattered by diaspora” (Zetter 1999:5). However  this 
contradictory attitude  of “the perceived limbo-like situation of being neither 
`here’ nor `there’ can be a  paralyzing force and prevent refugees from 
developing strategies to make a living in the settlement country (Bloch 
2004, Al-Rasheed 1994, Al-Ali et al. 2001a).  The ‘myth of return’ can also 
contribute to the establishment of transnational networks which provide 
potential resources e.g., access to jobs, political participation maintenance 
of cultural and linguistic elements of ethnic identity for socially bounded 
groups (Al-Ali et al. 2001b; Al-Rasheed 1994 ; Portes 1998).  
 
I use the myth of ‘returning home’ in relation to the imagined community, 
since “myths of return serve to strengthen ethnic solidarity but in many 
cases have little practical effect. The `return’ of many in the diaspora is an 
eschatological concept used to make life easier by means of a belief in an 
eventual resolution - a virtual utopia. The return is hoped for ‘at the end of 
days’ and … ongoing support of the homeland and, a collective identity … 
relationship (Esman 2009; Hall 1999 ; Munz and Ohliger 1998 ; Shuval 
2000:8).     
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But also for many, this dream of returning home is realised in retirement. 
However most of the Kurdish and Turkish migrants do not return 
permanently as they had initially hoped. Instead, they spend some months 
in the settlement countries and some months in the homeland. Because of 
their dream of returning “home”, both Kurdish and Turkish first generation 
migrants pay close attention to events in Turkey and Kurdistan and they 
get all their news about these events from the media. Turkish media call 
these people gurbetçi”, - one who lives far from the homeland in a foreign 
country. This nationalistic phrase is reiterated everyday by the Turkish 
media underlining migrants are not a part of the society but of the Turkish 
imagined community.  
 
 
While living in a ’foreign country’ where they face multiple forms of 
discrimination, exclusion and the feeling of not being accepted by the ’host’ 
society, the ‘myth of return’ becomes an alternative, imaginary strategy in 
the mind of migrants. Therefore they imagine returning to an idealized 
home. As Ahmet, a Turkish participant in Berlin stated:  
“We are gurbetçi [expatriates] and wish to go back to 
our country. 
Y: Where do you get information about Turkey? 
A: We have TRT, Kanal D, I read Hürriyet at 
kahvehane [a social place where men meet up and 
play cards].  
J: Do you talk about the current events taking place 
in Turkey at kahvehane and about returning to 
Turkey? 
Of course. All our talk is about Turkey”  
(Interview with Ahmet, Berlin, 13 July 2007). 
 
Imagined community is the community has been constructed through 
different nationalistic symbols over time.  Within it, one of the most 
powerful ideas is the myth of return which manifests itself in many 
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communities (Zetter 1999). Therefore the visually imagined homeland and 
myth of returning “home” through the media play a crucial role in the 
everyday life of the first generation. The first generation of Kurdish and 
Turkish migrants in Germany and Britain tend to define their identities 
through their ethnic backgrounds, a tendency only strengthened by the 
war. The “national” identities as Kurd or Turk have been polarised and are 
seen as surmounting all other identifications in the hegemonic struggle of 
hot and banal nationalism. In the everyday relations between Turks and 
Kurds, their multiple identities disappear behind a single ascribed identity 
and these identities come into competition with each other (see chapter 
VII). Moreover, they have a strong attachment to their homeland because 
of their cultural and social norms, their family members in the homeland. 
For example, the Turkish participant, Sedat has been living in Berlin for 27 
years. He owns a newspaper store where he reads all the Turkish papers 
and also the “separatist terrorist” ones (as defined by Serdar). He states 
that 
“S: I watch mainly TRT or Show TV and I read all the 
news here [at his newspaper store] about Turkey.  
Y: Which newspaper do you read here? 
S: I read all. I read Hürriyet, Zaman, sport 
newspapers and I read the “separatist terrorist” 
newspaper. 
Y: What is the name of this the “separatist terrorist” 
newspaper. 
S Oh you are researching about media and do not 
know this newspaper. Here you are. 
 
S:..I have been living for 27 years and have dual 
citizenship. But I feel Turkish. I have my family and 
my friends in my city [in Turkey]. I go there every 
summer. I feel more comfortable there than here. I 
hope I will be healthy when I will be a pensioner and 
will go to my city and will spend the rest of my life 
there… “(Interview with Serdar, Berlin, 17 July 2007). 
 
Despite his self employment and dual citizenship, Serdar is thus one of the 
first generation migrants who dreams of going back to Turkey. In his news 
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agent’s, he sells a range of international newspapers but only reads the 
Turkish language ones (both Kurdish and Turkish). He does not read the 
German newspapers. This is again an indication of his strong identification 
with Turkey. There was a similar term used amongst the Kurds who wish to 
go to their Welat – homeland. 
 
In contrast to Germany and Britain, the first generation Kurdish and Turkish 
migrants in Sweden are closer to the second generation interviewees in 
the ways they express their identity. While they do mention their ethnicity, 
this identity is always interpreted in a politicised way. The Kurdish and 
Turkish mother-tongue teachers interviewed emphasised their dual 
identification as from Turkey but also a Kurdistan or Swedish citizen.  
 
The Turkish and Kurdish migrants who went to Sweden after the military 
coup, mentioned in their interviews that they were “happy to be in a 
democratic country” and added that “Okay I am Turkish but I am Swedish 
too” (Hale, Stockholm, 26th June 2007) or “Kurdistan is our country, but we 
made our home here and I am Swedish too” (Amed, Stockholm, 10th June 
2007). These explanations are similar to some second generation Kurdish 
and Turkish migrants in Germany and in Britain. In my research I have 
found, therefore, that Kurdish and Turkish migrants in Sweden differ from 
those in Germany and Britain. But the Kurdish first generation in Sweden is 
passionate about Kurdish identity and its reproduction in the diaspora. 
Kurdishness is their way of expressing their identity and plays an important 
part in their lives, for example the opening of the first modern Kurdish 
library in Sweden where I collected a lot of literature about the Kurds.  This 
contradicts somewhat Van Bruinessen’s argument (2002) that it was the 
Kurdish second generation migrants who politicized the first generation. 
 
The educated first generation are active in their communities and even in 
mainstream parties and institutions in the country of settlement. They 
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follow various media including those of the country of settlement, as well 
as Turkish and Kurdish media. Their media consumption habits are similar 
to those of some second generation, who have grown up and been 
educated in the countries of settlement. Therefore these groups constitute 
the main consumers of transnational media, following media in two or three 
different languages.  
 
b. Case Two: The second generation 
Van Bruinessen points out that “[t]he so-called second generation, 
consisting of immigrant workers’ children who have grown up in Europe, 
tend to be much more interested in Kurdish identity and Kurdish politics 
than their parents were, many parents returned to their Kurdish roots under 
the influence of their children” (van Bruinessen 2000a: 3). While this may 
be so, my research has found that the second generation migrants tend to 
define their identities more broadly, integrating their ethnic background and 
settlement country identity. The cities of Berlin, Stockholm or London are 
also a part of their identity, as they live there and think they can find a job 
without a serious problem. These factors give them a sense of being at 
home and create feelings of belonging.  
Baran, a second generation Kurd from London states: 
“In my opinion if you are born as a Kurd and if you 
are aware of Kurdish identity, of your heritage and 
the Kurdish situation, the Kurdish issue, you 
automatically are involved in politics. Because you 
were born in a society in which people have no rights 
at all to develop and contribute to their language and 
culture - even in some cases, their existence is put in 
question. If you are aware of this unjust situation and 
do something against the oppressor, you are 
involved in politics and follow all the news about the 
ongoing conflict in Kurdistan” (Interview with Baran, 
London 13 February 2007). 
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This response is typical of second generation Kurdish migrants in Germany 
and in the UK who also  played an important part in politicizing their 
parents in Europe (Leggewie 1996, van Bruinessen 1999b). Kurdish 
migrants often came from rural areas and had low levels of education. So 
they were not highly politicised in the 1960s and 1970s, but their children, 
who grew up and were educated in Europe, developed a strong 
attachment to Kurdishness from the 1970s onwards.  First, they noticed 
that their families spoke a different language from Turkish and this led 
them to search for their identity. The political refugees in Europe together 
with the second generation Kurds and the Kurdish media developed a 
more articulated sense of Kurdishness.  So the second generation began 
to follow the Kurdish media more closely and pay careful attention to the 
Kurdish situation in Turkey, becoming active in Kurdish diaspora politics. 
They politicized their parents in the process of adopting a sense of 
Kurdishness from the Kurdish media.  
 
The conflict in the homeland has meant that many second generation 
Kurdish migrants have revived their sense of ethnic identity and it has 
strengthened their allegiance to various aspects of Kurdishness. They feel 
a sense of solidarity or obligation with other Kurds in the homeland. They 
feel this sense of responsibility all the more as the position of the Kurds in 
Kurdistan has deteriorated. One young woman born in Germany explains:   
“Kurdish identity is important. I have not got the 
opportunity to experience life in Kurdistan. But I feel 
emotionally connected to them because of their 
situation under the violence of the Turkish state. 
Therefore, I try to do anything I can do from here [to 
help]” (Interview with Civane, Berlin, 17 August 
2007). 
 
Another participant brings a different perspective as to why he returned to 
his ethnic identity and now follows the Kurdish media: 
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“My Kurdish identity is an important aspect in all my 
socio-political relations. Because the Kurdish cause 
is a burning political issue and this issue has an 
impact on our identity. It creates a collective and 
solidaristic identity amongst Kurds. It doesn’t matter 
where you live. If I say Kurdish identity I am talking 
about a politicized Kurdish identity that stands up for 
our rights. I am interested in a new Kurdish identity 
not the past. Because I see a society which is rapidly 
forming here and in Kurdistan … Of course the media 
play an important role in this political transformation. 
The Kurdish media give the Kurds a sense of 
belonging after having felt for decades the outsider 
because of political and economic discrimination in 
our homeland (Interview with Dilsad, Berlin, 18 July 
2007).  
 
These two testimonies demonstrate that for these second generation 
Kurds, expressing allegiance to a Kurdish identity is a moral issue of 
showing solidarity with Kurds who are suffering from oppression. 
Expressing Kurdish identity is for them a political project connected with 
building a new Kurdish society or defending Kurds from oppression. It is 
not a search for identity in the lost traditions of the past which has merely 
been forgotten through migration.  
 
For many Turkish second generation migrants, on the other hand, their 
sense of Turkish identity has strengthened through media consumption, 
being involved in community work and emergency of Kurdish identity in 
Europe. Zeynep, a Turkish community worker emphasises her loyalty to 
Turkishness: 
I am Turkish. Turkishness is my significant identity. It 
does not matter where I am living or whether I am a 
citizen of another country. Turkishness is my identity 
and I am defined by it everywhere. I am a citizen of 
this country. Citizenship and identity are two different 
things. My country is Turkey and I feel attached to it 
and defend it everywhere. 
Y: Why do you feel that you should defend it? 
Z: We have a problem in Turkey, in East Turkey and 
here. The Germans are against us. 
 220 
Y: Did you send any protest letter which has been 
published in Hürriyet or     Sabah against some 
institutions or individuals who are against Turkey or     
Turks according to these newspapers?  
Z: Yes I... I think I sent one to Spiegel [German 
weekly news magazine]. They have published some 
negative news about Ataturk” (Interview with Zeynep, 
Berlin, 29 August 2007). 
 
The second generation, for example, is able to acquire information from 
the host countries’ sources as well as from Kurdish and Turkish sources.  
These groups have started a transnational dialogue between Berlin, 
London, Stockholm, Turkey and Kurdistan via the media. Many Kurds from 
different geo-political spaces (Sweden, Turkey, Kazakhstan, and different 
parts of Kurdistan - Iran, Iraq and Turkey etc) call Roj TV to express their 
feelings, their views, and their political position in the same programme 
and at the same time.  In a similar way, the Turkish audiences from 
different European countries and from Turkey communicate at the same 
time on the same programme. 
 
There are also a significant number of Kurdish second generation in 
Sweden who primarily consume the Swedish, English and Kurdish media, 
while the second generation of Kurds in Britain and Germany tend to use 
more media in Kurdish and Turkish languages. In some cases, the 
consumption of Turkish or Kurdish originated media depends on the 
education, social stratification and locality of the migrant. The Turkish and 
Kurdish media consumption depends on where people live, if they live in 
certain so-called segregated areas or high-concentration, ethnic minority 
areas. The young people consume media and discuss the issues, but in 
areas where the ethnic group is not significant, then young people have 
friends with non-Kurdish and non-Turkish background and the discussion 
topic focuses on issues relating to the countries of settlement. In Sweden 
many people have two televisions on, one for the first generation who 
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watch Kurdish TV, and a second for the first generation who watch 
Swedish TV. Some members of the third generation stated that they 
consume unwanted Turkish and Kurdish TV to appease their family’s 
desire to be “a proper family watching a film or news together”. 
Significantly, many people in Sweden also stated that they have two 
television sets, one for parents and one for children. 
 
While some second generation have loyalties to their Kurdishness and 
Turkishness due to the ethno-national conflict, Turkish policies of ethnic 
discrimination against the Kurds and a strong reaction of defending Turkey 
against the Kurdish accusations and those of the media in the countries of 
settlement, have led to a significant move by the second generation to 
acquire information from the host countries’ sources as well as from 
Kurdish and/or Turkish. They have grown critical of the Turkish and 
Kurdish media coverage and also of Turkish policies towards the Kurds as 
well as the PKK.  
 
For example Rebeen, a Kurdish participant from London testified: 
“They kill everyday each other. In the mean time the 
Turks and Kurds have not used the economic growth 
opportunities, democratization, building civil societies 
and not tried to integrate their people and political 
system as well as their economy to the growing 
globalised world. When they did put all their 
recourses in this war. I am watching their Turkish and 
Kurdish nonsense war, discussion and I feel that they 
are not from this world. Turkey will recognize one day 
the Kurdish identity and maybe like in Iraq we will 
have a Kurdish prime Minister or state president and 
maybe Kurds will have a parliament like Scottish 
parliament the we will ask us that indeed why we 
killed each other? It is a pity that many people die 
from both site everyday” (Interview with Rebeen, 
London, 19 March 2007). 
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A similar statement comes from Devrim, a Turkish participant in London:   
“To be honest I can not understand why they are 
killing each other. They have sit down and maybe 
calm down and then solve the problem on the table. I 
stop to watch the news on TV” (Interview with 
Devrim, London 03 March 2008). 
 
Of course there are also some second generation migrants who have very 
little connection with Kurdish or Turkish issues. They relate to Turkish or 
Kurdish identity mainly through the stories they have heard from their 
parents but not through the media. These stories may be emotionally 
salient, but the interviewees locate themselves in the settlement country 
and mention Turkishness or Kurdishness only as their parents’ 
background.  
 
As 20 year old Dêmgul, explained:  
“My mum and dad were in prison in Kurdistan and 
after they were released they fled to Sweden. 
Therefore we have never been to Kurdistan. But my 
mum dreams of going back one day to Kurdistan. 
However I have no memories, or friends who can tie 
me to Kurdistan. I was born here and have grown up 
here and all my friends are from here. I am 
Swedish….. I watch the Swedish TV. My mum and 
dad watch Kurdish TV. There was conflict between 
me and them regarding which TV we should watch. 
But we solved it by buying another TV” (Interview 
with Dêmgul, Stockholm, 02 June 2007). 
 
The Turkish participant and bank employee, Gulben states:  
“To be honest I ask the question - Who am I? It is 
difficult to answer. Yes, I am a Swedish Turk. I did 
not grow up in Turkey. But if I go there, especially to 
the small town where my family comes from, I do not 
feel Turkish. I like Turkish music. We do not have 
satellite TV; therefore I do not follow the Turkish 
media. Sometimes I read some stuff about Turkey on 
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the internet” (Interview with Gulben, Stockholm, 16th   
July 2007). 
 
The first generation tend to watch or read the ethnic-based media more, 
not only because of the language barriers, but also because of their self 
identification with their homeland ethnic identity. The first generation have 
lived in Turkey and the Kurdish and Turkish media help them to relate to 
their past lived experience. This is particularly important for those migrants 
who were actively involved in social, political and cultural issues in Turkey. 
Consuming Turkish and Kurdish media makes them feel comfortable and 
entails enjoyable moments.  
 
The second generation tend to consume media product of the settlement 
country where they have grown up. But the particular networks of first and 
second generation migrants play an important role in shaping their media 
consumption. For example, the Kurds and Turks in neighbourhoods with 
many other Turks and Kurds (e.g. Berlin Kreuzberg, Hackney in London 
and Rinkeby in Stockholm) have easy access to Turkish and Kurdish 
media. In particular, if they attend Turkish and Kurdish cafes and 
restaurants or community centres, they are exposed to constant 
discussions about the homeland. In these places, migrants discuss the 
Turkish-Kurdish conflict or cultural issues of “their homeland”.  Being part 
of these networks leads migrants to identify more closely with the ethnicity 
of the homeland because the everyday conversations create 




The new technologies enable migrants to participate in political and cultural 
developments in their ‘homeland’.  In particular, the Internet compresses 
time and space and connects people from different political and 
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geographical spaces where they can not only meet for the first time and 
create a sense of belonging, sharing common experiences and identity 
with ‘our’ nation but it also helps them to reproduce and disseminate these 
ideas within a local and transnational setting. This new form of virtual 
conversation has created new social networks which have been described 
as ‘virtual communities’ (Rheingold 1993, see also Appadurai 1995:219).  
 
Castells explains how people act and create meaning in this virtualized life 
in ’virtual communities’:  
“People increasingly organize their meaning not around what 
they do but on the basis of what they are, or believe they are. 
Meanwhile, on the other hand, global networks of instrumental 
exchanges selectively switch on and off individuals, groups, 
regions, and even countries, according to their relevance in 
fulfilling the goals processed in the network, in a relentless flow of 
strategic decisions. It follows a fundamental split between 
abstract, universal instrumentalism, and historically rooted 
particularist identities” (Castells 1997:470). 
 
 
The scholars focused on the interaction between migrants and the 
homeland through the internet consider these new conversations and 
connectedness as an ‘imagined community’ because “everyday ethnicity”  
is reproduced through the discussion and is reflected  back to community 
living in the settlement countries. Hence it becomes a routinized social 
practice to consume media in the homeland language.  
 
The activists  (expatriates, exiles, stateless) of these  virtual communities 
have created an online virtual ‘home’, ‘homeland’ or ‘nation’ where people 
‘meet’, discuss, create forums, petitions, campaigns for homeland politics 
and develop their transnational political activity across the borders and 
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“organize resistance activities" (Fink 1998) against  repressive policies of 
‘their’ homeland government globally (Fink 1998). The virtual political 
activities of Sri Lankan Tamils, Kurds, Palestinians, Sikhs and diasporic 
Iranians and Armenians are examples of this. 
 
 These new means of political participation are not isolated acts, as 
Anderson claimed, but dynamic political and social movements which have 
influence on the governments in settlement countries and on claims for 
ethnic, sexual, religious rights in repressive states. 
 
The internet has become an institution for stateless Kurds where they have 
developed their language, culture and sense of belonging to a particular 
people/nation which has been denied by the nation-states which occupy 
Kurdistan. There are thousands of materials about how to learn Kurdish 
and online Kurdish classes, an online Kurdish museum and even cartoons 
and films available on the net.  
 
Simultaneously the Internet has become one of the most successful 
mediums  for disseminating banal nationalism e.g. internet domain name 
such as .uk, de, tr. (Diamandaki 2003).   Stateless nations dream also of 
their own domain names. The dissemination of banal nationalistic symbols, 
flags, ‘the national colours’ of Turks and Kurds, discourses of nationhood 
decorate the websites, blogs and online newspapers produced and 
consumed by migrants. These banal nationalist signs are markers of 
ethnic, national and religious identities. (Bakker 2001 ; Diamandaki 2003 ; 
Ding 2007 ; Eriksen 2007).This is proof that “Nationalism is flourishing on 
the Internet” (Bakker 2001:4). 
 
Consequently it does not matter whether the members of imagined 
community live in the homeland or far away from home it is crucial that 
they imagine the ‘nation’. This can be more intensive abroad or in 
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settlement countries where people are ethnically marked in a different way 
in everyday life and confront multiple forms of exclusion.  As Demmers 
sums up:  “by long-distance interference with the conflict in their homeland, 
diaspora communities are engaged in a sort of “virtual conflict” they live 
their conflicts through the internet, email, television, and telephone without 
direct (physical) suffering, risks, or accountability” (Demmers 2002:94). 
In particular the groups in the conflict use the internet very effectively to get 
national, but also international, support for their political projects 
(Diamandaki 2003 ; Geser 2004 ; Smith 2007 ; Vertovec 2005 ; Wayland 
2004). 
 
Turkish and Kurdish migrants used internet very actively to express and 
legitimize their political positions within the communities and amongst the 
politicians, institutions and media in the settlement countries. The articles 
on the Turkish-Kurdish ethno-national conflict in German newspapers have 
become a ‘battleground’ between both groups, in particular during periods 
of ‘extraordinary emotional mood, striking at extraordinary times’ (Billig  
1995:55).  
 
While most of the Kurdish internet websites create a virtual Kurdistan in 
cyberspace and demand an independent Kurdistan (Eriksen 2007) the 
Turkish websites disseminate banal nationalist symbols in the layout of the 
website.  Therefore, the internet becomes the site of a hegemonic struggle 
between the groups in conflict.  Numerous Kurdish websites are banned in 
Turkey and the access to them is denied by the Turkish authorities.  
 
The  Kurds use the Internet effectively in Europe, not only for  mobilizing 
transnational Kurds  for the homeland but also for the re-invention of the 
Kurdish nation, developing Kurdish language, disseminating national 
narratives and symbols across the borders (Sheyholislami 2010). As 
Eriksen sums up: “Since much of the Kurdish elite is in exile, the Internet 
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has turned out to be a perfect medium for the consolidation of identity and 
dissemination of news for Kurds” (Eriksen 2007:9). 
 
A Kurdish parent in Berlin told me that that his 14 year-old son had  
“some problem with his Turkish classmate at school. 
When teacher asked children where they are from, 
my son said that he is from Kurdistan. However his 
Turkish mate stated “where is Kurdistan?” and asked 
my son to show it on the map. Of course there is not 
Kurdistan on German produced map at school and 
my son could not show Kurdistan on map to his 
Turkish and German classmates. I think he was a bit 
disappointed and confused. But I told him that he has 
to say to his Turkish classmate that he should go 
Google and type Kurdistan then he will find where 
Kurdistan is” (Interview with Huner, Berlin 13 August 
2007). 
 
This is an extraordinary statement to analyse about a virtual Kurdistan 
which does not legally exist in the world of nation-states (Billig  1995:6) but 
can be imagined virtually.  Also this statement shows us how young people 
who have been ethnicized in different ways are confronted with the idea of 
nationhood at school and forced to justify their belonging to a particular 
group. 
 
The interviewees stated that the internet plays a crucial role in their lives, 
reconnecting them via email, social networks, webcams and other means, 
to their families, friends, political, cultural and religious organizations in the 
country of origin and other countries where their relatives live. Moreover, it 
is easy to access different sources of information and news and to be part 
of ongoing discussion in both the host country and country of origin.  61% 
of Turkish and Kurdish migrants stated that they mostly read newspapers 
on the Internet. This percentage is higher amongst Kurdish participants 
(67%) than among the Turkish ones. The Kurds use internet very 
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effectively to get information from various sources and highlight the 
Kurdish cause, bringing it into the public domain. 
 
To sum up, scholars agree that the Turkish state has tried to export 
Turkish nationalism via “state-oriented media” (Hafez, 2002) to create an 
imagined community. The Kurdish media have tried this by mobilising the 
Kurds in the Kurdistan region in Turkey and in Europe. But the Turkish and 
Kurdish audiences have multiple identities, using different sources to 
obtain information and form their opinion of everyday events. Their media 
consumption is complex. They consume different media in different 
languages and in different countries which creates heterogeneous and 
diverse audiences, owing to their transnational consumption pattern.  
Undoubtedly this proves that identity is no longer simple, singular, and 
exclusive. Sen stresses that 
 
“community, nationality, race, sex, union 
membership, the fellowship of oligopolists, 
revolutionary solidarity, and so on, all provide 
identities that can be, depending on the context, 
crucial to our view of ourselves, and thus to the way 
we view our welfare, goals, or behavioural 
obligations”. (Sen 2002:215).  
 
In this sense my interviews show that the Turkish and Kurdish media have 
reshaped political identity around ethnicity, nationalism, religion and 
gender by mobilising people for certain political, cultural or religious ideals 
which can lead to “belonging” and “practical identification with collective 
agencies”  (Anderson 1983:254).  But “the commonalities of groups” (Sen 
1998:20) do not prevent multiple identities within the group but nor do they 
create a singularity out of the  group’s multiple identities. For example, one 
of the women interviewed defined her identity as “being a woman, Kurdish, 
Elewî, Left and urban” (Interview with Roza, London, 17th February 2007) 
(However she did not define her identity as “a migrant” in the UK. “Being a 
 229 
woman, Kurdish, Elewî, Left and urban” does not confine her to one 
geographic place. This identity can be claimed in Kurdistan, Turkey and 
Germany as well as in the UK. This statement, and many others which I 
heard from Kurds and Turks who are not confined to a single geographic 
place, shows that they are echoing the discussion in the media in their 
everyday lives.  Both Kurds and Turks are attuned to events in Turkey and 
Kurdistan, acquiring all the news about these events through the media.  
 
However my field work also indicates that the media play a crucial role in 
mobilising and shaping their identities, poisoning them with the ongoing 
ethno- national conflict in the homeland. The conflict in the homeland is 
reflected in their conversation and relations with each other. Amongst 
some Turkish- and Kurdish-oriented groups, multiple identities are 
subsumed to a single ascribed identity, for example, during the Kurdish 
demonstration against the capture of the PKK leader, Abdullah Öcalan, or 
during the Turkish demonstrations across the Turkey and Europe 
“condemning terror” in 2009. The long-lasting ethno-national conflict has, 
with and without Turkey’s intervention, caused a hostile atmosphere 
amongst Turkish and Kurdish audiences and a hegemonic struggle in 
everyday life, both locally and nationally in different countries of settlement. 
The national identities of Kurd and Turk have become polarised and are 
seen as surmounting all other identifications in everyday relations between 
the Turkish and Kurdish migrants in different geopolitical spaces. Of course 
in other situations, within each group different, dynamic forms of 
identification e.g. “being women, Kurdish, Elewî, Left and urban”, “being a 
German Turk”, or “Swedish Kurd” predominate.  
2.3. Use of media in the homeland language  
The audiences who were interviewed gave various reasons for following 
Turkish and Kurdish originated media:  
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First of all, the strong feeling of belonging, of being either Turkish or 
Kurdish and seeing Turkey or Kurdistan as their homeland. The ongoing 
ethno-national conflict and conflict between the military and AKP 
government stoked their interest. 
 
Secondly the failure of the media in the countries of settlement, especially 
in Germany to transmit positive images of so-called foreigners. Migrants 
are portrayed as stereotyped characters, liable to criminality (Ruhrmann et 
al. 2006, Camauër 2003) and mostly a problem or cause of problems.  
 
Linguistic dominance is the principal reason for the prevalence of Turkish 
media consumption (Hafez 2000, Hafez 2002). As well as lack of 
competence in the language of the host country, other factors affecting 
their consumption patterns include: the length of immigration, age, gender, 
the content of programmes which relate to their memories and interests, 
the degree they had maintained cultural and political contact with the 
homeland, and their cultural and linguistic capital, keeping “in touch with 
their roots by satellite” (Brochure of the Turkish EuroD channel quoted in 
Aksoy 2000). 
 
Different research in Germany has found out that migrants from Turkey 
find the German programmes cold and emotionally reserved (Trebbe and 
Weiß 2007). Therefore they watch either Turkish or Kurdish programmes 
where they feel more at home. 
 
Age is an important factor in Turkish and Kurdish media consumption. The 
first generation independent of age is more interested in the homeland 
owing to their lack of knowledge of the host language (Simon 2007), their 




Gender plays an important role in Turkish media consumption, especially 
of homemakers. Many homemakers watch Turkish soap opera. Individuals 
who seek to escape from everyday life concerns, worries and problems, 
routine, possible alienation, discrimination and isolation in everyday life find 
refuge in media consumption. Hafez states that Turkish and Kurdish media 
from a distant world act as a deliberate, almost therapeutic escape from 
the burdens of modern society such as traffic, work stress and time 
pressures (Hafez 2002).  
 
Homesickness was attributed as another reason. Many migrants, in 
particular young people, believe that they have better job opportunities in 
Turkey. For example, 3 of the Kurds interviewed in London are working in 
Turkey and in the Kurdistan region of Iraq. So they have an incentive for 
keeping in touch with the news in Turkey.  
3. The Conflict in Media Culture over Contesting Terminologies 
This body of research and my own show that both migrant groups in 
Europe have fallen back on “their” transnationalized and mediated ethnic 
resources to re-construct coherent identities in the different countries of 
settlement. Thus they have created a new transnational conversation with 
their fellow migrants in different countries of settlement and their 
homelands, which has contributed to the formation of a new media culture. 
 
In general, media culture contributes to the ways we “produce the fabric of 
everyday life . . . shaping political views and social behaviour, and 
providing the materials out of which people forge their very identities”  
(Kellner 1995:1). Media culture provides models of how to live one’s life 
and how to evaluate it.  
“Media culture also provides the materials out of 
which many people construct their sense of class, of 
ethnicity and race, of nationality, of sexuality, of “us” 
and “them”. Media culture helps shape the prevalent 
view of the world and deepest values: it defines what 
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is considered good or bad, positive or negative, 
moral or evil. Media stories and images provide the 
symbols, myths, and resources which help constitute 
a common culture for the majority of individuals in 
many parts of the world today. Media culture 
provides the materials to create identities…” (Kellner 
1995:1). 
 
In the case of both migrant groups, this is complemented by the 
involvement of different actors and agencies (the Turkish state, the Kurdish 
national movement, different religious groups) in categorizing and shaping 
individual and group identities, trying to forge attachments and loyalties to 
the nation through transnational networks of organisations and media. The 
Turkish and Kurdish migrants have undergone a social, cultural and 
political transformation from “guest workers” to ethnicized citizens of the 
countries of settlement. This has entailed changes to migrants’ identities. 
They have become part of transnational communities that relate to both the 
settlement countries and the homeland.  
 
In the process of becoming ethnic minorities in the European countries 
they live in, Kurdish and Turkish migrants have not only created new 
complex identities. They have also strengthened their increasingly 
divergent and conflicting identities as Turkish and Kurdish migrants which 
they perform in certain socio-political spaces. This performance of 
Turkishness or Kurdishness has over time heightened the visibility of 
differences in ethnic identity between Kurds and Turks. This is a case in 
point of how media and political mobilization can enhance ethnic 
identification in the diaspora. This political mobilization of an ethnic identity 
of being Turkish or Kurdish can lead to belonging and “practical 
identification in collective agencies” (Anderson 1991:254).  But “the 
commonalities of groups” (Sen 1998:20) do not cause a singularity of a 
group’s multiple identities. Instead, as I have argued so far, complex and 
multiple identities that go beyond ethnic and national labels do exist. 
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Indeed, ethnic identities are articulated in relation to other political and 
social identities, such as “being a democrat” (Swedish Kurds and Turks) or 
showing solidarity with oppressed people. Despite these complexities of 
identification, the mention of the Kurdish-Turkish conflict in the interview 
situation often elicited an emphatic reiteration of irreconcilable, antagonistic 
identities as either Kurdish or Turkish. In these situations many 
interviewees did not express their identities in a nuanced and complex 
way.  
 
In Berlin, Halil who regularly visits a local Turkish community centre that 
supports the Turkish national movement makes this clear:  
“H: Who dares to destroy Turkishness? Of course we 
will make ourselves and our identity visible. We have 
not abandoned Turkishness …… 
Y: Do you have any contact with Kurds? 
H: No, I do not want to have any contact with 
separatist terrorists. What could I possibly talk to 
them about? About dividing Turkey and accepting 
that the so-called Kurdish language should be taught 
in the school? Or accepting that the almighty 
Turkishness should be a subordinated identity in 
Turkey just like the recently discovered Kurtculuk?”23 
(Interview with Halil, Berlin, 21st August 2007). 
 
Halil’s statement shows us that he follows the debate in Turkey closely in 
the media. Kurdish politicians and some Turkish journalists have argued 
that the constitution should be changed so that all references to ethnic 
Turks are removed from the constitution and it is made to include all the 
ethnic and religious identities of people who live in Anatolia. Kurds have 
demanded that the Kurdish language should be taught in school. Halil uses 
the term Kurtcu which in Turkey is usually used pejoratively by state 
officials and the media for Kurdishness. Halil takes for granted the 
dominance of the Turkish ethnic group and is against the teaching of the 
Kurdish language in school. 
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On the other hand, Dilsad from Berlin admits that he does not have contact 
with Turks in general, “only [with] democratic Turks who are not pro-
Turkey”. He argues:  
“There has been a politicization and polarization of 
Kurds and Turks since the 1990s in Berlin. All the 
relations between the two groups have been 
politicized through the media, the Turkish embassy 
and the Turkish and Kurdish community centres 
because of the war in Kurdistan. If they [Turks] ask 
me which city I am from, I reply that I am from Dersim 
(Kurdish) or Tunceli (Turkish) [the name of the city, 
Dersim, was changed to Tunceli after the genocidal 
massacre24 by Turkish forces in 1938]. Their face 
and friendly manner changes and they feel that they 
should position themselves against me. I think this 
situation is not nice, either for me, or for them. 
Therefore I avoid contact with them. The Turkish 
media has caused hostility with its anti-Kurdish news 
in Berlin. They cause an atmosphere of fear and hate 
here. This news has influenced even Turkish exiles 
from the Communist Party. I have a friend from the 
Turkish Communist Party. When we talk about the 
Kurdish question, he states that Kurds are henchman 
of the USA. But he cannot see that Turkey has been 
a henchman of the USA since the 1940s. Turkey is a 
gendarme of the USA in the Middle East and a 
member of NATO and there are US military bases in 
Turkey. Turkish politics, economy and media are 
ideologically and politically dependant on the USA.  
In the past few years I have witnessed such an 
ideological blindness among Turks that I lost my 
interest in talking to such people” (Interview with 
Dilsad, Berlin, 18.07.2007). 
 
Dilsad uses the name of Dersim to define his identity when he meets up 
with Turkish people in Berlin. Both Dara and the Turkish people know the 
name of the city Dersim and its symbolic meaning for the Kurds through 
the narratives of the people who lost their relatives during the massacre 
and deportation of the civilian population from Dersim to Turkish populated 
cities. There are several articles every year commemorating the Dersim 
revolt and massacre in the Kurdish media. Obviously this symbolic 
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meaning causes problems for the Turkish people who feel that they are 
talking to a person who has some affiliation to Kurdishness.  Dara talks 
also about two different nations who have a relation with the USA: the 
Turks and the Kurds. Although Dara was born in Turkey, he identifies 
himself with Kurds, including with Kurds in Iraq who have a strong relation 
with the USA but he does not have any affiliation to the Turkish state. 
 
These testimonies show that both ethnic groups have developed a media 
culture within the framework of attachment and loyalty to their own nation 
and nationhood. The process of identity formation entails constant 
differentiation of identity amongst Kurdish and Turkish migrants according 
to their particularist attachment in the diaspora.  
 
Moreover, while many Turkish migrants see the conflict as a problem of 
terror in the “East and South East of Turkey”, the Kurds see it as 
“legitimate resistance to Turkish state oppression, occupation and 
violations against Kurdish people” (Interview with Rojhan, London, 5 April 
2008). Even Kurds who do not support the PKK take this view, as Hawar in 
Berlin points out:  
“I am not a sympathizer of the PKK but in my view, 
the real terrorist is Turkey not the PKK. Even the 
Turkish media report that 17.000 people have been 
killed in Kurdistan, they do not say Kurdistan, they 
say East and South East Anatolia and they do not 
say who has killed these people. They were arrested 
by JITEM [Special Gendarmerie Intelligence Unit] 
and disappeared and yesterday Roj TV reported that 
a mass grave has been discovered” (Interview with 
Hawar, Berlin, 25 August 2007). 
 
Rojhan sees the PKK as “Kurdish armed opposition” (Interview with 
Rojhan, London, 5 April 2008). This term has been used by the Mayor of 
Diyarbakir (in Kurdish, Amed) three years ago. Moreover Rojhan sees the 
PKK guerrillas as “freedom fighters” and criticises the German media for 
calling the PKK “Kurdish separatists”. According to Rojhan “[t]his is the 
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language of the Turkish media, the German media has translated it from 
Turkish media into German and use it” (Rojhan, ibid).   However many 
Turkish migrants criticised the British and Swedish media for defaming 
“Kurdish fighters as separatist terrorists” (Interview with Fatih, London, 02. 
April 2008).  
 
Examples abound of the contestation of terms explicitly referring to Kurds 
and Kurdistan in the Turkish media. Leyla Zana called “East and South 
East Anatolia” “Kurdistan” during the local elections in March 2009. The 
Turkish media became guardians of the nation and attacked her for using 
the name Kurdistan. The Turkish media avoid using the term “Kurdistan 
regional government in Iraq” and instead use the one coined by the Turkish 
military “entity in Northern Iraq” or “so-called ‘Kurdish Federal Region’” (in 
inverted commas).25 Hürriyet and Vakit newspapers have published 
several articles about the “Kurdistan Polemic” where they explain that the 
idea of Kurdistan is only a polemical term. In contrast to this, the Kurdish 
diaspora has created a country in the mind through everyday 
conversations and discussions.  
 
During this information war, the habits and thoughts of people have been 
formed through repeated news, deploying terms like “terrorists”, 
“separatists”, “so-called Kurds”, “ East and South East Anatolia” “so-called 
Kurdistan Map” in the pro-Turkish media. These terms are used by Turkish 
migrants in their everyday conversation with each other.  
 
On the other hand, the Kurdish media uses terms such as “colonised 
Kurdistan”, “Kurdish armed opposition”, “guerrilla”, and “the leader of the 
Kurdish people” (referring to Abdullah Öcalan, the PKK leader).  The 
repeated use of these terms in the media normalizes them and makes 
them taken for granted in everyday life in the separate communities. Billig 
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would define such normalisation of nationalistic terms as banal 
nationalism.  
 
Halil and Dilsad in their views stated above, provide us with completely 
different interpretations of the ongoing events in the homeland which they 
follow through the media. While the Turkish media and Turkish migrants 
see the east and south eastern part of Turkey, this is defined by Dilsad and 
politicised Kurds as the “colonized” or “occupied Kurdistan” (Interview with 
Alan, Berlin, 28 August 2007).   
 
This constitutes a huge challenge for many Turkish migrants who have 
seen the Kurds for decades as Turks. In their eyes, these people have only 
“become Kurds” in the diaspora (Leggewie 1996:76). A Turkish teacher, 
Birsen, in Stockholm states: 
“B: When I was in Turkey, we did not know the Kurds. 
We were all Turks. I still see them as Turks. They are 
Turks. But when I came here I noticed that they 
called themselves Kurds. Indeed they are kurdicised 
here [in Sweden]. The Swedish say “you are 
Kurdish”. They [the Swedes] woke them up. I mean 
before coming here I knew us all as Turkish. There 
was no distinction. I have been witnessing here that 
they are Kurdish because they [the Kurds] are 
encouraged here. For example, they [the Swedes] 
ask the students or pupils from East and South East 
Anatolia whether they come from Kurdistan. They 
[the Swedes] encourage them [the Kurds]” (Interview 
with Birsen, Stockholm, 14 June 2007). 
 
“Y: So in your view the Swedish people or institutions 
are kurdicising the Kurds or the Kurds are describing 
themselves as Kurds? 
B: To be honest I don’t have much idea but it is my 
impression that Swedish people are kurdicising them. 
Frankly speaking, they [the Kurds] define themselves 
as Kurds. 
Y: Yeah do you think there is a Kurdish question or a 
terror problem in Turkey? 
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B: Definitely a terror problem 
Y: There is no Kurdish question? 
B: No. What can I say? I don’t have much knowledge 
about this issue. I have only very superficial 
knowledge. 
Y: Where do you get information from about this 
issue? 
B: From the newspapers or TV channels. 
Y: Which media Turkish or Swedish?  
B: Turkish I read Yeni Cag 
Y: Do you think that the Kurds are Turks? 
B: I see them as Turks. 
Y: But do the Kurds see themselves as Turks? 
B: No they see themselves not as Turks but they 
must accept that they are Turkish. They are Turkish 
too. If they live in Turkey they must accept that they 
are Turkish and must learn Turkish. They are 
Turkish. 
Y: Yeah, you are a Turkish language teacher. What 
do you think of prohibition of Kurdish language in 
schools? 
B: It is a difficult question. From my point of view it 
should be banned because this will cause linguistic 
and territorial separation of Turkey” (Interview with 
Birsen, Stockholm, 14 June 2007). 
 
Birsen’s views are shared by many Turkish migrants in Germany, the UK 
and Sweden. They think that the European countries of settlement 
encourage Kurds and allow them to reconceptualise their identity. They 
share the Turkish state ideology in terms of denying Kurdish identity, 
seeing the conflict as a problem of terror. The Turkish migrants are 
confronted with different terms like “Kurdistan” that are taboo in the Turkish 
media. This re-conceptualized Kurdish identity in the diaspora poses a 
huge challenge to Turkish migrants who see Kurds as Turks.  
 
As Hatice, who has lived in Sweden since 1975 states 
“Of course this Kurdish issue has an effect on our 
wellbeing in Sweden. Wherever you go as a Turk you 
are confronted with this problem of terror. In this 
country, the media and Swedish people talk about 
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Kurds and Kurdistan. Where is Kurdistan? There is 
no such country called Kurdistan. I am Swedish but if 
the unity of Turkey is in question, yes I am Turkish. 
There was an unpleasant discussion between me 
and my Swedish work colleague about this issue two 
years ago. They do not believe that we have a 
problem of terror. That frustrates me. I am Swedish 
but if I talk about these issues with Swedish people, I 
become Turkish. I am forced not to be Swedish” 
(Interview with Hatice, Stockholm, 15 June 2007). 
 
As this statement shows, many Turkish migrants feel that the settlement 
countries media and institution promote Kurds to create their own distinct 
identity. The Turkish migrants feel that this is a political game of 
imperialists towards Turkey and Turks.  
 
However the Kurds see the conflict in a different light. They blame the 
Western countries for supporting Turkey with economic aid and political 
support: “Turkey is economically and politically supported by Germany and 
USA. The Kurdish towns and villages have been bombed and destroyed by 
German Leopard II tanks” (Interview with Dilsad, Berlin, 18 July 2007). 
4. The Construction of a Narrative of “Kurdistani”26 identity 
I asked research participants “where are you from”? This is a question that 
is a regular part of conversations between Kurds. It is asked to find out 
which city or region a person comes from in order to make a prejudgment 
about their ethnicity (Turkish, Kurdish, Laz and Syranic etc) and religious 
affiliation (Muslim, Elewî, Christian).  
Mirza, a Kurdish participant, who works for a Swedish media company in 
Stockholm, answers in the following way: 
“ M: I am from Kurdistan 
Y: OK but from which part of Kurdistan, Turkish 
Kurdistan…? 
M: I do not like this term “Turkish Kurdistan”. 
Kurdistan does not belong to Turkey. It is occupied 
by Turkey. You are using this term to legitimize the 
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occupation.  No, no, I am from Northern Kurdistan” 
(Interview with Mîrza, Stockholm, 03 June 2007). 
 
The term “Northern Kurdistan” is used in the Kurdish media and also in 
Kurdish community centres which operate as virtual embassies of the 
stateless Kurds because they play an important role in reconstructing 
Kurdish identity in the diaspora, creating solidarity and providing practical 
assistance. However the term “Northern Kurdistan” has also different 
meanings for Kurdish individuals depending on whether they engage in 
Kurdish political movements in the diaspora. For example Mehtav, a PhD 
student, told me that there is even a debate amongst Swedish Kurds about 
this term. According to these Kurdish audiences in Sweden, the Kurdish 
media uses the term “Northern Kurdistan” or “North Kurdistan” wrongly-  
 “as if all the parts of Kurdistan have nothing to do 
with each other. As if they are geographically, 
politically, culturally and economically separate and 
far from each other’. They blame the Kurdish parties 
which think ‘only on their interests but not in interest 
of Kurdish people” (Interview with PhD student, 
Mektav, Stockholm, 06 June 2007). 
 
The “right term” is not Kurdistana Bakur - North Kurdistan - but Bakura 
Kurdistan- North of Kurdistan - which indicates “the unity of Kurdistan as 
one country”. The Swedish Kurds who developed the Kurdish language in 
the diaspora, speaking Kurdish or Swedish in their households but refusing 
to speak Turkish, display a high level of national consciousness (Anderson   
1995) created in diaspora. They have conceptualised a sense of belonging 
to Kurdishness. During my fieldwork I saw that Kurds from different 
countries in Sweden had merged Kurdish dialects into one language which 
the Swedish Kurds use in everyday life. However, such specific and 
politicised terms used in Sweden did not mean much to other Kurds in 
Europe, especially if they were not very politicised.  
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Firat in London exemplifies the difference. After being taught a lesson from 
Kurdish research participants in Sweden, I asked carefully about 
“Northern”, “North Kurdistan” and “North of Kurdistan to test whether other 
Kurds have a similar understanding of these terms. Firat, who came to 
London recently under family re-union and has “nothing to do with politics”, 
responds thus:  
“Y: Are you from the North of Kurdistan? 
F: No I am not from North Iraq. I am Kurdish from 
Turkey. I was born on the border but later on my 
family immigrated to Istanbul. 
Y: What do you mean by ‘born on the border’? 
F: My family comes from Sivas. There was a conflict 
between our village and the Turkish villagers before 
12 September [the military coup in Turkey in 1981]. 
Our village is exactly on the border between the 
Turkish and Kurdish villages” (Interview with Firat, 
London, 7 April 2008). 
 
This statement shows us firstly that he understands the term North of 
Kurdistan as North of Iraq. The Turkish media use the term “North of Iraq” 
to avoid naming the Kurdish existence in Iraq, so Firat confused the “North 
of Iraq” with “North of Kurdistan”. This different understanding can be 
interpreted “...a split between the people and the intellectuals” (Gramsci 
1985: 168) who conceptualize their own understanding of Kurdishness. 
This clearly show that the language used in the Kurdish media and by 
intellectuals is not always understood “as an element of culture, and thus 
of general history, a key manifestation of the ‘nationality’” (Gramsci 
1985:170). 
 
Gramsci (1985:325) states that “If it is true that every language contains 
elements of a conception of the world and of a culture, it could also be true 
that from anyone’s language one can assess the greater or lesser 
complexity of his conception of the world”.  Firat understands the 
“conception of the world” through Turkish media because he is not within 
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the politized Kurdish community and its “unified fields of exchange and 
communication” of Kurdishness.  
 
Also Firat’s understanding of the term shows how he is influenced by the 
Turkish media’s terminology.  Yet, in the same statement, he refers to 
being “born on the border” which refers to a socio-political boundary 
between Turkish and Kurdish settlers. This coincides with the 
geographically defined distinction between Kurdish and Turkish areas of 
settlement. In this sense, although he does not use the term “North of 
Kurdistan”, Firat, too imagines the existence of a distinction between 
Turkish and Kurdish areas.  
 
Some interviewees confirm the important role of media in forming and 
entrenching migrants’ views. Dara, an advisor at a community centre in 
Berlin said:  
 
“D: People are zapping from Kurdish TV channels to 
German or Turkish channels. Interestingly enough all 
these channels tell the same things since I have 
become curious and watch this news.   
Y: What do they tell? 
D: The Turkish channels report on separatist 
terrorists and separatist terrorists and again 
separatist terrorists every hour. They have been 
saying this for 30 years. On the other hand, the 
Kurdish channels report on fighting for the Kurds and 
fighting for the Kurds and again fighting for the Kurds. 
It is a pity that the Kurdish issue is still the only 
political topic. An end should be found so people can 
find peace here and there. German channels show a 
banal picture of migrants in headscarves and talk of 
integration and the “foreigner’ problem” (Interview 
with Dara, Berlin 14 August 2007). 
 
Likewise, in London, Nurhayat, a Turkish community worker observed:  
“This place [Hackney] is like a smaller version of 
Turkey. How can Turkey not have problems, in all 
aspects, for example economic difficulties, ethnic 
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problems, for example those which concern the south 
eastern part of Turkey, and all these similar problems 
are found here too. People read newspapers; people 
watch 24 hours television from their satellitized TV 




The media consumption of Turkish and Kurdish communities has shifted in 
part from the media of the countries of settlement to the Kurdish and 
Turkish media (Zentrum für Türkeistudien 1997, Weiß and Trebbe 2001, 
GöfaK-Studie 2001, Robins and Aksoy 2001, Hafez 2002). These media 
have created a new form of communication “between those who move and 
those who stay” (Appadurai 1997:21-22 ). 
 
My own research on media consumption shows that the Turkish and 
Kurdish migrants have developed their own media culture which shapes 
their identities and relations with each other over belonging to the Turkish 
or Kurdish nation, and taking a position in the ongoing ethno-national 
conflict in the homeland. In this sense, the Turkish and Kurdish media 
exert a huge influence on formation of migrants’ ethnic identity, also 
differentiate them into “us” and “them”. This has contributed to the 
hegemonic struggle between both migrant groups around certain banal 
nationalist terminologies in the countries of settlement. In this process the 
Turkish media has opened up a “front” amongst Turkish and Kurdish 
migrants who follow the Turkish media. It has unintentionally contributed to 
creating opposition among Kurds who feel that the Turkish media mainly 
portrays them in a negative light. This alienation from the Turkish media 
has led many Kurds to embrace Kurdish media and the values of the 
Kurdish national movement. The Kurdish media has politically and 
culturally empowered Kurdish migrants to create a sense of belonging to 
their homeland, Kurdistan. Yet it has also alienated some Kurds with its 
highly politicised programmes.   
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Turkish and Kurdish migrants position themselves through different terms 
of identification with their homeland which they receive from media and 
existing Turkish and Kurdish communities in the countries of settlement. 
This reconceptualisation of ethnic identity is taking place when Kurdish 
migrants claim their identity as Kurdish rather than conforming to the 
Turkish state’s demands they identify as Turkish. When Turkish migrants 
realise that some Kurdish migrants in diaspora are reconceptualising their 
identity in this way, they often react with shock. This leads to conflicts 
between Turkish and Kurdish migrants. Indeed, many Turkish migrants feel 
that it is the European countries which encourage Kurds to express their 
identity as Kurdish. This discourse has been used by the Turkish media 
and state. Kurds on the other hand, enjoy the freedom to define their ethnic 
identity as Kurdish in the diaspora.  
 
While using the term “Kurdistan” can cause prosecution in Turkey, in the 
diaspora, Kurds can imagine and construct Kurdistan as a country, albeit 
without legal status in international relations. However, this imagined 
Kurdistan becomes meaningful for Kurdish and Turkish migrants as well as 
citizens of the countries of settlement. Kurds and Kurdish issues become 
visible amongst migrants and these issues are huge challenges to some 
Turkish migrants. The political and geographical terms and representations 
of Kurdishness become a part of Kurdish migrants’ publicly expressed 
identity in multicultural societies. We are currently witnessing a period of 
transition among Turkish and Kurdish migrants, an adaptation to the values 
of a multi cultural society. Moreover my research focus has been on 
examining immigration experiences and the process of division, 
differentiation and deterritorialization of different political, ethnic and social 
identities from being seen and accepted as “Turkish migrants” to becoming 
“Kurdish and Turkish migrants”  These identities have contributed to 
differentiating the homogenous  concept of “Turkish migrants” in Europe as 
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many Turkish journalists interviewed considered Kurds as subsumed within 
this designation (see chapter VII). However for many Kurdish migrants, the 
imposed identity as Turks remains only on paper, once they have 
migrated. I call this the dissolution of the project of a homogenous Turkish 
nation in the minds of migrants. This dissolution is also a source of conflict 
between both migrant groups in some countries of settlement. 
 
The process of differentiation between Turks and Kurds has reached its 
peak in Sweden where Kurdish and Turkish communities have broken off 
relations with each other or the Turkish migrants have accepted the 
Kurdish affiliation to Kurdishness. The Swedish state and society treats 
Kurds and Turks as distinct and does not encompass Kurds unofficially 
within the term “Turkish migrants”. The Swedish state even provides some 
resources for the development of Kurdish culture and language. This has 
had a huge impact on ethnic self-identification amongst Kurds. Even 
though the Turkish migrants complain about Swedish support for Kurdish 
language and culture, Kurdishness has become normal for Turkish 
migrants in Sweden. This is in marked contrast to the UK and Germany 
where the period of transition is still in progress and Kurds have not been 
recognized by the authorities. This creates more conflict and hostility 
amongst Kurdish and Turkish migrants, a stronger trend in Berlin than in 
London because Turkish migrants have a strong sense that Kurdish 
identity is outlawed in Germany owing to the banning of the PKK. Germany 
refuses to recognize the Kurds publicly as Kurdish migrants but conflate 





Chapter VI:  Struggle for “our” Nation in Transnational Spaces: 
Öcalan’s capture. 
1. Introduction 
Transnational activities are social, cultural, economic and political 
movements “across national borders of members of an expatriate 
community.  In political transnationalism ”the  sending  states, the political  
parties of the sending  country, and  the  immigrant  organizations  in the  
receiving  countries  interact to expand  the spaces  of  political  action  and 
citizenship across  national  borders” (Itzigsohn 2000:1148). In these 
“transnational settings and dynamics” (Vertovec 2001:573), migrants 
reconfigure, negotiate and reproduce  their individual and group identities 
(Basch et al. 1994). For people involved in political transnationalism, these 
identities become visible through lobbying for the homeland, organising 
rallies, raising funds for political parties and networks in the homeland. It 
enables migrants to develop different strategies to deal with everyday life 
and discrimination in the settlement country, opening an alternative way of 
constructing their presence which is not always accepted by the settlement 
country’s institutions. Political transnationalism has been subject of 
numerous debates in settlement countries as well as in migrants’ country 
of origin. 
 
Some of this political transnational activism developed as a reaction to 
government policies in migrants’ country of origin where the minority 
identities are denied. Other transnational political movements are “state-
sponsored” (Portes et al. 1999:221) because “governments realized the 
importance of their expatriate communities and sought to circumvent or co-
opt their initiatives,” (Portes et al. 1999:221) and attempt to reincorporate 
transnational migrants into state centered efforts to construct a 
‘deterritorialized’ nationhood” (Smith 2003:469, also see Basch et al. 
1994). The homeland political parties can also become active 
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transnationally, trying to gain influence and power in the receiving 
countries.   
 
The rapid development of transport and communications technologies 
(Itzigsohn 2000) have contributed to the “exchange of resources and 
information along with participation in socio-cultural and political activities” 
(Vertovec 2001:574).  In this sense media play a crucial role in connecting 
people across nation-state boundaries informing them of and framing the 
ongoing political issues in the homeland. This has also contributed to 
political transnationalism. For example   
 “The pro-Kurdish daily Özgür Politika publishes on 
its first page a huge picture of the manifestation led 
by ‘100,000’ sympathizers of the PKK in front of the 
European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, with 
the slogan ‘Free Öcalan and peace in 
Kurdistan….On the same day (November 22, 2000), 
the nationalist Turkish daily, Hürriyet publishes, also 
on its first page, a picture of the same size showing 
this time the Strasbourg march of the Turks ‘against 
terror’” (Rigoni 2002:7). 
 
This shows how the transnational Turkish and Kurdish media reproduce 
their versions of common sense deterritorializing the hegemonic struggle 
among their readers abroad. The attempts of the Turkish and Kurdish 
press to carry on their ethno-national struggle, not only in “their” homeland 
but also cross-border, shows the internationalisation of the Turkish-Kurdish 
question and the ethno-national conflict to migrant communities via the 
media. The transnationalized media is attempting to create imagined 
communities in transnational spaces by invoking nation and homeland to 
remind the readers of belonging to a particular ethnic group (Aksoy and 
Robins 2000, Georgiou 2005, Kosnick 2007). 
 
As we have seen, many migrant communities, including the Turkish and 
Kurdish, build their sense of imagined community in different spaces 
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primarily through the media. However there are some criticisms of 
Anderson’s and Billig’s concepts for ignoring the diversity of identities of 
citizens and audiences (Balnaves et al. 2009).  Hall criticises the idea of  
unified identities: “The old identities which stabilized the social world for so 
long are in decline, giving rise to new identities and fragmenting the 
modern individuals as a unified subject” (Hall 1992:274). Some scholars 
have highlighted that the political community, as well as the individual 
subject, is in transformation due to globalisation, communications and 
information technologies, significant movement of people for various 
reasons (Castles and Davidson 2000; Holston and Appadurai 1999; 
Itzigsohn et al. 1999; Sassen 1999). These developments have created 
huge differences between individual, group identities and sense of 
belonging and loyalty to a constructed national identity (Glazer 1997). 
 
Moreover, Anderson’s and Billig’s theories do not address the 
contemporary diversity of media. This diversity of media means that the 
media are not any longer able to unify audiences into one imagined 
community (Allan 2005; Dhoest 2009; Dhoest and Simons 2009; Hassan 
2004). In particular the internet has contributed to membership of different 
political, cultural and social spaces. The intense use of the internet for 
transnational political projects has created a sense of deteritorized 
citizenships (Laguerre 1998, Eriksen 2007). New media contribute to 
creating an alternative sense of belonging for people who have been 
forced into dominant ethno-national communities. The excluded people are 
able to develop “subaltern counter publics” (Fraser 1990:61).  In addition to 
this some media have lost of audiences, in particular print media 
experience a decline of circulation (McNair 2003).  This means that 
newspapers and TV have lost some of their strength in disseminating 
nationalist ideology and creating a national consensus. Furthermore 
national, and even local, media have become part of globalisation (Franklin 
2005). Even nation states are affected, which may have weakened the 
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national loyalty and citizenship (Itzigsohn et al. 1999, Castles and 
Davidson 2000). Thus a multiplicity of contested belongings have arisen in 
the media which need to be taken into account Yet, Anderson’s and Billig’s 
frameworks remain relevant, as the media continue to play a key role in 
constructing identity and belonging. They contribute to the creation of 
contested national identities of Kurds, on one hand, and Turks, on the 
other, not only at the national level, but also in the European diaspora.  
 
Media discourse, in particular that of the tabloid press, plays an important 
role in creating the ideological cohesion of the nation. Through 
sensationalism and emotive language the media produce  a sense of 
national belonging: “from which we increasingly make sense of our world, 
whether it be in a banal or a profound way” (Conboy 2006:185). Therefore 
the media continues to play an important role in reproducing national 
subjects through everyday discourse. Moreover the media contributes to 
setting the agenda for politicians and institutions, which forms the basis of 
many everyday discussions among the audiences (Marr 2004)  One key 
element of this is the creation of media events (Conboy 2006). This 
chapter focuses on an important media event that evokes an identity of 
belonging to an imagined Turkish or Kurdish political community:  
representations of the capture of the Kurdish PKK leader, Öcalan, in the 
Kurdish and Turkish media. The impact of these representations in 
polarising Turkish and Kurdish migrants in their views on the Turkish-
Kurdish relationship will be explored.  
 
The capture of Öcalan by the CIA (McDowall 2004:443) and Turkish forces 
in Kenya in 1999 and its representation in the Turkish and Kurdish media 
marked a significant moment in the war of position because thousands of 
Turkish and Kurdish people from different geopolitical spaces, went on the  
streets for or against Öcalan (Vertovec 2005). The state killed two Kurdish 
demonstrators and arrested about 8,000 people in Turkey and violent 
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confrontations took place between Turkish and Kurdish migrants in 
Europe. 
 
Öcalan is a symbolic figure, associated by many Turkish migrants with 
someone who wants to divide the Turkish nation territorially, undermining 
its unity in order to establish an independent Kurdistan. Since he attacks 
the unity of the Turkish nation militarily and politically, he is portrayed as a 
“separatist terrorist”. In the Turkish media coverage and in the daily 
conversation of Turkish migrants, the topic of Öcalan and his threat to “the 
unity of Turkey’ and the 6,000 deaths of Turkish soldiers are discursively 
linked. When talking about one of these issues, the other issue almost 
certainly came up in conversation in my fieldwork. 
 
The threat to the territorial unity of Turkey and death of solders are 
repeated in Turkish politicians’ speeches and in Turkish media coverage. 
In an interview with the Milliyet newspaper, the Turkish academic Prof. 
Volkan of Virginia University argued that “Öcalan personally started a 
deadly terrorist period. Even though he did not do this alone, he is the 
symbol of terrorism” (Sevimay 2009). While Volkan repeats the official 
Turkish nationalist discourse, the Kurdish media and Kurdish migrants 
interviewed for this research  blame the Turkish state for killing 35,000 
Kurds during the conflict and for the disappearances, torture of thousands 
of Kurdish dissidents, the burning of 3,000 Kurdish villages and towns, 
lingocide (Hassanpour 1992), displacements and occupation of their 
country by the Turkish military. The majority of Kurds, even Kurdish 
dissidents who criticize Öcalan and the PKK tactics, see him and his 
political movement as the ones who brought voiceless Kurds onto the 
international political scene, forcing Turkey to change its discriminatory and 
assimilationist policies and recognize Kurdish existence in Turkey (Barkey  
14.08.2009). Öcalan’s followers call him “the leader of the Kurdish people”. 
Hundreds of thousands of Kurdish people went onto the streets, in all three 
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cities, firstly to protest against his capture by the Turkish security forces in 
1999 and again when he was sentenced to death for “treason to his 
country’ and recently over his deteriorating health in prison on İmralı 
Island. 
 
There are a number of reasons why Öcalan’s capture and imprisonment 
has acted as a touchpaper for Turkish and Kurdish nationalist sentiments.  
Firstly the conflict spread from Turkey/Kurdistan to Europe through the 
media and migrant transnational practices across borders, especially 
demonstrations, lobbying and street battles for or against Öcalan.  
Secondly European nation-states in the countries of settlement became 
involved in decisions about Öcalan in 1999. For example, those European 
governments opposed to the death penalty argued he should not be 
extradited to Turkey, once captured. Thirdly, Kurdish and Turkish migrants 
became active in lobbying and protesting against the political involvement 
of the USA and the European countries who were either pro or contra the 
Kurdish political movement and Turkish government policies. Finally, 
European countries blamed the Turkish and Kurdish media (Heitmeyer 
1996) and “foreigners” for becoming political actors in homeland politics on 
their national territories. Making the Turkish-Kurdish conflict an issue was 
seen as importing into Europe a divisive external issue. 
 
However as van Bruinessen argues 
“the politicization of the Kurdish diaspora, as well as 
increasing efforts by the Turkish authorities to 
maintain or regain their control of their Turkish and 
Kurdish subjects abroad, have gradually made clear 
that the Kurdish question in not just an Iraqi, an 
Iranian, a Syrian or a Turkish problem, but that it has 
also become a problem of European politics” (van 
Bruinessen 2000a:17). 
 
This became evident, during Öcalan’s short stay in Italy, his abduction by 
the Turkish state and Kurdish and Turkish migrants’ demonstrations. From 
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the standpoint of finding a political solution to the ethno-national conflict, it 
is a political problem for the many international powers involved, including 
the European Union, not least because of Turkey’s wish to become a 
member (McDowall 2004). The parties in conflict have also established 
transnational networks with organisations, parties, embassies and media. 
In particular, the development of transnational media has created an 
ethnic, religious-based media culture amongst people in different 
transnational spaces who share a common experience of language, 
“kinship, ethnicity, nationality and religion (Karim 1998, Aksoy and Robins 
2000, Georgiou 2005). In this media culture, nationalistic symbols, images 
of political belonging and affiliations to “our” homeland and “our nation” are 
disseminated to this transnational audience (see TRT 2006 programm). 
Although some academics overlook the impact of this new media culture 
as Rigoni (2002) has shown, the Turkish and Kurdish media have a huge 
impact in mobilising people for homeland politics when they at home in 
transnational spaces. 
 
Moreover, the tragic, historical events in Kurds’ lives never before received 
such huge attention among the Kurds themselves before the development 
of the Kurdish print and audiovisual media (Keles 2008), when Saddam 
used chemical weapons against the Kurds in Halabja killing 5,000 people, 
(Hardi 2011) the reaction of the Kurds was not as big as it was to the 
abduction of Öcalan. Although the genocide was photographed and 
published in some Turkish and Iranian newspapers, the communications 
technology was less developed and the Kurds did not own any television 
stations or even a daily newspaper at that time. The sense of the imagined 
Kurdish nation had not taken hold compared to today. There were some 
demonstrations condemning the use of chemical weapon against the 
Kurds in Europe but not on the scale of the demonstrations against the 




Kurds27 have different dialects, alphabets and also communicate in 
languages of the countries occupying Kurdistan, as well as in those of 
settlement countries. But the national consciousness, emotional 
attachment and solidarity shown in the mass movements against Öcalan’s 
abduction that the imagined community does not need a common 
language and can be based on multiple dialects and languages. The 
crucial issue is the media connecting people from different geographical 
spaces and making them feel part of a nation through shared experiences. 
These shared experiences do not need to be expressed in one national 
language. Experiences can be expressed in different dialects or languages 
but it is important they are shared and interpreted as common experiences. 
 
The Kurdish media has created through its images and text, a strong, 
popular sense of belonging to the Kurdish nation and having a country 
called Kurdistan, which is occupied by Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria. They 
used the figure and symbolic power of Öcalan to create a strong historical 
identification with Kurdishness. This is the way that a  historical myth is 
created around a personality (Castells 1997) stimulating political 
engagement (Billig  1995) to create a collective “we”. As a consequence, 
Turkey has lost its “consensual control” over Kurdish migrants in Europe as 
well as in Kurdistan. According to Gramsci, consensual control “arises 
when individuals ‘voluntarily’ assimilate the worldview of the dominant 
group (Ransome 1992:150). This has been done through educating 
Kurdish children in Turkish and teaching them the history of Turkish ethnic 
group, their values and norms and education and through religion which is 
mixed with Turkish nationalism and Islamic values.  
 
On the other hand, Turkey used its media to denigrate the Kurdish 
presence in the European public’s mind by mobilizing Turkish migrants for 
the homeland (Rigoni 2002). Hürriyet newspaper and the state TRT INT 
 254 
played an especially important role in highlighting the state’s voice in 
Turkish migrant households during the pro- and counter-demonstrations 
around Öcalan. Therefore, it is important to look at the way in which the 
Turkish media sought to represent Öcalan and his movement and what 
meaning it held for the two communities. 
 
In my interviews with migrants from the three settlement countries, it 
became clear that the capture of Öcalan was seen as an important event in 
the media culture of migrants and their relation to each other. Therefore, 
concentrating primarily on the imagined community produced by the media 
culture during the long lasting ethno-national conflict, I will examine how in 
the case of the capture of Öcalan, it manifested itself in the Turkish and 
Kurdish communities. 
 
Different approaches can be used to analyse media texts including the 
written and audio-visual contents: discourse analysis, semiotic approaches 
and content analysis. Content analysis, in other words textual analysis, is a 
research method which entails “collecting, collating and analyzing large 
amounts of information about the content of media products” (Rayner et al. 
2004:70). It is a systematic technique to  count the frequency of  words in a 
clearly defined sample of texts and then analysing those frequencies (Rose 
2001 :16)  This word-frequency count in a text is usually used for 
quantitative analysis of messages (Neuendorf 2002:10) but also for 
qualitative analysis. As my central concern is how migrants make meaning 
out of the transnational media and how these media impact on migrants’ 
ethnic identities in the context of ethno-national conflict, I do not examine 
the frequency of use of contested terms but focus on the discourse and 
language, as well as images, deployed by the media event  of Öcalan’s 
capture .  
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Discourse is a combination of text, artefact and social practices and 
discourse analysis looks at how these elements combine to reinforce or 
challenge dominant relations and power structures (Fairclough 1995; 
Fairclough and Wodak 1997; Fiske 1982; Foucault 1980; Parker 1992; van 
Dijk 1993). According to Foucault, who sought to explain the regulation of 
the individual through the  state, institutions, discourses and practices, the 
construction of knowledge and discourse is articulated with social practice 
(Foucault 1980). Discourse analysis could be defined as a “set of methods 
and theories for investigating language in use and language in social 
contexts” showing  how  linguistic practices construct the world view of 
social groups endowed with unequal power (Wetherell et al. 2001). 
Discourse analysis focuses on the “categorizing, performative, and 
rhetorical features of texts and talk” (Antaki et al. 2003:1) as well as visual 
images in order to understand “the nature of power and dominance” (van 
Dijk 2001:301- 302). 
 
The discursive analysis can help us to understand the relations between 
text and context. Moreover observing and analyzing the discourse of the 
media can help conceptualize how social realities are constructed through 
certain power relations and ideologies. As dominant groups disseminate 
their narratives, subordinated groups are pushed to silence (Parker 1992), 
so it  is also important to examine who speaks for the nation and on behalf 
of the people, what their positions are and what they say.  
 
Critical discourse analysis aims to understand the role of  ideologies in 
shaping society through specific linguistic features (Fairclough 1989) 
Scholars in the field of Critical Discourse Analysis are influenced amongst 
others by Foucault’s notion of power and Gramsci’s concept of hegemony, 
and apply these to understand how the dominant discourse legitimizes its 
existence and excludes others (Fairclough 1995, Van Dijk 1991). One of 
the main scholars in the field, Fairclough describes it as:  
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“systematically exploring often opaque relationships 
of causality and determination between (a) discursive 
practices, events and texts, and (b) wider social and 
cultural structures, relations and processes; to 
investigate how …. [they] arise out of and are 
ideologically shaped by relations of power and 
struggles over power; and to explore how the opacity 
of these relationships between discourse and society 
is itself a factor securing power and hegemony”  
(Fairclough 1995:132).   
 
It has been widely used to analyse the power of language and media in 
constructing  national values, ideologies and identities (Billig 1991). 
 
Fairclough’s (2005) approach to critical discourse analysis is characterised 
by a realist social ontology that sees social structures and social events as 
part of social reality and a dialectical view of structure and agency. 
Therefore social practices are not treated in isolation from discursive 
practices and discursive practices are seen as part of social and power 
relations. This approach looks at how language influences people’s 
identities, knowledge and values, treating language as a tool of political 
and ideological construction in the process of dominating people 
(Fairclough 1995; Hall 1982; Parker 1992; Van Dijk 1991).   
 
A similar approach has been developed by scholars analysing the meaning 
of signs. The study of signs was developed by Saussure and post- 
Saussurean linguistics to understand how signs are constructed to create 
meaning. Meaning is socially constructed, therefore it is crucial to analyse 
the sign and ideology in the representation of different political positions 
produced through images. The  structuralists  Saussure  (1983) and  
Barthes (1987) have conceptualized  semiotics as “consisting of a material 
signifier and an immaterial signified. This signifier can thus be dots, lines, 
shapes, sound waves or whatever physical, concrete entity that we link to, 
or associate with, some idea or notion” (Gripsrud 2002:101). The signified 
is the concept invoked by the signifier. Once combined, the signifier and 
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the signified make a sign. This “associative connection” creates 
conventions of rules and codes which we unconsciously take for granted 
seeing them as “normal”, “natural” and “neutral”.  “They are conventions, 
that is to say “agreements” established by way of habit in a community of 
users of the same language, the same sort of pictures, music and so on. A 
code is a rule or convention that associates a signifier with a certain 
signified or meaning” (Gripsrud 2002:101).   Saussure, Barthes considered 
the sign as language through which meaning is created.  Language is a 
constructed system which represents a world view and shapes the 
understanding of people. The method of critical discourse analysis has 
been criticized for not being objective and ignoring the active aspects of 
audiences’ interpretation. Indeed, audiences can actively interpret the 
context in a critical light (Blommaert and Bulcaen 2000).  
 
The materials used in this chapter were collected by examining the Turkish 
and Kurdish media’s representation of Öcalan’s capture, scanning the 
internet for representations of Öcalan from his departure from Syria to go 
to prison in Turkey in October 1998 until my fieldwork began in 2008. The 
abduction of Öcalan marked one of the important milestones for the 
Kurdish and Turkish people within Turkey but also Kurdish and Turkish 
migrants in Europe. Following Fairclough’s (1995) division of discourse into 
text, discursive practice and social practice, I will focus on these texts and 
their interpretation by audiences exposed to the conflict through the 
transnational media. 
2. The Flight and Capture of Öcalan - Live on TV 
Abdullah Öcalan (known as Apo, “uncle” in Kurdish) established a left-wing 
political organisation in 1978, with the aim of establishing an independent 
Kurdistan in “East and South East Anatolia”, predominantly populated by 
Kurds. He established the Headquarters of the PKK in Syria and Syrian-
occupied Lebanon, where the PKK trained Kurdish guerrilla groups since 
1980s coup (McDowall 2004:442). However in 1998, the USA and Turkey 
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threatened military action against Syria for harbouring Öcalan and the PKK 
and demanded Syria “expel the PKK and hand over Abdullah Öcalan 
forthwith” (Mcdowall 2004:442). The Syrian President, Hafez al-Assad, 
asked Öcalan to leave Syria and find another base for the PKK. 
 
When Öcalan first left Syria, he went to Moscow. But when he received an 
invitation from 109 Greek Members of Parliament as “leader of the world’s 
most oppressed people”, he then travelled to Greece.  However, as a 
consequence of US pressure, the Greek government forced Öcalan to 
leave the country again for Moscow (Weiner 1999). When Moscow refused 
to grant him refugee status, he flew to Italy where Öcalan hoped the 
centre-left Prime Minister, Massimo D'Alema, would grant him political 
asylum. In reaction to Turkish protests and pressure from the US, the 
Italian government sent him back to Moscow. Then Öcalan flew again to 
Greece where the Greek Foreign Minister, Pangalos highlighted the need 
for “humanitarian assistance” to Öcalan and sent him to the Greek 
embassy in Kenya in February 1999 as a temporary solution for just three 
days (Testimony of Öcalan’s Greek lawyer Failos Kranidiotis (Özkan 
2000). There, however, he was handed over to the CIA (Weiner 1999, 
Yetkin 2004) and Mossad (see Öcalan statement on ANF News Agency 
03.09.2008) who finally handed him over to the Turkish authorities on 
February 15, 1999. All these travels of Öcalan were published and 
broadcast in the Kurdish and Turkish media to the migrants who mobilized 
for or against him in Europe. 
 
In November 1998, Öcalan had come to Europe to tell the European public  
“what the cruelty and inhuman 75 years of terror [75 years system related 
to Turkey] has done to the peoples of Mesopotamia and Anatolia and their 
cultural values and also  to highlight the European role and responsibility 
for this terror”  (MED  TV, 15 Nov 1998).  He called on the Kurds “not to 
forget the cultural richness of Armenians, Assyrians and Greeks, the oldest 
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peoples in history who have been wiped off the map by Turkish barbarism. 
If the Kurds cannot succeed, they will face the same fate and will vanish 
from history”.  The move constituted an important new stage in the Kurdish 
national struggle: “by leaving Ankara, we became a party, by entering the 
Middle East we established an army, by entering the world [Europe] we will 
establish a state” (MED TV, 15 Nov 1998).  
 
For the stateless Kurds, this feeling of hope turned into huge 
disappointment in the Kurdish diaspora when Öcalan was handed over to 
Turkey and he gave up the aim of establishing an independent Kurdish 
state. The first images of Öcalan, captured on a Turkish intelligence-
service video of the abduction, showed him blindfolded, handcuffed and 
drugged in a jet on its way to Turkey (van Bruinessen, 2000). The 
abduction led to huge protests by Kurds in Europe, Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Syria 
and Armenia. The Kurdish media called on Kurds to protest against the 
Turkish, US, Greek and Israeli governments over their involvement in the 
illegal act. The Turkish media deliberately reported the role of the Greek 
and Israeli governments in the abduction in order to divert Kurds’ anger 
towards these two states.  In the protests, Kurdish demonstrators occupied 
Greek embassies in several European countries. During an attempt to 
occupy the Israeli embassy in Berlin, the Israeli security forces killed 4 
Kurds. 
 
During and after his trial, Öcalan made positive statements about 
Kemalism (the official ideology of the state) and affirmed the unity of 
Turkey. Many Kurds criticized Öcalan for his willingness to co-operate with 
the state during the trial. This caused great disillusion among Kurds in the 
homeland and the diaspora and polarised his party, leading many 
members to leave. Some established a new party, the PPDK, while other 
dissidents, such as Nizamettin Tas, the ex-PKK commander, accused 
Öcalan of giving up the ideal of an independent Kurdistan, becoming, 
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instead, a pawn of the Turkish state. Nevertheless, Öcalan was re-elected 
as PKK president and the party threatened the Turkish state with retaliation 
if he were executed. In the event, he was sentenced to death, but owing to 
international pressure and the possible destabilisation of the country, the 
Turkish government abolished the death penalty in 2002 and commuted 
his sentence to life imprisonment. Since his capture in 1999, he has been 
the sole prisoner on the island of Imralı, off the coast of Istanbul. Just 
recently, the government has brought three other prisoners to the island. 
 
In 1999 Öcalan issued a call from İmralı to his armed organisation to lay 
down their arms and leave Turkey for Kurdistan in Iraq. Meanwhile, the 
PKK declared a unilateral ceasefire in order to facilitate a political solution 
to the Kurdish question. Yet when, in 2004, the Turkish army attacked the 
PKK, they resumed the armed struggle. In 2009, the PKK again 
announced a unilateral ceasefire. In 2005, Öcalan had issued a 
“Declaration of Democratic Confederalism in Kurdistan”, which while 
accepting the existing state borders of Iran, Iraq, Turkey and Syria, allowed 
for  the Kurds to rule themselves.  Yet, the level of support for Öcalan and 
his control of the party were evident when, in  2007 thousands of Kurds in 
Turkey and Europe protested against an alleged attempt by the Turkish 
state to poison him in İmralı prison. The Kurdish diaspora witnessed new 
pictures of Öcalan (images 6.5 and 6.6) which were taken by the European 
Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (CPT) during their visit in May 2007. 
 
Commentators hold contradictory views about Öcalan’s arrest and his 
future role in Turkish and Kurdish politics. Ergil echoes the view of many 
Kurdish dissidents that 
“Öcalan is not fit for the leadership role of a peaceful 
political organization that extends from the Middle 
East to the Caucasus, all the way to Europe and the 
U.S. His extreme authoritarian and cruel character 
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leaves no place for conciliation. His leadership style, 
forged as a guerrilla commander, has served its 
purpose. Now he is history”  (Ergil 2001:175) 
 
Yet, the Turkish scholar, Ozcan, presents a different view arguing that 
“Öcalan has a high symbolic value for some Kurds,” (Seibert 2009  ).  
Tocci  et al (2008:7) found that “through the control of political and 
associational life in the southeast, the PKK retained influence in the region 
despite its leader’s imprisonment and the flight of its militants to Northern 
Iraq”. Öcalan remains the PKK’s symbolic leader and has a strong 
influence on Kurds. In 2009 he was even portrayed in some Turkish media 
as a person who could end the conflict through the road map to peace he 
was drawing up. The negative representations were now complemented by 
views of him as the Phoenix rising from its own ashes to bring peace to 
Turkey. 
3. Öcalan in the Turkish media 
Critical discourse analysis dissects texts, language and communication in 
their social context and considers them as aspects which shape the 
society. Text is not just an isolated, passive report but a part of ongoing 
events which creates meaning and shape people’s world-view. Fairclough 
(1995) states that  the linguistic representations of certain identities aims to 
categorize them through certain pronouns, names, attributions and 
adjectives, terms to include and exclude certain individuals  and  groups to 
create a certain discourse. 
 
 Öcalan and his movement have been represented in the Turkish media in 
various ways since the 1980s. It is not an overstatement to say this war 
was also a war between Öcalan and the Turkish journalists who used 
various negative epithets to describe him. As the Hürriyet’s editor explains 
“our official discourse was to name him “chief of a bandit gang”, 
“ringleader” and “baby killer” for decades” (Özkok, Hurriyet Newspaper 
18.07.2009). The journalist uses “our” pronouns to describe the Turkish 
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imagined community and exclude the “other”. Billig would describe this as “ 
distance rhetoric| which describe “we” and excludes “they” (Billig 1995:49). 
 
This outline of “our official discourse” shows that the mainstream media are 
influenced by the official ideology of Turkish state (cf Masterman 
1985:187). The Glasgow University Media Group (1980) which focused on 
analysing news in the miners’ strike in Britain in the 1980s and the Israeli- 
Palestinian conflict, states that journalists in the mainstream media cannot 
change the dominant discourse, but they help to reproduce it as “neutral” 
and objective, (Philo and Berry 2004, Philo 1995) maintaining the 
“dominant political system” (Hall 1982:87).  
 
The mainstream Turkish media representation of Öcalan have produced a 
particular “social construction of a reality, a form of knowledge” (Fairclough 
1995:18) through nationalistic language and negative representations of 
Kurds in personifying them, their identity in one describing him as a 
“separatist” and “terrorist”. This knowledge became institutionalized by the 
state and media, shaping the social practices of Turkish people in Turkey 
and in Europe. The Turkish media have used specific narrative codes, 
photographic and linguistic signs which are not neutral. They are 
ideological positions in the context of the ethno-national conflict and the 
imagined political community of the dominant, ethno-centric Turkish state. 
The connotations of these signs and codes are nationalistic. These images 
create a continuity, familiarity, and meaningfulness about the dominant 
group (Gripsrud 2002).  All the images refer to Turkishness and its 
symbols, while anything in juxtaposition to the Turkish imagined community 
is connotated negatively. 
 
The journalists committed to Turkish nationalism create a common sense 
of the emerging Kurdish nationalism and its symbols and personalities as 
the “enemy”, “terrorists”, and a danger to “our” Turkish nationalism, which 
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is presented as positive and taken-for-granted. These terms have been 
used by most of the Turkish media (see image 6.1) and also by a large 
proposition of Turkish audiences I interviewed.  Drawing on Gramsci’s 
concept of hegemony and also semiotic concepts, Hall (1982) considers 
the “representation” of the other in a negative way as not something 
directly constructed by the media, which is rather influenced by existing 
political and cultural norms. However, in Turkey, the majority elite 
journalists have their own agenda which reproduces the dominant 
nationalism daily. They filter news which should be published and their 
main sources are usually military (though in recent years, this has 
declined), other institutions or extremist politicians. Therefore, the political 
and cultural norms for the representation of the “other” in Turkey are not 
neutral or at a distance, because the news bias and ideological character 
of these newspapers are based on close links with the Turkish state 
sources and its common sense. Only references related to “we” and the 
world-view of Turkishness decorate the layout of newspaper. The others 




Image 6.1. Search for terrorists who try to take action in Eruh and Semdinli 
[two districts in Diyarbakir and Hakkari, Y.K.] Headline: Operation in South 
(Hürriyet, 13.08.1984). 
 
The above headline categorises and identifies other as “terrorists” and 
differentiates them from “we”. This has been done since 80s for example 
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when Öcalan was the “chief of a bandit gang”, or “Armenian - Artin 
Agopyan”28. Later he was routinely called a “baby killer”, “head of the 
terrorist organisation” and since the ‘90s “head of the bloody separatist 
terrorist organisation” in news coverage of him in Turkish media.  Since the 
1980s, the generals of the military junta, three state presidents, and seven 
governments have come and gone from the public life, but Öcalan and the 
columnists of Hürriyet, Milliyet, and Zaman are still playing an important 
role in establishing and reshaping the agenda for the Turks and Kurds as 
well as speaking for the nation. 
 
Öcalan’s abduction was perhaps the most provocative media event. After 
the humiliation of being a pawn between Russia, Greece and Italy, he 
appeared in the Turkish media handcuffed, blindfolded and confused, 
“waking up from what looked like a drug-induced sleep”  (van Bruinessen 
2000b:15). The most dramatic moment was when, in his confused and 
demoralized condition, he told the masked Turkish security men “that he 
really loved the Turkish people, that he was willing to co-operate and that 
he could be very useful to them”. Van Bruinessen explains the significance 
of the capture of Öcalan as follows 
“The video images of this humiliating scene, hurriedly 
and very visibly edited so that doubts remained about 
the context of Öcalan's words, were shown again and 
again in news programs of the major television 
stations all over the world. The images created an 
upsurge of nationalistic fervour in Turkey and caused 
outrage among Kurds of all political affiliations, 
including Öcalan's fiercest opponents. These images 
— of which more were to follow — had the obvious 
intention of destroying Öcalan's charisma by showing 
him as a broken and weak man, ready to betray his 
cause. In an obvious effort to counteract any pity or 
sympathy that Öcalan's plight might provoke, the 
Turkish media invariably referred to him as 
‘babykiller’ and ‘terrorist chief’ in each news item that 
mentioned him” (van Bruinessen 1999a:1).  
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Though hot nationalism is typical “in times of social [ethno-national] 
disruption, ” (Billig  1995:44)  in the Turkish media, it is an everyday 
occurrence (Yumul and Özkirimli 2000). The Hürriyet headline read: “The 
head of terror has been cut off”, and superimposed on the Turkish flag it 
said: “This is the great Turkey” and in red capital letters: “VICTORY’ (see 
image 6. 2). This was meant to summarize the atmosphere in the whole 
country.  The producer of this text used symbols which are constantly used 
in Turkish media. This makes it easy to interpret the image without reading 
the content.  The image is itself a coded text with different information 
including historical background of the conflict, the celebration of 
nationhood and the defeated “enemy”.  And the headline reproduces the 
power relationship through the “victory” of “This is the great Turkey”. 
“Turkey” as the name of country is used to include all the citizens of the 
country. This shows on one hand, an inclusiveness while also referring to 
the hegemonic ideology with its motto “Turkey belongs to Turks”.  
 
 
Image 6.2 from Hürriyet newspaper ( 17.02.1999) 
 
Hürriyet published the dialogue between Öcalan and the security forces in 
the jumbo jet (See image 6.3) which brought an end of the myth of his 
invincibility to the Kurds. 
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Image 6.3, Headline of Hürriyet ( 18.02.1999) in capital letters and bold: 
DEFEAT (TÜKENİŞ). 
 
Language can be used to empower the dominant ideology (Ives 2004), 
construct alliances and silence the subordinated discourse to “win consent” 
in conflicted societies (Fairclough 1992:93). The media influences the 
audience’s “knowledge, beliefs, values, social relations, social identities” 
(Fairclough 1995:2). The media published photos of Öcalan in the airplane 
on his way to Turkey under the heading of “DEFEAT”, gloating that “there 
are moments when one photo can be more powerful than pages of writing.  
Here it is! …This photo is the state’s answer to those who want to divide 
the Turkish republic” (Hürriyet Newspaper 1999c 18.02.1999). At that time 
the Turkish media applied methods of psychological warfare against Kurds 
in Turkey and the diaspora. The media representations of Öcalan’s capture 
were aimed at humiliating Kurds and dashing any hopes of realising their 
demands as the responses of the Kurds whom I interviewed reveal (See 
below).   
 
The television channels broadcast reports on the capture with a Turkish 
flag in the top left corner of the screen, repeating the images of an 
exhausted and defeated Öcalan over and over again.  The print media 
concluded that “the separatist terrorists” lost the battle and speculated that 
Öcalan would call on the PKK to surrender. Indeed, Hürriyet reported: 
“Öcalan claims to serve Turkey”. The Turkish media reported that “After 
 267 
the capture, Öcalan has seen the power of Turkey and now he is worried 
for his life. Apo said “I repent, do not execute me. I will confess everything”  
(Hürriyet Newspaper 23.02.1999 ). He was depicted as a coward only out 
to save his own skin and escape from Turkish justice.  All the Turkish 
media talked about the “seizure of baby killer terrorist Apo” (See Milliyet, 
Hürriyet and Zaman Newspapers between February 15, 1999 and April 
1999).  As much as humiliating the Kurds, this was also directed at 
boosting Turkish nationalism and celebrating Turks as victors. For 
example, the Milliyet headlined with: 
“‘Congratulations, my Turkey’ …‘the seizure of baby 
killer terrorist Apo has been celebrated as a festival 
in all of Turkey…. After watching Prime Minister 
Ecevit’s statement on television, the citizens flooded 
into the streets in a happy mood. Hundreds of 
thousands of people rushed out with Turkish flags in 
their hands … They shouted slogans in support of 
the Prime Minister, condemning the PKK. Many 
citizens sat on the roofs of their cars and even lorries 
made a triumphal tour waving the Turkish flag. In the 
meantime many have hung the Turkish flag from their 
houses. Amongst the citizens flowing out into the 
street, the martyrs’ mothers’ and war veterans’ tears 
of happiness have drawn attention. While some 
groups have demonstrated in the front of HADEP 
[pro-Kurdish People's Democracy Party], the police 
have taken strict security measures”  (Milliyet 
Newspaper 17.02.1999) 
 
Here the newspaper positioned itself as owner of the country and 
attempted to create shared experiences amongst its readers through its 
discursive practices.  The report emphasises that the abduction of Öcalan 
was celebrated “as a festival in all of Turkey”. Yet Milliyet and other Turkish 
newspapers avoided reporting how Kurdish people reacted. Kurds in 
Istanbul and the Kurdish regions demonstrated against the abduction, but 
this contested the dominant ideology. Newspapers attempted to show that 
there was a consensus amongst Turkish citizens against “separatists”.  
Indeed, the Turkish newspapers only represented the version of the 
 268 
imagined community which was accepted as “natural” (Fairclough and 
Wodak 1997:258)  
 
However, the newspapers’ European editions did report on Kurdish 
demonstrations in Europe, using the same familiar rhetoric to delegitimize 
the demonstrators. In the European editions, Kurdish demonstrators were 
depicted as “terror sympathizers” and critical voices from Western 
countries were targeted. At that time, the Turkish media in Germany 
attacked every critical voice and called on the Turkish migrants to act by 
attending demonstrations or writing protest letters. The media and its 
columnists targeted particular German media and journalists. The example 
below from Kozmopolit is only one of many: 
“Now it is enough. The European media shelter the 
PKK, the Turks will be furious. In particular Öcalan is 
sheltered by one-sided German media coverage. The 
Turks who feel unprotected are close to revolt… We 
are publishing a sample letter of protest in German 
and Turkish. If you agree with it, you can send it to 
ARD [the German state television channel]. The 
address and fax number are in the European pages” 
 
The enclosed sample letter of protest is: 
“Your publications with regards to the PKK and 
Abdullah Öcalan are one-sided. Your view of the 
Turks is not unprejudiced. I condemn you for your 
publications which did not include the view of Turkish 
society. Therefore you have propagated for 
somebody who has attacked the Turks. In this way, 
you encourage the terrorists.  You call the PKK the 
representative of all Kurds and deceive the German 
public. You hurt the Turks who have contributed with 
their effort and tax to the prosperity of this country” 
(Sabah 1999  in Kozmopolit 1999, online article). 
 
This style of  “campaign journalism” (Hafez 2002:43) addresses the 
readers as a national “us” (Billig  1995:115) and calls on Turks to stand up 
for and speak for “our” nation, giving instructions on how to act as “Turks” 
against the imagined enemy of the nation. The media deliberately use the 
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term “Turks” in order to “evoke an identity” (Billig  1995:106) of a people 
whose nation has been attacked. 
 
Hürriyet and Sabah targeted  Le Figaro Magazine’s columnist Franz-Olivier 
Giesbert (Özkok 1999) and Dr Udo Steinbach who were both critical of 
European countries’ complicity in the unlawful abduction of Öcalan. Sabah 
published Steinbach’s photo with the headline: “This is Apo’s friend” 
(Sabah 1999  in Kozmopolit 1999). In doing so, the newspaper and Turkish 
TV channels created a sense amongst the Turkish migrants that there 
were people attacking “our” nation alongside the terrorists against whom 
they were called to defend “our” country. As Billig demonstrates, this 
“rhetoric distances ‘us’ from ‘them’, ‘our’ world from ‘theirs’, (1995:49) 
which has “its roots in fear and hatred of the Other, and its affinities with 
racism” (Anderson   1991:141). 
3.1. From “chief of separatist terrorist organisation’ to peace maker 
During a talk show on CNN-Turk (the corporation of media tycoon, Dogan, 
and CNN) the question of whether “Öcalan could be compared to South 
Africa's Nelson Mandela” was raised. Subsequently, the Radio and 
Television Supreme Council (RTUK) banned CNN Turk from broadcasting. 
(The Committee to Protect Journalists 2000)  Öcalan’s status as the most 
hated person in the Turkish media started to change during the local 
elections in March 2007. Avni Ozgil, a Turkish journalist started a debate 
on Öcalan, arguing that he could play an important role in disarming the 
PKK and solving the Kurdish issue in Turkey. Although the media still used 
all the old epithets such as “chief of the separatist terrorist organisation” in 
the mean time some journalists believed that he was the person who could 
bring peace to Turkey because of enduring influence on the PKK and 
public opinion in Kurdistan, as well as on the pro-Kurdish BDP. 
 
Some journalists advised the government to take Öcalan seriously in order 
to keep Turkey’s unity.  Ertuğrul Özkök, the editor-in-chief of Hürriyet at 
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that time, one of the hardliners who used to refer to Öcalan as “terror 
chief”, “ringleader”, “baby killer” (Özkok 2009a) announced that he had 
applied to the General Staff office to interview Öcalan and hoped that, if he 
got permission, he would “bring a message back from Imralı. So maybe I 
can serve to bring peace back to our country which all of us deserve. I am 
ready to play a postman for this aim” (Özkok 2009a).  Here the discourse 
changed from “us” to “all of us” which included all the people living in 
Turkey.  This signalled what Fairclough has termed was the power 
relationship in transformation, constantly being renegotiated as the 
language and discursive practices in the media shift and thereby constitute 
social and cultural change (1995:29).  
 
In a similar vein, the prominent, progressive commentator, Oral Calislar 
believes that “We are at the end of the road of solving this problem….The 
address for this solution is Imralı” (Çalışlar 2009). Likewise this was the 
view of the former pro-Kurdish DTP and new BDP M.P, Tuncel (Çinar 
2009). This narrow-minded reaction from the legal Kurdish party assumed 
that Öcalan and the PKK could speak for the Kurdish nation as a whole, 
but many of the Kurdish migrants interviewed questioned the meaning and 
existence of the DTP and newly formed BDP. As a Kurdish participant in 
London stated that: 
“If they push the solution of the problem [the Turkey-
Kurdish problem] on a man who is perceived himself 
by the Turkish public as a key problem for the 
peaceful solution [of Turkey’s Kurdish question], then 
I am asking what they are seeking in the Turkish 
parliament? Are they only in the Turkish Parliament 
as cosmetic figures for the Kurds?” (Interview with 
Peri, London, 2nd April 2008). 
 
What is clear is that the representation of Öcalan in written and visual text 
has changed over time.  Structuralists argue that the “Meanings or 
signifieds of signs tended to change with time and place (...) they are not 
absolutely and finally determined once and for all.  ... Signs that once had 
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positive connotations can, for example, later come to have negative 
connotations” (Gripsrud 2002:103).   In Ocalan’s case, if he accepts the 
“red lines” of Turkey’s politics, he may be seen more positively, but if he 
demands Kurdish self-representation and equal rights in language and 
education for Turks and Kurds, he is called “head of separatists”.   
4. Öcalan in the Kurdish media 
In the Kurdish media, views of Öcalan are contradictory. Part of the media 
represent him as “Serok” (leader) and invincible. During Öcalan’s period in 
Syria (1984-1998) he was represented very positively as a leader in 
various Kurdish newspapers and on the London-based satellite channel 
MED TV. During Öcalan’s short-lasting trip to Europe, the Kurdish media 
created the hope, through its discursive practice, that the Kurdish question 
would be turn from an internal issue into a European question, which would 
help to achieve the solution of a Kurdish state. Kurdish intellectual groups 
led a popular national mobilisation to establish a nation state.  However 
this dream dissolved after the abduction of Öcalan. During his trip to 
Europe, his abduction and finally his trial, a war broke out between the 
Turkish and Kurdish media: the Turkish media propagated the defeat of the 
separatists and humiliated Kurdish demonstrators with such provocative 
titles as “They went berserk” (Hürriyet Newspaper 1999b). “They” was 
used to belittle the Kurds. On the other hand, the Kurdish media tried to 
raise the spirits of the Kurds who felt deeply disillusioned with the end of 
the myth of an independent Kurdistan, while the Turkish state used all its 
powers to stop MED TV from broadcasting (see chapter III). 
 
MED  TV argued that “The name of Apo has been identified with the 
Kurdish people who have risen up and are fighting for independence” 
(Witschi 1999). Therefore it came as shocking news when Öcalan offered 
the Turkish security forces on the plane from Kenya to Turkey to serve the 
Turkish republic. The Kurdish media responded that Öcalan was under the 
influence of drugs and that his statements under conditions of capture 
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should be disregarded by Kurds. Roseberry provides an analysis of the 
concrete practice of hegemony that aptly describes the discursive practices 
of Kurdish media at that time:  
“I propose that we use the concept [of hegemony]  
not to understand consent but to understand 
struggle, the ways in which the words, images, 
symbols, forms, organizations, institutions, and 
movements used by subordinate populations to talk, 
understand, confront, accommodate themselves to, 
or resist their domination are shaped by the process 
of domination itself. What hegemony constructs, 
then, is not shared ideology but a common material 
and meaningful framework for living through, talking 
about, and acting upon social order characterized by 
domination” (Roseberry 1994:360–361). 
 
Although Öcalan is imprisoned in İmralı in Turkey, some Kurdish media 
have reinforced his leadership role by repeatedly using the term “Serok” - 
leader, or “leader of the Kurdish people”. Pointing out the similarities of 
their struggles and imprisonment, the Kurdish media has created its 
Kurdish Nelson Mandela. Here the aim of some Kurdish media has been to 
naturalize the power of the PKK and its leader amongst the Kurdish 
population. Moreover, it attempts to assume power and depict him as the 
representative of all Kurds. Online Gündem published a long interview with 
Nelson Mandela’s lawyer, Essa Moosa, to underline this link. Essa Moosa 
compared the two thus: “Both Mandela and Öcalan have struggled for their 
people”(Genç 2009). With this metaphor, the Kurdish media has 






Image 6.4    Image 6.5 
Öcalan in his small room reading the newspaper. This photo was taken by 
CPT during their visit to Öcalan in May 2007. These pictures are the most 
frequently used images of the Kurdish Mandela in Özgür Politika 
newspaper. 
 
The Kurdish media choose such images to create a sense of Kurdishness 
to instil a social practice amongst Kurdish people of mutual identification, 
building solidarity against the “oppressors”.  The notion of “the oppressed” 
(Fairclough 1995:113) is widely used in the Kurdish media.  The linguistic 
and photographic representation of Öcalan by some Kurdish media aims to 
create an emotional bond between him and the Kurdish people.  Moreover, 
some Kurdish media focused on the discourse of victimhood and 
vulnerability which had a huge impact on Kurds who had experienced 
Turkish state violence in their homeland (See image 6.6).  Using such 
signs, it “bring[s] to mind” (Penn 2000:230) similar experiences of Kurds 




Image 6.6: the picture was shot by CPT during their visit to Öcalan while 
they were investigating the alleged attempt to poison him. This is a 
zoomed-in fragment of a photograph of Öcalan in the prison yard under 
surveillance (Image 6.7). However Yeni Özgür Politika and Roj TV mainly 






Öcalan’s character is sometimes abstracted and idealized. This bears 
similarity to the Turkish state’s ideological portrayal of Ataturk as immortal. 
For example, the media talk about “loyalty to leadership” relating 
exclusively to Öcalan: Online Gündem waxes lyrically: “Öcalan is our will, 
Öcalan is our health, Öcalan is our sun”(Çaglayan 2008). Öcalan and his 
movement have been partly effective in organising the Kurds in their 
homeland and in the diaspora to continue the hegemonic struggle against 
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the dominant Turkish nationalist discourse. In this process both media 
present the news in the framework of the hegemonic struggle for 
nationhood which has set the tone of hagiography and whitewashing 
leadership. 
4.1. The Kurdish opposition and Öcalan 
As I have argued, Turkish and Kurdish migrants’ multiple identities 
disappear on the question of the ongoing ethno-national conflict (see 
chapter IV). In this instance, Turkish and Kurdish communities cohere 
around their ethno-national identities which determine their political views 
and social behaviour towards each other. But these identities vary within 
the groups according to their political and ideological affiliations. For 
example, while many Kurds state that they are against the Turkish state’s 
policy of humiliating Öcalan, some Kurdish intellectuals and Öcalan 
dissidents have criticized and opposed his political and cultural hegemony 
and that of the PKK and the personality cult around Öcalan. These views 
were also voiced in my focus group and face-to-face interviews in 
Stockholm, Berlin and London. 
 
Many Kurds, particularly Swedish Kurds who have had or still have some 
affiliation to other Kurdish political parties and organizations which are 
competitors of the PKK, and were attacked by it during the 1970s and 
1980s, are particularly critical of the ideas Öcalan developed in prison. 
They have been key in advancing the intellectual capacity of Kurdish 
society by establishing and institutionalising Kurdish language and culture. 
They view the PKK as “not social-democratic” (Interview with Medya, 
Stockholm, 05th June 2007). This emphasis on social democracy shows 
how much Kurds in Sweden are influenced by the normative ideal of social 
democracy prevalent there. One example of this critical view of Öcalan is 
presented by Aziz Alış, the current chairperson of the European Kurdish 
initiative, who argues:  “Öcalan defends Kemalism in his articles. Therefore 
I do not see any differences between Öcalan, the Turkish general staff and 
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the Turkish state” (Vakit Newspaper 01.09.2009). The former editor of the 
Kurdish website Nasname, who is an ex-editor of Yeni Ulke and Özgür 
Politika, criticizes Yeni Özgür Politika for their lack of critical distance from 
Öcalan. He ironically called the paper “ÖP” - meaning kiss in Turkish, 
referring to its excessive loyalty and closeness to Öcalan. Recep Marasli, 
an influential leftwing Kurdish intellectual concludes that “the word “Imralı” 
enters Kurdish literature as a metaphor for harmony and collaboration with 
the Turkish military. All statements from İmralı show this harmony”(Maraşlı 
2009).  
 
Nasname, Gelawej, Kurdistan Post and other Kurdish internet-based 
newspapers, criticise Öcalan for capitulating since his capture and for 
having turned Kemalist. They are particularly opposed to Öcalan’s 
Democratic Confederalism (Öcalan 2005) which gives up on demands for 
independence or federalism. Some dissidents called him neo-Kemalist 
(Boti, Nasname.com 19.09.2009) and disparage the “İmralı mentality” as 
“capitulation” (Tevger 2009). Those who criticize Öcalan are excluded from 
sections of the influential Kurdish media such as Yeni Özgür Politika and 
Roj TV. The best example is the sociologist, Ismail Besikci who spent 25 
years in prison for researching Kurds and Kurdistan. He criticized Öcalan’s 
policies for giving up the idea of an independent Kurdistan and so 
disappeared from the most influential Kurdish media with the largest 
audiences. Öcalan calls him as a “Kurdish nationalist”. 
 
Even though Öcalan calls on Kurds to “discuss my thoughts”, these 
discussions are very circumscribed within the Kurdish media. Gunay Aslan, 
a prominent Kurdish journalist from Yeni Özgür Politika criticises his own 
paper for not publishing Besikci’s views after he was critical of Öcalan. 
Aslan argues that this is against journalists’ professional ethics (Çeko 
2009). But all these criticisms are focused on defending “our” nation, “our” 
civic Kurdishness which shows the strong affiliation to the imagined 
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political Kurdish community. However again the Kurdish migrants 
interviewed, including some media producers had very different concepts, 
perceptions and understanding of the imagined Kurdish political 
community. Gavrilos would argue that “[a] nation as an imagined 
community is …. defined by a continuously negotiated struggle of 
competing ideologies and identity differences between groups” (2002:427). 
This negotiated struggle of Kurdish intellectuals and political groups is 
taking place to define what is Kurdish and what is not, as excluding and 
including form part of the process of constituting the imagined community. 
But the idea of the Kurdish imagined community is not fixed, singular and 
exclusive, just as Turkishness amongst the migrants, who have different 
understandings of being “Turks”, is not. However these different 
understandings of nationhood do not hinder migrants from standing up and 
speaking out for their nation in everyday life, in their transnational political 
practices. In this sense, despite their differences, their communality is a 
part of their particularity as an ethno-national group, primarily constructed 
around the mediated ethno-national conflict in their homeland. 
 
5. The Öcalan Case and Kurdish-Turkish Relations in Europe 
When Öcalan was under house arrest in Italy, it was the first time that 
Kurds from different diaspora countries and political orientations came 
together to support him and save his life. Thousands of Kurds from all over 
Europe came to Rome to demonstrate for Öcalan’s right to remain in 
Europe and against the threat of deportation to Turkey. This was a 
significant example of political transnationalism. Many Kurds hoped that if 
he was allowed to stay in Europe, then Turkey’s Kurdish question would 
not only be treated as a military issue for Turkey, but as a political problem 
for the European Union. Many Turkish migrants, in turn, demonstrated by 
lobbying the governments of their countries of residence to deliver Öcalan 
to the Turkish state. This led to a hegemonic struggle between Turkish and 
Kurdish migrants who stood and spoke out for their nation. 
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The Kurdish dream turned into a nightmare when they saw Öcalan 
blindfolded and handcuffed on the Turkish media, (See image 6.8) 
accompanied by triumphant celebrations of Turkish “victory”. On the other 
hand, many Turks in Europe celebrated his abduction. Many Kurdish and 
Turkish migrants, interviewed as part of this research, affirmed that the 
abduction of Öcalan and the Turkish court’s death sentence affected 
relations between Turkish and Kurdish migrants in their everyday life. In 
particular, the media images of Öcalan’s abduction exacerbated worsening 
tensions. This showed that the discursive practices of Turkish media 
operated differently and created oppositional readings amongst the 
ostensibly homogenous, imagined Turkish community. This means that the 
coded messages in written and spoken text addressed a particular group, 
and not all members of the nation: it could not create a common sense or 
shared experiences amongst all Turkish nationals.  
 
The testimony of the migrants I interviewed provides us with an important 
account of the role of the media in fostering the national imagination and 
“emotions of national loyalty” (Billig  1995:19) in hot and banal forms of 
nationalism. The migrants are connected to their homeland through the 
media which is their primary source of information about concerns in the 
homeland which many migrant interviewees see as their country, even 
though they have been living in Europe for decades. This strong sense of 
belonging shows us that “The notions of nationhood are deeply embedded 






Image 6.8.  This photo was released to the national and international 
media by the Turkish state when Öcalan was captured and flown by the 
Turkish security forces from Kenya to Turkey on February 16th 1998. The 
image almost caused civil war to break out in Turkey between Turkish and 
Kurdish ethnic groups and also changed the Turkish and Kurdish migrants” 
relationship in Europe. I used this picture in my fieldwork because its 
publication was a victory for the Turkish state and media, much celebrated 
by the Turkish ethnic group. However this image represented humiliation 
and deep disappointment for the Kurds. By showing this picture, I aimed to 
find out about the perceptions and influence of the Öcalan, i.e. as a cult 
figure and his symbolic influence over the Turkish -Kurdish relationship. 
 
5.1. “They wanted to shoot even into our dreams” 
One interviewee, Rosa, from London stated that she watched this picture 
on Turkish TV and was unable to express her feelings. She was living in 
Turkey at that time and points out that she felt that in Turkey, Turks and 
Kurds were in a state of ethnic war: 
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”First of all, let me give you my notions as a Kurd who 
has sympathy for Öcalan. This picture is taken 
consciously and deliberately in this way.  It was taken 
in revenge for the years they fought but did not win 
the war against Kurds…. for the defeated military and 
its media. The Turkish military and media are aware 
of the influence of Öcalan on Kurds, they know that 
Öcalan is their representative; they aimed to 
humiliate the Kurds. They aimed to make him look 
ridiculous to Kurds. This picture gives out the 
message to the Kurds that ‘if you dare to fight against 
us, you will end up like Öcalan’. Öcalan, who was 
blindfolded, was presented as guilty with the flag 
behind him. This picture was part of the 
psychological war against Kurds. 
Q: Do you think that Turks feel differently when they 
see this picture? 
R: Turks were over the moon when this picture 
appeared in the media and the news. They were 
blind drunk with victory without thinking about the 
consequences. This picture gave them a 
psychological satisfaction. That moment was enough 
for them. They said to the Kurds ‘we’ve caught him, 
we have humiliated you.’ 
Q: What do you feel emotionally about the picture? 
R: The picture was taken in February 1999. I saw it in 
the Turkish media. It was awful. I was not able to 
express my feelings. Not only me, it led to many 
protests in Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Europe. It came to 
the point of ethnic civil war between Turks and Kurds.  
People who saw the picture threw their TV out of the 
window. The Kurds have revolted 28 times and they 
were defeated. And the 29th uprising, the largest 
Kurdish revolt has ended with such a humiliation, 
with such a picture! It has devastated the Kurds 
emotionally. Severe and heavy street fighting 
occurred between the Kurds and the police forces in 
Turkey and Europe. Many Kurds were arrested and 
Turkey was close to an ethnic war” (Interview with 
Roza, London, and 17th February 2007). 
 
Roza’s comments were not exceptional during my fieldwork.  The words 
“humiliation”, “psychological war”, “revenge”, “speechlessness” were 
uttered by almost all the Kurds interviewed in the three countries for this 
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research. For example, some second generation Kurds from Stockholm 
who were interviewed commented that they were no fans of Öcalan but 
 
“because of this picture I went onto the street and 
protested against the Turkish government. This 
picture is not about Öcalan it is more about all Kurds. 
The Turkish state humiliated all Kurds.  [By 
publishing this picture the government] said to us 
‘you cannot win this war against us, you have to 
accept our occupation and our oppression in 
Kurdistan. If you don’t accept it, we will capture you 
like Öcalan” (Interview with Afsan, Stockholm, 4th 
June 2007). 
 
Despite these interviewees’ different views of Öcalan, they both argue in a 
similar way that the Turkish state sought to humiliate the Kurdish people 
and create hopelessness amongst them so they would give up their cause. 
 
Jiyan, who works for the Kurdish media and lives in Sweden emphasised 
the role of the media in this “hot” form of Turkish nationalism reinforcing the 
military in its war against the Kurds: 
“….publishing these pictures has caused hostility 
between the Turks and Kurds here and in Turkey, 
this is still in the minds of people. Because at least 
Kurds expected from their Turkish neighbours a bit of 
empathy but instead of empathy, their neighbours 
distributed sweets to celebrate this abduction. And I 
think the media has consciously created this 
atmosphere to get public support to continue the war” 
(Interview with Jiyan, Stockholm, 8th June 2007).  
 
Maybe this issue was even more sensitive for first generation Kurdish 
migrants who are political refugees who had experienced state violence in 
Turkey. When I showed the picture to a Kurdish first generation political 
refugee in Germany, he looked at the image of the handcuffed Öcalan for a 
long time without saying anything. 
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Kawa:” Yes…this picture is not only about 
Öcalan…This is a published document about lot of 
Kurds in Turkey who were arrested like me… 
Q: I am sorry if this picture recalled your memories, if 
you do not want to talk we can stop the interview. 
Kawa:…[silence] 
Y: [To ease the situation I started to talk about 
unrelated issues] I have not been to Berlin for a long 
time. The city has changed. Where do you live here? 
Kawa: [After seeing these images on the media] I 
could not sleep for a long time. When I closed my 
eyes I saw the faces of the police who tortured 
me…The issue was not Öcalan. The issue was that 
with these pictures they wanted to shoot even into 
our dreams … What else can I tell you?... Yes the 
city is changed” (Interview with Aram, London, 14th 
April 2007).  
 
It was a difficult moment for him and for me in the interview. A Medical 
Foundation for the Care of Victims of Torture report confirms this difficult 
moment. At the time of Öcalan’s arrest many refugees experienced “an 
acute deterioration of their state of health and re-traumatisation” (IPPNW 
1999, online article). Many Kurdish refugees and migrants who had not 
had any psychological problems until then showed up in the neurologists’ 
surgeries. Neurologists reported: 
“increased emergencies and mental breakdowns by 
a part of the Kurdish patients. It should be born in 
mind that a significant number of Kurds living in 
Germany are traumatized through torture and severe 
human rights abuses in their homeland. The pictures 
in the media about the arrest of Abdullah Öcalan 
cause the recall of memories of torture and 
maltreatment again, like a horror film that does not 
want to stop”  (IPPNW 1999, online article) 
 
Another medical foundation - XENION - in Berlin reported that “the pictures 
of excessive violence, threat to life, powerlessness and helplessness can 
easily be brought to life again if external occasions are suitable for it”  
(IPPNW 1999, online article). In this sense, the strong psychological 
reactions of my interviewees were not exceptional but demonstrate how 
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deeply the media images affected Kurdish refugees and migrants in 
Europe. 
 
However there were Kurdish migrants who stated that the PKK had 
reduced the Kurdish cause to itself and Öcalan during the mass 
demonstrations in Europe. Zana, a Kurdish pensioner in Stockholm 
declared: 
“I do not like Öcalan or the PKK. But at that time I 
was present at all demonstrations because that was 
not an attack on Öcalan. They [Turkish authorities] 
attacked all the Kurds through Öcalan. But again I did 
not like to see PKK flag at demonstration we should 
have had only Kurdish flags which is acceptable for 
all Kurds”  (Interview with Zana, Stockholm, 5th June 
2007).  
 
The Kurds I interviewed concurred in seeing the Turkish media’s 
publication of these images as intended to humiliate the Kurdish people, 
and even viewed them as part of “Turkish psychological warfare” through 
the “Turkish fascist media”. But this does not mean that all of them support 
Öcalan and his political movement. What brought and still brings people 
onto the street is their experiences of similar maltreatment in Turkey or 
feelings that their Kurdish identity is being attacked and they, demeaned. 
This has led to a break-away from the Turkish media, also by Turkish 
people who did not empathise with the campaign of psychological warfare. 
5.2. Images as an outlet for Turkish nationalism 
While many Turkish migrants I interviewed reacted positively to the 
pictures of Öcalan’s capture, there was a range of opinions among them. 
One position among those interviewed was that they had attended 
demonstrations demanding the handover of Öcalan to the Turkish state but 
were unhappy with the depiction of Öcalan with “our flag”. Seher, a Turkish 
participant who was a teacher in Turkey and works on a voluntary basis for 
a Turkish women’s organisation in Berlin, testified: 
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S: “I went to demonstrations in Berlin when Öcalan 
was in Italy. There were over ten thousand of us. We 
demanded that the Europeans should hand him over 
to Turkey because he is responsible for the death of 
36,000 people. 
Q: Where did you learn that there would be a 
demonstration for the extradition of Öcalan? 
S: From the media. I heard it from TRT INT and also 
from the newspapers. 
Q: Which newspaper? 
S: I can’t remember but I heard it from the media. 
The worst thing is that he is not even Kurdish. He is 
from the PKK. They are Armenian. I told my Kurdish 
neighbour that he is not Kurdish. We discussed him. 
Q: What was the response of your Kurdish 
neighbour? 
S: They see him as Kurdish and their leader. 
Q: What do you feel when you see this picture? 
S: I think that there should not be a Turkish flag on 
his left and right sides. There should be photos of the 
people he killed. It should be the photos of the 
uneducated young boys and girls who were recruited 
for his terrorist group. Why should my flag be there? I 
cannot understand why they blindfolded his eyes. 
Why did they [Turkish authorities] blindfold his eyes? 
What is it that he should not see? He should see the 
photos of the people killed because of his politics. 
Maybe his soul would shudder. 
Q: Do you think the Kurds have a different opinion 
about him? 
S: Yes they think differently from me which makes 
me unhappy. They see him as a father, as 
representative of the Kurds.  They are influenced by 
the Kurdish media. But if they need a representative, 
it means they want a state or a state has been 
established. They can go to Iraq. Look I am here, in 
Germany. I am not happy here and I don’t buy a 
house here. I can go to my country and buy it there. If 
they are not happy in Turkey they should go. I do not 
mind. I have no objection” (Interview with Seher, 
Berlin, 10th August 2007).  
 
Seher provides a rich account of the views of the first generation of Turkish 
migrants on Kurds and Öcalan and their sources of information on Kurdish 
issues. She mentions that Öcalan is an Armenian which was the state and 
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media discourse for a long period during the 1980s and 1990s when Kurds 
were not accepted as a different ethnic group. The Turkish nationalist 
slogan “either love or leave” clearly underpins her views. The state and 
media representation of people who join the PKK as “uneducated young 
boys and girls” is reflected in her speech.  Despite uncritically reproducing 
these representations of Kurds, she disagrees with the use of the flag in 
the pictures as she has very positive associations with the flag but sees the 
moment of Öcalan’s capture as associated with negative issues, namely 
the deaths of many young people. 
 
Serdar, a Turkish participant from Berlin, is very aware that a number of 
young people from his hometown in Turkey lost their lives fighting as 
soldiers against the Kurds. For him, seeing Öcalan captured represents the 
possibility of justice for the Turkish soldiers killed and the beginning of 
peace: 
“When I saw this picture, we celebrated that he was 
captured and I slept in peace for the first time. They 
[two young people from his hometown] were 
martyred defending the country against these PKK 
terrorists. Of course these terrorists did not leave us 
in peace here, either. They still demonstrate for the 
chief terrorist. … When I see them I get very angry. 
They build castles in the air. … But I have to tell you. 
He [Öcalan] will come out one day from Imralı…. 
what's done can't be undone. The MHP [the 
nationalist MHP at the time was part of the coalition 
government] should have executed him. The poor 
families’ children are squandered” (Interview with 
Serdar, Berlin 17 July 2007).    
 
Mehtap, another interviewee from Stockholm, thinks that the Turkish 
authorities “presented him as blindfolded and handcuffed to show the unity 
of Turks” Like many other Turkish interviewees she criticised the Kurds 
who demonstrated in favour of Öcalan. She emphasised the idea that: 
“They are Turkish citizens and should be happy about his delivery to 
Turkey” (Interview with Mehtap, Stockholm, 16th June 2007).  She sees 
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the Kurds as part of the imagined Turkish community and is disappointed 
“they” did not join the celebrations of Öcalan’s arrest and thus refused to 
be part of the national imagined community.  
 
This reflects the longstanding argument of the majority of the Turkish 
media that all citizens of Turkey should identify solely with the Turkish 
nation.  A number of the Turkish migrants, whom I interviewed, while 
agreeing with the capture of Öcalan, disliked the humiliating nature of the 
pictures and media representations. One remarked: 
 “It is wrong to show him like this. OK you arrest him 
but you do not need to show him. It was a disgusting 
moment. I do not know whether I should say I felt 
ashamed of the Turkish media’s exaggerated, 
manipulative coverage” (Interview with Devrim, 
London, 3rd March 2008). 
 
There were also left-wing or Elewî Turkish interviewees, often second 
generation migrants who expressed concern with the media 
representations and the triumphalist nature of the pictures. Gulben, a 
second generation, bank employee from Stockholm said 
“I think showing this image on TV channels and in the 
newspaper is intended to cover up their crime in 
Kurdistan. They think that they can manipulate 
people. Yes maybe they can manipulate some Turks, 
but not all of them” (Interview with Gulben, 
Stockholm, 16th June 2007).  
 
Saniye, a second generation Turkish migrant, who does not consume any 
Turkish and Kurdish media, was  distinctive in having no political view of 
the image or the conflict. 
“I have Kurdish friends. I know what a terrible day 
this was for them when Öcalan was abducted. And 
then we saw this picture on television. It was a 
horrible moment for me. I even wanted to go to 
demonstrate with my Kurdish friends against such a 
humiliation. I do not consume any Turkish or Kurdish 
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media. I followed it on German TV or newspapers” 
(Interview with Saniye, Berlin, 9th August 2007).  
 
Thus, there is a wide range of different views on the capture of Öcalan 
among Turkish migrants. For all the interviewees, this constituted a key 
media event. They reacted strongly and emotionally to the pictures of 
Öcalan’s capture and related these pictures to different aspects of the 
conflict. While some agreed with his capture, some disliked the use of such 
pictures to gloat and humiliate (Focus group with Turkish participants in 
London, 13 March 2008). 
 
 For some, the Turkish flag, which they associated with positive feelings, 
should not have been used in this way. Others agreed with the use of the 
Turkish flag as it symbolised Turkish unity and the celebration of victory, 
the beginnings of finding inner peace and justice for the soldiers killed in 
the conflict (Focus group with Turkish participants in London, 13 March 
2008 and 26 August 2007 in Berlin). On the other hand, some leftwing 
Turkish migrants felt strongly that the images of Öcalan’s capture were 
triumphalist and manipulative. 
6. Conclusion 
In this chapter I have argued that the capture in 1999 of Abdullah Öcalan, 
the PKK leader, the subsequent court case and his imprisonment in İmralı 
became key media events. The Turkish and Kurdish media’s 
representations of Öcalan were highly emotive and polarised. I have 
examined media texts (visual imaginary and written language) to see how 
representations of Öcalan were used to signify “our” imagined community 
against the “other”.  
 
The Turkish media for a long time vilified Öcalan which contributed to his 
conflation with the PKK, terrorism and the Kurdish question, all personified 
in the one enemy.  The Kurdish media held contradictory views on Öcalan. 
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The media with the widest audience, Yeni Özgür Politika and Roj TV, hold 
positive views of Öcalan and reify him as the leader of Kurds, often 
reproducing a personality cult around him by emphasising his leadership of 
the Kurdish people and using his photographs ubiquitously. The respective 
media have played their part in the hegemonic struggle between the 
Turkish state and the Kurdish national movement. This has stirred up “hot” 
nationalist emotions between the Turks and Kurds which almost led to civil 
war between the ethnic groups in Turkey/Kurdistan and in Europe where 
the Turkish and Kurdish migrant battle for the “homeland” in their countries 
of settlement. 
 
This chapter has highlighted the response of the Kurdish community to 
pictures of Öcalan which proves they have already constituted an imagined 
Kurdish community, and have no attachment to the Turkish state, but 
identify Kurdistan as “their” country. This is important as it indicates that 
the Kurds abroad are not part of the Turkish imagined community, giving 
clear evidence that Turkey has lost its control over the Kurdish population 
in Europe and how they think. They respond by acting as a nation. They 
share the same emotions in different countries of settlement. Why 
otherwise would they get upset when they see the negative and sometimes 
racist depiction of the Kurdish in the Turkish media, if not because they 
recognise themselves as an imagined community?  
 
The contrast between the portrayal of Öcalan in the Turkish and Kurdish 
media crystallises this struggle for hegemony, with both sides contesting 
the images of Öcalan as “national hero” or “terrorist” villain of the piece. 
This is hegemonic struggle manifested through the media. The power and 
reality of this contest is palpable in the feelings of the people whom I 
interviewed. Hegemony and it counter-hegemony are not just abstract 
ideas, but ideas which can have practical effects empirically. The concepts 
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which Gramsci developed give real insight into the nature of social and 
ethnic conflict. 
 
Both communities share particular spaces in Turkey and Europe but the 
conflict remains about the ability to construct an imagined community 
which manifests itself not only in the minds of members but also among 
Kurds who want their own territorial homeland. So the conflict operates at 
different levels. My focus has been how the conflict plays itself out 
psychologically and emotionally – aspects essential to building an 
imagined community. As Anderson rightly points out that nation is a 
community and imagined “because members…will never know most of 
their fellow members…yet in the minds of each lives the image of their 
communion" (Anderson   1991:6).  It comes out clearly in my interviews 
that the imagined Kurdish community is already there. The reason the 
Kurdish people whom I interviewed, reacted in that way was precisely 
because they feel members of an alternative imagined community which is 
not just about speaking the language, but also an emotional pull, 
fundamental to nationalism. Nationalism is about passion and “emotion” 
(Anderson 1991:51).  Similar responses and experiences were registered 
in all three European countries.  
 
In a similar vein, Turkish migrants tended to be united in their celebration 
of Öcalan’s capture. Even though there are a variety of views on the 
particular representation of Öcalan in the media, this media event 
confirmed Turkish migrants’ view of Öcalan as an enemy of the Turks 
which is the official Turkish nationalist view since he attacked the nation-
state. The Turkish migrants reacted with shock when they realised that 
many Kurdish migrants felt quite differently to them, feeling deeply for 
Öcalan, rather than celebrating his capture and seeing this as an occasion 
of unity of Turkish citizens. Yet, for some Turkish migrants the emotive, 
humiliating representation of Öcalan was seen as manipulative. They felt 
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bad that such a humiliation was done in their name as Turks and felt 










































Chapter VII: Three-way Mediated Banal Nationalism in Transnational 
Spaces 
1.   Introduction 
This chapter examines the way in which the imagined community is 
constructed in Turkish and Kurdish transnational spaces and in the 
homeland. It will look at the impact of Turkish and Kurdish ‘banal 
nationalism’ in the media on the struggle for hegemony between the two 
sides seeking to build their own imagined community.  
 
Many scholars have focused on the reproduction of the nation via the flag, 
maps, television, newspapers, the currency, the names of institutions like 
sports clubs and so on (Billig  1995:93). But little attention has been paid to 
the flagging of nationhood amongst migrants in the countries of settlement 
where the migrant ‘nation’ does not exist ‘out there’ and is not tangible or 
visible on every street corner. The notion of nation itself, as an imagined 
entity, is far from the everyday life of migrants. However they are 
connected to it by the Turkish and Kurdish media ‘flagging the homeland 
daily’ in their own vernacular.   
 
These media take the “nation” and “ethnicity” as a given, and not as a 
constructed entity. They see the people who have been living for a long 
time in the countries of settlement as citizens of their former homeland and 
take as given the loyalties and attachments of all citizens, including 
“outside Turks” or “Kurdan li diaspora” - the Kurdish diaspora. These media 
address their readers as members of the “nation”. However these readers 
do not share the same psychic space as their counterparts in the 
homeland so psychologically they do not form part of the “nation”. 
However, the media “present news in ways that take for granted the 
existence of the world of nations” (Billig  1995:11) like “we, the Kurds”, “we, 
the Turks”, “they, the Swedes” or “they, the Brits”. Therefore this chapter 
will also assess the impact of “banal nationalism” on migrants in 
 292 
transnational spaces, a topic which, to my knowledge, has not been 
researched. 
 
Diasporic communities can themselves be highly proactive in reproducing 
“banal nationalism”. In the countries of residence, migrants’ ethnic identity 
becomes more salient. Migrants are ascribed ethnic identities in 
multicultural societies which highlight and commercialise diversity. The way 
migrants are categorised as “different” in these countries encourages them 
to identify with “banal nationalism”. In addition, recent developments in 
communications technologies offer migrants new forms of contact with the 
cultural and political environment of the homeland where “hot” and “banal” 
nationalism pervade the media.  For example, the Kurdish and Turkish 
media reports on the war in the homeland counterposes “us” and “them”, 
as well as presenting “the national homeland as the home of the readers”, 
(Billig  1995:11) even though the readers of these media do not live there. 
But the newspapers constantly remind audiences where migrants belong, 
namely to Turkey or Kurdistan, even though the homeland is only 
mentioned as a holiday destination for migrants. 
 
In the light of this, we should understand that the nation and its 
reproduction are no longer confined to the nation-state or to a specific 
geographical and political space (Appadurai 1996). Moreover, how does 
this juxtaposition by “banal nationalism” affect the relationship of the 
migrant groups in conflict in the countries of settlement?  Billig’s concept 
has been used by many scholars to explain nationalism within established 
states but it has not been used for the televisual, stateless nation in the 
diaspora. “Banal nationalism” can also exist in stateless nations after a 
long struggle for the nation, which has made it familiar to the stateless 
group, as in the Kurdish case. 
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Billig argues that the state needs to reproduce the “nation” in order to 
create an “us”, and “them”.  This juxtaposition heats up when the “nation” 
goes through difficult times for example, when Turkishness or Serbian 
national identity, are imposed by force. These are extreme, irrational cases 
of imagined identity where they are too complex and fluid to fit in with a 
certain political project. However it is possible to shake them up for a 
certain time with harsh and repressive measures, to impose a national 
identity on a daily basis, in unobtrusive ways which familiarise people with 
it. 
 
2.  Interlocked “Hot” and “Banal” Nationalism 
Billig (1995) distinguishes between hot and banal nationalism, and the 
struggle for unity in Turkey and the Kurdish national movement for 
independence can be considered as a case of hot nationalism. However, 
Anderson challenges the notion that banal nationalism is confined to 
established nations: 
“Many ‘old nations’ once thought fully consolidated, 
find themselves challenged by ‘sub’-nationalisms 
within their borders - nationalism which, naturally, 
dreams of shedding this sub-ness one happy day. 
The reality is quite plain: the ‘end of the era of 
nationalism,’ so long prophesied, is not remotely in 
sight. Indeed, nation-ness is the most universally 
legitimate value in the political life of our time” 
(Anderson 1991: 6). 
 
In the case of the established nations like the UK or France, the sub-
nationalisms within their borders have increased and even created their 
own interlocked hot and banal nationalisms as is the case with Scottish 
and Corsican nationalism.  
 
Yumul and Ozkirimli (2000) examined the role of the print media in 
nationalist cultural and political discourses. The study surveyed 38 Turkish 
daily newspapers on a randomly selected day and their role in the 
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reproduction of superficial and unnoticed nationalist ideology in a non-
democratic, non-Western nation-state. Their findings show the constant 
reproduction of Turkish nationalism in Turkish newspapers through 
pointing out internal and external enemies and glorifying Turkishness. This 
indicates that banal nationalism can take place, not only in established, 
democratic nation-states but in the periphery too. While Yumul and 
Ozkirimli’s research made an important contribution to the study of banal 
nationalism, it did not look at the interlocking of hot and banal forms of 
nationalism, or of the reception of banal nationalism on audiences.  
Therefore, my study contributes to these debates, by examining the impact 
of banal nationalism on Kurdish and Turkish migrant audiences. In 
particular, my interviews with the Kurdish and Turkish migrants shed light 
on how they perceive nationhood through the lens of the Kurdish and 
Turkish media which create the deixis of “us” and “them”. 
 
This study argues that hot and banal nationalism are interlocked in the 
periphery too, by flagging nationhood in both a soft and coarse manner. 
For example, the Turkish state sometimes flags nationhood in oppressive 
and discriminatory ways and sometimes in an imperceptible, fabricated 
way. This “endemic condition” (Billig  1991:6) of flagging the nation in the 
media has become an ideological habit used to prove that the nation is 
unified and inclusive.  At other times, it is used to glorify Turkishness. 
Thus, it creates juxtaposition between these two conditions in which 
Turkish nationalism is reproduced as acceptable, normal and benign, as a 
nation that sacrifices itself for the sake of “others”. 
 
How banal nationalism is constructed by highlighting the virtues of Turkish 
nationhood in the media can be illustrated by the case of one of my 
interviewees, Ronya, an English language and literature graduate from 
Turkey, who was appointed to teach in Mardin, her father’s Kurdish 
hometown: 
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“After completing my degree I wanted to work and 
gain some experience before leaving the country for 
the UK where I was going to do my PhD. I applied to 
the Ministry of Education to teach English in a school 
and they sent me involuntarily to teach in Mardin 
where my father is from. One day, a Turkish journalist 
called Sonat Bahar from Sabah newspaper 
(24.11.2005) came to the school to interview me 
because she had heard of my engagement with  the 
pupils. ….I told her that my father had originated from 
this city and that I had grown up here until the age of 
7. We then moved to Aydin because my father was a 
bank employee and he was sent to Aydin after 
serving the state bank for a long time. I said to her 
that it was very interesting that after completing my 
degree I came back to the place where I had spent 
my childhood and that I was enjoying being here and 
helping the children. I added that this was my second 
year here and that I could speak Kurdish which helps 
me to communicate with the pupils and their parents 
but I would leave here in 6 months time to go to the 
UK to do my PhD there. She called me one night 
before publishing the news and stated that she felt so 
sorry because the newspaper editors in Istanbul had 
changed the interview slightly in order to make it 
appropriate and that this was not her fault and that 
she was sorry for this change but she could not tell 
me what the newspaper editors had changed in the 
interview. The next day when I read the news, I was 
shocked because what I had told her, she or her 
editors in Istanbul did not publish, instead they 
published what I did not tell them. They made up a 
new story and portrayed me as the educated 
daughter of a wealthy Turkish banker from Aydin (a 
Turkish city in the Aegean Sea) teaching in the 
village of Kiziltepe, a district of Mardin having given 
up her comfortable life in Aydin and sacrificed her life 
to teach the children in Mardin. They changed my 
story completely and made up a totally new Turkish 
story and published with a beautiful portrait picture of 
me. They created a Turkish heroine teaching 
uneducated Kurdish children in Kurdistan, who had 
initially planned to go to the UK but changed her 
mind and stayed there. I called the newspaper to 
correct this great lie but they stated that it was too 
late and asked me why I had problems accepting my 
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Turkishness” (Interview with Ronya, London, 21st 
February 2009). 
Incidents such as these that emphasise Turkish nationalistic stories about 
doctors, nurses, soldiers are routine in the Turkish media. Their aim is to 
give the readers the impression that the nation is reproduced through 
heroic individuals who serve the nation by bringing Turkishness to Kurdish 
children in the backward “East and South East Anatolia”.  They publicise 
Turkishness to Turks through a fabricated life-story of Kurdish person. In 
so doing, they also reinforce the dominant image that the Kurds are 
uneducated and incapable of helping themselves, and therefore, are in 
need of help from Turks. The Turks are constructed as their saviours. As 
the story of a Kurdish teacher did not fit this image, it had to be retold as a 
Turkish teacher sacrificing herself for her “uneducated” Kurdish pupils.  
Hall argues that “‘racism and the media’ touches the problem of ideology, 
since the media’s main sphere of operation is the production and 
transformation of ideologies” The reporter “‘speaks through’ the ideologies 
which are active” in the society and in the country (Hall 1996:271-72). 
Ideology is generated, produced and reproduced in specific settings which 
produce meaning for the existing social order. This ideology is transmitted 
through the media which continually reassures that “the imagined world is 
visibly rooted in everyday life.’’ (Anderson 1983:39-40). 
In this case, publicly positive norms, values, behaviour can only be 
imagined as associated to Turkishness.  As  Ronya  stated that  
“I was not a teacher anymore but I was a soldier in 
defence of my country against enemies and I 
received several letters from men who wanted to 
marry me. Several charities from Istanbul contacted 
me to send their cast-offs to school but the pupils 
were not interested in their clothes” (Interview with 
Ronya, London, 21st February 2009). 
 
With this news they constructed an official Turkish “orientalism”: an 
ordinary Kurdish teacher is portrayed as a rich banker’s daughter who 
serves like a soldier for her country. The media turned her into “a 
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missionary for the Turkish nation in Kurdistan” who glorifies Turkishness 
and “decries the position of the Kurds”, (Ronya) in the form of children who 
need saving. 
Incidents like these however, can also have consequences for the private 
life of the individual involved. Ronya explains how her father and friends 
called her to ask for clarification of this news and whether she had tried to 
hide her Kurdish identity and portray herself as a rich Turk in the service of 
the Turkish nation. Some friends of hers were so angry that they refused to 
talk to her for a long time. 
 
Yet, Ronya’s experience is routine in Turkey because media- and state-
imposed Turkishness have created an orientalist narrative about the 
Kurdish people and Kurdistan through this “banal” forms of nationalism. As 
Yumul and Ozkirimli (2000) point out hot nationalism increases during 
times of political crisis in Turkey, particularly in relation to the Kurdish 
question, the Armenian genocide, the Cyprus question or Turkish-Greek 
dispute over the Aegean Sea.  When the crisis eases hot nationalism turns 
into banal nationalism. The media has a significant role in flagging the 
nation in periods of hot nationalism in Turkey e.g. during the Cardak crisis 
between Turkey and Greece, the “victory of Turkey” during the abduction 
of Öcalan from Kenya, and then in cooler times in banal, routinized ways 
such as fabricating news as in Ronya’s case. 
 
3. Flagging the Homeland Daily 
For Anderson   newspapers play a central role in thinking the nation, 
constructing and disseminating nationhood amongst large-scale 
communities. The press  “brought together, on the same page, this 
marriage with that ship, this price with that bishop” contributing to the 
creation of “an imagined community among a specific assemblage of 
fellow-readers, to whom these ships, brides, bishops and prices 
belonged”(Anderson 1991, 62). His theoretical concept has created a 
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debate on the relationship between news and nationhood and been subject 
to varied theoretical and empirical treatment (Billig  1995, Bishop and 
Jaworski, 2003, Brookes, 1999, Law, 2001, Rosie et al., 2004, Schlesinger, 
1991, Yumul and Özkirimli 2000). While some of the scholars have agreed 
that the media shape nationhood and flag it in everyday life (Billig 1995, 
Yumul and Özkirimli), others have questioned the viability of banal 
nationalism in a society which is heterogeneous and consumes media in 
complex and diverse ways (Conboy 2006, Gripsrud 2002, Harries and 
Wahl-Jorgensen 2007, Higgins 2004, Law 2001, Rosie et al. 2006, Tunstall 
1996). Critical voices accept that the media’s discursive practices 
reproduce the dominant ideology through the distancing rhetoric and 
deictic juxtaposition of “them” and “us”, “here” and “there” which contribute 
to the sense of belonging to an imagined community.  The nation and 
nationhood as ideological and social constructions become normalised and 
unproblematic to readers.  
Hall used the term ideology to refer to “those images, concepts and 
premises which provide the frameworks through which we represent, 
interpret, understand and ‘make sense’ of some aspect of social existence”  
(Hall 1996:271). “Shared meaning” (Hall 1997:1) is not only created 
through written texts but also through images which are also “texts”. They 
form a language used by the media to transmit a constructed frame of a 
society. Hall states that: 
“reality exists outside language, but it is constantly 
mediated by and through language; and what we can 
know or say has to be produced in and through 
discourse. Discursive ‘knowledge is the product not 
of the transparent representation of the ‘real’ in 
language but of the articulation of language on real 
relations and conditions” (Hall 1980:131). 
 
In this sense, the language and symbols used in Turkish and Kurdish 
media have the ideological function to disseminate nationhood. For 
example, the Turkish media and their European editions are decorated 
 299 
with Turkish flags (see image 7.1 and image 7.2), images of the founder of 
the Turkish state, Ataturk (see image 7.3) and different nationalistic 
symbols that recall the nation. Some  newspapers use racist headings 
such as “Turkey belongs to Turks” (The slogan of the Hürriyet   newspaper, 
image 7.1) and “Happy is he who considers himself a Turk” (The slogan of 
Ortadogu, image 7.4) The newspapers, Magazins (image 7.5) and TV 
channel names consist of references to nation-state identity like Turkiye 
(Turkey), Cumhuriyet (The Republic), Milli (The National), Milliyet 
(Nationality), the Turkish Daily News (in English), Yeni Asya (New Asia)  
newspaper, TRT Turk (the Turkish state  International TV) channel. 
 
 
         
 
                       
 













Image 7.5 There is no minority! 
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One Language, One Flag (available online) 
As Anderson argues, nationalist symbols and language, “the single most 
important emblem” of a newspaper, “provides the essential connection, the 
steady onward clocking of homogenous, empty time” (Anderson 1983:37).  
In this way, the media creates a common sense of belonging to a particular 
bounded territory of unified time and space, that can be conceived as “a 
deep, horizontal comradeship”, (Anderson 1991:7) despite the unequal 
power relationships amongst members of the imagined community.  
However this view has been widely challenged for defining the nation and 
its history, official language, norms and values in a “dynamic, multi-ethnic 
setting,” (Elmhirst 1999:814) to the exclusion of subordinated peoples who 
have a different language and ethno—national identity. The ethno-centric 
nation-building project and its cultural, linguistic and political policies 
creates deep rifts within “horizontal comradeship”. People from the 
dominant ethnic group are empowered through the cultural and linguistic 
policies while the minority groups are disempowered. This causes strong 
and weak citizenship and cultural and linguistic discrimination. The 
excluded groups can develop “alternative visions of the nation” (Itzigsohn 
and  vom Hau 2006:196), a similar ideology to the dominant one and an 
alternative imagined community which can create a struggle between the 
consolidated  imagined community and that of subordinated groups 
(Chernilo 2006, Yiftachel 1999).  The antagonistic groups will attempt to 
legitimize their own nationalistic positions, language and symbols through 
various means including the media (see chapter I). 
 
Images, logos and slogans form part of everyday life and they become 
familiar, natural and normal to people who follow the media (Billig  1995). 
However these images are not neutral but have coded meanings 




“There is not intelligible discourse without the 
operation of a code. Certain codes may, of course, 
be so widely distributed in a specific language 
community or culture,...they appear not to be 
constructed as the effect of an articulation between 
sign and referent – but to be ‘naturally’ 
given...however [this] does not mean that no codes 
have intervened; rather, that the codes have been 
profoundly naturalized” (Hall 1980-131-132).  
 
A main concern of this mediated nationalism has been the juxtaposition of 
ethnic “others” to Turkish nationalism that is portrayed as tolerant and 
benign patriotism. On the other hand, minority groups’ nationalist 
movements – chief among which the Kurdish - are portrayed as destructive 
separatism (cf Chernilo 2006, Yiftachel 1999, Elmhirst 1999, Itzigsohn and 
vom Hau 2006). Furthermore, Turkish banal nationalism in the publication 
of the European editions of the Turkish press is reproduced in countless 
subtle and habitual ways. The naming of readers as “we, Turks” is an 
example of creating a national identification for the readers (Yumul and 
Özkirimli 2000). 
 
As has been argued previously, (See Chapter III) the Turkish flag can be 
seen on every page of the Turkish newspapers and TV channels. In the 
mainstream newspapers “the cult of the flag” (Billlig 1995:39) acts as a 
“condensation symbol”. Moreover, the emotion surrounding the flag is 
underlined by being discursively linked to sacrifice in the conflict: “The flag 
that has been watered [sic!] with the blood of our martyrs” (Yilmaz 2005). 
The exceptions to this are some left-wing newspapers and magazines (e.g. 
Evrensel). However, these have a very small circulation. The media use it 
often on certain days when the temperature of the conflict rises – e.g. 
between the Turkish military and the PKK or on days of national 
commemoration, such as the celebration of the establishment of the 
Turkish Republic, National Independence Day, the 19th of May celebration. 
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Banal and hot nationalism is used in the Turkish media in order to reach a 
broader audience. Evindar, a Kurdish MP in Berlin, criticized the media for 
using alarmist headlines to reach a broader audience. This view is shared 
by many Turkish and Kurdish readers and viewers who feel that the 
headlines do not reflect to the news. 
 
As Evindar, a Kurd in Berlin expressed it:  
“I find it really ridiculous to see a lot of Turkish 
nationalist symbols in the media. It disturbs me to 
see the fetish of excessive space devoted [to these 
nationalist symbols]. It has the effect that some 
Turkish people see red, and behave like a bull 
charging] towards a matador. In the media the 
Turkish military is fetishised in many ways to show off 
the Turkish soldiers’ brutality against the Kurds” 
(Interview with Evindar, Berlin, 7th August 2007). 
 
Certainly the Turkish media, particularly the tycoon, Dogan’s media, create 
a sense of “the Turk has no friends but the Turk”. This saying is often 
repeated in Turkey but it grows stronger and more visible in Turkish 
migrants’ lives in the countries of settlement where they are not in a 
majority and also face discriminatory policies like other migrants. The 
media have built their news on this saying which creates a feeling among 
Turkish migrants of being an unwanted group in Europe. The news put out 
by these media constantly highlights internal and external enemies of the 
Turks and Turkey. My research has found that reporting the news in a 
nationalist way has a certain impact on Turkish migrants, in particular on 
the first generation of Turks in Europe.  
 
The Kurdish media follows a similar line to the Turkish media but is not as 
aggressive and hostile. For example, the Kurdish media has not developed 
a nationalism directed against ethnic Turks, but against the Turkish 
nationalist state and its anti-Kurdish policies. However, the Turkish media 
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has openly defined Turkishness against the Kurds by stereotyping them or 
reducing their identity to “separatist” one. 
 
The Kurdish media highlights the social, cultural, economic and political 
discrimination against the Kurds who currently live in Iran, Turkey, Syria 
and Iraq but also in the diaspora. In doing so, they have played with the 
idea of creating a collective ethnic identity amongst Kurds, which aims to 
establish their own “deep, horizontal comradeship” (Anderson 1991:7) 
against the domination of nations occupying Kurdistan and their imposed 
languages. 
 
To create a political, social, cultural and ethnic identity, they use ethno-
national symbols in their text and images. This reached its apogee in 
audiovisual, print and digital media (Hassanpour 1997). All the Kurdish 
media constantly deploy three colours (green, red, and yellow) in their 
designs, headlines and published images (Sheyholislami 2010). These 
three colours signify the colours of the Kurdish flag. They are also 
perceived by Kurds as the Kurdish national colours and by Turkish 
institutions as the “colour of terror”.  The image below (image 7.5) 




Image 7.5: The Headline in Turkish: 17. Kurdish cultural festivals (Yeni 




Öcalan’s banner and the PKK flags become more salient images than the 
Kurdish flag, a reality which was criticized by many participants especially 
in Stockholm: 
 “They [PKK supporters] are not interested in 
Kurdistan, Kurdish language and the Kurds. We see 
more PKK symbols or Öcalan images in some of the 
Kurdish media and on their demonstrations. I do not 
agree with these people and do not go to such 
demonstrations. There should be only the Kurdish 
flag which is accepted by all Kurds” (Interview with 
Dêmgul, Stockholm, 15th June 2007). 
 
However, this assumes that Kurdish banal nationalism is accepted by all 
Kurds which shows how unnoticed and routine it has become. Many left-
wing Kurds or “unpoliticised” Kurds avoid being part of this “flag-waving 
nationalism” (Billig  1995:44). 
Dara, an immigration adviser in Berlin commented critically:  
“Many Turks and Kurds feed their stomachs and 
souls with flags, slogans, and other people by talking 
about the concept of Europeanization which is 
beyond nation” (Interview with Dara, Berlin 14th 
August 2007). 
 
This indicates that some Kurds remain unhappy about the flag-waving 
within the Kurdish movement.  
 
Another important and significant example of banal nationalism is the 
Newroz (see Image 6), the Kurdish New Year celebration. During the 
celebration, red, green and yellow and fire are the most visible signifiers of 
Kurdish nationalism. The Roj TV broadcasts live from Amed (Roj TV, 
21.03.2008) (the diaspora Kurds refer to Diyarbakir by its historical Kurdish 




Many Kurdish organisations organise Newroz to celebrate and highlight 
Kurdish issues across Europe and their posters are part of the banal 




The newspaper and TV stations reported about the “splendid Newroz 
celebrations” (Yeni Ozgur Politika, 18 March 2008)30 in Germany, Holland, 
the UK and France 
 
Even the name of the television like MED TV, Medya TV or Newroz (Image 
7), Kurdsat, Kurdistan TV are a part of banal nationalist discourse. 
 
 





The websites which are ideologically closer to the PKK and other Kurdish 
parties that offer a critical distance and discourse about the media - have 
similar banal nationalist tendencies in their design and news. The Kurdish 
flag is one of the commonly used banal nationalistic symbols in Kurdish 
internet-based newspapers like Kurdistan-post.com (replaced with 
Kurdistan-post.ru) which defines its position as “the voice of free 
Kurdistan”. Flags as a non-verbal form of communication have a symbolic 
power for nations and its citizens (Ablamowicz 1998) because they are 
universal signs: “The flag language is a universal, the most understood 
abbreviated code, a language above the global linguistic Babylon. Unlike 
any other, it is an instantly mastered language, requiring no long training” 
(Makolkin 2001:3).  The flag also demonstrates a national, ethnic identity of 
the socially bonded group who go on the streets to highlight in public their 
concerns and demands. For example in 2007, the followers of the founder 
of the Turkish state, Ataturk, used the Turkish flag at their demonstration to 
show their opposition to the ruling AKP which is rooted in Islamic values. In 
using the Turkish flag, the group demonstrated that they own the Turkish 
republic. Later on, the Islamic group used the flag for the same claim. The 
flag became a symbolic, collective statement for both groups.  For the 
Kurds, the Kurdish flag is also a collective statement of desire for an 
independent state and to stake a claim to “our” nationhood. Therefore the 
Kurdish flag on the Kurdish website appeals “to the most basic emotions of 
the group, such as the sense of solidarity and community” (Makolkin 
2001:8, see Macke 2001) but also opposes Turkish state policies. “To 
wave a flag means to make a strong political statement, to state one's 
belonging, preference, to signal Otherness” (Makolkin 2001:8). 
 
The case of Kurds from Turkey is an excellent case for understanding 
banal nationalism in the diaspora. The majority of Kurds in Turkey do not 
call out loud for a separate Kurdistan as they intend to attain “their” 
cultural, political and economic rights within the current Turkish borders. 
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On the other hand, the Kurdish diaspora and their media have already 
created “Welate me” of the mind  - “our country”-  in Kurdish.  The term 
“Welat” has been used by the Kurdish media, there is even a paper with 
the name “Welate me”. Many of my Kurdish participants use this term to 
invoke the homeland by saying they “received a call from Welat” or “will 
visit welat”  
 
For example, a 36 year-old Kurdish web designer, Zana from Sweden said: 
“I am going to Welat-country this summer and will 
start my journey from Amed32 and then move to 
Kurdistana Bashur and visit my friends (Kurdish: 
hevalan)”  (Interview with Zana, Stockholm, 24th 
June 2007).  
 
This statement shows that the welat has become an “unnoticed” or 
“mundane” part of Kurdish banal nationalism in the diaspora. He stated 
that he will start his journey from Amed.  Indeed the name of the city 
Diyarbakir has been used as Amed by Kurds since the late Ottoman 
Empire, but Amed disappeared for decades and reappeared in the mid 
1980s. This Kurdish site signifies an alternative discourse using different 
historical markers, or in recent decades, new terminology to deconstruct 
the official Turkishness in the Kurdish region. Certain names have caused 
a fierce debate in the Turkish and Kurdish media and amongst nationalists. 
The Kurdish media uses Amed in all its reports including the weather 
forecast (see Roj TV news or Yeni Özgür Politika search machine which 
provides 8,089 news items about Amed (Kurdistan-post.com, and 
Nasname.com).  
 
The mainstream Turkish media tries to put the official Turkish banal 
nationalism on the agenda by asking “Where is Amed?….. So our 
Diyarbakir!33 Kurdistan's capital in their [Kurds] heads!” (Çölaşan 1999). 
The Turkish authorities insist on using the name Diyarbakir which does not 
have any historical or geographical roots and was created one day on the 
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orders of Ataturk (Dundar 2007). The debate in the Kurdish and Turkish 
media about political and geographical terminologies has caused certain 
posturing and “political correctness” amongst migrants too. Barzan uses 
the term Kurdistana Bashur and heval - also signs of Kurdish banal 
nationalism because the term Kurdistane Bashur (South Kurdistan), 
Kurdistana Bakur (Northern Kurdistan), Kurdistana Rojhilat (East 
Kurdistan) and Kurdistana Rojava (West Kurdistan) are used almost daily 
on the news of the transnationalized and digitalized Kurdish media 
(Hasanpoor 1997, Romano 2002, Rigoni 2002). Heval is another term 
which resolves the political position of individuals as to whether they are 
involved in Kurdish national movements or not.  It is clear that many terms 
entering into Kurdish political and social life imperceptibly indicate political 
positions and contribute to a banal nationalism of the diaspora. 
4. Three-way Banal Nationalism 
The debates in the countries of settlement on Britishness, Germanness 
and Swedishness centre around social and national cohesion, evidence of 
the symbolic role of nationalism in politicians’ speeches and in the media 
(Solomos 2003, Anderson 1991, Billig  1995, Back 1993, Ålund 1999, 
Becker 2001, Spencer 2001, Heitmeyer 1997). During the economic crisis 
it has become accepted rhetoric as witnessed by Prime Minister Gordon 
Brown’s demand for “British jobs for British workers”. At such times, 
migrants become easy targets for the media in the countries of settlement. 
Sometimes not only right-wing groups, but other native inhabitants are 
actively racist as was the case when Romanian migrants were attacked by 
their neighbours in Belfast after negative media coverage on Romanian 
membership of the EU and the inflow of Romanian migrants into Northern 
Ireland.  
 
Furthermore, everyday ethnicity (Brubaker 2004), as expressed in routine 
ethnicizing practices in the countries of settlement give rise in migrants to a 
new consciousness of political and cultural diversity based on ethnic 
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difference. This issue has received little attention amongst scholars. Van 
Bruinessen explains the development of Kurdish nationalism in Europe 
with reference to the migrant groups themselves: “Due to a combination of 
political factors and technological developments, these diasporas [Kurdish 
diaspora] have increasingly become    (re-)oriented towards the part of 
Kurdistan and the state of origin” (2000a:1). 
 
However, this ignores the everyday ethnicizing policies and practices of the 
countries of settlement that differentiate between “us” and “them” (van 
Bruinessen 2000) Ethnicity and religion have been turned into key visible 
markers differentiating migrants’ identity in multicultural societies (Solomos 
2003, Hall 2000, Bauman 2000). Baumann notes the tendency of 
multiculturalism to ignore agency and reduce “all social complexities, both 
within communities and across whole plural societies, to an astonishingly 
simple equation: ‘Culture = community = ethnic identity =nature = culture’ ” 
(Baumann 1996:17).   
 
Ethnic and cultural differences are mobilized by different agencies for 
multicultural, as well as nationalist, purposes. For example, some of the 
countries of settlement, especially Germany, blame the Turkish, but also 
the Kurdish, media for creating a “parallel society” and “media ghettos” 
within mainstream society (Heitmeyer 1998). They claim that “the 
integration of the Turkish residential population in German society...[is 
hindered]… under the influence of the Turkish media” (Lambsdorff 
(Lambsdorff 1998:1). Lambsdorff notes the “constantly negative reporting 
about Germany” that creates feelings of uncertainty and “sometimes even 
generates fear” of “individual,… radical rightwing skinhead attacks”  on 
Turkish migrants. In so doing, the Turkish media aims “to keep Turkish 
families living in Germany confined in the old cultural circles and ways of 
thinking” (Lambsdorff 1998:1). He blames the Turkish media for printing 
unexceptional incitements such as “Germans burn the Turks!”. The 
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German government has talked to the Turkish media to curtail this 
inflammatory reporting (Lambsdorff 1998).  
 
According to Schicha, “through the media-centred concentration on the 
prevailing problems, lines of conflict, issues and perceptions in the country 
of origin, a lasting estrangement of citizens of the majority society can 
occur” (Schicha 2003:16). Therefore, many German academics call for 
“media integration” of migrants in Germany.  Moreover, Heitmeyer (1996, 
1998) goes further, echoing the view of SPD politician, Hans-Ulrich Klose 
(see Introduction), that the migrants who live in Germany have lost contact 
with German culture and live in media ghettos where they are prey to 
fundamentalism and nationalism which endanger Germany 
society(Heitmeyer 1996, 1998). Migrants who use the media in other 
languages are viewed as “dissociated from the social life” of everyday 
German society (Marenbach, 1995, quoted in Aksoy, 2001:344).  
 
As Billig maintains: 
“ sociological forgetting is not fortuitous…. Instead, it 
fits an ideological pattern in which ‘our’ nationalism 
(that of established nations…) is forgotten: it ceases 
to appear as nationalism, disappearing into the 
‘natural ‘environment of ‘societies’. But the other 
nationalism is seen as dangerously emotional and 
irrational: it is conceived as a problem” (Billig  
1995:38).  
But Becker sees the ethnicization as part of multicultural society in 
Germany: “Ethnicization of the media allows the members of one’s own 
group to see themselves, one’s own problems, one’s own fate and cultural 
identity” (Becker and Behnisch 2001 quoted in Kosnick 2007:77). Becker’s 
multicultural approach insists that in a multicultural society and 
constitutional state, people have the right to consume media in their 
vernacular, maintaining their culture as a minority group and remaining in 
contact with their homeland.  
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Both the media of the countries of settlement and countries of origin 
reproduce  “homeland deixis” and the deictic practice of constituting “them” 
and “us”. The dichotomy between the Turkish and Kurdish media becomes 
more complex because these and other symbolic banal nationalist devices 
work in multiple ways through: i) reproducing Turkish state-nationhood for 
migrants from Turkey including Kurds; ii) juxtaposing the “other” in the 
conflict e.g. Kurdishness vs. Turkishness and vice versa; iii) juxtaposing 
the nationalism of the country of settlement i.e. Germanness/Swedishness/ 
Britishness e.g. the debate on parallel society. I call this “three-way banal 
nationalism”.  
 
This triangular relationship can be seen in terms of the conflict and media 
intervention and influence over migrants. When the Turkish Prime Minister, 
Recep Tayip Erdogan visited Germany on February 10, 2008, he called on 
his “compatriots”  to reject assimilation and maintain their language and 
culture. He warned the German authorities not to confuse assimilation with 
integration, telling the migrants “I understand very well that you are against 
assimilation. One cannot expect you to assimilate”. While thousands of 
Kurds were protesting against Erdogan in front of the Köln Arena (in 
Cologne) at his “human rights violations in Kurdistan”, Erdogan told his 
“compatriots” that “assimilation is a crime against humanity” He called on 
Turkish migrants to become active in politics and lobby for their country. 
The Kurdish and German media called on Erdogan to look in the mirror 
before criticizing Germany. The Kurdish and German media stated that an 
actual “crime against humanity” was taking place in Turkey (Kalnoky 2008, 
Tek 2008, Der Spiegel 2008). More importantly, the German Chancellor, 
Angela Merkel and the German authorities reacted to Erdogan’s utterance, 
criticizing it as interference in “German affairs”. The then SPD leader, Kurt 
Beck spoke out about “trends towards ghettoization [amongst Turkish 
migrants] with the support of the Turkish government” (Der Stern 2008). 
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This case demonstrates the relation between the three different nationalist 
positions.  
 
The most significant three-way banal nationalism occurs in the countries of 
settlement when the conflict between the Turkish state and the PKK heats 
up in the homeland. During this intensified period of conflict, the Turkish 
media portray the Turkish soldiers as “our heroes”, supported by images of 
the soldiers. The soldiers who lost their lives in this conflict become “our 
martyrs”. The mainstream media uses “our martyrs” as an ideological 
support for state policies of discrimination against the Kurds and to 
maintain the status quo in Turkey.  Therefore the media propagate “dying 
for the nation” as a virtue in the conflict, to perpetuate the war.   
 
Turkish print and visual media have perfected their visual practices such as 
“click the photo gallery” and videos of “our martyr’s funeral ceremony” 
where the endless trauma and sadness of the soldiers’ families and even 
“the tears of the general” are repeatedly consumed. This tool of clicking on 
to photos can help the newspaper owners to show how long and how 
many people visit their online edition so they acquire more advertising. 
Moreover, the readers are invited to write racist comments on “our martyrs” 
so click on, thereby raising money from advertisers. Many soldiers 
complain that the media profits from their stories and the war (Mater 
2000:162). 
 
The tragic deaths of Turkish soldiers in the conflict have been used to hide 
the actual Kurdish problem and legitimize the war in the eyes of the 
Turkish public in Turkey and in Europe. The media has contributed with its 
well-constructed dramatized news. While the wailing mothers, partners, 
relatives are used as background sounds, the audience learns of the 
stories:- of the soldier who wanted to be chief of the Turkish general staff; 
of the father and his orphaned two year-old; of “the martyred soldier” who 
 313 
called his family “yesterday to tell them that he has a feeling that he will 
become a martyr which made him happy because he fights for his country, 
performing his patriotic duty”  (Hürriyet, 26 August 2009).  
 
The Turkish media takes part in this conflict as a spokesperson of the 
military (Bulut 1992, Sezgin and Wall 2005) portraying the Turkish soldier 
as “our martyr” and the Kurdish guerrilla as “Armenian seed”, or as 
“terrorists captured dead” (Zaman Newspaper 2009a) or “carcasses” 
(Turkish General Pamukoglu (Bayramoğlu 2011). The Turkish media 
reports the death of Kurdish guerrillas from the same military perspective 
which contributes to legitimising the discourse of savagery in the society. 
This militarized and nationalistic discourse has come into widespread use 
in the society in language and practice by lynching Kurdish individuals in 
the street. Many racists were empowered by the Turkish authorities and 
media and their actions in attacking Kurds in 2006, 2007 and 2008. 
Balakrishnan attributes the reason for the mobilization of the nationalist 
masses by the state and media to the political crisis, interstate conflicts 
and  weak citizenship (Balakrishnan 1996). 
 
This tension spread to Europe, for example in November 2007 it rose 
between Turkish and Kurdish migrants when fighting between the Turkish 
military and the PKK reached a peak again and many young people from 
both sides were killed. The Turkish authorities, media and generals publicly 
discussed the invasion of “South Kurdistan” to prevent the PKK from 
entering Turkey. Kurds in Europe and in Kurdistan protested against the 
imminent “invasion of Kurdistan” including in Berlin, London and 
Stockholm. The German newspaper, Taz’s headline gave the reason for 
the Kurdish demonstration as: “War drives the Kurds to the Streets” 
(Wierth 2007). Turks, on the other hand, protested “against separatist 
terror”  A member organization of the Turkish community centre (an 
umbrella organisation of Turkish communities in Berlin and one of my 
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interview partners) called on the Turkish migrants to protest against the 
terror.  Many Kurds were attacked by Turkish nationalists - mostly young 
people in their cafés, restaurants or community centres. The German  
newspaper Die Welt described it thus: “Turks hunted Kurds” (Peters 
2007a). The Kurdish, and some Turkish, communities blamed the Turkish 
media for stirring up problems between both groups (Menne and Taxacher 
2007). The Kurdish media contributed to this conflict, too. However the 
Turkish media fought back and blamed the Kurdish and German media “for 
supporting the separatists”.  
 
The Turkish media interviewed Turkish politicians and ambassadors as 
part of this three-way banal nationalist competition. For example, Hürriyet 
interviewed the Turkish ambassador, Mr. Irtemcelik in Berlin about the 
Turkish and Kurdish ethno-national reactions to the Turkish “martyrs” and 
the Turkish invasion of “South Kurdistan” in December 2007. He defended 
the invasion against “the foreign-backed terrorist attacks” on Turkish 
national unity and praised the Turkish migrants in Europe who 
demonstrated their support for the homeland as “motivated by our 
emotional feelings of national solidarity - the highest expression of our 
national character” (Hürriyet Newspaper 2007). 
 
The Turkish journalist posed a further question to the ambassador directed 
to Turkish audiences in Germany: 
Question: Although the PKK is classified as a terror 
organization by the German authorities, the German 
media use a different language.  What is the attitude 
of the German media and German authorities?” 
Answer: ”German media organs ignore the fact that 
the PKK is classified as a 'terrorist organization’ in 
this country and the meaning and content of this 
state decision. Insisting on presenting this, the 
bloodiest terrorist organization in the history of 
mankind with evocations of innocence such as 
'insurgents', 'guerrillas', and ‘freedom fighters' hurts 
us as well as our people here, in every way. It is a 
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futile effort to hope to beautify Hitler by using 
romantic adjectives. Similarly it is clear what the PKK 
is. Therefore the effort of trying to portray this bloody 
gang positively will help us to make a healthy 
assessment of their [i.e. the German media’s] real 
face, intentions, and what they are like. As I said, this 
hurts us; on the other hand, we can exploit this 
situation” (Turkish ambassador Mr. Irtemcelik, 
Hürriyet, 31.10.07). 
 
This declaration is also based on juxtapositions such as the comparison 
between “our noble national character” and the “separatist terrorist”, which 
is taken by many audiences to mean Kurds. The second juxtaposition is 
between Turkishness and Germanness. The Turkish media and Turkish 
authorities expect the European media to act like the Turkish media and 
report with a clear anti-PKK and anti-Kurdish bias. German journalists who 
criticize “our nation” are labelled as Nazi. The three-way banal nationalism 
serves to glorify “our nation” (X say), juxtaposing Y and Z nations, while Y 
glorifies its nation by different means and creates a juxtaposition between 
X and Z. 
 
The outcome of these utterances can cause an emotional reaction as 
reported by members of the Kurdish and Turkish audiences whom I 
interviewed, who recounted that when they watch or read any news about 
soldiers killed in battle or about the guerrilla it upsets them. A Turkish 
migrant in Berlin, Osman explains what this means: 
“I know what I am going to say is bizarre but when I 
watch the funeral ceremony of the martyrs and 
wailing mothers, crying wives of martyred soldiers, it 
is as if I lost my brother. I feel terrible and frustrated 
and I would like to go onto the street and kill 4 or 5 
Kurds. This media estranges us from our humanity” 
(Interview with Osman, Berlin, 26th December 2007. 
5. Hot and Banal Nationalism in Transnational Spaces 
Different Turkish and Kurdish agencies propagate deterritorialised “hot” 
nationalism in the countries of settlement to mobilize political and 
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ideological, as well as financial, support among both migrant groups 
(Demmers 2002, Eriksen 2007, Rigoni 2002, Hafez 2002). The conflict is 
already a deterritorialized issue for thousands of people who form part of 
the transnational ethno-national movements in Berlin, London, and 
Stockholm and elsewhere. The conflicts in Berlin and London between 
both groups show that hot and banal nationalism are interlocked. “Hot” 
nationalism increases amongst both migrant groups during heavy clashes 
in the homeland. But if the intensity of the clash decreases in the 
homeland, the activity of both groups decreases too. However as Billig 
states: “thoughts, reactions and symbols become turned into routine habits 
and, thus, they become inhabited” (Billig  1995:42). This inhabiting in the 
form of hot nationalism declines within a certain time but will not disappear 
but continue in a banal form. However if the conflict starts again, banal 
nationalism will turn into a form of hot nationalism. 
 
Banal nationalism in the diaspora is not restricted to a territory (Demmers 
2002, Ostergaard-Nielsen 2002, Cohen 1997, Vertovec 2005, (King and 
Melvin 1999), Smith 2007). Territory is replaced by identity in multicultural 
societies. Identity creates spaces for diasporic banal nationalism to flourish 
discursively and in practical ways (Appadurai 1996). In this process, 
nationalism plays a significant role as an “endemic political ideology” (Billig  
1995) in all societies in conflict.  
 
The Turkish-Kurdish conflictual relationship with ethnic-based media offers 
fruitful ground for conceptualising this argument. Firstly the Turkish and 
Kurdish communities are highly involved in homeland politics in the 
countries of settlement and play a significant role in lobbying for the nation 
in different geographical and political spaces (Wahlbeck 1998, Demmers 
2002, Ostergaard-Nielsen 2002, Cohen 1997, Vertovec 2005, King and 
Melvin 1999, Smith 2007). Their activities are reflected in the European 
sections of the Turkish and Kurdish media, in particular during the local 
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and general elections and in promoting their businesses, social status and 
political positions (Rigoni 2002). 
 
Secondly, it is important to highlight the emergence of political, ethnic and 
social identities amongst Kurdish transnational communities in Europe 
(Holgate et al 2009a, Eriksen 2007, Hassanpor 1997). The freedom of life 
in the diaspora has created cultural, political and linguistic spaces where 
the Kurdish ethno-national and social movements have taken shape 
(Curtis 2005). The Kurdish media is a cyber-bridge between the homeland 
and transnational local spaces where Kurdish banal nationalism is 
reproduced (Sheyholislami 2010, Eriksen 2007).   
 
Thirdly, the Turkish and Kurdish media are heavily influenced by the 
ongoing Turkish-Kurdish ethno-national conflict (Rigoni 2002). These 
media have lost their journalistic function of informing their audiences in 
the diaspora about issues in their homeland and in their countries of 
settlement. These media have become the mouthpieces of the Turkish and 
Kurdish political nationalist groups in the conflict. While hot nationalism 
becomes visible in the partisan publishing and broadcasting habits of these 
media, the project of banal nationalism works unobtrusively through 
mediated “hot” nationalism (Billig  1995). 
 
The Turkishness and Kurdishness on the front pages of these newspapers 
(in the editorial and chronicles) mostly relates to the reproduction of 
nationhood. This discourse influences and is influenced by migrants’ daily 
talk. The texts and images of these media focus on commemorating the 
nation in the homeland and in the countries of settlement. Culture, 
language, social values and religion become signs of national differences 
between “us” and “them”, particularly in extraordinary times, such as 
Turkey’s cross-border operations against Kurdish rebels.  
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Other significant instances of banal nationalism appear in these media 
during general elections in the countries of settlement. These media call for 
support for “Turkish candidates” (Radikal, 16.09.2006, Zaman 09.03.08., 
Hürriyet 20.10. 08)34 or “Kurdish candidates” (Yeni Ozgur Politika, 15.05. 
07, 22. 09. 09)35.  These media support “Turkish” or “Kurdish” candidates 
who are supposed to be pro-Turkey or pro-Kurdish and pro-the homeland, 
while the Kurdish media try to be universalist in supporting a left-wing 
Turkish candidate. The candidate’s ethnic background is presented as 
“being from Turkey” (Yeni Ozgur Politika, 15.05.07)36. During the elections, 
the pro candidates are interviewed several times and their election 
campaign and what they will do for Turkey or Kurdistan is extensively 
reported. The terms “Turkey” or “Kurdistan”, “Turks” or “Kurds” become key 
in highlighting why people with the same “ethnic”, religious, cultural or 
linguistic background should vote for this or that candidate.  However if the 
media is not happy with the policy of “our” candidates or party, then they 
use bold headlines in large letters. For example during my fieldwork in 
Berlin, a Hürriyet headline ran “SPD [i.e. the German Social Democratic 
Party] sold out the Turks”. Presenting such a provocative headline helps 
the Turkish media to increase its circulation and also reminds audiences 
that they are Turkish, and that the German SPD betrayed them because of 
this. This kind of news reflects the deictic practice of juxtaposing “us” and 
“them”. Billig notes that “the crucial words of banal nationalism are often 
the smallest: ‘we’, ‘this’ and ‘here’, which are the words of linguistic ‘deixis’ 
...Beyond conscious awareness, like the hum of distant traffic, this deixis of 
little words makes the world of nations familiar, even homely,” (Billig  
1995:94). 
 
The nationalist deictic discourse in the media brings migrant groups into 
opposition because the understanding of the Turkish media of “we - the 
Turks” mirrors that of Turkish state ideology: that everyone from Turkey is 
Turkish regardless of their ethnic or religious affiliation. This means that the 
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Turkish media continues to present the Turkish and Kurdish migrant 
groups as a unified, inclusive, imagined Turkish community in the countries 
of settlement. Reclaiming other ethnic identities has been seen by 
mainstream Turkish media as an issue of separatism because 
multiculturalism, pluralism and cultural diversities are still seen in Turkey as 
“disintegrative, sapping the strength of the nation”  (Cizre 2001:231).  
 
6.  Delegitimizing Diversity 
 
The Turkish media’s hegemonic strategy consists of delegitimizing, ethnic 
and cultural diversity in the eyes of Turkish migrants. Migrants should have 
one voice for the fatherland. Whoever dares to dispute the national 
consensus deserves to be attacked by media which acts as the guardian of 
the Turkish state. However representing diversity as a force for 
disintegration causes conflict amongst both ethnic groups.  In so doing, the 
media reinforces the feeling that “the Turk has no friend but the Turks”.  
Drawing on evidence from focus groups conducted with Turkish 
participants from Berlin, the first generation migrants of ethnic Turkish 
background expressed how they feel when confronted with ethnic pluralism 
and the rejection of Turkishness:  
Ahmet: There were no discussions amongst Turkish 
and Kurdish people. We were all Turkish but when 
the PKK came, the Kurds started to say that they are 
not Turkish but they are Kurdish. The PKK separated 
us from each other. 
Gurdal: But it is normal that the Kurds indicate that 
they are not Turkish because they are not... 
Ahmet: They are. They are citizens of Turkey. The 
citizens of Turkey are Turkish. They should accept 
this fact or go to Northern Iraq. 
Gurdal: If the German government banned the 
Turkish language and forced you to say that you are 
not Turkish but German, how would you react? 
Ahmet: That’s a different issue. We did not want to 
separate Germany. 
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Efkan : The Kurds are real Turks. They speak Turkish 
better than me, why  do they not accept to be 
Turkish? 
Gurdal: Because they are a nation like others. They 
have their own language and culture. 
Ahmet: You have no clue about the political game of 
the imperialists. This is the game of imperialists to 
separate our country. 
Y: How do you know that they are in collaboration 
with imperialists? 
Ahmet: There was a columnist in Hürriyet, Emin 
Colasan; he washed their dirty linen in public. But 
later he lost his job at Hürriyet   newspaper because 
of the AKP, the Arab and Kurd party” [the AKP is the 
ruling party of Turkey. AKP refers to the Justice and 
Development party but many Turkish nationalists call 
the AKP the Arab and Kurd party.] (Focus group with 
Turkish migrants, Berlin, 26th July 2007). 
 
The discussion amongst first and second generation migrants of ethnic 
Turkish background highlights the intergenerational differences in opinion. 
Some second-generation migrants regularly follow Turkish media and have 
a strong relationship with their homeland, very much like the first 
generation. Some second-generation migrants live in multicultural societies 
in Europe and find different expressions of ethnic identity normal.  The first 
generation (but also some second-generation migrants) repeat the state 
and media narrative of external and internal enemies of Turkey. The 
enemies are sometimes the German media which does not call Kurdish 
rebels “terrorists” but “Kurdish guerrillas”, sometimes the Kurdish media, in 
particular Kurdish Roj TV. Kurdish activists are the target of the Turkish 
media. The Turkish media criticizes Western politicians who are critical of 
Turkey’s policies towards Kurds. Therefore, it is not always easy for 
Turkish migrants to accept the ethnic diversity amongst migrants from 
Turkey. A Kurdish participant working for a youth organization in Berlin 
blames the Turkish media for the conflict with her Turkish colleagues at 
work 
Arin: We offer Turkish language courses for young 
people and I wanted to open a Kurdish class for 
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Kurdish second generation people in order to give 
them some sense of belonging  to their mother 
tongue language and also many of them cannot 
speak Kurdish which makes them sad. They blame 
their families for this reason that the families not were 
able to teach them the Kurdish language. But my 
Turkish colleagues very strongly opposed my idea to 
open a Kurdish class, arguing that a Kurdish 
language class could create conflict between ‘Turkish 
youths’. They include the Kurdish youth in the 
category of ‘Turkish youths’. I think my Turkish 
colleagues are influenced by racist Turkish news 
coverage. 
Y: In what way are they influenced by the Turkish 
media? 
Arin: Oh in a thousand ways. If you look at Turkish 
media, there is not any positive news about Kurds 
and the Kurdish language. In particular they show 
teaching Kurdish in schools in Turkey as a danger for 
the integrity of Turkey. Even the government bans 
the letters which do not exist in the Turkish alphabet 
but exist in Kurdish like Q, W, and X. These three 
letters become the enemy of Turkish integrity in 
Turkey and Kurdish letters are called terrorist letters. 
It is ridiculous but this policy influences Turkish 
migrants here too. Because they watch and read the 
Turkish media on a daily basis. And if the ethnic and 
cultural diversity is portrayed as a danger to the 
nation, the migrants who have strong connection to 
Turkish nationalistic communities or the embassy 
oppose Kurdish language classes. Because ethnic 
and cultural diversity is portrayed negatively among 
migrants from so-called Turkey. I have discussed this 
for a long time with them” (Interview with Arin, Berlin, 
5th July 2008). 
As Arin states her Turkish colleagues at work take for granted the Turkish 
state and Turkish media’s ideological habit to “include the Kurdish youth in 
the category of ‘Turkish youths’” and while it is normal to teach Turkish, 
teaching Kurdish language is “disintegrative”.  Blaming the Turkish media 
for the ethnic conflict between the Turkish and Kurdish migrants is 
widespread amongst Kurdish audiences because they consume the 
Turkish media and see the glorification of Turkishness in juxtaposition to its 
negative “other”: Kurds and Kurdishness. Though many Turkish 
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participants confirmed that they do not follow the Kurdish media, 
nevertheless they have a clear idea that the “separatist media”, i.e. the 
Kurdish media cause problems amongst both ethnic groups: 
A: The Kurdish media separates Turkish society 
[including the Kurds] in Europe and causes conflict 
between them in the society 
Y: Do you read or watch Kurdish media? 
A: No I do not read or watch the separatist terrorist 
media or the PKK media 
Y: How do you know that the Kurdish or PKK media 
causes conflict between the Turkish and Kurdish 
migrants or, if you like, in Turkish society? 
A: Oh this media has caused a huge conflict even 
between Turkey and Denmark where the PKK 
channel broadcast its separatist ideas. 
Y: What is the name of this channel? 
A: I do not know and do not want to know. 
Y: But you have read the news that this channel 
caused diplomatic problems between Turkey and 
Denmark several times? Where did you hear about 
this news? 
A: in the media. 
Y: Which media? Turkish, British? 
A: Our media 
Y: If you say ‘our media’, are you talking about 
mainstream Turkish media and Islamic media? 
A: I read all the Turkish media”                                                                     
(Interview with Abdullah, London 2nd February 
2008). 
 
Abdullah clearly indicates how the Turkish media shapes Turkish 
audiences’ reception of “our” media and “their” media. Abdullah has a 
strong Islamic background, therefore if he says “our,” he is referring to the 
Islamic media. It is common amongst Turkish and Kurdish ethnic groups to 
divide media into “ours” and “theirs”. But “our” Turkish media are divided 
into several slices e.g. for example Cumhuriyet newspaper for the 
Kemalists, Vakit newspaper for Islamists, Ortadogu for the ultra-
nationalists. For some Kurds Yeni Özgür Politika is “our media”.  
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7. Reinforcing the Legitimacy of Turkish Nation-State Identity through 
Routine Practices 
 
The repeated and routinized practices of Turkishness are the object of a 
fierce debate amongst migrants.  Some Turkish migrants and even Kurdish 
migrants unwittingly repeat the flagging of Turkish nationhood. Others 
oppose this reproduction of Turkish banal nationalism in the diaspora, 
while the Kurds create their own banal nationalism. Hall argues that people 
reiterate ideologies that have been transformed by media “unconsciously 
rather than by conscious intention” because “ideologies tend to disappear 
from view into the taken- for- granted ‘naturalized’ world of common sense” 
(Hall 1996:272). Drawing on evidence from focus groups conducted with 
Kurdish participants from London you can see how the term “Turk” 
becomes a banal nationalist habit and how the Kurds react to this habit: 
Ferhat:  “We, Turks, watch TV 30 hours per week. 
This is quite a lot. 
Rebeen: I thought you were Kurdish 
Ferhat: Yes I am. 
Rebeen: Then why do you say ‘we, Turks’ 
Ferhat: It’s a bad habit. It is difficult to change the 
habit. If somebody asks me what is your ethnic 
background of course I say I am Kurdish. Do you 
know you hear the term ‘we, Turks’ in Turkish soap 
operas, news etc and many people repeat it without 
thinking? Many of my friends say this on a daily 
basis”    (Focus group interview, London, 17 May 
2007). 
 
While Ferhat reproduces the Turkish dominant discourse consciously or 
unconsciously and explains this as a “bad habit”.  Rebeen reacts to 
Ferhat’s statement. Indeed this conversation shows us the differences 
between Kurdish migrants who follow Turkish media and those who follow 
Kurdish media. Rebeen reveals that he watches Kurdish Roj Tv, Kurdistan 
TV and Kurdi1 TV where Kurdishness is glorified and Kurdish national 
identity reproduced and transmitted. But Ferhat follows Turkish media and 




“On a daily basis” people who follow the Turkish or Kurdish media become 
a part of the “nation” and flag it in everyday conversation. Ferhat states 
that he is not Turkish but he repeats the Turkish media’s ideological claim 
that in Turkey, everyone is a Turk without regard to race or religion. This 
national story becomes routine and taken-for -granted even in the 
countries of settlement.  
 
Ronya, who as we saw earlier was misrepresented as a Turk in the Turkish 
newspaper report, provides a rich explanation of how Turkish banal 
nationalism is taken-for granted by media and audiences. 
“When I showed this news to my Turkish and Kurdish 
friends who are critical of …the official Turkification 
policy, many of them criticized me but not the 
newspaper’s fabrication, while the others just said 
‘Wow! You’ve been in the newspapers’ without 
understanding or noticing the propaganda for 
Turkishness. Even though they know that I am not 
Turkish, they did not ask any questions about my 
identity. That was normal for them or maybe habit 
that they did not notice that the tale was made up for 
the nation” (Interview with Ronya, London, 21st 
February 2007). 
 
The Turkish and Kurdish media do not only focus on the conflict in the 
homeland but also on migrants’ interests in ethnic-based news to enhance 
their political and commercial interests. 
 
This Kurdishness and Turkishness debate takes place in different 
geographical spaces where Kurds are forced to stand up against media 
expressions of Turkish banal nationalism. Some Kurds express this openly 
and even reject speaking Turkish and following the Turkish media, 
particularly in Stockholm, but some follow critically the media dissemination 
of Turkish banal nationalism. 
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Baran’s testimony provides rich insight into the debate: 
“The Turkish institutions continue the same politics of 
the Turkish state in London because they are a 
Turkish institution…. In their view the Kurds are Turks 
here. I mean you do your PhD on media - when you 
look at the Turkish media like Kanal D, ATV, Show 
TV or Hürriyet they have correspondents working 
here sometime who do programmes and they never 
mention the word Kurds. They called the Kurds Turks 
and talk about ‘Turks in London’, ‘Turkish shops’, 
’Turkish migrants’ etc. Someone like me feels sorry 
for them when I listen to these programmes on 
Turkish television or read Turkish newspapers. They 
can’t understand the social, political and cultural 
changes in the world and continue the turkification 
policies of the Turks towards the Kurds even in the 
diaspora” (Interview with Baran, London 13th 
September 2008). 
 
King argues:  
“Straightaway we must …acknowledge here at the 
outset that the designation ‘Turkish’ (or ‘Turks’ etc) is 
deeply problematic, especially for the Kurds from 
Turkey (who resist being called ‘Turkish Kurds’)’ …. 
Within Turkey, Kurds have a marginal, persecuted 
status deriving from the failure of the Turkish state to 
recognise them – Article 13 of the Turkish 
Constitution states that ‘in Turkey, from the point of 
view of citizenship, everyone is a Turk without regard 
to race or religion’. This hegemonic categorisation 
travels with the migrants/refugees to the receiving 
countries, where, despite their persecuted status 
derived from their situation in Turkey being the raison 
d’être of their acceptance as refugees and asylum-
seekers, they continue to be classed as ‘Turkish’” 
(King et al. 2008:3). 
 
The case of a Kurdish MP from Berlin shows how “Turks” can be perceived 
as different. The German-Kurdish MP testifies how the Turkish media 
organized a campaign against her during her candidacy for MEP in the 
2004 European elections as she is the daughter of a PKK supporter. She 
lost the race to be the candidate due to the Turkish media’s negative 
campaign, but managed to get elected to the Berlin local parliament. 
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“After my election to the House of Representatives in 
Berlin (in German: Abgeordnetenhaus von Berlin) I 
was not the daughter of a PKK supporter anymore 
but I was an MP of Turkish descent in these 
newspapers. They started using the argument that 
there are several Turkish MPs in the House of 
Representatives of Berlin in order to show Turkish 
political power in Berlin. But I am not Turkish and I 
made this clear in my press releases and my politics, 
as well as highlighting this to Turkish journalists. But 
they still portray me as a Turkish MP” (Interview with 
Lorin, Berlin, 7th July 2007). 
 
The term “Turk” has become one of the most important ideological tools of 
banal nationalism in the media. The language used by the media reduces 
multiple identities to a singular term in order to reproduce the nation within 
the communities which have roots in Turkey. As has been shown in 
chapter VI, the language used by the Turkish media is based on production 
and transformation of a consolidated, imagined Turkish political 
community.  In Anderson’s concept of imagined community, language has 
the function of unifying the fields of communication through media which 
create common shared experiences and belonging to an imagined 
community. Therefore the language used in the media actively creates a 
national consciousness.  
 
On the other hand, scholars in the field of the critical discourse analysis 
have focused on examining the combination of text, artifact and social 
practice to understand how social realities are constructed through certain 
power relations and ideologies. So they look at how the media generate 
the language (written and audio-visual “texts”) and produce unequal power 
relationships, constructing identity and social meaning that favours the 
dominant social group (Fairclough 1995 , Fairclough and Wodak 1997 , 
Fiske 1982 , Foucault 1980 , Parker 1992 , van Dijk 1993, see chapter VI).   
Hall (1996:271) states that “language, broadly conceived, is by definition 
the principal medium in which we find different ideological discourses [e.g. 
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nationalistic, racist, sexist and so on] elaborated”. The discursive practices 
of ideologies are produced and transmitted by the media which “can serve 
as both reservoirs and reference points for the circulation of words, 
phrases, and discourse styles,” (Spitulnik 1997:162) within imagined 
communities (Talbot 2007) The meaning is articulated through the 
language of imagined community but language itself is also part of the 
meaning (Fairclogh 1995). However discursive conflict and struggle can 
arise over the socially constructed and circulated meanings of nation, 
national identity and belonging to a particularist group. Therefore, the 
discursive practices of the media can be changed over the time, in 
accordance with the political climate in the country concerned. An example 
of this has occurred since the 1980s, when the Turkish media denied the 
existence of the Kurds and represented them as “separatists”, while today 
there are “Kurdish intellectuals” who talk about the “Kurdish question” as 
unmentioned representatives of Kurds on Turkish channels. The media 
also depict these communities and individuals as “Turks” in the countries of 
settlement in order more firmly to embed this identity in the institutions of 
the country of  settlement (King 2008). 
 
A Turkish journalist from the Islamic Zaman newspaper justified the 
flagging of Turkish nationhood in Europe by portraying different ethnic 
groups as Turks and imposing on them an unwanted Turkish state identity 
in these terms: 
“First of all we do not separate the Turks and the 
Kurds. We include them as Turks because they are 
from Turkey.  But if the Kurdish community centres 
condemn the terror and violence, this could be 
interesting news for us and we will name the Kurdish 
organization with its Kurdish name. 
Yilmaz: Two interviewed Kurdish MPs stated for this 
research that Turkish journalists deny their ethnic 
identity and portray them as Turkish which they see 
as an identity imposed by Turkish Journalists. 
Zaman: First of all I know the name of these two 
MPs. I do not know whether they mention their ethnic 
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background in their press releases and I do not know 
whether they have double citizenship but if they have 
a double citizenship, it means they have Turkish 
citizenship because Kurdish citizenship does not 
exist. There are different ethnic groups under the 
umbrella of Turkish identity. …….We cannot write 
about all these identities in our news.  It is impossible 
to do it. If the Kurds mention their ethnic background 
in their press releases then we will write their ethnic 
background. However if I work on news about a 
politician who comes from Turkey, I use the term 
German politician of Turkish origin. We do not use 
the term German politician of Kurdish origin……. For 
example Cem Ozdemir (co- leader of the Green 
Party) is Circassian. Should we now say German 
politician of Circassian descent?” (Journalist, Zaman  
newspaper, Berlin  12th July 2007). 
 
A journalist from Hürriyet whom I interviewed put forward the same 
argument. While Turkishness is taken for granted, other identities are 
considered unnecessary to mention because the journalists’ ideological 
habit is to deal with cultural and ethnic diversity in this way, namely through 
turkification. Even the second generation become targets of this ideological 
habit, although they are not Turkish citizens and some do not even speak 
Turkish.  However the journalist from state Anatolia agency explained that: 
“The Turkish newspapers here are uncritical and 
focus on a narrow view around Turkishness. They 
report on Turkey and Turks here without making any 
critical points and they are not in the position to 
understand the social and political changes among 
migrants from Turkey because they did not study 
journalism and do not know the ethics of journalism” 
(Interview with Kazim, X date 2008). 
 
Moreover Kazim gave an example of how his work is restricted by the 
ideological habit of the Turkish state to prevent people of different ethnic 
backgrounds from being portrayed by the state Anatolia agency: 
“There was a celebration for successful grammar 
school pupils. The success of a girl was mentioned 
several times by [x country’s] education officers. Her 
family name was Turkish. I went to interview her. 
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When I said that I am from state Anatolia Agency and 
would like to interview her as a successful Turkish girl 
at school, she stated that she is not Turkish and if I 
could mention her Kurdish ethnic identity in my report 
she would be ready to be interviewed. Of course we 
are a state-run news agency and are not allowed to 
mention Kurdish identity in our news. This is the 
worst obstacle for us to interview such people. I was 
sad but I cannot change the rule” (Interview with 
Turkish state press official, 2008 I do not provide 
date and place of interview to protect this 
participant’s anonymity). 
  
This testimony indicates that many Turkish journalists are unhappy with the 
way that they are forced to report on the Kurds but are unable to challenge 
the ideological habits of the Turkish media. Moreover, it sheds further light 
on Kurds have a different ethnic self-identification from the imposed 
Turkish one. 
8.  Conclusion 
This chapter has analysed the Turkish and Kurdish press coverage of 
issues pertaining to national identity:  how the Turkish media imposes 
national identity; the Kurdish media reconstructs ethno-national identities 
among the Turkish and Kurdish migrants; and the impacts of these 
processes on the migrants in Germany, the UK and Sweden. In the 
process of reshaping ethnic identities, these media deploy ethno-national 
symbols in their text and images, sometimes in an “extraordinary, 
emotional mood-striking” way (Billig 1995:45)  and sometimes in 
“unnoticed”, “mundane” and “routine” ways in order to create a collective 
ethnic identity amongst migrants as “us” against “them”.  
 
These Turkish and Kurdish banal nationalist practices have contributed to 
inflaming the conflict between the Turkish and Kurdish communities in their 
homeland and in diasporic spaces in Europe. Here this banal nationalist 
rhetoric has created feelings of belonging, attachment and loyalty to a 
“nation” a thousand miles away. Diasporic banal nationalism is not 
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restricted to a territory and breaks the link with a specific territory. Territory 
is replaced in diasporic banal nationalism by identity in multi-cultural 
societies which opens up spaces for diasporic banal nationalism to occupy 
discursively and in practice. In this process, nationalism becomes a 
significant factor as an “endemic political ideology” in all societies in 
conflict. 
 
I have highlighted Billig’s argument that banal nationalism is the main form 
of nationalism in “established, democratic nations” (Billig  1995:93) as 
problematic because banal and hot nationalism appear in both democratic 
and established nations, and in non-democratic, non-established nations, 
including stateless nations.  In particular, the debate on migrants and 
foreigners in the media and in public institutions in the countries of 
settlement has contributed to a hostile public attitude towards migrants. 
Moreover the “everyday ethnicity” (Brubaker 2004) embodied in the 
ethnicizing practices of the media, including those in the countries of 
settlement and the ethnic minority press, increases competition over who is 
a member of “our nation” and who is not, as well as enhancing 
consciousness of political and cultural differences in the minds of “natives” 
and “migrants”. In the case of the Turks and Kurds, their media and the 
European media in the countries of settlement position themselves against 
other nations and other national identities. The Turkish media’s approach 
is to juxtapose the “Turkish nation” to the “German nation” and the “Kurdish 
nation” and create a three-way banal nationalism which has a significant, 
negative impact on those of different ethnicity. 
 
This explanation sheds light on the repeated examples of “hot” and “banal” 
forms of nationalism which the Turkish and Kurdish migrants interviewed 
cited from their everyday life.  While many Turkish migrants repeat Turkish 
banal nationalist media discourse that the Kurdish media and “separatist 
thinking” have contributed to destabilisating Turkey and Turkish society, 
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the Kurdish migrants highlight how the Turkish media and Turkish 
institutions impose Turkification on them even in the diaspora. However 
their opposing arguments are based on Kurdish banal nationalist discourse 



































This thesis has explored the complex linkages between transnational 
ethnic media and migrant communities through 6 focus group interviews 
and 74 individual interviews with Kurdish and Turkish migrants of different 
ages, gender, occupation, religious and political affiliation and length of 
residence in Stockholm, Berlin and London. Transnational media play an 
important role for these migrants in mediating and disseminating the 
imagined communities of nation and homeland (Kosnick 2007, Robins and 
Aksoy 2001, Tsagarousianou 2004). By doing this, transnational media 
contribute to the creation of migrant transnational spaces in the three 
European countries studied here. In this sense this study has analysed the 
role of the Turkish and Kurdish media in the formation of migrants’ opinions 
and identity in Europe. The thesis has explored the role of transnational 
Kurdish and Turkish media in articulating migrants’ identities as well as 
mobilizing different political positions amongst Turkish and Kurdish 
migrants in the three European countries (Sweden, UK, and Germany).  
 
One of the key themes in Turkish and Kurdish media reporting on the 
homeland is the ethno-national conflict. This long-lasting conflict is the 
result of Turkish nationalistic discourse and repression which has denied 
Kurdish existence in Anatolia (Olson 1989, van Bruinessen 1999b, 
McDowall 2004) and forced Kurds to assimilate into Turkishness. This has 
lead to a bitter hegemonic struggle for power between the Turkish ethnic-
dominated state and the subordinate Kurdish national movement, based 
on an attempt to create alternative imagined Turkish and Kurdish political 
communities (Anderson 1991). Owing to the migration, a Kurdish-oriented 
diaspora has developed which, through transnational communications and 
transport technologies has helped to construct a Kurdish imagined 
community in Europe and elsewhere.  This poses a huge challenge to the 
hegemony of the nationalistic ideology of the Turkish state and its allies in 
the Turkish media. The latter exerts huge influence by presenting 
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nationalistic discourse as “common sense”, and mobilizing Turkish 
migrants in defence of the territorial unity of the Turkish state (see chapter 
II, III, IV, V, VI, and VIII). 
 
In the theory chapter I argued that the relation between the transnational 
media and migrants’ national identities can be understood through the 
concept of imagined community. I have viewed national identities not as 
given but as socially constructed. For migrants, the transnational media 
plays an important role in constructing their national identities. A key 
means of doing this is banal nationalism, (Billig  1995) that is through the 
repeated use of flags, symbols and rituals to create a meaningful imagined 
community defined as “our” nation which creates a sense of belonging. I 
have suggested that a Gramscian approach (Gramsci 1971) is useful for 
understanding the construction of two alternative imagined communities, 
that of Turkish migrants and that of the Kurdish. I have examined how 
these groups have been established in particular through the role of the 
media in disseminating an imagined sense of who these actors are in their 
distinct communities.  
 
My theoretical framework has drawn upon Anderson, Billig and 
transnationalim as they are all concerned with issues of nation, media 
identification and symbols (Gavrilos 2002) and transnationalized ethno-
national conflict (Smith 2007). Yet, they all offer different insights into these 
processes. The Gramscian notion that hegemony is a process of constant 
negotiation between different social groups has been useful to look at the 
different ways in which the Turkish state and media have tried to define 
Kurds by using different terminologies such as “bandit”, “separatist”, 
“terrorist” etc. After 85 years, the changes in terminology in the Turkish 
media are the result of the Kurds’ counter-hegemonic challenge. Kurds as 
a subordinated group have also used banal nationalism to challenge the 
hegemonic view of the Turkish state that has denied them recognition of 
 334 
their ethnic identity. There is an ongoing struggle over the nature of the 
Turkish and Kurdish imagined communities in which the media, both in the 
homeland and in the diaspora are involved invoking symbols of banal 
nationalism.  
 
The thesis has looked at the interrelation of the Turkish state, nationalist 
ideology, the economy and the media in Turkey to explain the ideological 
dependency of the media on the state. It has discussed the power of the 
media in Turkey to define the Kurds and approve the use of coercion 
against the Kurds. The hot and banal forms of nationalism in the Turkish 
media form an important part of the daily dissemination of the Turkish 
imagined community which has a strong impact on how Turks think about 
themselves and Kurds. Having discussed the ability of the Turkish media to 
construct a strong sense of Turkish nationalism, racism and national 
identity, the thesis then turned to examining the Kurdish media. The 
Kurdish media analyse the symbols and meanings generated by the 
Turkish media and challenge this. They have developed their own counter-
hegemonic project of an imagined Kurdishness. The Kurdish national 
movement challenges the Turkish state’s and media’s dominant narrative 
of the nation and has exposed its limitations and weaknesses. The Kurdish 
media play a key role in this as they have developed and disseminated 
their own narrative about who they are as an imagined community. Both 
groups utilize hot and banal forms of nationalism as means to construct an 
imagined national community and struggle for hegemony of their national 
projects. This struggle is played out through the media. What is at stake in 
analysing the media is that the ability of the alternative Turkish and Kurdish 
national projects to create their own national “common sense” which 
depends on their ability to disseminate them through the media?  
 
This ongoing struggle for hegemony manifests itself not only in the content 
of the media but also in the way Kurdish and Turkish audiences make 
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sense of these texts. Thus, in my empirical work with migrant audiences, I 
tested out these ideas of hegemony and counter hegemony, exploring how 
Turkish and Kurdish migrants make sense of the symbols, ideas and 
stories told by the media. I have shown that they have taken these stories 
and worked with them, accepting, re-telling and transforming them. It is a 
complex process rather than a matter of the media disseminating ideas to 
migrants who simply absorb and reproduce them. However, the media is 
clearly important as part of the process of making sense, by framing and 
reiterating a nationalistic discourse which migrants engage with, 
appropriating the stories told by the media.  
 
Transnational Kurdish and Turkish media have created imagined Turkish 
and Kurdish communities in different geo-political spaces, repositioning 
migrant communities in the ongoing conflict. Thus, migrants in Stockholm, 
Berlin and London engage with the same media stories, laugh about the 
same cartoons and suffer with the same characters of soap operas, with 
the killing of Kurdish civilians in Kurdistan or Kurdish guerrillas (Kurds) and 
Turkish soldiers (Turks). They also receive the same news and are faced 
with the same polarisation of Kurdish and Turkish identities in 
representations of the ethno-national conflict. Therefore, the media has 
created a new culture that includes conversations between those who 
migrate and those who stay behind. This transnational media culture also 
connects migrants in different parts of the diaspora.  
 
At the same time, the opportunities of transnational media have also 
allowed for a freer expression of Kurdish identity (Hassanpour 1998, 
Romano 2002). Alongside the polarisation of Kurdish and Turkish identities 
in the homeland media, this process of trans-nationalization of media has 
created more pronounced Kurdish and Turkish identifications, both among 
migrants in Europe and in Turkey/Kurdistan. Transnational media connect 
people across different geographical spaces and build imagined 
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communities beyond geography. Turkish and Kurdish transnational media 
talk on behalf of the nation to the nation, regardless of where the members 
of these imagined national communities live. But these opportunities for 
connecting people across disparate geographic spaces may also have the 
effect of polarising them, within the shared geographical space. Thus, the 
polarisation of Kurdish and Turkish identities, through the media 
representations of the ethno-national conflict, has lead some of my Kurdish 
and Turkish interviewees in Berlin, Stockholm or London to stop contact 
with each other (see chapter V and VI).   
 
The thesis has argued that the Kurdish and Turkish transnational media 
therefore should be seen as an important factor in the de-terrritorialisation 
and differentiation of ethno-national identities of migrants in Europe. The 
significance of transnational media in enabling migrants to construct 
increasingly differentiated identities can be better understood with the 
example of previously denied or marginalised identities. The key focus of 
this thesis has been on the significance of the Kurdish media in creating 
Kurdish identifications among migrants in Europe. The role of the 
transnational media in creating new identities has also played a significant 
role in the case of the Elewîs. Arinas with Kurdish Elewî background in 
Berlin argued that she did not know much about the meaning of Elewîsm 
when she was in Turkey as it was marginalised in public discourse. But 
after migrating to Berlin, she learned a lot about her Elewî identity, as she 
put it, through the transnational media. While the transnational media 
speaks to multiple aspects of migrants’ identities, the focus of this thesis 
has been on the representations of the Kurdish-Turkish ethno-national 
conflict and their impact on identity formation in repositioning and 
mobilizing migrants for homeland politics. A key finding of the empirical 
work was that migrants’ multiple identities were reduced to single national 
identifications as either Turkish or Kurdish when it came to the question of 
how they viewed media representations of the Kurdish-Turkish ethno-
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national conflict. It emerged from the interviews that this conflict has 
reinforced an ethnic division, differentiating Kurdish and Turkish migrants 
in Europe.  
 
The transnational media has a dual effect: on one hand, their reporting of 
the Kurdish-Turkish ethno-national conflict is important in mobilizing 
migrants’ allegiances to the homeland. They emphasize one single aspect 
of migrants’ multiple identities, namely their ethno-national identities as 
Kurdish or Turkish. The transnational media’s reporting on the Kurdish-
Turkish national conflict plays a key role in migrants’ privileging of either 
their Kurdish or Turkish identity. When migrants position themselves vis-à-
vis the media reporting on the Kurdish-Turkish national conflict, most 
migrants take up polarized ethno-national identities as Kurd or Turk, while 
other aspects of their identities become secondary. On the other hand, 
transnational Kurdish and Turkish media play an important role in de-
territorializing the Turkish and Kurdish ethno-national conflict. By reporting 
on the ethno-national conflict and at the same time attempting to mobilize 
migrants’ identities for conflicting identities either Kurdish or Turkish, the 
transnational media make the conflict an integral part of migrants’ everyday 
lives in Europe. In addition, the transnational media mobilize Kurdish and 
Turkish migrants and call on them to lobby governments and institutions of 
the countries they live in, as well as those of the European Union. This 
clearly shows the tremendous impact of the mediated homeland on 
migrants.   
 
My PhD has primarily explored the role of media in constructing imagined 
communities and employing banal nationalism as constitutive elements in 
the struggle for hegemony between the two communities, to build their 
sense of ethno-national identity. One important instance I have shown of 
this de-territorialisation was the capture of Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of 
the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (the PKK). The power of the media can be 
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shown when contrasting the extent to which two important events in the 
Kurdish national struggle achieved political visibility in Europe. When 
Saddam Hussein’s regime used chemical weapon against the Kurds in 
1988, the chemical attack on Kurds did not even turn into proper news in 
Europe about the genocide. Kurds protested locally but this did not have a 
significant impact in Europe as they were not organized on a transnational 
level.  One reason for this is that Kurdish media had not developed at that 
time and did not play a role in organizing such a transnational mobilization. 
This contrast sharply with the capture of Öcalan in 1999: Kurdish migrants 
followed with high hopes and excitement the live broadcasts and 
newspaper reports of Öcalan’s arrival in Europe and his journey through 
the skies above European countries. The Kurdish media message at the 
time encouraged Kurdish migrants’ hopes by arguing that Turkey’s Kurdish 
question would be solved if Öcalan could find a place in Europe. The 
chapter on Öcalan and the “victory” headlines of the Turkish media and the 
call of Kurdish media to protest his capture has argued that the Kurdish 
transnational media has considerable power, as the Turkish media does, to 
mobilize migrants. Thousands of migrants demonstrated from the Middle 
East to Europe and America. The Kurdish media has interconnected the 
Kurds, regardless of political, cultural, class, gender, religious or dialect 
differences as a unified, imagined Kurdish community against the 
“occupier”. The Kurdish media has used the symbolic power of the figure of 
Öcalan to create a strong imagined community. This is a development of 
historical importance that indicates that Turkey has lost its consensual 
control over a significant group of Kurdish migrants in Europe and in 
Turkey/Kurdistan. Instead, Kurds have built strong solidarity all over the 
world through their tragic story. 
 
The Turkish state has used coercion in Kurdistan but Turkey could not use 
its state monopoly of violence against the Kurds in Europe. Instead, the 
Turkish state has tried to call on Turkish migrants through the Turkish 
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media. Some Turkish migrant organisations are closely connected to the 
Turkish media and influenced by its aggressive reporting about the Kurds. 
On the other hand, the Kurdish media chose similar ways to mobilize 
Kurdish migrants to protest against Turkish state policies. This was not 
only a hegemonic struggle between the Turkish state and Kurdish national 
movements but between the Turkish media and the Kurdish media as well 
as the respective migrant communities (see chapter VI and VII). This 
hegemonic struggle has strengthened the ethno-national conflict between 
the Turkish and Kurdish migrants. The Turkish state’s handling of the event 
and media representations of Öcalan’s humiliation have been seen by 
Kurdish migrants as humiliation of their own personality and nation. 
Moreover, the images of folded hands and blindfolded eyes brought back 
the memories of the Kurds who were subjected to state violence in their 
homeland. In this sense, the Kurdish and Turkish transnational media have 
played an important role in polarising the ethno-national identification of 
Kurds and Turks in Europe (see chapter VI and Appendix A).  
 
I have argued that the two communities in conflict share a particular space 
in Turkey and in Europe. There are different levels on which this conflict is 
played out. Examining the ways in which migrants make sense of the 
media representations of the conflict, I have found that the emotional 
aspects play an important role (see chapter VI and Appendix A). Many 
Kurdish people, even those who did not identify as supporters of the PKK 
or Öcalan, had strong emotional reactions to the media reporting on 
Öcalan’s capture and on the killing of Kurdish civilians and guerrillas. 
These media representations struck a chord with Kurdish migrants, 
precisely because they connected to their own experiences and stories 
they had heard from parents, relatives, friends or the media. They 
identified as members of an imagined Kurdish community. This was not 
just about speaking language, but an emotional reaction which, in the 
context of nationalism, is fundamental. Nationalism is about passion, 
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feeling and emotion. I found similar responses and experiences in all three 
European countries. This is an imagined community that does not have a 
physical basis in a unified homeland, but exists in the minds of Kurds. I 
have argued here, that it exists in part because of the way the 
transnational media brought together diasporic groups and connected 
them with their homeland. This also constitutes a challenge to the 
imagined community of the countries of settlement which have tried to 
integrate “others” culturally and linguistically into their imagined 
communities through different integration policies. Therefore, the 
intervention of these media in the lives of migrants, mobilizing them for 
homeland politics is seen as creating “parallel and mutually exclusive 
media communities” (Robins 1998:11) on their national soil (Piorr et al. 
1996). This development is viewed as a potential threat and challenge to 
the sovereignty of the European countries of residence (Heitmeyer, Müller 
et al. 1997; Özdemir 1997; Robins 1998; Georgiou 2005) and as 
“dissociated from the social life” of everyday (Marenbach, 1995, quoted in 
Aksoy, 2001b:344) in the countries of settlement. I have defined “rhetoric 
distances” (Billig 1995:49) of  the Turkish, Kurdish and settlement 
countries’ media of “us” from “them”, of “our” world from “theirs” (Billig 
1995:49)  as  “three-way banal nationalism”. This competing triangular 
banal nationalism can be defined as “…an ideological consciousness of 
nationhood” which  “can be seen to be at work that embraces a complex 
set of themes about “us”, “our homeland”, “nation” (“ours” and “theirs”, the 
“world”, as well as the morality of national duty and honour” (Billig  1995:4). 
The debates on the “parallel society “should be understood from this 
perspective of competing forms of three-way, banal nationalism in the 
countries of settlement. “Our” nationalism is taken for granted by the 
counterposed media to create alternative imagined political communities 
contesting for a place within the “order of nations”  (Billig 1995:1).  
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Contributions to debates theorizing the role of transnational media  
I have shown that the concepts of “banal nationalism” and “imagined 
community” should be extended to cover the study of transnational 
communities because transnationalism is a process “by which immigrants 
forge and sustain multi-stranded social relations that link together their 
societies of origin and settlement”, (Basch et al. 1994:6) “across the 
borders of multiple nation-states” (Faist 2000:189) which are “multi-
connected, multi-referential” (Soysal 2000:13). These transnational 
communities are not given, but constructed through their involvement and 
intervention in homeland politics  (Ostergaard-Nielsen 2001). The 
transnational media play an important role in the identity formation of 
Kurdish and Turkish migrants in Europe and the positions they take up. 
 
Gramsci’s concept of hegemony can be usefully applied to the question of 
conflict in national and diasporic imagined communities where a constant 
war of position takes place between different social groups to ally 
themselves with those in power or to create an alternative set of alliances 
from below to challenge for hegemony.  In particular, this concept has 
helped in exploring the different ways in which the Turkish state and media 
have defined Kurds deploying pejorative terminology such as “bandit”, 
“separatist”, “terrorist” and how the Kurdish national movement and media 
have challenged Turkish “common sense” by developing a Kurdish 
alternative common sense in Turkey/Kurdistan and amongst transnational 
Kurdish communities in Europe. The members of the imagined Turkish and 
Kurdish communities manifest themselves in diverse places because they 
share a sense of collective national identity which is, in my account, 
directed and developed through shared experiences of the media.   
 
The ethnicisation of the media landscape and of the migrant communities 
has been perceived by some host countries as a problem or threat, defined 
by the media, some politicians and academics as “a parallel society” within 
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the imagined community (Heitmeyer 1996; Heitmeyer, Müller et al. 1997; 
Lambsdorff 1998; Schulte 2002). But what the proponents of a “parallel 
society” fail to appreciate is that migrants also have individual identities 
which are no longer singular and exclusive, so they are also no longer 
passive consumers as a media audience.  The ethno-national conflict and 
Kurdish identity pose key challenges to the Turkish state and media as well 
as to Turkish migrants. Similarly when the Kurds watch Kurdish TV or read 
Kurdish and then watch the Turkish media, they feel the victim of Turkish 
state terror which positions them against the Turkish state and its related 
symbols and culture. These issues can reduce the multiple identities of 
individuals in some transnational spaces to a simple polarised opposition 
of Kurd and Turk, strengthening belonging to the Turkish or Kurdish 
imagined community in Europe, but there is also evidence of transnational 
migrant practices that cut across this. The outcome of the research clearly 
illustrates that Kurds and Turks read the provided texts and media images 
differently. But individuals within the Kurdish and Turkish communities also 
read the media contents differently. This different reading depends on the 
media sources they draw on, but also varies with age, occupation, gender, 
length of residency, education.  
 
Contributions to debates about Turkish and Kurdish migrants in 
Europe 
It is important to highlight that Turkish and Kurdish migrants have multiple 
identities. In many situations they articulate complex identities. Yet, the 
effect of media reporting of the Kurdish-Turkish ethno-national conflict is to 
reduce these to singular, national identities as either Kurdish or Turkish. 
Thus, identities which were multiple and complexly articulated in other 
contexts become singular and polarised as migrants reposition themselves 
as a consequence of the highly politicised media reporting of the conflict.  
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My research has shown that Kurds and Turks have developed distinct 
identities in Europe. They cannot any longer be viewed as a homogeneous 
group of “Turkish migrants”. Therefore the research which encompasses 
the Kurds within the category of “Turkish migrants” (Robins and Aksoy 
2000, Erdemir and Vasta 2007, Çaglas 2007) cannot take account of the 
deterritorialization, differentiation and division of Turkish and Kurdish 
migrant identities  
 
Kurdish and Turkish migrants have developed a media culture which plays 
a tremendous role in informing them, as well as shaping their opinions. 
Especially Kurdish migrants’ transnational media provide an important 
source of information about events in Turkey and Kurdistan, as they report 
on issues that are not covered by Turkish media or are only covered in a 
one-sided way.  
 
Rather than arriving in Europe with a fully formed Kurdish identity, many 
Kurdish migrants have developed an identity as Kurds in the diaspora. In 
this process, transnational Kurdish media have played an important role. 
The media have contributed to the construction of an autonomous Kurdish 
identity. On the other hand, the freedom of expression that Kurds enjoy in 
Europe has helped to develop the Kurdish language and Kurdish media. 
Thus, Kurdish television broadcasting, which began in Europe, has made 
Kurdish media accessible to a wide range of audiences both in Europe and 
in Kurdistan.  
 
Contribution to debates on research methods 
This research has contributed to doing politically sensitive research 
amongst groups in conflict.  While many researchers have focused on the 
problems of doing sensitive research on health, sexual behaviour issues, 
HIV/AIDS, mental health, dying and death (Davies et al. 1998, Benoliel 
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1984, Shreffler 1999, Johnson and Clarke Macleod 2003, Dickson-Swift et 
al. 2008) and other  “socially sensitive” (Sieber and Stanley 1988) or 
“culturally sensitive” (Johnson and Clarke Macleod 2003) issues, politically 
sensitive research topics have received comparatively little attention. This 
research has provided a rich account of migrants’ memories, experiences 
and politically motivated emotions. It has also gathered data on highly 
controversial issues affecting both institutions which wield disproportionate 
power, and individuals in transnational spaces, to show how they make 
sense of the media framing of the ethno-national conflict through banal 
nationalism.  
 
Contribution to debates about the Kurdish-Turkish ethno-national 
conflict 
The Kurdish transnational media (newspapers and TV) produced in Europe 
and in Turkey have actively helped to produce a Kurdish identity and 
imagined community both in Turkey and in Europe. The Kurdish 
transnational media have created new ways of understanding Kurdish 
identity and language as culturally and politically legitimate. This has been 
part of constructing a counter-hegemonic historic bloc and common sense 
among Kurds against Turkish nationalistic discourse and dominance.  
The Kurdish media produced in Turkey and transnationally have 
contributed to the formation of this Kurdish historic bloc in opposition to the 
Turkish state’s national imagined community. Especially Kurdish migrants’ 
transnational media culture has acted as an alternative source of 
information about the war and as a counter narrative. As many European 
media have limited access to the area of war, they have often relied on the 
Turkish media for their sources, and therefore not provided any alternative 
perspective. The Kurdish media have been instrumental not only in 
providing information from a different viewpoint, but also a different way of 
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making sense of the conflict that constitutes a counter-hegemonic 
“common sense”. 
 
In my empirical research I have found that the migrants’ views and ethnic 
identities are polarised in Germany because of their marginalisation within 
the society. What is lacking is a multicultural approach which can enable 
societies to reach mutual acceptance of ethnic diversity. Moreover, the 
dominance of the Turkish state’s representation of the conflict has led the 
German authorities to deny recognition of Kurdish identity and ban Kurdish 
organisations and media. German state discourse has served to legitimise 
the position of the organisations and individuals loyal to the Turkish state 
and enabled them to use Germany as a base to undermine Kurdish identity 
and the legitimacy of the Kurdish national struggle. In the UK there is a 
greater degree of mutual acceptance of separate Turkish and Kurdish 
identities because of the acceptance of distinct communities in the British 
multicultural paradigm and the strength of the Kurds among the migrant 
population.  In Sweden, in contrast to both these two cases, Kurdish 
identity is better recognised and represented in public life than Turkish 
identity. This I reflected in the separate Kurdish and Turkish communities, 
the former feeling well represented in the media, while the Turks feel 
challenged by this difference. It is clear that mutual acceptance and 
multicultural policies reduce the transnational ethno-national conflict 













X. APPENDIX  
APPENDIX A: Print and Visual Material for Research 
1. Print Materials: 
1.1.  A double investigation of the “multi-lingual local council” (From  
Pro Kurdish Özgür Politika Newspaper) 
Ramazan YAVUZ/ DİYARBAKIR, (DHA)  
 
The Ministry of the Interior and the Attorney General of the Republic have 
started two different investigations into the decision of the local council of 
Sur in Diyarbakir to conduct turn the local council multi-lingual. Two 
inspectors sent by the ministry have begun the investigation work in 
Diyarbakir. 
The local council of Sur (Diyarbakir) governed by the DTP (Democratic 
Society Party) has taken a decision to become a multi-lingual local council 
last week. In response to this decision, the ministry of the Interior and 
Diyarbakir Attorney General started two investigations. Ahmet Koyuncu 
and N. Nursel, Chief Inspectors from the Ministry of the Interior have 
started their work.  
The Inspectors wanted to see the decision taken by Sur local council and 
wrote the following letter:  “We ask that all documents, and information, 
council decisions, committee reports, proposals, and its applications 
relating to Sur council’s decision to deliver services not only in Turkish but 
also in Kurdish, Syriac and English that is against our constitution and its 
legislation and regulation be sent to our inspectorate” 
 
In addition to this investigation on the mult-lingual council, the inspectors 
have also started an investigation on a project the council started 
previously: the development of a Kurdish writing software based on Linux. 
In their letter on the issue to Sur council they say the following: 
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“We ask to be sent information on the purpose of having this writing 
software developed, which company or person was charged with 
developing the software. We ask for information on the uses of the writing 
software in official work and procedure, on which and how many units and 
computers belonging to the council the software is installed and being 
used. We ask for information on whether the software was paid for out of 
the council’s budget and if so we ask to be sent the related necessary 
claim forms and their confirmation, the contracts and the proof of payment. 
We ask for two copies of all documents to be sent urgently to the 
inspectorate”. 
 
Investigation of the General Attorney 
Not only the Ministry of Interior, but also the General Attorney in Diyarbakir 
has also started an investigation of Sur council’s decision to become multi-
lingual. In its letter marked “urgent”, the General Attorneyship states. 
“We ask to be urgently sent one copy of the decision your council made 
that from now on apart from Turkish languages such as Kurdish, Armenian, 
Syriac and English will be used in council publications and the identity 
cards, names and addresses of those present at the meeting in question, 
as well as the minutes and summaries of the decisions of the meeting in 
question” 
The Sur council leaders have handed in the council decision and all related 
records and documents to the general attorney’s office. 
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1.2. The prohibition of Turkish language goes to the UN (from Turkish 
Hürriyet Newspaper 27 December 2006) 
 
The Turkish civil society organization resisting the prohibition of Turkish 
language classes at the German town of Rastatt have decided to take the 
issue to international institutions. The Turkish community organisations will 
take the issue to the UN and the European Council. The Ambassador of 
Karlsruhe, Sadik Toprak is holding a press conference relating to the 
prohibition of mother tongue in Rastatt today at 3pm.  Toprak will inform 
about official initiatives. Toprak will meet parents and representatives of 
civil society to evaluate the events of Rastatt. The ambassador will give 
information about the planned official initiatives in response to the 
prohibition of mother tongue classes in Rastatt. The Turkish public is 
curious and awaiting Toprak’s declarations. 
Initiatives on the international level 
 
The Turkish civil society organizations resident in Rastatt have come 
together under the name of Union of Turkish Community Organizations to 
unify their forces. The prohibition of mother tongue has provoked a strong 
reaction among the Turks living in Germany  and the “Union of Turkish 
Community Organizations” has announced it will resist it on the one hand 
on the local level on the other hand it has decided to take this to 
international institutions. 
Representatives of the Union are determined to take this to international 
platforms, foremost to the United Nations (UN) and the Council of Europe 
and other institutions. They will apply to these organizations to counter 
inequalities and follow up the issue to the end they stated. 
Meeting on 13 January 
 
Those who said that they would not remain silent in the face of this issue 
that denies equal education are calling for a protest meeting. The Protest 
meeting will be realized with the support of other civil society organizations 
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such as Italian or Croats and will be held in the first month of the New Year 
on 13th January. The meeting will be held in front of Rastatt Townhall from 
2pm. Under the slogan “If you want to speak Turkish to your grandchildren 
come here for your children!” the meeting plans to draw attention to the 
injustice done to Turkish pupils. The Rastatt council had taken the decision 
not to provide classrooms for the provision of Turkish language classes. 
 
2. Visual Materials 
2.1. Pictures 











2.2. Audio-visual material  
2.2.1. Speech of the Chief of the Turkish General Staff for Migrants in 













APPENDIX B: QUESTIONS ABOUT VISUAL AND PRINT MATERIALS 
FOR FOCUS GROUPS 
1. The Turkish Flag 
a. What do you feel when do you see this flag? 
b. Dou thinks that Kurds feel differently when they see the Turkish flag? 
2. The Capture of Öcalan 
a. What do you feel when you see this picture? 
b. Do you think that Turks feel differently when they see this picture? 
3. Speech of the Chief of the Turkish General Staff for Migrants in the 
USA 
a. How do you find his speech? 
b. What is the content of his speech? 
c. He talks about the internally and externally “enemies” in his speech. Do 
you know about whose he talks? 
d. He mentioned in his speech about dynamic forces (dinamik Gucler) 
who will fight against enemy. Whom does he mean with the term 
“dynamic forces”? 
e. Do you think that military should express its opinion about political 
situation in Turkey in public? 
f. Do you agree with him? Could you define yourself as a part of “dynamic 
forces”? 
 
The issue of the Languages (Newspaper coverage) 
a. What are differences between both situations? 
b. Do you think the intervention in Turkey is justified? 
c. Do you think the intervention in Germany is justified? 
d. Do you think Kurds in Turkey should have the right to use their 
language? Why? 
e. Do you think Turks or Kurds in Germany should have the right to use 
their language? Why? 
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f. What should the state do in Germany about language rights of 
minorities? 
g. What should the state do in Turkey about language rights of minorities? 
h. What should the EU do for the language rights of minorities in 
Germany? 
i. What should the EU do for the language rights of minorities in Turkey? 
 
APPENDIX C: QUESTIONS ABOUT FOCUS GROUP 
These questions were given to participants after the focus group 
discussion in the one-to-one interviews. 
 
1. How did you feel during focus group? How did you find the 
atmosphere? 
2. Which opinion or persons have irritated you? 
3. Which opinion or person did you find close to you? 
4. Do you think that you felt free and said everything which you wanted to 
say regarding the focus group discussion? 
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APPENDIX D: QUESTION FOR LONG INTERVIEW WITH KURDISH 
PARTICIPANTS 
 
1. Interviewee’s background in the country of origin and in the settlement 
country Including education, age, gender, income, family, place/locality 
of residence, work experience, professional background, and why did 
s/he emigrate? 
Question related to the Kurdish participant and her/his media 
consumption and to the relationship between Kurdish participant and 
Kurdish community as well as Turkish state institution in the UK 
2. Do you have any contact to Turkish people, Turkish communities or 
Turkish state institutions? Are you member of any Turkish 
associations? What do you think about these contacts? 
3. Do you have any contact to Kurdish people, Kurdish communities or 
Turkish state institutions? Are you member of any Kurdish 
associations? Do you involved in political issues regarding Kurdistan or 
Kurds in the UK? Which identity are for you important e.g. Kurdishness, 
Islam, Secularity, Elewite, Feminism, Britishness, and Londoner Etc? 
4. If you think of Turkey or Kurdistan  what is important  for you in Turkey 
or Kurdistan e.g. your family and relatives, Kurdish culture and 
Language, Kurdish Flag, Religion, Laicism, Kurdish guerrilla, Kurdish 
economy, Kurdish media, Turk and Kurds Relations, Kurdish 
democracy, Human rights and Right of Minorities, Freedom of opinion 
and expression, Press Freedom 
5. Have you ever watched Turkish channels or read Turkish Newspapers? 
What do you think about Turkish media? 
6. How many hours do you spend watching TV or reading Newspaper 
everyday? How many hours do you watch Kurdish or Turkish channels/ 
read Kurdish or Turkish Newspaper? 
7. Which Kurdish and Turkish media do you watch/read? Why these 
Newspapers/ Channels? How often do you watch news on Kurdish or 
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Turkish channels and which programs do you watch on Kurdish 
channels? 
8. Where do you watch Kurdish or Turkish channels? With whom do you 
watch Kurdish or Turkish channels? Who manages the remote control 
at home? 
9. Who watches more Kurdish or Turkish channels in your family? 
Gender/Age/ Occupation/ Education 
10. If you are interested in news which news are you more interested in 
from Turkey or Kurdistan? Which subject is important? E.g. Sport, 
Governments-, Military-, Guerrilla activates, Kurdish issue, human 
rights, economy, religion, laicism etc. why? 
11. How do you find news on Kurdish channel and in Newspapers? How do 
you find the use of language in news? 
12. Do you think the Kurdish or Turkish television and Newspaper have had 
a positive or negative influence on Turkish and Kurdish migrants 
regarding integration of Turks and Kurds in settlement countries and 
Nationalism, ethnic conflict between the Turks and the Kurds in EU? 
How do you know that? 
13. Do you think that Government or military has influence on media In 
Turkey? 
14. What about Kurdish media? Does this media independent Kurdish 
media or by parties run media? What about freedom of opinion and 
expression and press freedom within the Kurdish society and Kurdish 
media? 
15. How satisfied are you with the Kurdish media’s coverage of people and 
events in your own community? Do you feel involved in Kurdish media? 





Question related to spread of ethnic conflict: 
16. Do you have any contact with Turks? How do you get on well with 
Turks in London? What do you think about Turks? 
17. What do you think if the Turks go in street and demonstrate against 
policy of Kurds? 
18. How is Kurds portrayed in Turkish media? How satisfied are you with 
the media’s coverage of news about Kurdish question in Turkey? Do 
you agree with the Kurdish media coverage about the Kurds? 
19. How is Turks portrayed in Kurdish media? Do you agree with the 
Kurdish media coverage about the Turks? 
20. Do you know that the relationship is different between Kurds and Turks 
in other countries where Turkish and Kurdish migrants live? 
21. How does the UK depict in Kurdish media? Which role has to play the 
UK in conflict between Kurds and Turks? 
22. How does the EU depict in Kurdish media? Which role has to play the 
EU in conflict between Kurds and Turks? 
23. Do you join any demonstration which the Kurdish television or 
Newspaper have had announced? 
 
Question related to settlement country and participants knowledge 
about settlement 
Country and its media 
24. How do you feel in London? 
25. Do you have any knowledge of the relevant policies of the settlement 
country and how did you acquire such knowledge (through the 
settlement country media or Kurdish/ Turkish media, ethnic networks, 
friends or relatives, other sources of information)? What kind of 
information do you have on these policies and who gave it to you? 
26. Contact with various types of authorities, including direct or indirect 
experience. Can you give me examples? How did you feel about it? 
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27. Contact with natives (individuals, families). Again illustrate both facts 
and perceptions of the contact. Can you give me examples? How did 
you feel about it? 
28. Contact with non-statutory agencies: Immigrants associations or other 
non-governmental organizations. Can you give me examples? How did 
you feel about it? 
29. Do you also watch British channels? If yes how many hours do you 
watch British channels? Which British channels do you watch? Which 
programs do you watch on British channels? 
30. How does the Kurds depict in British media? And how does the Turkish 
and Kurdish conflict depict in British media? 
31. Who watches British channels in your family? Gender/Age/Occupation / 
Education of them 
32. How often do you go back and forth between the country of origin and 
the country of settlement? Do you have any contact to other countries 
in Europe? 
33. Which country do you consider as your home? 
 
Internet 
34. Do you read Newspaper/watch television on internet? From which 
particularly Internet Newspaper (except regularly Newspaper) do you 
get information? Many migrants read Newspaper on internet. They can 
send their comment about every news. Do you send any comment via 
internet to Kurdish internet Newspaper? Were your comments 
published on internet Newspaper? 
35. Do you take contact to your relatives/ party/ organization in Turkey/ 
Kurdistan or in EU by internet? If yes. Could you please give name of 
countries/party/organization? 
 357 
APPENDIX E: QUESTION FOR IN-DEPTH INTERVIEW WITH THE 
TURKISH PARTICIPANTS 
1. Interviewee’s background in the country of origin and in the settlement 
country Including education, age, gender, income, family, place/locality 
of residence, work experience, professional background, and why did 
s/he emigrate? 
 
Question related to the Turkish participant and her/his media 
consumption and to the relationship between the Turkish participant 
and the Turkish community as well as the Turkish state institution in 
the UK 
2. Do you have any contact to Turkish people, Turkish communities or 
Turkish state institutions? Are you member of any Turkish 
associations? Do you involved in political issues regarding Turkey or 
Turks in the UK? Which identity are for you important e.g. Turkishness, 
Islam, Secularity, Elewitism, Feminism, Britishness, and Londoner etc? 
3. When you think of Turkey what is important  for you in Turkey e.g. your 
family and relatives, Turkish culture and Language, Turkish Flag, 
Religion, Laicism, Turkish Military, Unity of Turkey, Turkish economy, 
Turkish media, Turk and Kurds Relations, Turkish democracy, Human 
Rights and Right of Minorities, Freedom of opinion and expression, 
Press Freedom 
4. How many hours do you spend watching TV or reading Newspaper 
everyday? How many hours do you watch Turkish channels/ read 
Turkish Newspaper? 
5. Which Turkish media do you watch/read? Why these Newspapers/ 
Channels? How often do you watch news on Turkish Channels and 
6. Which programs do you watch on Turkish channels? 
7. Where do you watch Turkish channels? With whom do you watch 
Turkish/Kurdish channels? Who manages the remote control at home? 
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8. Who watches more Turkish channels in your family? Gender/Age/ 
Occupation/ Education 
9. If you are interested in news which news are you more interested in 
from Turkey? Which subject is important? E.g. Sport, Governments 
activates, Military, Kurdish issue, human rights, economy, religion, 
laicism etc. why? 
10. How do you find news on Turkish channel and in Newspapers? How do 
you find the use of language in news? 
11. Do you think the Turkish/Kurdish television and Newspaper have had a 
positive or negative influence on Turkish and Kurdish migrants 
regarding integration of Turks and Kurds in settlement countries and 
Nationalism, ethnic conflict between the Turks and the Kurds in EU? 
How do you know that? 
12. How satisfied are you with the Turkish media’s coverage of people and 
events in your own community? Do you feel involved in Turkish media? 
Could you give an Example? 
 
Question related to spread of ethnic conflict: 
13. Do you have any contact with Kurds? How do you get on well with 
Kurds in London? What do you think about Kurds? 
14. What do you think if the Kurds go in street and demonstrate against 
policy of Turkish state? 
15. Do you think that Government or military has influence on media In 
Turkey? 
16. How is Kurds portrayed in Turkish media? How satisfied are you with 
the media’s coverage of news about Kurdish question in Turkey? Do 
you agree with the Turkish media coverage about the Kurds? 
17. Have you ever watched Kurdish channels or read Kurdish 
Newspapers? What do you think about Kurdish media? 
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18. Do you know that the relationship is different between Kurds and Turks 
in other countries where Turkish and Kurdish migrants live? 
19. How does the UK depict in Turkish media? Which role has to play the 
UK in conflict between Kurds and Turks? 
20. How does the EU depict in Turkish media? Which role has to play the 
EU in conflict between Kurds and Turks? 
21. Do you join any demonstration which the Turkish television or 
Newspaper have had announced? 
 
Question related to settlement country and participants knowledge 
about settlement country and its media 
22. How do you feel in London? 
23. Do you have any knowledge of the relevant policies of the settlement 
country and how did you acquire such knowledge (through the 
settlement country media or Kurdish-/Turkish media, ethnic networks, 
friends or relatives, other sources of information)? What kind of 
information do you have on these policies and who gave it to you? 
24. Contact with various types of authorities, including direct or indirect 
experience. Can you give me examples? How did you feel about it? 
25. Contact with natives (individuals, families). Again illustrate both facts 
and perceptions of the contact. Can you give me examples? How did 
you feel about it? 
26. Contact with non-statutory agencies: Immigrants associations or other 
non-governmental organizations. Can you give me examples? How did 
you feel about it? 
27. Do you also watch British channels? If yes how many hours do you 
watch British channels? Which British channels do you watch? Which 
programs do you watch on British channels? 
28. How does the Turks depict in British media? And how does the Kurdish 
and Turkish conflict depict in British media? 
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29. Who watches British channels in your family? Gender/Age/Occupation / 
Education of them 
30. How often do you go back and forth between the country of origin and 
the country of settlement? Do you have any contact to other countries 
in Europe? 
31. Which country do you consider as your home? 
 
Internet 
32. Do you read Newspaper/watch television on internet? From which 
particularly Internet Newspaper (except regularly Newspaper) do you 
get information? Many migrants read Newspaper on internet and they 
can send their comment about every news. Do you send any comment 
via internet to Turkish internet Newspaper? Were your comments 
published on internet Newspaper? 
33. Do you take contact to your relatives/ party/ organization in Turkey or in 
EU by internet? If yes. Could you please give name of 
countries/party/organization? 
34. Do you take contact to your relatives/ party/ organization in Turkey or in 






APPENDIX F: ACESS TO INTERVIEWEES AND LIST OF 
INTERVIEWEES 
 
Table 1: Kurdish Interviewees 
Stockholm    Berlin    London 
2 interviewees at Kurdiska 
Biblioteket i Stockholm 
(Kurdish Library in 
Stockholm) 
3 interviewees at 
Kurdisches Zentrum 
e.V. Berlin (Kurdish 
Centre in Berlin) 
 
2 interviewees at 
Kurdish Community 
Centre in London 
 
1 interviewee at Kurdiska 
Riksförbundet Kurdish 
Federation in Sweden 
2 interviewees at 
Kurdisches Volkshaus 









4 interviewees at Apec 
Publishing House 
1 interview via 
Kurdistan-
AG (Kurdish Student 
Group) 
 




6 interviewees contacted 
through my own 
exploratory field trip to 
Stockholm- Rinkeby, 
Tensta, Alby at cafes and 
restaurants 






3 interviewees contacted 
via Kurdish Studies and 
Student Facebook 
5 interviewees contacted 
through Facebook and 
Viva Kurdistan social 
network 
2 interviewees at 
Yekmal e.V (Kurdish 
Parent Organisation) 
 
2 interviewees at Elewî 
Cem House and Cultural 
Centre 
3 interviewees snowballed 
through previous 
interviewees’ contact 
2 interviewees at 
Kurdistan Kultur- und 
Hilfsverein e.V. Berlin 
(Kurdistan Culture  
and Aid Organisation 
on Berlin) 
 
5 interviewees contacted 
through my own 
exploratory field trips to 
Hackney, Harringey and 
Islington in London 
(cafes, restaurants, 
Minicab office) 
























Table 2: Turkish Interviewees 
Stockholm    Berlin    London 
2 interviewees via former 
leader of Turkiska 
Riksförbundets (Turkish  
federation) in Stockholm  
1 interviewees at  and 1 via 
Türkische 
Gemeinde zu Berlin(Turkish 
Community in Berlin) 
 
1 interviewee at 
The Süleymaniye 
Mosque 
3 interviewees via a Turkish 
mother tongue teacher 
2 interviewees at 
Familiengarten des Kotti 
e.V.  Berlin (Families 
Garden of Kotti-Berlin)  
 
 




2 interviewees via 
Stockholm Bredäng  
Monsque 
2interviewees at Şehitlik  
Mosque in Berlin  




3 interviewees contacted 
through my own exploratory 
field trip to Stockholm- 
Rinkeby, Tensta, Alby, Kista  
at cafes, restaurants 
2 interviewees at Hilfs- und 
Solidaritätsverein für 
Rentner, Behinderte und 
Senioren (EMDER) 
 
4 interviewees at a 
restaurant where 
people from the 
Embassy and Turkish 
federation regularly 
visit 
2 interviewees contacted 
through Facebook 
1 interviewee at  Türkischer 
Elternverein in Berlin-
Brandenburg (Turkish 
Parent Organisation in 
Berlin-Brandenburg) 
3 interviewees 
contacted through my 
own exploratory field 
trips to Hackney, 
Harringey and 
contacted through my 
own exploratory field 






groups, GP surgery) 






 Islington in London 
(cafes, restaurants, 
Minicab office) 
4 interviewees snowballed 
through previous 
interviewees’ contact 
1 interviewee at Der 
Türkische Frauenverein 




 1 interviewee at Föderation 
der demokratisch-
idealistischen 
Türkenvereine in Berlin 
 
 6 interviewees contacted 
through my own exploratory 
field trips to Berlin- 
Kreuzberg(2) Schöneberg 
(2), Neukölln (1), 
Wedding(2) (cafes, 
restaurants, football 
groups, GP surgery) 
 


























Demographical information of Participants 
Stockholm 
Demographic information about focus group interview Kurdish 
participants in Stockholm 
No 
Name of 




1 Arin F 48 BA -Turkey 
Coordinator of 
Kurdish federation in 
Sweden 30 
2 Arjin F 35 
High School-
Turkey Shop Worker 9 
3 Baran  M 61 BA  -Turkey pensioner 28 
4 Behram M 55 BA-Turkey 
Actor/ moderator of 
Kurdi1TV 35 
5 Raman   M 42 BA-Turkey Publisher 23 



























Demographic information about In-depth interview Kurdish participants 










1 Afsan F 36 BA -Sweden Solicitor 27 
2 Zana  M 36 




3 Ciwan M 18 Pupil   born  
4 Dêmgul  F 23 Student   born  
5 Hêro  F 55 College-Turkey Factory Worker 25 
6 Heval  M 41 
Uncompleted BA-
Turkey Self- employed 8 
7 Hîwar  M 24 Student Rap singer 17 




9 Karzan  M 41 
High school- 
Turkey  Businessman 7 





11 Mehtav  F 31 PhD Student   26 
12 Mîrza  M 32 BA-Sweden Economist 28 
13 Nawruz  F 49 BA-Turkey Mat Teacher 28 
14 Rohat  M 52 BA-Turkey 
Mother Tongue 
Teacher 28 










Demographic information about focus group interview Turkish 
participants in Stockholm 
No 
Name of 





1 Okkes M 29 BA- Turkey Teacher 3 
2 Birsen F 35 
BA-Turkey Mother Tongue 
Teacher  5 
3 Hale F 58 BA-Turkey 
Mother Tongue 























































 Unemployed 29 
3 Erdal M 51 
High School-
Turkey Self employed 34 
4 Gulben F 34 BA-Sweden Bank Worker 30 





6 Haluk M 18 Pupil  Born 




Worker  33 
8 Mehtap F 27 BA-Turkey Social Worker 4 
9 Nazife F 28 
High School-
Turkey Worker 7 
10 Oktay M 54 BA-Turkey Busnessman 29 






12 Osman M 30 
Secondary 
School-Sweden Barmen Born 








Demographic information about focus group interview Kurdish 
participants in Berlin 
No 
Name of 
Participant Gender Age Education Occupation 
Length of 
Stay in  
Berlin 
2 Beriwan F 47 High School Unemployed 28 
3 Ciwane F 24 BA-Germany Actress Born 
4 
Dermanw
an M 54 BA-Germany GP 31 
5 Dijwar M 21 Student  Born  
6 Dilsad M 29 MA-Germany 
Hotel 
Manager 9 









n M 41 
Uncompleted 
BA-Turkey Author 9 
9 Kawa M 51 BA-Turkey Shop Worker 5 
10 Rêber M 49 BA-Germany Social Worker 26 














1 Arinas F 37 MA-Germany Researcher 18 
2 Ciwane F 24 BA-Germany Actress Born 
3 Dara M 51 MA-Germany 
Immigration 
Adviser  24 
4 Dijwar M 21 Student  Born  
5 Dilsad M 29 MA-Germany Hotel Manager 9 




Kurdish Centre 31 
7 Noshirwan M 41 
Uncompleted BA-
Turkey Author 9 
8 Hawar M 32 
High School-
Turkey Musician 13 





10 Kawa M 51 
Uncompleted BA-
Turkey Shop Worker 5 
11 Miraz M 56 BA-Germany GP 24 






Demographic information about focus group interview Turkish 










5 Ahmet M 62 High School-Turkey Pensioner 31 
10 Osman M 27 High School-Turkey Advertiser 7 
12 Saniye F 52 BA-Turkey 
Health Care 
Worker  28 
15 Tugba F 23 Student  Born 
 Zeynep F 46 BA-Germany 
Community 
Worker 19 
 Efkan M 44 
Technical High 
School-Germany Electrician 21 














1 Aydin M 43 BA-Germany NGO 35 




Teacher for Turkish 
Migrants 10 





Coordinator of Turkish 
Federation in Berlin 24 
4 Dogan M 37 BA-Turkey GP 4 
5 Erhan M 62 
High School-
Turkey Pensioner 31 
6 Gulseren F 38 BA-Germany Architect 30 
7 Halil M 36 BA-Turkey Self employed 11 
8 Mine F 43 BA-Germany Teacher Born 
9 Orhan M 18 Pupil  Born 
10 Osman M 27 
High School-
Turkey Advertiser 7 
11 Salih M 46 
Secondary 
School-Turkey Domestic Worker 24 
12 Saniye F 52 BA-Turkey Health Care Worker  28 
13 Serdar M 50 
Primary School-
Turkey Self employed 19 
14 Tugba F 23 Student  Born 
15 Halit M 47 BA-Turkey 
Adviser for the Turkish 
Pupils in Berlin 24 
16 Seher F 58 BA-Turkey 
Advisor at a Turkish 






Demographic information about focus group interview Kurdish 










1 Roj F 18 Student  18 
2 Sozan F 21 BA Adviser 16 
3 Baran B 26 BA Self-employed in 
Finance 
18 
4 Peri F 27 BA Solicitor 19 
5 Arjin F 28 BA/MA Researcher (Biology) 20 
6 Avashin F 25 PhD Student  9 
7 Firat M 38 BA in Turkey Domestic worker 4 
8 Neslihan F 49 Primary School Pensioner 20 
9 Rebeen M 35 BA in the UK Filmmaker 12 
10 Nawroz F 67 - Pensioner 27 














1 Azad M 31 PhD Student  9 
2 Baran M 26 BA Self-employed in 
Finance 
18 
3 Aram M 38 BA in 
Turkey 
Advertising department 
of Telgraf Newspaper 
4 
4 Hidir M 71 - Pensioner 36 
5 Neslihan F 49 Primary 
School 
Unskilled 20 
6 Peri F 27 BA Solicitor 19 
7 Arjin F 28 BA/MA Researcher (Biology) 20 
8 Rojvin F 29 BA/MA Labour Councillor  in 
Hackney 
29 





Demographic information about focus group interview Turkish 
participants in London 
No 
Name of 





1 Aysenur F 24 Student  19 
2 Selma F 33 BA-Turkey Bank employee 13 
3 Devrim M 34 BA-Turkey Interpreter 12 
4 Kerem M 47 
Primary 
School- 
Turkey Self-employed 18 
5 Mustafa M 37 BA-Britain Housing Officer 12 
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8 Tacettin M 32 Shop Worker  19 
4 Selma F 33 BA-Turkey Bank employee 13 
9 Elmas F 18 A-Level  Born 
3 Devrim M 34 BA-Turkey Interpreter 12 
1 Fatih M 49 GCSE Self employed 38 
2 Abdullah M 51 BA-Turkey 
Chairperson of 
Suleymaniye mosque 3 
5 Nebahat F 41 
High School-
Turkey Domestic Worker 9 
6 Nurhayat F 46 BA-Turkey Community Worker 18 
10 Talat M 28 BA-Britain  
Employee for a 
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1 The Kurdish oriented  parties have been shut down one after the other by the constitutional court on the grounds of separatism and/or 
supporting the Kurdistan Workers Party (Marcus,  2007; Valentine 2007).  The recently banned DTP was replaced with the Peace and 
Democracy Party. In addition left-oriented and critical, PKK opponent, pro-Kurdish parties have been banned from politics. 
2 Gramsci did not  use the term counter-hegemony however the term has been used widely by scholars of hegemony including Neo-
Gramscians (Pratt 2004), and realists (Jospeh 2000), to explain the way in which the alternative forces pose a challenge to the hegemonic 
domination  and its legitimacy  within the cultural, economic, ideological  and political frame (Schwarzmantel 2009).   
3 The idea that the ethnic differentiation among Turkish migrants was created by European countries was a common idea by Turkish 
participants in Berlin, Stockholm and London 
4 Kromsey  claims the mixture of languages as  ‘speech disorders’ 
5 According to Andrews  there are more than 40 ethnic groups in the Turkish Republic (Andrews, P. A. 1989. Ethnic Groups in the 
Republic of Turkey, Wiesbaden, Benninghaus, Rüdiger.) 
6 While some Kurds supported Mustafa Kemal, others in the Kocgiri uprising in 1920 revolted against his movement and organised an 
insurrection. 
7 Law for the Maintenance of Order (Takrir-i Sükun Kanunu), promulgated on 4 March 1925. By virtue of this Act, martial law was declared 
which granted the Government broad powers to ban all kinds of organisations, propaganda and publications that could lead to a reaction 
and rebellion against Turkish public order and security. 
8 Kemalism refers to the principles of the founder of the Turkish republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk who defines the official Turkish state 
ideology as  consisting of 6  pillars:Republicanism, Populism, Secularism, Revolutionism, Nationalism, Statism. Kemalism has outlawed 
three ideologies in the Turkish political and cultural sphere: Komünizm (Communism) ve Kürtçülük Kurdism (Kurdish nationalism) and 
Islamcilik (Islamism/political Islam) 
9 The Eastern Revolutionary Cultural Hearths (Turkish: Devrimci Doğu Kültür Dernekleri,DDKO, Kurdish: Civîngehên Çandî yên Şoreşgerê 
Rojhilat) in 1969, Partîya Sosyalîsta Kurdistan (PSK) in 1974. Later on National Liberation of Kurdistan (KUK), Kawa, Rizgari etc. were 
formed 
10 The PKK  started out as a Marxist Leninist party with some instances of Stalinist tactics. Thus, Kurdish political opponents were fought 
with cruel violence (van Bruinessen, 1999).  ManyKurdish political opponents of the PKK live in Sweden. Therefore the PKK could not find 
many Kurdish supporters in Sweden compared to Germany and the UK (see chapter 4 and 6). 
11 The 2 million figure is an estimate made by the U.S. State Department. See Turkey: Human Rights Report, 1996 (Washington, D.C.: 
U.S. State Department, 1996).HADEP, in a report it prepared for the 1996 HABITAT II Conference, stated that over the last four years 
some 3 million people had been made homeless as 3,000 villages and hamlets had been burnt down or evacuated, Cumhuriyet, June 20, 
1996). The government claimed that by the end of 1994, 988 villages and 1,676 hamlets had been destroyed, resulting in an outflow of 
311,000 residents (Milliyet, July 28, 1995). 
12 The People's Labour Party (Turkish: Halkın Emek Partisi, HEP 1990-1993),  the Democracy Party (Turkish: Demokrasi Partisi, DEP 
1993-1994), the Freedom and Democracy Party [ÖZDEP] the People’s Democracy Party (Turkish: Halkın Demokrasi Partisi, HADEP 
1994-2003),  the Democratic People's Party (Turkish: Demokratik Halk Partisi, DEHAP), the Democratic Society Party (Turkish: 
Demokratik Toplum Partisi, DTP 2005-2009) These parties have been shut down one after the other by the constitutional court on the 
grounds of separatism and supporting the Kurdistan Workers Party (Marcus,  2007; Valentine 2007) The recently banned DTP was 
replaced with th Peace and Democracy Party (BDP). In addition left-oriented and critical, PKK opponent, pro-Kurdish parties have been 
banned from politics including the  Democracy and Change Party (Turkish:Democrasi ve Degisim Partisi DDP 1994 -1995),  Democracy 
and Peace (Turkish: Demokrasi ve Baris Partisi DBP 1996-2003), replaced with the Rights and Freedom Party (Turkish: Hak ve 
Özgürlükler Partisi Hak)-Par, the first liberal pro-Kurdish  Democratic Mass Party (Turkish: Demokratik Kitle Partisi DKP 1997-1999) 
replaced the Democratic Participation Party (Turkish:Katılımcı Demokrasi Partisi, KDP). 
13 See PKK Fifth Congress programme 
14 Today the Turkish mainstream media is a tool for the interest of multi-sectoral groups like Dogan Group. “Operating in newspapar, 
magazine, book, radio and television publishing, production, print, digital media, distribution, retailing and alternative telecom segments, 
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DYH is the pioneer, innovative, steering power of the Turkish media” (Dogan Group, 2009). The Dogan Group has 9 daily newspapars, 7 
TV Channels,  49 Digital TV, 4 radio stations, 4 magazines, distribution and retailing company etc).. 
15 Up to 2003 especially the distribution of Kurdish newspapars to Kurdish areas was prevented by the state of emergency regulations. 
16 According to the 2001 Census, there are around 53,000 people in the UK, born in Turkey. The Turkish Consulate estimates the number 
of Turkish nationals living in the UK at 150,00016. The Kurdish community which acts as an embassy for the Kurds estimates the Kurdish 
population from “Northern Kurdistan” living in the UK at around 200,000 Holgate, J., Pollert, A. & Keles, J. 2009b. The influence of identity, 
‘community’ and social networks on how workers access support for work-based problems, Paper presented at the International Labour 
Process Conference, Edinburgh, Scotland, 6-8 April 2009,  including undocumented Kurdish migrants Bloch, A., Sigona, N. & Zetter, R. 
2009. ’No Right to Dream’: The social and economic lives of young undocumented migrants in Britain. London: Paul Hamlyn Foundation., 
students, au pairs and the Kurds from Cyprus. 
17 TGFRA is in state service in different European countries which aims to preserve Turkish culture and religious identity and the 
European countries have opened their doors to this organisation to regulate religious issues amongst migrants and protect them from 
Muslim extremists. However they have created a strong sense of identification with homeland and its nationalistic discourse and represent 
only Muslim migrants but not those of Elewî beliefs. Organised worldwide, TGFRA has played an important role in lobbying on behalf of the 
Turkish state in religious dialogue  and propaganda amongst migrants in recent years.  It is worth noting that TGFRA magazine17 counts 
different  Muslim ethnic groups in Germany, Sweden and other European countries and also states that the religious authorities serve all 
citizens without any ethnic, religious and political discrimination (Yigit, 2008:15) but the religious authorities aim to serve “our citizens”(15) 
in relation to “the unity of state- Nation-religion” (15). Therefore  “in recent years different games have been contrived for  countries aiming 
to separate our nation.  It is incumbent on us, Muslims as indicated in the Koran to stand up against these games”(Hakan Öztürk, 2008 
issue, 105, 23). It is interesting enough to mention that many Kurdish participants interviewed stated that since the Turkish state had 
started to establish some religious and Turkish nationalistic Masjid  (a Muslim place of worship) or mosques since 1990,  “the relation 
between Kurds and Turks has been getting worse because “ they are Turkish state civil servants who work in synch with the Turkish 
Embassy and the sermon (which is delivered at the noon prayer on Fridays and on certain other occasions) at these mosques and  Masjid 
target us”(Interview with Karzan, Stockholm, 07 June 2007).  (Avrupada Diyanet 2008. Immigration to Sweden. Avrupada Diyanet, Turkish 
General Directorate for Religious Affairs, 108.) 
18 The Swedish and UK institutions have encouraged the local migrant communities, with generous financial help, to set up their 
organisation and participate in the political and economic life of the country of settlement. These organisations have an important role in 
participation in domestic socio-political life  e.g. the London Kurdish community organizations run campaigns and hold dinners  in support 
of the Labour or Conservative candidates for the 2010 general election in order to get their support after the election for immigrant issues 
and issues related to their  homeland. However the German authorities tend to exclude the migrant communities from public participation 
(Østergaard-Nielsen 2001) and have excluded migrant communities from public life. This policy has been reviewed in recent years owing 
to the significant increase in the number of  migrants who have obtained German citizenship which plays an important role in shaping 
German political life. Germany has seen the Kurdish transnational organisations close to the PKK as counterproductive  for its integration 
policies. 
19 The political transnational network and the political transnational practices operate in-between, ‘here’ (the settlement country) and 
‘there’ (the homeland) . In some cases, the actors in these networks are more influential than the long-established political parties and 
politicians. For example, the UK Foreign Office has not given an appointment to Leyla Zana to whom the EU awarded  the Sakharov Prize 
for Freedom of Thought in 1995 and who has twice been nominated for the Nobel Peace prize. In contrast to this, the Foreign Minister, 
David Miliband took time to meet Kurdish community leaders of London. The Kurdish community leader highlighted the urgency of the 
political solution of Turkey's Kurdish question during their meeting.   
20 Dogan group is in cooperation with German conservative Alex Springer media group 
21 TRT broadcasted  programme about The Armenian issue and Terror on 25 April 2005  
22 First-generation refers to migrants who have left one country to settle in another country and spent their childhood and youth in their 
homeland 
23 Kürtçüluk, which in Turkey was usually used pejoratively by Turkish officials and some right-wing activists for Kurdishness 
24 Genocidal massacre describes ‘shorter, limited episodes of killing directed at a specific local or regional community’ (Kiernan 2007:14) 
25 http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=6106399&tarih=2007-03-12 
26 Being from Kurdistan. 
27 As an aside I argue that this event sheds critical light on Anderson’s claim that a unified print language is central to creating nationalism, 
for Kurds orality has been important in establishing a national consciousness. Wogan (2001:404) also argues that orality plays an 
important role in establishing an imagined community as it is infused with emotion.  
28 The Armenien minority has been contronted with racist media coverage which intented to describe Kurdish movement over racist term 
referring to Armenien mignority 
29 The Byzantine empire called Diyarbakir, Amida and the Kurds, Amed. 
30 http://www.yeniozgurpolitika.org/?bolum=haber&hid=29511 
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32 Amed is the Kurdish name of the unofficial capital city of the Kurdish region and in Turkish: Diyarbakir. 
33. While the Turkish ultra-nationalist journalist, Emin Colasan writes about ‘so our Diyarbakir!’ the DTP  
 sympathizers in Diyarbakir shout out "Hey Turko, go home, Amed is not yours," after the DTP success in  
 the local election in Diyarbakir. See http://www.Hürriyet .com.tr/english/domestic/11326137.asp?scr=1 
34. The number of Turkish candidates in the French election increased despite the pressure to recognise the genocide [Armenian 
Genocide]. http://www.Zaman.com.tr/haber.do?haberno=662160 
Berlin’s election and the Turks http://www.Radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=198819 
Moreland’s Obama Turkish candidate http://www.Hürriyet .com.tr/dunya/10166963.asp 
35. The success of Kurds in Bremen http://www.yeniozgurpolitika.org/?bolum=haber&hid=17103, 
The preference of the Kurds was clear http://www.yeniozgurpolitika.com/?bolum=haber&hid=51637 
36. http://www.yeniozgurpolitika.org/?bolum=haber&hid=17103 
